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To: Janice Shell who wrote (7037)1/24/2005 9:20:42 AM
From: scion  Respond to of 12465
 
PENNY-STOCK PAYDAY

By CHRISTOPHER BYRON

January 24, 2005 -- LAST week we poked through the hodge podge of conflicting information that a North Carolina-based stun-gun company called Law Enforcement Associates Corp. (LEA) has filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission over the last couple of years.

Now, still more information has come to light showing how the company's filings helped hide the role that a North Carolina politician named John H. Carrington played in orchestrating the sale of his family's law-enforcement supply business to a Nevada penny-stock company in December 2001.

Public investors were never informed — by Carrington or anyone else — that at the time of the sale, Carrington himself controlled both sides of the penny-stock deal, making all that followed inherently suspicious, whatever the deal's terms eventually turned out to be.

Until recently, investors in the shares have done well. Law Enforcement Associates' stock price has risen from pennies per share to a peak two weeks ago of $12.70 on market excitement over news that the company would soon be introducing a "non-lethal electric stun gun" for the law-enforcement market. But stun-gun stocks are now falling, with LEA's share price tumbling nearly 46 percent in little more than the last week. The slide has been worsened by LEA's own top brass, who have emerged as big sellers of shares in their own company.

According to federal filings last week, the company's president, Paul Feldman, sold 14 percent of his LEA stock for roughly $800,000 during the preceding workweek, and his boss, Carrington, LEA's controlling shareholder, pocketed a similar amount from stock sales of his own. Neither man returned phone calls for comment about their stock sales or several related matters.

The stock that they sold two weeks ago began its life seven years earlier, in May 1998, with the founding of a Nevada penny stock shell company called Academy Resources, Inc.

With a Canadian stock promoter named Nolan Moss as its one-man board of directors, Academy made at least two failed attempts to merge with private businesses and begin promoting itself as something worthwhile to invest in. Press releases trumpeting these stillborn deals were issued on behalf of Academy by an ex-con Florida sex offender named Orville Baldridge.

FINALLY, in June 2000, Academy Resources announced a merger with a New York outfit called Myofis Inc. Company press releases described Myofis grandly as "a start-up Internet service provider [that] provides dial-up access to the Internet for a flat fee of $14.95 per month from any of its 152 access nodes located in the nation's largest cities."

In fact, the Myofis operation was worthless, and as a subsequent SEC filing eventually showed, Academy Resources acquired it by issuing 21.09 million shares of its own worthless stock, valued at one cent per share, or just $21,093 for the entire business.

By the end of 2000, Academy had written off the entire investment and begun looking for some other private business to take over, which is when the shell company and Carrington found each other.

An SEC filing by the two merged companies more than a year later shows that Carrington, then a member of the North Carolina state senate, became a private investor in Academy Resources in August 2001 — four months before the creation of LEA — via an initial $50,000 cash outlay for which he received back five million shares of Academy stock valued at one cent per share.

But no known SEC filing by the company disclosed that barely six weeks later, on Oct. 16, 2001, Carrington made a second, larger — and, at least so far as the public was concerned, entirely secret — investment in Academy, buying 13.6 million more shares of its stock for $115,000. This stock didn't come from the company itself but, as we now know, from several of Academy's so-called "Myofis" investors.

We'll turn in a minute to how we know this, but for the moment it is enough to say that as late as of last week, even one of Carrington's own hand-picked LEA board members seemed unaware of the fact that Carrington had already secretly acquired control of Academy before merging it with his family business.

That individual is yet another North Carolina politico: State Senate Democratic Leader Anthony Rand, who told The Post last week that Carrington had explained that he, Carrington, hadn't purchased the Myofis shares until after the merger. Be that as it may, the two purchases, when added together, gave Carrington roughly 60 percent of all Academy shares in existence, making him secretly, though indisputably, the company's largest — and controlling — shareholder.

