SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Strategies & Market Trends : The Epic American Credit and Bond Bubble Laboratory -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 12:23:54 PM
From: ild  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
Through October, according to LoanPerformance, the major metro areas where the number of non-owner occupant loans accounted for 10 percent or more total loan volume were: Las Vegas, 16.1 percent; Sacramento, 14.6 percent; Riverside, Calif., 13.1 percent; San Diego, 12.4 percent; Phoenix, 12.1 percent; Tampa-St. Petersburg, 11.3 percent; and Los Angeles, 10.4 percent.

However, in several smaller markets, where far fewer mortgages are written, the percentage of non-owner occupancy was much greater. In Redding, Calif., for example, 19.5 percent of all loans issued in the first 10 months of last year were to people who admitted on their applications that they would not be residing in the houses.

Other places with extremely high percentages include Medford, Ore., 18.5 percent; Visalia, Calif., 18.2 percent; San Luis Obispo, Calif., 17.8 percent; Merced, Calif., 17.8 percent; Chico, Calif., 17.6 percent; Reno, Nev., 17 percent; and Tallahassee, Fla., 16.5 percent.


chicagotribune.com



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 12:31:15 PM
From: steve from ihub  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
hi russ,
every morning as part of my premarket check that is one of the links i check. i havent really found any conclusive ties to the performance of the stock market. could you elaborate a bit on why you think the low level would lead to a selloff later today?
thanks in advance



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 1:02:21 PM
From: Les H  Respond to of 110194
 
Guess who?

Japan spent a record 35 trillion yen (HK$2.66 trillion) on foreign exchange intervention in the 15 months to last March to slow an appreciation of the yen.

thestandard.com.hk



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 1:05:48 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
Well it appears that the market is excited that the FED might pause.
Then when they only hike a quarter next month, the market will be excited that the FED only hiked a quarter.
Then more bad data will come in and people will think the fed will pause and the market will rally.
The FED will again hike by a quarter and the market will bereathe a sigh of releif once again.

I suppose we should just all go long the DOW as it should be about 800 points higher by June easily with 10 year treasuries at 3.72%

By then of course there will have been 3 more rounds of refinancings, the commercials will be short treasuries and the yield curve will be inverted. All the bears will have long been wiped out in both treasuries and equities, the bond market will revolt on the pause and treasuries will shoot up 100bps in 4 days wiping out FNM who will have reversed at exactly the wrong time. New treasuriey bears will come in near the end of the run and in the housing collapse will get wiped out in the ensuing rally that lasts forever in the face of the world wide depression that should be starting at that point with a 1500 point DOW drop in a week.

This scenario is called global thermo-monetary-war-madness.
The only way to win is to not play (or to wait for 800 more points of DOW rally before thinking of more shorting)

Mish



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 3:35:23 PM
From: ild  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 110194
 
COTs 02/01/05

Commercials covered a lot of shorts in SP500 and Naz mini
cftc.gov



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 3:50:38 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 110194
 
How much of this US$ lift is a result of repatriating foreign dollars at favorable giveaway tax break of 5.25%?

How much will that affect earnings of some companies going forward?

Mish



To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/4/2005 11:03:56 PM
From: orkrious  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 110194
 
what do you think of noland's comments tonight where he thinks the economy and mortgage bubble will be difficult to derail?

prudentbear.com

The Disparate Approaches of Messrs. Trichet and Greenspan:



Bloomberg’s John Berry noted that immediately after yesterday’s announcement from the Fed there was basically no movement in any instrument along the entire yield curve. “Call it, if you will, case of perfect transparency.” The market new exactly what to expect and it was fully discounted. Throughout the marketplace, the Fed’s policy of open transparency and “baby step” adjustments receives universal adoration. It shouldn’t.



Not only do I take exception that “perfect transparency” is a good idea to begin with – in a world of Global Wildcat Finance and endemic speculation - it also occurs to me that the Fed is really being less than forthright with its communications. We now appreciate that Federal Reserve meetings do include discussion of important issues such as asset prices and excessive risk taking, yet official meeting pronouncements offer little more than colorless boilerplate. And in public communications, as was demonstrated again today, our Fed Chairman retains distinction as The Master of Obfuscation.



