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To: LindyBill who wrote (103580)3/7/2005 5:13:53 PM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793888
 
The Moody Druze
beirut2bayside.blogspot.com
By Tony

After Walid Jumblat made that now infamous statement to David Ignatius about the ME Berlin Wall falling, and him changing his mind about the Iraq war, there was a whole bunch of posts in the blogosphere about whether he should be taken seriously, etc. Most of the posts were between pro-Bush people and anti-Bush people, and they were duking it out amongst themselves with little concern about Lebanon and Jumblat himself!

But my buddy Lee Smith has sat down with Moody Druze during his visit to Lebanon this past Dec-Jan and has published the piece in the Weekly Standard. Unfortunately, the Standard is not making the piece available for free on the web. Never fear, I'm posting it whole here, for you to get a chance to hear more about Walid Bey!

The Moody Druze
Walid Jumblatt knows which way the wind is blowing.
by Lee Smith
The Weekly Standard
03/14/2005, Volume 010, Issue 24

Moukhtara, Lebanon

WALID JUMBLATT is trying to say something. Shortly before a meeting of Lebanese opposition figures, several hundred people are gathered in front of the Jumblatt family ancestral seat, a 19th-century palace and gardens in Moukhtara, a small village in Lebanon's Chouf Mountains, when the crowd breaks into the Lebanese national anthem. Jumblatt looks exasperated. A thin, stylishly dressed man in his mid-50s, Jumblatt has large, sad eyes and hunched shoulders that are expressive vehicles for articulating both his frequent wit and displeasure, and now it seems as though his body is letting out a small sigh of frustration. He is trying to say something, but with the singing, it now looks hopeless. So, after a few bars, Walid Bey, as he's frequently called in Lebanon, joins in.

While former prime minister Rafik Hariri was the highest profile figure to oppose Lebanon's Syrian-backed government, Jumblatt, leader of the country's Druze community, representing about 10 percent of the population, was the first prominent non-Christian official to stand against Syria's Assad regime, which has occupied Lebanon for the last 29 years. And since the February 14 explosion that killed Hariri, Lebanon's most powerful Sunni politician, Jumblatt has become the international symbol of Lebanon's Cedar Revolution, with his widely quoted statement to the Washington Post's David Ignatius comparing the regional effects of Iraq's elections to the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is an interesting turn of events for a man once allied closely with the Syrians, at least when the regime was headed by Bashar al-Assad's father, Hafez, the man who had Jumblatt's father, Kemal, assassinated in 1977.

"The Syrians thought that some of their past allies, like me, would defend them," Jumblatt told me a few weeks ago at his second home in Beirut's Clemenceau district. "In the past, I accepted their line as a fait accompli. Now I'm fed up, and for the first time in my life I feel free. I have a free conscience, because my father opposed Syria and now I can sleep at night."

This compelling personal drama is unfolding on a very large stage. All of a sudden the Bush administration's grand vision for a post-9/11, post-Iraq-war, free Middle East seems to hinge on a democratic Lebanon independent of Syrian tutelage. Meanwhile, the Assad regime's regional prestige, and maybe its survival, depends on its ability to control its neighbor. During the course of a career that was thrust upon him with the murder of his father, Jumblatt has shown himself to be a loyal leader deeply involved with the concerns of his Druze constituency, a ruthless enemy to his foe of the day, and a flexible, sometimes quixotic tactician who knows better than anyone else which way the wind is blowing in Lebanon. Jumblatt is not just an important player, but also a kind of guide to the action.

Jumblatt and his Progressive Socialist party first broke with Syria over the decision by Damascus last September to extend by three years the term of Lebanese president Emile Lahoud. Syria's heavy-handed extension of Lahoud's mandate provided a rallying point for the Lebanese opposition, but what indicated that it had gained substantial ground inside the country was Jumblatt's January meeting with the wife of one of his Christian foes in the Lebanese civil war, Samir Geagea, the imprisoned leader of the Lebanese Forces, the Christian militia. With that meeting, the Syrians felt the ground shifting under their feet.

