Since you asked about Fan Gang, Mish, here is an old article written by him (dated in Aug. 2002) on the high amount of bad debt in China. He made a valid point, and still relevant until today.
============== (All data in the following were as of Aug. 2002) When talking about the financial problem of China, there are usually two issues: one is bad debt of China's banks, and the other is Chinese government debt. The international economists usually separate the two issues. This maybe is true in other economy, but in China, these two issues should be considered together.
According to the latest data, bad debt owned by China's state banks accounts for about 26-27% of China's GDP. If adding up the 140 billion Yuan which has already switched under the debt Management Company, and minus the amount sold already (10 billion Yuan), the total bad debt will account for about 40% of China's GDP. As a result, China's bad debt can be ranked as the highest in the world. Everyone is talking about the bad debt problem in Japanese banks, but that is only between 6% and 11%.
What is interesting is that why the state banks of China still operate as usual with such a high proportion of bad debt? And why there is no ordinary Chinese worried about their savings, and still keep deposit their money into the banks? The latest data indicated the total amount of deposit in China has surpassed 8 Trillion Yuan, and Chinese economy still grows at 7-8%, and there is no financial crisis.
As a result, we should look at the financial problem of China from a broader point of view. To some degree, the bad debt in China can be considered as the national debt. Because the state banks have the support of the nation's reputation, as long as the state does no bankrupt, then the banks will not bankrupt. Majority of the debt owed by SOEs. So to certain degree, these debt are essential to keep the SOEs operating. And the state subsidy to the SOEs does not go through the financial means, but go through the state banks. From this aspect, these so-called "bad debt" is actually quasi-national-debt. Thus, to clean up this debt, it also requires the state involved.
On the one hand, China has THE lowest national debt among the world as a nation, only accounting for 6% of its GDP. Even if among the developing countries, which tend to have high national debt, China is among the lowest.
The low national debt but high bank debt in China has contributed to some historical reasons. From mid-1980s, China changed its system for how to finance SOEs, from giving money directly to SOEs to giving loans to SOEs. On the other hand, Chinese gov. adopted a very tight fanatical policy, does sell national debt often. That is why China has a low amount of national debt.
Thus, if considering bad debt of the state banks and the national debt together, China's debt is not that high, even if adding up all the foreign debt.
Looking back countries involved in the Asian currency crisis: short term foreign debt accounted for close to 40% of S. Korea's GDP in 1997, close to 30% of Thailand's GDP. This high amount of debt ratio is a major reason for their currency crisis. By comparison, China has a foreign debt ratio of 15%, and most of it is long term debt bet. gov. and gov. . Short term foreign debt only accounts for 1% of GDP. While vast majority of foreign debt in Asian countries involved in the currency crisis were short term commercial debt.
All the bad debt, gov. debt, and foreign debt of China will eventually have to be returned by the whole nation. The total amount of all three accounts for about 60-70% of China's GDP. If excluding long term foreign debt, the total is about 57-58% of GDP. So this amount is still manageable.
This is exactly why the bad debt in state banks in China has not caused major crisis. And even if there will be a crisis, it will be an internal one, unlike the one in East/Southeast Asian countries, an external one. As for the large amount of bad debt to cause the shrinking of the loan, this is already happening in China. The deflation which has been going on since 1996 in China is the result of it. [My comment, I have never read any Western economist to point out this cause of the deflation in China]
As for the external financial risk, from the economic point of view, China is extremely conservative. The annual trade surplus of China is >$20 billion, and FDI is growing, plus the increase of the total foreign reserve, all these together is more than enough to deal with external financial crisis. Generally speaking, for a developing country like China, it seems unreasonable to keep such a large amount of foreign reserve, but this is for the consideration of a financial insurance for the nation.
This is Not to say the financial system in China is sound and no need to reform, just to make the point that China will not have any financial crisis in short term. And if all the problems remain unsolved, no one can guarantee that China will not have a financial crisis in a long run. The problems exit in banking sector, capital market, financial risk management* So China should keep the pace of reform.
(As of 2002), non-SOEs account for 70% of GDP growth, but can only get 30% of loan. So the difference bet. the two is the 40% of bad debt. So this unreasonable distribution should be changed.
So how to reform the financial sector in China. 1) to strictly control the growth of the bad debt; 2) to keep the economic growth rate and looking to the new sector for the investment; 3) speed up the banking sector reform.
As a matter of fact, it is not that difficult to eliminate the bad debt. If we can control the growth of the bad debt, even if the absolute amount of the bad debt remains the same, and GDP grows at 8% each year, 7 years from now, bad debt ratio (for GDP) will decline by 50%, and 10 years later, bad debt will decline 70%. This reminds us, we should not put emphasis on the bad debt, but should research on how to increase the financial capital, and the flow of the capital. That is the key for the financial reform.
For the original Chinese version: china.org.cn |