I much prefer the ECB’s Straight Talk approach to disciplined central banking.



European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet speaking yesterday at the regular ECB news conference: “Further insight into the outlook for price developments in the medium to long-term horizons is provided, as you know, by the monetary analysis. That latest monetary data confirm the strengthening of M3 growth observed since mid-2004. This increasingly reflects the stimulative effect of historically very low level of interest rates in the euro area. As a result of the persistently strong growth in M3 over the past few years, there remains substantially more liquidity in the euro area than is needed to finance non-inflationary economic growth. This could pose risks to price stability over the medium term and warrants vigilance. The very low level of interest rates is also fueling private sector demand for Credit. Growth in loans to non-financial corporations has picked up further in recent months. Moreover, demand for loans for house purchase has continued to be robust, contributing to strong house price dynamics in several euro area countries. The combination of ample liquidity and strong Credit growth could, in some part of the euro area, become a source of unsustainable price increases in property markets.”



That’s the way central bankers are supposed to talk! And from the question and answer session:



Mr. Trichet: “As for house prices…at the level of the full-body of the euro area, we are not alarmed. In some part of the euro area we see phenomenon that are not in our view sustainable and certainly are not necessarily welcome.”



Questioner: “You say you are not alarmed at the asset prices and housing prices”

Mr. Trichet: “At the level of the euro area as a whole!”



Questioner: “In your statement you said the combination of ample liquidity and strong Credit growth could become a source of unsustainable price increases in property markets. What is the function of forward-looking monetary policy? When you have to react – do you react before the Bubble is bursting or after the Bubble has burst?”



Mr. Trichet: “Before the Bubble burst…as you know full well. And it is the reason why I insist on vigilance, permanently. We also insist - even if it has not been noted in the question – on the fact that the monetary analysis calls for vigilance, as I said, because we see dynamism of M3 and dynamism by definition by the counterpart of M3, which means that we – from that standpoint, from that analysis – can see that we could have an overhang of liquidity and even in the short-run this does not necessarily materialize in inflation. In the long-run, we see in our own analysis that – and the reason that we have a monetary analysis – we see that it can materialize in inflation. So I would say we follow this evolution of the monetary aggregates with great care. We see phenomena that have to be monitored very, very clearly. We could see that the explanation we had on the portfolio shifts and then the unwinding of portfolio shifts – which was a convincing element to understand what was happening – doesn’t seem now, in our own analysis, to be convincing to explain the present dynamism of M3. So it is a real, real cause for being vigilant, that’s clear.”



Jean-Claude Trichet, speaking today before the Group of Seven meeting: “Clearly what we have ... is that there is a level of lack of savings which has to be corrected, certainly in the United States and we all agree on that… The industrialized world as a whole is in deficit, that is the current account deficit, and there is no offsetting of the US current account deficit by the other industrialized countries and that of course means that we are asking the rest of the world to finance us. It doesn’t seem to be that it’s acceptable as a sustainable, long-term feature of the present functioning of the global economy.”



Mr. Trichet speaks clearly and cautiously, befitting of the President of what has become the world’s preeminent central bank.



Chairman Greenspan, on the other hand, today gave another intriguing New Age Economics talk in London titled “Current Account.” He garrisons his Pollyannaish and New Paradigm view that “the increased flexibility of the American economy will likely facilitate any adjustment without significant consequences to aggregate economic activity.” I’ll provide a few excerpts, but I encourage readers to go to the Fed’s website and read it in its entirety.



“International trade has been expanding as a share of world gross domestic product since the end of World War II. Yet through 1995, the expansion was essentially a balanced grossing up of cross-border flows. Only in the past decade has expanding trade been associated with the emergence of ever-larger U.S. current account deficits…



A number of factors have recently converged to lessen restraints on cross-border financial flows as well as on trade in goods and services.

