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Politics : High Tolerance Plasticity -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Suma who wrote (22846)2/12/2005 2:59:18 AM
From: Bruce L  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 23153
 
"The Origins of the Second World War" and History Repeating Itself

Mary Lou,

Enclosed within the quotes above is the title of a book by A. J. P. Taylor, a British historian, first published in 1961. It was considered controversial then (What! You thought "Hitler" was the explanation for WWII?) but now is considered a classic.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Some of the ironies and conflicts between principles and reality that Taylor points out seem to me to be pertinent today in light of the latest United Nations scandals: "Oil for Peace" and the sexual abuse of people the UN was supposed to protect. What do you think, Mary Lou? It's my observation that the people who are most critical of Bush's policy in Iraq are those who are most likely to take 'a head in the sands' stance towards these scandals. Something very like this took place in 1934-36.

In any event, Taylor is very ironic and (I thought) funny in his description of the events leading up to WWII. There are also other parallels.

As it involves some work on my part to lay it out, I would appreciate comments; no one likes his efforts going unread into the ethernet void.

THE PRE-WAR SITUATION

Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 within a couple days of FDR's inauguration. Most Democrats in 1933 were disillusioned Wilsonians and looked on their former European Allies as incorrigibly wicked; the less America had to do with Europe the better. The Democratic majority passed a series of laws that made it impossible for the U.S. to play any part in world affairs; FDR accepted these laws without any sign of disagreement. Never a member of the League of Nations, the U.S. had to drop out of the Disarmament Conference of 1932-33.

Locarno, Stresa and the Abyssinian Affair

By the Treaty of Locarno in 1925, Germany was admitted to the League and Belgium, Britain, Italy and France guaranteed the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia (who both had taken broad swathes of territory containing millions of ethnic Germans).

In July 1934, Austrian Nazis murdered the Austrian Chancellor and attempted to seize power. This came as a shock to Mussolini. Austria was both his client state (along with Hungary and Albania) and a buffer. For him, positions were unexpectedly reversed: he now needed backing from France rather than the other way round. Mussoini had to become the upholder of treaties and the champion of collective security. This conversion was welcomed by both France and Britain, many of whose diplomats saw Germany as the greater danger. The result was the treaty of Stresa: France promised to send troops to the Tyrol, Italy promised troops for the defense of Belfort and Britain promised general support for both. But in truth each of the 3 powers hoped to receive help from the others without providing any in return. In the short term, the new Austrian Chancellor, restored order under Mussolini's protection, and the Anschluss (union) was delayed for 2 years.

But in the meantime, Mussolini had decided to invade Abyssinia, a member since 1925 of the League of Nations. Before he did so, he clearly got an approving wink from the French who were understandably anxious to recruit Italy for the anti-German front. So too possibly from the British, though this is controversial.

But for the British government, the invasion, when it occurred, presented a dilemma. On the one hand, they too wanted to recruit Mussolini. But on the other hand, the British Ministers genuinely wanted to maintain the League as an instrument for dealing with Germany. Also, they were increasingly hampered by their own public opinion. Propaganda for the League and collective security was at its height. For many British voters, the two concepts solved many a moral dilemma. Supporting the League provided altruistic cover for many who would turn with horror from defending the treaty settlements of Versailles and Locarno; also for those with pacifist inclinations the League was a way to register disapproval of foreign aggression without having to vote to increase British armaments.

An interesting twist occurred. Naval advisers delivered a report to the effect that the British navy in the Mediterranean was no match for the combined Italian Navy and air force! In the actual event (WWII) the British Navy went from victory to victory against the Italian with very little trouble. "But every expert is a human being and every technical opinion reflects the political views of those who give them. Generals and admirals are confident of winning when they want to fight; they always find decisive arguments " against a war they don't like. The British admirals were elderly, conservative, admiring of Mussolini and disapproving of the League. Those very same persons who were most clammoring for sanctions against Italy were one and the same as those who in earlier years had denounced British armament and British military experts! Payback. "Hence the successors of Nelson put their names to a craven opinion which would have earned them instant dismissal from earlier Boards of Admiralty."

In the elections of November 1935, the Tory government campaigned on the platform of "All sanctions short of war." This presented the Labour opposition with a terrible dilemma. "Should they demand stronger sanctions, with the risk of war, and thus lose the votes of the pacifists? Or should they denounce the League as a dangerous sham, and thus lose the votes of the enthusiasts for it?" After fierce debate, Labour decided to do both!; and the inevitable result followed. (They lost big.)

With the elections out of the way, the British government had to face the consequences. Through the use of poison gas, Mussolini's conquest was going faster than expected. They devised a compromise by which Italy would keep the fertile lowlands while Haile Selassie would keep his ancient mountain strongholds with the British throwing in access across British Somaliland to the Red Sea (per the Times, "a corridor for camels.") France welcomed the plan; Mussolini was willing to accept it. The next step was to present it at Geneva; then, with the League's concurrence, to impose it on the Emperor of Abyssinia - a beautiful example, repeated at Munich, of using the machinery of peace against the victim of aggression."

But then, no one knows how, the plan was leaked. The revelation produced an explosion in British public opinion. The Foreign Secretary was forced to resign. But the British government was still resolved to try to retain the atmosphere of Stresa. They publically dumped the "compromise" and enquired of Mussolini if he would object to his oil being cut off; when told that he would, the British successfully resisted oil sanctions.

"This was the death blow to the League as well as to Abyssinia. 52 nations had combined to resist aggression; all they accomplished was that Haile Selassie lost all his country instead of only half. Incorrigible in impracticality, the League further offended Italy by allowing Haile Selassie a hearing at the Assembly; and then expelled him for the crime of taking the Covenant seriously."

A. Taylor has more funny accounts of the re-occupation of the Rhineland and Munich. But that's enough for now.

Bruce






To: Suma who wrote (22846)2/12/2005 10:11:17 AM
From: Bruce L  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 23153
 
<<<<Do not assume that I do not like history. It repeats itself you know so it would behoove all of us to read it. So much to read so little time is my problem.>>>>

I have followed your postings here and on the 'Foreign Affairs ' thread. Without exception, every post reflects an irredentist attitude towards the 2004 elections. You have plenty of time to read "Big Lies" and its progeny.

My (unstated) point was that you are one of those LOLs that Mussolini laughed about. No?

Bruce