SIX weeks later, on Dec. 3, Academy Re sources issued 25 mil lion shares of its stock to purchase Carrington's family-owned policing equipment business, then changed its name from Academy Resources Inc. to Law Enforcement Associates Corp. Next, the company ordered a one-for-three reverse stock split to reduce the total shares outstanding from 56 million to fewer than 19 million, thereby making them three times more appealing to investors on their scarcity value alone.

Then the company began issuing stock-hyping press releases about LEA's bright new future in the post 9/11 world. Several of these releases were signed by a New York-based stock promoter named Guy Cohen, who had been the Myofis group's eyes and ears with a seat on Academy's one-man board of directors.

Cohen soon moved on from LEA to promote other penny stock deals, operating out of a swanky office on Park Avenue. In fact, the office in question turns out to be a mail drop and message center that was raided last December by state investigators seeking evidence against a ring of Caribbean scamsters who had been using the place as a mail drop for an investment swindle that preyed upon immigrants.

As for LEA, it took seven more months before the combined company filed any SEC documents purporting to describe what had actually happened in the merger with Academy Resources. And when it finally did so — in July 2002, by way of a so-called 10SB "registration statement" — the company adjusted most, but not all, of the stock-related calculations in the filing to reflect "post-split" instead of "pre-split" share totals, making it almost impossible for outside investors to figure out what went on.

Worse still, when Carrington finally filed his own papers with the SEC, on Sept. 11, 2002, to show the number of LEA shares he actually held and how he had acquired them, he gave Aug. 29, 2002 — and not Aug. 29, 2001 — as the date when he purchased the 5 million shares from Academy directly.

And when it came to the 13.6 million shares that he acquired on Oct. 16, 2001, from the Myofis group, Carrington provided no date at all, saying only that he acquired them from "other shareholders."

Much of this has now come to light from the company's own lawyer, Eric Littman, who is himself currently facing SEC charges for an alleged role in a separate penny-stock swindle. In extensive interviews last week, Littman insisted that his client's SEC filings were accurate, then to prove it, he proceeded to spell out the previously undisclosed details of Carrington's pre-merger stock purchases.

Of such elements is the penny-stock world composed, so what else is there to say but, beware.

cbyron@nypost.com



To: Janice Shell who wrote (7037)1/26/2005 9:03:23 AM
From: scion  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 12465
 
SEC SUES GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. FOR IPO VIOLATIONS; GOLDMAN SACHS WILL PAY $40 MILLION

Litigation Release No. 19051 / January 25, 2005

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. GOLDMAN SACHS & CO, 05 CV 853 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y.)

SEC SUES GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. FOR IPO VIOLATIONS; GOLDMAN SACHS WILL PAY $40 MILLION
The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Goldman Sachs & Co. with violating the securities law in its allocation of shares in initial public offerings (IPOs) in 1999 and 2000, by inducing or attempting to induce certain customers to purchase shares in the aftermarket. Goldman Sachs has agreed to a settlement in which it will pay a $40 million penalty and be enjoined from future violations of the applicable laws. The settlement is subject to court approval.

In connection with this matter, the Commission today filed a Complaint against Goldman Sachs in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that Goldman Sachs violated Rule 101 of Regulation M under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by unlawfully attempting to induce, or inducing, certain customers to purchase stock in the aftermarket of certain IPOs underwritten by Goldman Sachs during 1999 and 2000. The Commission's Complaint alleges as follows:

Rule 101 of Regulation M, among other things, prohibits underwriters, during a restricted period (the five-day period preceding the determinations of IPO prices and prior to the completion of distributions of IPO shares), from directly or indirectly bidding for, purchasing, or attempting to induce any person to bid for or purchase any offered security in the aftermarket. As a prophylactic rule, Regulation M's prohibition is designed to prevent activities that could artificially influence the market for the offered security, including, for example, supporting the IPO price by creating a perception of scarcity of IPO stock or creating the perception of aftermarket demand for the stock. Regulation M may be violated with or without, among other things, any impact on the price of a security, scienter, or any agreement to buy stock in the aftermarket.