The advance of information and communication technology has effectively shrunk the time and distance that separate markets around the world. The vast improvements in these newer technologies have broadened investors’ vision to the point that foreign investment appears less exotic and risky…



Both deregulation and technological innovation have driven the globalization process… The effect of these developments has been to markedly increase the willingness and ability of financial market participants to reach beyond national borders to invest in foreign countries… Implicit in the movement of savings across national borders to fund investment has been the significant increase in the dispersion of national current account balances... The decline in home bias, as economists call the parochial tendency to invest domestic savings at home, has clearly enlarged the capacity of the United States to fund deficits.



Arguably, however, it has been economic characteristics special to the United States that have permitted our current account deficit to be driven ever higher, in an environment of greater international capital mobility. In particular, the dramatic increase in underlying growth of U.S. productivity over the past decade lifted real rates of return on dollar investments. These higher rates, in turn, appeared to be the principal cause of the notable rise in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar in the late 1990s. As the dollar rose, gross operating profit margins of exporters to the United States increased even as trade and current account deficits in the United States widened markedly. But these deficits have continued to grow over the past three years despite a decline in the dollar, whose broadly weighted real index is now much of the way back to its previous low in 1995.

“To understand why the nominal trade deficit--the nominal dollar value of imports minus exports--has widened considerably since 2002, even as the dollar has declined, we must consider several additional factors. First, partly as a legacy of the dollar’s previous strength, the level of imports exceeds that of exports by about 50 percent. Thus exports must grow half again as quickly as imports just to keep the trade deficit from widening--a benchmark that has yet to be met. Second, as is well-documented, the responsiveness of U.S. imports to U.S. income exceeds the responsiveness of U.S. exports to foreign income; this difference leads to a tendency--even if the United States and foreign economies are growing at about the same rate--for the growth of U.S. imports to exceed that of our exports. Third, as of late, the growth of the U.S. economy has exceeded that of our trading partners, further reinforcing the factors leading imports to outstrip exports. Finally, our import bill has expanded significantly as oil prices have risen in recent years.”

“we may be approaching a point, if we are not already there, at which exporters to the United States, should the dollar decline further, would no longer choose to absorb a further reduction in profit margins.”

Besides market pressures, which appear poised to stabilize and over the longer run possibly to decrease the U.S. current account deficit and its attendant financing requirements, some forces in the domestic U.S. economy seem about to head in the same direction. The voice of fiscal restraint, barely audible a year ago, has at least partially regained volume… An increase in household saving should also act to diminish borrowing from abroad. The growth of home mortgage debt has been the major contributor…to the decline in the personal saving rate in the United States from almost 6 percent in 1993 to its current level of 1 percent. The fall in U.S. interest rates since the early 1980s has supported both home price increases and, in recent years, an unprecedented rate of existing home turnover.

All told, home mortgage debt, driven largely by equity extraction, has grown much more rapidly in the past five years than during the previous five years… Interestingly, the change in U.S. home mortgage debt over the past half-century correlates significantly with our current account deficit… over the past two decades, major innovations in the United States have improved the availability and lowered the costs of home mortgages. These developments likely spurred homeowners to tap increasing home equity to finance consumer expenditures beyond home purchase. In contrast, mortgage debt is not so readily available among our trading partners as a vehicle to finance consumption expenditures.”



There is no mystery surrounding the correlation of home mortgage debt and the current account. By its very nature, home mortgage Credit excesses will tend to inflate home values, sales and construction - all the while stimulating consumption. After years of accommodation, such dynamics will ensure a powerful infrastructure dedicated to consumption and asset-based lending – along with the resulting deeply maladjusted economy. Mr. Greenspan is inferring that mortgage Credit can now be expected to slow meaningfully, thus stabilizing and improving the current account deficit. He is a brave man (as opposed to a cautious central banker!) for attempting to call the top of the Great Mortgage Finance Bubble.



And I take strong exception to much of Mr. Greenspan’s analysis. “Restraints on cross-border financial flows” have been “lessened” primarily because of the explosion in global speculative finance and the unparalleled expansion of central bank holdings. And let’s face a little reality here and recognize that these are not the most pristine of market dynamics. The U.S. government and financial sector have greatly inflated the quantity of dollar balances flowing to the rest of the world, and the global financial system has evolved to accommodate these flows. That tends to be the nature of Bubbles.