"Prohibiting intercommunal alliances was one of the main taboos imposed by Syria," says Farid al-Khazen, head of the political science department at the American University of Beirut. "But now we're coming back to the normal aspect of Lebanese politics, how it was before 1990, when the government and opposition both had leaders from different communities."

While Jumblatt's meeting with Mrs. Geagea was a sign that Syria was vulnerable--the Druze leader wouldn't have dared it otherwise--Jumblatt explains that it was also a step in postwar reconciliation. "We fought each other. There was a civil war. Spain had one and so did the United States. It's time to heal now and think about the future."

Whatever that future holds for Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world, the new alliances created and the old ones dashed by the forces now at work in the Middle East suggest that the region can no longer be understood in terms of the bipolar dynamic that has long dominated Middle East political discourse. There is not one Arab nation standing together against the imperialist designs of Washington and its Zionist stooges, as the struggle used to be construed here. Solving the Palestinian question is no longer the be-all and end-all of Middle East diplomacy. Rather, within the Arab world itself, there are countless challenges, conflicts, and political disputes between countries, tribes, religious, and ethnic groups that are rising to the surface. Neither the force of Arab nationalist rhetoric nor the violence of Arab nationalist regimes is capable of suppressing this any longer. Case in point: Syria's decades-long "relationship" with Lebanon has at last been named for what it is--an occupation.

Jumblatt himself has had recourse to plenty of anti-American, anti-Israel verbiage in the past. One of his most famous outbursts cost him an American visa after he said he wished Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had been killed in a missile attack on the hotel he was staying in during a fall 2003 visit to Baghdad. Jumblatt called Wolfowitz a "virus" spreading "corruption in the Arab land of Iraq and in Palestine."

Now Jumblatt has reassessed the effects of that virus. "It's strange for me to say it," he told Ignatius last week, "but this process of change has started because of the American invasion of Iraq." When I phoned him last week, Jumblatt deadpanned: "Maybe I should just go to Washington now and become a neocon."

Of course, if the neoconservative creed consists of believing that there's a causal relationship between authoritarian Arab regimes and the social, political, and economic distress of the Middle East, then Jumblatt is already in the fold.

"These regimes cannot stay this way in the long term," he told me in Beirut. "The Arab world cannot stay like that. Arabs are leaving. Have you seen our elite? The Lebanese have an excellent elite, you find them wherever you go--they're in the States, and Europe. But the opposition movement is having an effect on the Lebanese diaspora. We need freedom so these people can come back. If we succeed, and set up a democracy like it used to be, we'll be an example in the region. Let Syria have the system they want, but let them leave us free. We want our system. We're the only country in the Arab world that has freedom of press and speech. The liberals throughout the region are waiting for us. If we fail, it will return to the status quo."

Has Jumblatt changed his mind about Wolfowitz? "Did you see the nice comments he had about me?" Jumblatt asks, referring to an interview Wolfowitz gave to Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation TV. ("Even a man like Walid Jumblatt who has said some not-so-nice things in the past has had a lot of courage in standing up to the Syrians. We admire that," Wolfowitz said.) Jumblatt goes on: "It shows that when you're dealing with civilized people, even if you attack them, you can engage in rational discourse. I know. You're called a traitor in the morning, and a patriot in the evening."

Whatever Jumblatt's feelings are about Bush administration officials, the one political figure he seems especially interested in right now is the controversial Iraqi Shiite leader Ahmad Chalabi--"an intriguing person," Jumblatt calls him. He jokes about Chalabi's many loyalties and the inability of his American patrons to figure him out. It seems Jumblatt appreciates the gamesmanship and survival instincts of a kindred spirit. In the two of them--with their fractious hot-and-cold attitudes toward U.S. power--one senses the emergence of a new type of Arab political leader (or perhaps the reemergence of an old
type).

If the Arabs' Berlin Wall is crumbling, as a number of observers besides Jumblatt believe, the obvious casualties are Arab dictators. Who will replace them? The dictators themselves--whose explanation is echoed by any number of U.S. experts and academics--say après nous, a deluge of Islamist extremists. That certainly can't be ruled out. But it may also be the case that fewer Arab strongmen means more Jumblatts--opportunists, horse-traders, and politicians who are going to cut lots of deals, including with parties that are not friendly to U.S. interests. As some of our enemies pass from the scene, it's useful to recognize that many of our allies are also going to look different.

