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The New Wave
By Collin May
24 January, 2005
The Asian Tsunami and the Winds of International Change
Collin May writes for EURSOC
Aside from being a massive humanitarian tragedy, the Asian tsunami, perhaps better than any other recent event, demonstrates the new historical context of international relations. Even from an American standpoint, Iraq, however things turn out there, will be less important than developments in the Asian-Pacific theatre.
To demonstrate this, we can look at three reactions to the disaster, occurring within days of the event. The first was the now notorious comment by Jan Egeland, responsible for coordinating United Nations humanitarian efforts, to the effect that the developed world was “stingy.” Whatever his intention by making these remarks, they certainly reflect the old UN's heavily bureaucratic attitude which assumes that the UN alone, as a pseudo-government, can deal with “global problems.” And of course, in the UN’s eyes, every problem requires a “global” response.
Egeland’s comment also reflects a certain European view that contends that the state, and in this case a universal state, should be responsible for the welfare of humanity. Not surprisingly, this view is not shared by the United States, which looks far more to private and community-based actions to resolve social problems. Given this context, Egeland’s complaint was seen as most directly attacking the United States. And if you’ve worked in the UN/NGO community you’d know that this sort of assumption would not be wholly off the mark.
This leads us to the second event. While American diplomats derided Egeland’s slip of the tongue, the US engaged in an activity that said far more than any words could regarding the new international order. Without any concern for the UN, the US proceeded to set up a core group of nations to deal with the disaster. Partners in the group were Australia, Japan and India. It is this alliance that will matter most to the US in the future. The four big Pacific democracies, three with strong Anglo-Saxon histories, will most likely develop into the central alliance of the twenty-first century.
Before moving on to the third event, I want to elaborate this idea of the big four. From the American perspective, Europe is largely pacified and in demographic decline. The Asian theatre by contrast is in flux in terms of its political, economic and social future, and central to this flux is the growing importance of China and India. China, often touted as the next big economic super-power, certainly could present a problem to the United States. However, the Chinese threat can be overstated. China is actually a regional power, unlike the US which is a, if not the, global power. Additionally, despite its impressive economic growth of late, China continues to be a nation with extensive poverty and will have a long way to go before it catches the economic might of the United States. Here again, China’s less than impressive response to the tsunami shows how limited this nation still is.
Beyond these considerations there are the political ones. China remains a dictatorship with a highly centralized authority. Now, this fact isn’t simply a function of the continuing communist regime. China has tended to strong central authority on the imperial model for centuries. This is unlikely to change, and though it can be drawn upon to fuel impressive economic growth, it can also hinder entrepreneurial innovation. Moreover, China remains unable to solve the Taiwan problem. A nation that is unable to control what it considers its own territory still has some work to do before it can rival America. And finally, China knows that a no-holds-barred approach to challenging the US would also mean a loss of access to lucrative American markets. To date, China is in no position to continue its economic miracle without that access.
For its part, the US isn’t simply waiting for China to dominate the Asian region either. In fact, the big four alliance of Japan, India, Australia and the US is precisely contrived to surround and hem in China, and here special light has to be thrown on the Indian case. During the Cold War, India was a key player in the non-aligned movement. Today, the world’s largest democracy is a key American ally, both politically and economically. Out-sourcing of American jobs to India is no mere financial operation, but part of a political move intended to secure Indian friendship. And from India’s perspective, facing the Chinese on their northern border, the sub-continent is more than happy to reciprocate. Supplemented by Japan (which after the US is the second largest individual donor to international humanitarian organizations) and Australia (a regional power that has long been a reliable American ally), the Indian-American alliance could well be the most significant international alliance to emerge in the twenty-first century.
There is, of course, another key factor to consider here – the Anglo-Saxon angle. The United States, Australia and India are all countries with a strong Anglo-Saxon heritage, further adding to their status as natural allies. Along with Britain, Australia was the Americans’ staunchest ally in the Iraq war, and, unlike Spain, we see that this alliance did nothing to harm the electoral success of Australia’s ruling pro-American government. From time to time, the notion of the Anglo-Saxon bond has been floated as a basis for a global alliance, and of course this alliance did figure prominently in World War II which, along with Russia, was largely fought by Americans and members of the British Commonwealth.
That this alliance seems to be coming to the fore is not lost on its most vehement critic: the French. France has long derided the dominance of les Anglo-Saxons in the world, though this dominance largely came about through deft interventions on the part of the British during attempts by France to dominate its continental neighbors. In response to the Anglo-Saxon alliance, France has once again attempted to dominate Europe through the EU while interfering with American foreign policy goals when strategically possible. Chief among such actions is the effort by the French to curry favor with the Chinese dictatorship, as well as with left-leaning Latin American nations, most notably Brazil. The problem with this traditional French strategy is that it leaves the pays des droits de l’homme in league with the world’s most reprehensible regimes. On the other hand, the strategy does pay off somewhat with nations like Brazil, but unfortunately for France it’s a strategy that requires more resources than France is able to muster.
In the European theatre alone, France is constantly forced to attempt to dominate the rest of the continent in order to gain its objectives, while Britain has been content to use well-timed alliances to achieve its goals, withdrawing from the continent when balance has once again been secured. Because France lacks the political and economic might to enforce its will it often is left to arrogant posturing, as was the case when it told the East Europeans that they had missed a good opportunity to shut up during the lead-up to the Iraq war. In this regard, the expansion of the EU is a disaster for France, as each new member dilutes French dominance.