And I do believe that true economic returns have virtually noting to do with our massive current account deficits. The vast majority of inflows are merely the recycling of excess dollar balances back to U.S. securities markets. And, clearly, the onslaught of finance into the U.S. during the late-nineties was poorly rewarded. The technology Bubble burst, telecom debt collapsed and the boom in direct foreign investment came to a screeching halt. The King Dollar blow-off was then fueled by massive speculative flows (dollar “recycling”) into the U.S. bond market to profit from Greenspan’s widely-telegraphed post-tech Bubble interest rate collapse. Economic returns? No.



“It has been economic characteristics special to the United States that have permitted our current account deficit to be driven ever higher” qualifies as Mr. Greenspan’s most dangerous (“anti-cautious”) reasoning. My hunch is that the so-called “productivity revolution” is more related to the nature of inflating service-sector “output” and an undercounting of the hours actually worked. And if real returns of U.S. investment are so high, why has direct foreign investment remained so low? Why would most of the flows into the U.S. result in Treasuries, agencies, and ABS purchases? Why would foreign central banks be forced into the role of dollar buyers of last resort?



And why use the language “the responsiveness of U.S. imports to U.S. income exceeds the responsiveness of U.S. exports to foreign income.” Of course we consume more of our income than anyone else, and the structure of our economy dictates that a large portion of any additional consumption must come from imports. That’s precisely why we have enormous Current Account Deficits: We consume too much and invest too little in productive capacity. And I do not believe that it is accurate to today claim that our economy is growing more rapidly than our trade partners – this is certainly not the case with Asia or, increasingly, the emerging markets. And, yes, part of the ballooning trade deficit is related to higher fuel prices. And these prices are rising specifically because of unrelenting Credit inflation, U.S. trade deficits, and the weak dollar. There is no way to grow our way out of this dilemma, nor is possible to rectify imbalances through currency devaluation.



The only way to return to some semblance of a balanced current account would be to sharply reduce mortgage debt growth. Mr. Greenspan, presumably, believes that higher interest rates will soon induce this process. Indeed, at 2.5%, we have already reached a level that many not all too long ago forecasted would mark the end of Fed “tightenings.” The Fed may have raised the cost of overnight borrowings 150 basis points, but 10-year Treasury yields are actually a few basis point lower today than they were a year ago. And mortgage rates remain at historically low levels and, not surprisingly, real estate lending remains robust. General Credit availability and marketplace liquidity are as easy as ever. The backdrop is not conducive to restraint, and the Fed has a lot of work to do.



But this is the very nature of Bubbles: they so refuse to succumb easily or quietly. And the bigger they are the more challenging it is to get them to fall – that is without causing one heck of a ruckus. This is why Mr. Trichet is committed to caution and vigilance – why there is a focus on the short, medium and long-term prospects for price stability. As consummate central bankers, Mr. Trichet and the ECB are resolute in their pursuit of comprehensive monetary analysis and forward-looking monetary policy. They don’t have to partake in creative analysis or sophisticated obfuscation. And, importantly, they appreciate the necessity for reacting to Bubble “dynamism” as it develops and not waiting for Bubbles to burst.



Mr. Trichet repeatedly refers to “price stability.” Contemporary finance and economics dictate that this term must be used broadly. One important consequence of globalization is that a price index for a basket of goods (largely produced in Asia) is no longer a good indicator of domestic monetary conditions. Securities markets and asset prices must now be the focus. U.S. Credit inflation clearly manifests foremost into asset inflation and Trade Deficits. And, especially over the past two years, massive Current Account deficits manifest into unprecedented official flows into U.S. Treasuries and agency markets. The securities markets are at the threshold of contemporary Monetary Disorder.



Today was as good a day as any to witness Monetary Disorder and Price Instability at work in the U.S. bond market (ok, equities also). A somewhat weaker-than-expected report on non-farm payrolls incited a huge short-squeeze and derivatives unwind that saw yields lurch lower. The consensus view may be that a slowing economy explains the bond rally, but I remain quite skeptical. It would appear to me that this is one more example of any ebb in the typical ebb and flow of economic activity fostering an exaggerated response from the bond market. There’s too much liquidity at home and abroad.



