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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: cnyndwllr who wrote (156394)1/16/2005 8:17:54 AM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Now maybe you, Carl, somehow, knew that Bush and his cronies were going to drastically over reach

Nah, don't you remember? Carl KNEW that there wasn't going to be any war, Bush was going to back down. I lost count of how many times he predicted it.



To: cnyndwllr who wrote (156394)1/17/2005 5:29:23 AM
From: Bilow  Respond to of 281500
 
Hi cnyndwllr; Re: "To make matters even more puzzling you had theories about why they'd figure things out for the second term and yet you continue to ridicule their competence and intellect based on the quality of their post-reelection decisions-accurate criticisms in my view."

My comment has consistently been that when the American public decides it is time to get out of Iraq, the Republican party will soon follow. Bush went in, at least partly, because it was great politics. When it's great politics to get out, he'll get out. All I'm doing here is noting that Karl Rove is not in a position to change how the public thinks about the war so much as he is in a position to change how President Bush does.

Re: "The more subtle question of whether we would ultimately be "defeated" was more difficult to answer during the time frame you selected. As you know, it is impossible to know whether you are "defeated" until you know what the object of the endeavor is. I was unsure initially whether we would declare victory, soon leave the mess to the Iraqis, and leave the threat of our further aggression... "

Yes, I considered that case also. That there would be a new Iraqi government immediately after an invasion, would only be reasonable if we'd actually got Saddam at that time. But under that assumption, even if there were a fully elective government there, the new government would still be an enemy of us (and Israel).

Re: "On the other hand, I'd have had a definite opinion that we'd be defeated if I'd known that we were going to declare that AMERICA was going to ... I'd have had a definite opinion that we'd be "defeated" if I'd known that because, hey, I'm NOT as stupid as Bush."

Bush's plan was to have the US out of Iraq by late summer. All through the first six months of the war units were getting their tours extended. It was not the plan of the administration to stay in Iraq, which is why they didn't have a plan to stay there. They didn't think it would be needed because they didn't think that we'd have any need to stay any longer than we stayed in Kuwait. They were reasoning by (bad) analogy.

Re: "You'll note that I strongly opposed the invasion and that in the days following the "victory" when there was so much "celebrating" in this country I was not celebrating and I was voicing concerns that we were on the edge of a disastrous, mistaken policy that would lead us to this point."

Like I linked in the other day, articles about the nascent guerilla war were showing up in the early days of the war.

Re: "Now maybe you, Carl, somehow, knew that Bush and his cronies were going to drastically over reach and, for good measure, make the gang that couldn't shoot straight look like James Bond in comparison, but the rest of us thoughtful watchers had to wait a little longer."

This is my whole point. My comments to the effect that there would be a guerilla war was only under the assumption that there would be a reasonably long lived occupation. I didn't know for sure that this would happen either. But I knew that if there were no such long occupation, then our effect on Iraq's government would be negligible.

The reason I knew this, which is the fundamental source of the neocon's error, is that (a) Saddam was not as unpopular a figure in Iraq as commonly believed in the US (while he was in power), and (b) that the effect of a war would be to increase Saddam's popularity.

These are effects that were simply not present in Kuwait, and were unappreciated by the neocons. The whole neocon plan boiled down to an expectation that we would be met with parades and flowers. I knew that this wasn't going to happen, and therefore that there would either be no significant change in the diplomatic position of Iraq against the US, or, alternatively, there would be a long guerilla war and then no significant change in the diplomatic position of Iraq against the US.

But if you go back and read what I wrote back then, it was that (a) if our troops stayed in Iraq they would be considered an occupying force, and therefore be shot at by the Iraqis, and (b) there wasn't a damned thing we could do about it. I don't think I ever stated that an invasion would automatically create a guerilla war, just that trying to stay there would.

Re: "... but how did you "know" before the beginning of the occupation that Bush would put our troops, our nation's credibility and our treasure on the table in a sucker bet that America could remake Iraq through force of arms?"

Hey, it was early 2003 before I reconciled myself to the unhappy realization that Bush wasn't bluffing. I was so certain that a war would be an error, that I was one of the last to see it coming. In retrospect, I was operating under the assumption that Bush's administration would let (the majority of) their experts guide them away from disaster, but as often happens, they over ruled the experts.

Re: "... sucker bet ..." I'm sure it's satisfying to insult the majority of the American public (who thought that Bush's attack was a great idea for a number of fantastic reasons), but perhaps the Democrats will consider the possibility that constantly harping on the fact that 75% of the American public are idiots doesn't mean that the idiots will begin voting Democratic. Another little known fact of human nature: calling someone an idiot rarely changes their mind about anything. (It is, however, quite satisfying.)