During restricted periods, Goldman Sachs attempted to induce, or induced, certain customers to make aftermarket purchases of IPO stock in violation of Rule 101 of Regulation M by engaging in the following activities:

Goldman Sachs communicated to certain customers that Goldman Sachs considered purchases in the immediate aftermarket to be significant in the determination of IPO allocations. Goldman Sachs also informed certain customers that Goldman Sachs verified whether customers placed orders to purchase stock in the immediate aftermarket following an IPO. For instance, Goldman Sachs showed one customer an "Underwriting Aftermarket Report" that reflected, among other things, the customer's previous aftermarket purchases on IPOs underwritten by Goldman Sachs. Similarly, one customer sent an email to portfolio managers at her company relaying the information she had received from Goldman:

Goldman Sachs . . . has told me that for now, all their small techy deals will be subject to close scrutiny with regard to flippers. AMO's [aftermarket orders] will be watched for follow-thru on indicated intentions. . . .

During conversations or courses of dealing that included the preceding subjects, Goldman Sachs sales representatives asked certain customers during restricted periods whether, and at what prices and in what quantities, they intended to place orders to purchase IPO stock in the immediate aftermarket.

Goldman Sachs encouraged certain customers that had provided "aftermarket interest" (expressions of interest in buying shares in the aftermarket) to increase the prices they said that they would pay in the aftermarket. Some customers responded by expressing higher prices than they were originally willing to pay in the immediate aftermarket, in part, because they believed from their communications with Goldman Sachs sales representatives that this would improve their chances of receiving favorable allocations of IPO stock.

Goldman Sachs sought and/or accepted aftermarket interest from customers based solely or in relevant part on the amount of their prospective allocations. For example, a Goldman Sachs sales representative often suggested to one customer that he indicate that he would buy two to three times his allocation in the immediate aftermarket and did so on the CoSine IPO. The day before CoSine opened for trading, the sales representative sent an email to his ECM liaison informing him that the customer "will buy between 2-3x their allocation in the after market."

Through such questions and statements about aftermarket orders during restricted periods, Goldman Sachs communicated to certain customers hopeful of obtaining IPO allocations (including customers that did not have a genuine interest in long-term ownership of the stock being offered) that indications of intentions to place orders in the immediate aftermarket, and/or the aftermarket orders themselves, would increase their likelihood of receiving favorable allocations of IPO stock. As a result of Goldman Sachs's communications concerning aftermarket orders, and because some customers wanted to obtain IPO allocations that they reasonably believed they could "flip" for large profits, certain customers indicated intentions to place orders and/or placed orders to purchase IPO stock in the immediate aftermarket of certain offerings. Goldman Sachs engaged in a combination of some or all of the foregoing types of communications to certain customers in connection with the IPOs of CoSine, Marvell, and WebEx, Inc.

Goldman Sachs has agreed to settle the Commission's action and has consented, without admitting or denying the allegations of the Complaint, to the entry of a final judgment that: (1) permanently enjoins Goldman Sachs from violating Rule 101 of Regulation M under the Exchange Act; and (2) orders a civil penalty of $40 million pursuant to Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act.

SEC Complaint in this matter

sec.gov



To: Janice Shell who wrote (7037)1/26/2005 9:06:13 AM
From: scion  Respond to of 12465
 
Morgan Stanley also violated Rule 101 of Regulation M in the Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia IPO by soliciting a 350,000 share aftermarket order from a customer before all the IPO shares had been distributed. On the morning of the Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia IPO, and before Morgan Stanley had announced that syndicate had broken, Morgan Stanley called a customer and told it that Morgan Stanley was concerned because there were no aftermarket orders on Morgan Stanley's trading desk. Morgan Stanley then asked the customer to place an aftermarket order. The customer agreed to Morgan Stanley's request and placed an aftermarket order for 350,000 shares in the period before syndicate broke. Morgan Stanley executed the order later in the day after trading began. The customer sold all of its IPO shares and the shares it had bought in the aftermarket that same day.

SEC Complaint in this matter

sec.gov