Ten-year yields are now more than 30 basis points below where they spiked in early December, while mortgage rates are at the lowest level since late last March. There remains a strong inflationary bias in the nation’s housing markets, and I believe there is an unappreciated expansionary bias throughout much of the economy. I cannot at this time buy into the “deflation” story, but instead continue to believe the surprise going forward will be the resiliency of the Mortgage Finance Bubble and the U.S. and global economy overall.



Perhaps I will be proved dead wrong. The U.S. Bubble economy could be weaker than I perceive and the global economy not as sensitive to the extraordinary liquidity backdrop. And, perhaps, the Wild Mortgage Finance Bubble is poised to quietly succumb. But there is just nothing in my analytical war chest that points toward a warm and happy ending to this story. Mortgage rates need to be moving higher, but the distorted marketplace and the global liquidity Bubble are thus far incapable of orchestrating an orderly adjustment. And these artificially low rates will stimulate continued robust demand for mortgage and other borrowings.



Imbalances – most important being the Current Account – will not conform to Mr. Greenspan’s expectations. And a ballooning Current Account equates to further inflationary distortions, including the inflating pool of destabilizing global speculative finance. And, I will suggest, a surge in economic activity would these days catch the bond market especially unprepared. Bubble dynamics have forced the marketplace into a destabilizing squeeze and derivatives unwind that creates only greater vulnerability for a reversal and problematic spike later on. My fear of a 2005 dislocation in the interest-rate markets is being anything but allayed.







To: russwinter who wrote (25851)2/5/2005 9:18:06 AM
From: orkrious  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
Russ, Jennifer Ablan must be a student of yours. It's hard to believe this article was published in Barron's. It's incredibly good.

The one thing I can't reconcile is her forecast for interest rates when other central banks stop trying to weaken their currencies.

online.barrons.com

Handling the Truth
Stagflation leads this iconoclast to both gold and Treasury notes

By JENNIFER ABLAN

An Interview With Stephanie Pomboy -- One read of her MacroMavens commentary and you're liable to be hooked. Stephanie's iconoclastic takes on the big picture are consistently provocative, perceptive, and on the money most of the time, as well as just a great read. Stephanie, who worked with Ed Hyman and Nancy Lazar at ISI Group for 11 years, set up her own shop in 2002, and has attracted an elite list of institutional clients. They've been on the receiving end of some distinctly contrarian calls -- such as her call to buy Treasury bonds in the face of Fed tightening.

She also remains a fan of gold and gold stocks (especially South Africa's), which may be in her genes: The 36-year-old's dad, Richard Pomboy, put forth his bullish views on the metal in Barron's back in the 'Nineties.

With a black belt in Tae Kwon Do, Stephanie Pomboy thinks and goes her own way, which is apparent from our recent conversation.

Barron's: Is this year going to be a replay of '04 for the economy?

Pomboy: I see an environment of stagflation [tepid growth combined with relatively high unemployment and rising prices] with low interest rates. It sounds like an oxymoron to most people and yet I think that's a fairly apt description of what we have already been through over the last year. The surprise in 2005 will be that stagflationary pressures intensify and yet rates remain relatively stable.

Q: Last week, the Fed said again that future hikes likely would be measured.
A: Yes, and while I expect them to call it quits sooner than most, when I speak of stable rates, I'm really thinking of long-dated Treasuries -- the 10-year note and the 30-year.

Q: But bond bull markets are associated with disinflation [a slowdown in the rate at which prices increase], not stagflation.
A: Well, the forces of stagflation are fairly evident. One is that we've got a combination of a dollar bear market, which is obviously fueling higher import prices. At the same time, we have a commodity bull market, which in my view is feeding input price pressures as well. So you have this combination of higher import prices and higher input prices, and very little ability to pass those prices on because consumer-income growth has been so lackluster, notwithstanding the Microsoft dividend payment, of course!