-- Carl



To: cnyndwllr who wrote (156394)1/29/2005 12:42:21 AM
From: Bilow  Respond to of 281500
 
Hi cnyndwllr; You might wish to read famous military expert John Keegan's latest take on the war in Iraq:

The ballot, not the bullet, will see off Iraq's religious terrorists
John Keegan, The Telegraph, January 19, 2005
Those who supported the decision to go to war against Saddam Hussein in March 2003 may not now remember why they did so.

I supported the war and, given the emergence of similar circumstances, would do so again. Saddam's refusal to satisfy the outside powers that he no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) justified the use of force against him.

It is more than likely that the proven existence of WMD in the hands of rogue rulers will require force to be used again. Both America and Israel are clearly contemplating military action against Iran, which scarcely bothers to disguise that it has embarked on the production of weapons-grade uranium and already has missile delivery systems.

Yet it is not so much the spectre of WMD that prompted my espousal of the war two years ago but the likely outcome of the war itself. In the teeth of those who warned of hard fighting and heavy casualties, of a Stalingrad-on-Tigris, I took the view that the war would be won quickly and cheaply at little cost in lives to either side.

As things turned out, those who made that judgment were proved right. Iraq's armed forces were demolished and Saddam's regime overthrown, at a cost of 150 coalition battle casualties, in a campaign that lasted only three weeks. Regarded solely as a military operation, the Iraq war of 2003 was a scintillating success. It is the aftermath that has sowed doubt among those who supported the decision to risk an attack.

Casualties among the Western forces have risen. Casualties among Iraqis have risen even higher and continue to rise; not, however, for the reasons foreseen by the anti-war party. It is not conventional force or conventional defence tactics that end lives, but something quite different, which may be called large-scale terrorism, largely by car bombing, suicide bombing and the assassination of Iraqis who co-operate with Westerners.

This is not a new development. What is going on in Iraq resembles the second Palestinian intifada, though it is more intensive and better organised. It is also more difficult to counter, since the Western forces lack the detailed intelligence to which the Israeli security forces have access.
...
telegraph.co.uk

Previous wisdom from Keegan, military expert:

The war? That was all over two weeks ago
John Keegan, Telegraph, April 5, 2003
This war is over. The only question now is whether a new provisional government is installed before the BBC and The New York Times have finished running their exhaustive series on What Went Wrong with the Pentagon's Failed War Plan and while The Independent's Saddamite buffoon Robert Fisk is still panting his orgasmic paeans to the impenetrability of Baghdad's defences and huffily insisting there are no Americans at the airport even as the Saddam International signs are being torn down and replaced with Rumsfeld International.
...
telegraph.co.uk

Saddam's utter collapse shows this has not been a real war
John Keegan, April 8, 2003
...
Because the war has taken such a strange form, the media, particularly those at home, may be forgiven for their misinterpretation of how it has progressed. Checks have been described as defeats, minor firefights as major battles. In truth, there has been almost no check to the unimpeded onrush of the coalition, particularly the dramatic American advance to Baghdad; nor have there been any major battles. This has been a collapse, not a war.
...
telegraph.co.uk

Let the infighting begin: British and US rivalry resumes
John Keegan, Telegraph, April 17, 2003
Now that the fighting is over, supporters of our soldiers are beginning to ask how the respective contingents did. The Americans captured Baghdad. Does that mean that the American army is better than the British?
...
telegraph.co.uk

-- Carl



To: cnyndwllr who wrote (156394)1/29/2005 8:38:42 AM
From: GST  Respond to of 281500
 
<On the other hand, I'd have had a definite opinion that we'd be defeated if I'd known that we were going to declare that AMERICA was going to redo Iraqi society and that it was a "generations long" endeavor as stated by Rice at the time, that we weren't leaving until Iraq was a functional, secular democracy that respected and protected the rights of women and minorities, that we would disband every institution with the possible exception of the oil ministry, that in the process of disbanding the army and the police forces we'd cut their pensions and send them home with their weapons, that we'd attempt to step in with our own ignorant ruling authority to micromanage the nation of Iraq, that we'd leave the people without police protection, without jobs, without water, sewer, electricity or security, that we'd react to acts of unrest by shutting down the press, by knocking down doors and hauling away citizens without warrants, trial or hearings, that we'd abuse them in our custody and keep their whereabouts hidden from their loved ones, that we'd step in the way of the clerics and stop them from restoring order, and that we'd attempt to keep order with our language and culture disabled soldiers, many of whom would be scared enough to shoot anything that might be a threat. I'd have had a definite opinion that we'd be "defeated" if I'd known that because, hey, I'm NOT as stupid as Bush.>

A cogent summary of the remarkable list of mistakes in Iraq -- but is the general outline of the approach taken really surprising given the way the war was initiated and given the dominance of ideological hubris that saw the military as the answer and pushed aside those more experienced in nation-building and peace keeping? We have the most lethal force structure ever seen in human history. That force structure will do its job with extraordinary capability. But when it comes to building national and international institutions and keeping the peace, the unbridled and unilateral use of our military capability is more likely to achieve nation-destruction than it is to achieve nation-building.