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Politics : High Tolerance Plasticity -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Bruce L who wrote (22877)	3/5/2005 10:22:00 PM
From: energyplay	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23153

Two comments - The US and the EU have a common policy on the Ukraine, which was and is VERY aggresive. There is more cooperation on more issues than appears in the press. Where is my dear Democratic party going to be on Foreign Policy- if Iraq is semi-stable after 2 more elcetions and a constituion AND we get under 50,000 US troops deployed AND there's a Palestinin state which has even a thin peace with Israel AND most of the Syrians have moved to the fringes of Lebanon or back to Syria AND there's some degree of containment of Iran's nuclear activities ? Up the old creek without a paddle or a canoe.... Not to mention capturing Osama bin Laden and/or Zaqauwi, the trial of Saddam Hussein, some containment of North Korea, some improvement in Darfur in the Sudan, etc.

To: Bruce L who wrote (22877)	3/11/2005 11:39:14 AM
From: Bruce L	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23153

STRATFOR ARTICLE ON GEORGIA -FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OLD RUSSIAN/SOVIET EMPIRE Georgia: Rolling Back the Russians Summary The Georgian government is on the verge of delivering an ultimatum to the Russians: Close your military bases in Georgia or face international humiliation. This is a battle the Georgians are likely to win, but it will not spell the end of the Moscow-Tbilisi rivalry. Not by a long shot. Analysis The Georgian Parliament is scheduled to discuss a bill March 9 declaring Russian military bases in Georgia illegal. The bill also would enshrine into law provisions allowing Georgia to take actions -- such as power and water cutoffs and visa denials to all Russian personnel -- should Russia fail to announce a suitable withdrawal timetable by May 15, or to be gone by Jan. 1, 2006. Parliamentary speaker Nino Burjanadze criticized the measure as "untimely" and is recommending that Parliament delay -- but not indefinitely -- discussion on the matter. Her suggestion has generated considerable resistance in Georgia's nationalist-dominated Parliament, which hopes to proceed with the debate. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili supports the law in spirit, if not in timing -- his government is involved in negotiations to remove the bases, which he hopes will conclude by May 1. "Our position is clear," he said, "The Russian bases should be pulled out from Georgia. Georgia is a sovereign state and nobody has the right to have its bases on our territory." The bases in question include one facility at Batumi on the Black Sea near the Turkish border and another in Akhalkalaki in Georgia's Armenian enclave. The Georgians have been trying to convince the Russians to leave since the country gained independence in 1992, but have been flatly refused. Russian authorities assert they lack adequate quarters for the troops back home -- an assertion bordering on ludicrous considering the scale of Russian military drawdown during the past decade and NATO's standing offer to pay for re-barracking of the troops in question. The issue is one of influence. The Russians want to keep their finger on Georgia's pulse. Throughout the 1990s Moscow used its Georgian bases to keep its southern neighbor off balance and vulnerable. Unfortunately for Russia, times have changed. Under the government of Saakashvili, Tbilisi has managed to firm up central control over Georgia's outlying regions. Of most dramatic note was Saakashvili's success in bringing the renegade province of Ajara -- home of Russia's Batumi base -- back into the fold in May 2004. More to the point, facing such an anti-Russian leader as Saakashvili, the bases now are more a source of nationalist fire for the Georgian government than leverage for the Russians. Faced with a more confident -- and certainly more assertive -- government in Tbilisi, Russia is finding its dealings with Georgia more problematic. The Russian government is extremely disorganized, for two reasons. First, President Vladimir Putin spent most of his first term establishing himself as the ultimate arbiter in all even semi-important decisions. Russia's capability to make decisions, therefore, is fully a function of Putin's bandwidth. Considering Chechen attacks, a broad Western geopolitical offensive, scheming oligarchs, corrupt bureaucrats and protesting geriatrics, the Kremlin is a quite distracted place of late. Second, people who might otherwise provide Putin with timely information are engaged in a free-for-all as the government tries to grab the assets of Yukos, the falling giant of the Russian corporate world. Russia's Georgia policy, therefore, is on autopilot. That has not been lost on Tbilisi, which has spent the past several months preparing for this action. Since coming to power in early 2004, Saakashvili has doggedly sought Western allies to use against Moscow. He chose the former French ambassador to Tbilisi as his foreign minister, he has carefully cultivated a relationship with U.S. President George W. Bush and he has charmed the delegates from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- the West's leading security-monitoring entity -- at every opportunity. The result is that Western opinion has been turned firmly against Moscow as far as the issue of Georgia in general -- and the bases in particular -- is concerned. The only questions are, when and how will the Russians withdraw? The likely answers are that they will leave after the Georgians make a move against the bases, such as blockading them; and they will leave in humiliation. Putin's limited bandwidth makes it unlikely that he will address the issue before a crisis erupts, and then it will come to a cold comparison of facts. In Putin's mind, is it worth a confrontation with the West over two rather useless pieces of real estate? The answer will undoubtedly be a pragmatic "no." But two issues will flow from a Russian withdrawal. First, this is not the end of the Russian-Georgian confrontation. Russian largess continues to keep Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist Georgian enclaves, running independently of Tbilisi. Russian nationalists will now be even less likely to let those go. Second, nationalists in Russia are on the ascent, and any embarrassment over the Georgian bases will be clearly laid at Putin's feet. The once-invincible Russian leader is looking weaker by the day, and soon the person standing across the table -- and glaring across the border -- might not be the "friendly" face the Georgians have become accustomed to. ================================================================= NOTIFICATION OF COPYRIGHT The Global Intelligence Brief (GIB) is published by Strategic Forecasting, Inc. (Stratfor), and is protected by the United States Copyright Act, all applicable state laws, and international copyright laws. The information received through the GIB is for the Subscriber's use ONLY and may not be shared. For more information on the Terms of Use, please visit our website stratfor.com.