What I look at very closely is wages as a share of income, because increasingly, benefits -- health care in particular -- have become a larger and larger share of income and obviously you can't fill your tank or buy your groceries with your health-care benefits. So actual wage and salary growth have been very muted. In fact, the Employment Cost Index report that was just released had the wage and salary component at a record low for that measure. The result is that wages now account for the smallest share of what is considered "total personal income" in history, at 55%.
[photo]

Q: Go on.
A: The other force I see for stagflation is rooted in monetarist theory. Namely, the fact that the Fed is tightening. By draining liquidity from the pool, the Fed is refusing to accommodate broader inflation pressures. Essentially, it has created an environment in which as one price goes up, something else must go down. Either that or people have to buy less at the higher price...e.g., more inflation and fewer units...a pretty apt description of stagflation.

You're seeing this dynamic play out at the low end. Here, consumers have actually been forced to make budgetary decisions...a foreign concept over the past few years! Just look at the response to Wal-Mart's attempt to be less promotional over the holidays. In my view, as this "stagflation" dynamic intensifies against a backdrop of constrained consumer purchasing power, the shift away from consumer-discretionary stocks to consumer staples should gain momentum.

With regard to interest rates, this environment of receding liquidity I described -- wherein nominal growth is fixed and you simply shift up the mix between inflation and real growth -- seems likely to be mirrored in bonds, with nominal yields generally trending sideways while beneath the surface, the inflation premium is rising and the real yield falling. Of course, there is one important caveat.

Q: What's that?
A: The Fed controls money, but more than ever, the markets control credit. So, the fact that the Fed is tightening doesn't ensure that liquidity or credit is tight. Indeed, as we saw last year, the markets can completely flout the Fed. Even as the Fed raised rates, the credit markets continued to ease, with yields on Treasuries and all manner of corporate bonds declining in unprecedented fashion.

Q: So much for "Don't fight the Fed."
A: Yes. That said, there are now clear indications that the growth in credit is slowing. The most impressive evidence of this is the consumer, where, despite continued low mortgage rates, refinancings -- and particularly cash-out refi -- has declined.

More importantly, home-equity loans, where much of the marginal growth in credit has taken place, have slowed dramatically in recent months. The annualized growth slowed from a record high of $150 billion to $70 billion.

All of this is so critical because credit has been filling the ever-widening void I alluded to earlier between spendable income, namely wages, and consumption, as more of income takes the form of benefits. Against this backdrop, as the availability of cheap credit, or the willingness to use it, begin to wane, consumption seems sure to slow -- materially -- and the economy's stagflationary tendencies take center stage.

Q: You've been extremely bearish on the U.S. consumer for more than a year. But the upper crust has been nothing but resilient.
A: Absolutely. But I think what would be fascinating is if there was an analysis in which someone could strip out how much of the real strength at the high end is sort of masking what could possibly be a recession at the low end. We don't see it because, in the aggregate, the overall retail numbers look okay. Bottom line is that I'm not particularly concerned about the high end.

Q: Why?
A: This segment may actually do okay because they will be on the receiving end of the transfer of income from the corporate sector, as they have stepped up their activity in share buybacks and dividend payouts. However, corporations are hitting a very narrow segment of the consumer sector, and it happens to be the high end.

I think the Fed and the Bush Administration would much prefer companies to actually go out and hire people, which would be a wealth transfer to, perhaps, the middle class that really needs it.

Q: Let's get this straight: The labor market isn't falling apart.
A: I look at this chart of undistributed corporate profits, which got as high as about I think $500 billion, and now it's around $440 billion, because corporations have been paying out dividends, etc.

And I look at the chart and it literally keeps me up at night because I think to myself, you know, some day some big-time CEO is going to come out and announce that we've turned the corner, it's time to increase capital expenditures and every other chief executive officer in his industry is going to line up to do the same thing. It will be like flipping a switch and all of a sudden we will have a meaningful upturn in investment and that will be attended by employment.

But the shocking thing, obviously, is that they have been sitting on this cash and they are not doing anything with it despite incredible incentives to spend it, not just fiscally but from an interest-rate standpoint. It's not like keeping and sitting on cash is a particularly compelling investment idea right now. It speaks a lot about the environment that CEOs see out there with potentially the continued overhang that we've got from the post-bubble period.