On the other hand, I’m not convinced that the former Soviet-bloc countries will always remain fast American friends. I suspect that they will become increasingly integrated into the European miasma of pacified indifference. Still, it is this very indifference, combined with economic stagnation, falling birth rates and poorly educated and often hostile immigrants that will prevent Europe from ever challenging the dominance of the US. Europe’s social model, so beloved of UN bureaucrats, is fast becoming the albatross around the continent’s, and especially France and Germany’s necks.
Another result of the big four alliance is that Europe is left to deal with the less economically progressive regions of the world: the Middle East, Africa and, to some extent, Latin America. It is only in these regions that countries like France can find real allies against the US, and in these regions, there isn’t much to work with. Still, there is once again a difference between France on the one hand and America’s British ally on the other. And there’s no better demonstration of this fact than Africa. When Britain intervened in Sierra Leone to separate rebels and government forces in 2000, it was at the request of the Sierra Leone government. The operation was a great success for Britain, demonstrating both its independent ability to project force and its facility with so-called “soft power.” By contrast, France’s intervention in the Ivory Coast has been something of a failure. It incited the government and it highlighted France’s lack of military might. And, as an aside, I would also note that many in the French military were none too pleased with the failure of France to go to war in Iraq as this only meant that French military technology would fall further behind that of the Americans and the British.
It should also be mentioned that both the situation in Sierra Leone and the response to the recent tsunami have demonstrated that “soft power” in the form of economic aid often requires hard power in order to make it effective. The British, who are also busy forgiving the debts of many a nation, could only secure Sierra Leone with military might. Similarly, it was American military technology that allowed a relatively swift response to the tsunami disaster. The same cannot be said for a nation like Canada where a badly neglected military lacks sufficient resources to move rapidly into place.
My point then is rather simple: there does seem to be a significant alliance forming that will see the US work closely in the Asia-Pacific theatre with three powerful democracies intent on keeping China under wraps while enhancing the prospects for an historically Anglo-Saxon form of democracy. China will attempt to counter this alliance, but only insofar as its own economic relationship with the US is not compromised. It will also seek to work with European nations such as France to build a contrary force to the big four alliance, but given China’s continued and obvious weakness in key areas, along with Europe’s declining economic and military presence, such an alliance will be unable to disturb the Anglo-Saxon alliance in any substantial way. The Russians, increasingly weakened and isolated, will probably move between the two main alliances seeking whatever advantage they can find. But Russia is in reality turning into something of a disgruntled bit player, a fact demonstrated by its complete inability to influence the ultimate outcome in the Ukranian presidential elections. Other areas of the world, such as the Muslim Middle East are more likely to side with Europe, which they both love and hate. However, given the disastrous political state of most larger Muslim nations, it’s unlikely these will be able to sustain any long-term foreign projection of influence. They may be able to obtain nuclear technology, but it’s not at all clear that they will be able to use this technology to any long-term effect. In this, they do little more than reflect the political immaturity of their regimes. Still, Europe will try to build alliances with nations in this region, especially Iran. Brazil and other Latin American countries could side increasingly with Europe, or form their own trade zone based on the EU model, but the region will still rely heavily on American money and trade. Furthermore, despite the Latin American love-hate relationship with the US, the increasing number of Hispanics in American culture could serve to drive the two closer together - though this is uncertain given the penchant for corruption in the Latin American political class.
My own nation of Canada will likely do little to nothing of importance as a nation, but may see regional economic alliances formed, especially between Asia on the one hand and the provinces of Alberta and British Columbia on the other.
And this brings me to the third event at long last. Actually, the event concerns responses to the formation of the core group of nations, or the big four as I like to call them. Clare Short, the former British Development Minister, thought that the group was intended solely to destroy the UN. In her excitement to attack the US, as she is wont to do, she missed the actual strategic point made by the core group. In part, Ms. Short was correct, but she went too far in her extreme analysis. The US did not want to destroy the UN, only to give notice that the old overly bureaucratic, inflexible anti-American pattern of UN dealing would no longer suit the dominant alliance that the US was forming in the Asian-Pacific theatre. And, given the fact that the UN was concurrently mired in the oil-for-food scandal, it was a message that the UN heard.
Indeed, Kofi Annan got rid of his chief assistant in an effort to show that he was getting the message. The United Nations, which has long been a forum for anti-American, as well as anti-Israeli rhetoric, was being told to shape up or it would simply become as irrelevant in humanitarian affairs as it was in military ones. Apparently this is a message that was communicated to Annan by some high-profile friends of the UN, who have been warning him that the UN without American goodwill is nothing, and that the UN had better make some changes to get that good will back. So even this organization, one the French thought they might be able to use against the US during the Iraq war, was now finding itself having to adapt to the new realities of international affairs.
And, as if to reinforce the point that the formation of the core group was intended more as a political lesson than an actual working proposal on the aid front, the group quickly turned over authority for the humanitarian operation to a now chastened United Nations when international donors met in Jakarta. It is unlikely that comments about the “stingy” developed world will be heard again soon. But look for the core group, the big four alliance, with its strong British heritage, to pop up again, as it will most likely be the key political alliance of this century, presenting a sharp contrast to the European approach to democracy.
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