I don't want to be overly apocalyptic, but to think that three years after the greatest-ever investment boom of our lifetime, CEOs would run out and want to expand and spend might be a little bit optimistic.

I guess my point was going to be that I see a period where we have sort of sub-par employment growth because we are still working through these excesses.

Q: What is sub-par to you?
A: Let's say [nonfarm payroll increases of] between 100,000 and 125,000 a month.

Q: I know you don't change your forecast very much. But what will?
A: You know, what I think would sway me more from my forecast would be if I heard [about] companies using money, either the money that they are repatriating or the cash that they already have on hand, to increase cap expenditures and employment. And I still don't hear that. Maybe I have a tin ear. But you know, if anything, the recent surge in merger-and-acquisition activities strikes me as sort of the long overdue consolidation needed after this massive investment bubble, and it will probably lead to increased layoffs -- not increased hiring.

Q: Which all comes back to your concerns about the consumer?
A: Already, consumer purchasing power is limited by this lackluster income growth, specifically wages. People will argue, "Hey, income growth is actually pretty good now." But it's primarily benefits and people can't spend their benefits. And that I think is why you've seen in part this huge increase in consumer debt. It's not just because it's cheap and you know it's there, but increasingly, people need it because their wages aren't covering their basic consumption.

Q: Do you have some numbers?
A: Yes. Well one thing I look at is the diminishing marginal returns on credit, in that it takes more and more debt now to fuel each marginal dollar of consumption. It now takes 11 cents of new debt to generate each additional dollar of consumption. That's up from just three cents in 1992. And it's the highest ratio of debt to consumption since 1985. Of course, there are also all the standard metrics of how levered the economy has become...like the household debt-service ratio which is just off record highs at a time when interest rates are bouncing along 40-year lows.

Q: That's why interest rates will remain stable?
A: It strikes me that the yield curve might be sending you the signal that basically this is an economy that just can't handle significantly higher long rates. We've gotten to this point on the back of consumers' borrowing, and they are extremely extended and while employment is picking up, it's still not sufficient. I always picture that scene from A Few Good Men where Jack Nicholson says: "You can't handle the truth!" And I'm thinking we just can't handle higher rates. I mean that's it.

Q: The economy has a very low threshold of pain for higher rates?
A: I think it takes less and less of an increase in rates to snuff out economic activity, and it seems like a statement of the obvious. I mean, we've got more and more levered, of course, and it would take less and less of an increase in rates to slow this whole consumption engine down. Consumer credit or cheap credit is the stuff that keeps this economy moving. Raise the price of that, and we're going to move a lot slower. I think that is in part what the yield curve is saying is that this is an economy that's built on a continued supply of cheap credit, and if we want to keep moving forward, we can't let long rates move significantly higher.
[photo]

Q: Sounds like you are still bullish on bonds, particularly the long end?
A: As long as the Fed stays its measured course and the markets take the liquidity tide out, bonds should continue to frustrate the bears. My bond call is strictly a trading -- not an investment -- call. I am bullish on the long end. Although, to be honest, I don't find the 30-year as compelling as the 10-year. While the supply story is better for the 30-year -- in that there's less supply -- the 30-year has massively outperformed the 10-year. Thirty-year yields recently took out their spring '04 lows, and are now gunning for their summer '03 [Fed. governor Ben] Bernanke-deflation-scare lows.

Meanwhile, the 10-year is still well above its spring '04 lows. Also, the spec position -- and resulting potential for short-covering -- is higher in the 10-year note. In fact, it's double that of the 30-year. So, I'd rather bet that the 10-year plays catch-up and tests its spring '04 lows, which would represent about a 45 [hundredths of a percentage point] decline in yields from here.

Q: Let's talk about the dollar. In your July 2002 report, "Race to the Bottom," you made an early -- and right -- call on competitive devaluations. What now?
A: As we entered 2005, it struck me that everyone was in agreement that the dollar was going to continue to go lower at least at the end of last year, as they made their forecast for 2005. And the markets were sort of cheering that as a guarantee that the great reflation [where government attempts to tweak output using various stimulus tactics] and the abundant global-liquidity party would continue, because a weaker dollar ensures that the rest of the world is going to have to debase their own currencies if they want to continue to trade with the U.S.

So the easy money will continue to flow. At the risk of saying it's different this time, I think that we've reached a point where the willingness to want only to debase one's currency around the globe has started to decline, particularly in Japan.

Which has led me to conclude that in 2005, the dollar which has heretofore acted as a uniter -- bringing global economies together in the common purpose of debasing their currencies so as to maintain their export audience with the U.S. consumer -- will now become a divider.

As one country after another concludes the destructive consequences aren't worth the reward, it's no longer guaranteed that when we have a weaker dollar, the rest of the world is going to rush to try and weaken their currencies in response; therefore the global-liquidity floodgates will be thrown open, and money will flow like mad. We've now pushed the rest of the world to the point where they've had enough.

So my sense is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom that this sort of global liquidity will continue to flow and a weaker dollar will ensure that this high-beta game keeps going, we will experience the opposite. I think the reflation trade is over, and it's going to be much harder to make money in the year ahead.
POMBOY'S PICKS
Security Recent Yield
10-Year Treasury note 4.18%
Gold $420*

Company Ticker Recent Price
Newmont Mining NEM $40.88
Placer Dome PDG 17.06
Gold Fields (ADR) GFI 11.11

*Recent price per ounce.




Q: But you have been a huge fan of gold. Why own it now if you think the reflation trade is over?
A: Most people view the two as inextricably linked. However, I'm not most people.

I think the reflation trade is over insofar as the rest of the world is no longer going to follow us down the path of the currency debasement. So the global-liquidity spigots will begin to close. However, here in the U.S., we clearly have an agenda to weaken the dollar. Therefore, as someone who resides in the U.S. and earns a living in dollars, I think having gold is a vital hedge against what we are clearly trying to do politically...namely, inflate away our debt.

Q: And are there any fundamental reasons to expect the dollar to continue to go lower?
A: Circling back to my earlier comments on the economy, I believe that we will reach a point where the Fed actually ends up having to reverse course -- as evidence mounts to suggest that this levered economy simply "can't handle the truth" when it comes to higher rates.

As foreign central banks make fewer appearances at our Treasury auctions, and rates begin to rise, the Fed might soon find itself forced to assume the role of buyer of last resort. Then there's the very real possibility that the retreat of global liquidity precipitates a financial crisis. This, as ever, would surely find the Fed rushing in to mitigate the pain. Any or all of these would further undermine the dollar's already-limited virtues and enhance the appeal of gold. If you believe, as I do, that the dollar is headed lower, $500 gold is really a no-brainer.

Q: How about gold stocks?
A: I am long gold stocks. I have positions in the usual suspects, like Newmont Mining and Placer Dome, and so on. But, right now I am most excited about the South African gold stocks.

Q: But the mining companies are suffering because the rand has been so strong.
A: Exactly. That has been the problem. The rand has been relentless! In part, this has been because the central bank has refused to cut rates as dramatically as the economic fundamentals would seem to mandate. Short rates in South Africa are 7.5%, yet inflation is under 4%. This hasn't escaped the carry-trade speculators, who have exploited this unique opportunity to get 7.5% without stretching out on the maturity spectrum while getting a strong currency to boot. This, of course, has only intensified the upward pressure on in the currency.

But the rand is now, finally, beginning to reverse as it becomes clear that the central bank will be more aggressive and specs begin to pack up and head home.

This should help alleviate the intense profit squeeze that the strength in the rand has had on South African mining companies.

Q: With all this talk about gold, I have to ask: How has your father, a former gold bug on Wall Street, influenced your take on the yellow metal?
A: The influence my father has had on me is much more general. When I was growing up, I remember very vividly getting in the car with my mom and driving to the train station every day to pick up my dad coming back from New York after work. And every day he'd get in the car and she'd ask, How was the market today? And he'd say it was great. And I had this picture of my father hosing down the vegetables in the produce section of the market. I thought by the market she meant the grocery store.

Q: That's hysterical.
A: But you're right, from a young age I was interested in learning about what went on at the market. And now I know.

Q: Thanks, Stephanie.