Lee Smith is writing a book on Arab culture.



To: LindyBill who wrote (103580)3/7/2005 5:21:19 PM
From: Ish  Respond to of 793888
 
<<Later, the Italian government facilitated a ransom payment of over $10 million to the islamo fascists who had purportedly “kidnapped” Ms. Sgrena. Presumably, the $10 million will be used by the islamo fascists to continue their jihad against the Christian West.>>

Geeze, I didn't know Italians were so gullible. That's money flushed down the commode.



To: LindyBill who wrote (103580)3/7/2005 7:39:27 PM
From: Joe Btfsplk  Respond to of 793888
 
captainsquartersblog.com

Reality Check For Italian Conspiracy Theorists

The death of an Italian commando and the wounding of Giuliana Sgrena has led to hysterical charges of assassination attempts and war crimes, all of which approach the ridiculous. Michelle Malkin has the best round-up of the media coverage today, including multiple reports that the Italians paid millions of dollars in ransom to free Sgrena -- money that will undoubtedly go towards murdering Iraqis and American soldiers, and certainly a reason to play a little misdirection with an accidental shooting.

The Washington Post provides a look at why Sgrena's car likely got shot in an otherwise rather hostile article by Jeffrey Smith and Ann Tyson:

The automobile was traversing onto a route -- the road to the airport -- where soldiers have been killed in shootings and by roadside bombs. U.S. soldiers had established an impromptu evening checkpoint at the entrance to the road about 90 minutes earlier and had stopped other vehicles. They knew a high-level embassy official would be moving to the airport on that road, and their aim was to support this movement.

But no specific coordination occurred between those involved in Sgrena's rescue and the military unit responsible for the checkpoint, according to the source, who said he cannot be named because the military's investigation into the incident is continuing.

Soldiers at the checkpoint have told U.S. military officers that they flashed lights, used hand signals and fired warning shots in an effort to stop the car, which they believed was traveling at more than 50 mph, a typical speed for that road. But Sgrena, who had just been released by Iraqi captors, recalled later that the car was not traveling very fast and that soldiers started firing "right after lighting" a spotlight -- a decision she said was not justified. Sgrena was wounded by shrapnel in the U.S. barrage.

The absence of advance communication between the Italians and the U.S. soldiers at the checkpoint appears to have put the occupants of the car in grave jeopardy, given what many U.S. officials describe as the military's standard practice of firing at onrushing cars from their checkpoints in Iraq.

"In my view, the main contributing factor was a lack of prior coordination with the ground unit," the source said. "If requested, we would have resourced and supported this mission very differently."

Besides, as a commenter to CQ, ERNurse, noted on an earlier post, the damage done to Sgrena hardly matches up with the kind of ordnance she claims they took from the fire. This describes the kind of damage one would expect to see from armored-vehicle fire:

I was a squad machine gunner many moons ago, and I was issued the trusty dusty M-60.

Let me tell you, that was a kick-*ss weapon. Standard ammo was the 7.62 ball round. No frills, but it was reliable, portable, and powerful.

I have seen what just one M-60 can do to a car with just a couple of ten-round bursts using ball rounds. And the car in question was some old beat-up Chrysler from a local junkyard procured for the purpose by Uncle Sugar, and NOT one of the crappy old K-cars from the Iacocca era. My target was some serious tailfin-sporting by-gawd American steel.

I fired from 50 meters, and I tore that sucker up. I mean I just shredded it. And I used two belts- a couple of hundred rounds. Now, my assistant gunner with his pea-shooter M-16 also put some holes in the car, but they were teensy-weensy, maybe just big enough to stick a pencil through. But still pretty effective. And an M-16's high-velocity round tumbles once it hits something. So while my rounds punched big holes but went on through the other side of the car, the M-16 rounds just flew all around the inside of the car and tore up the interior. It was crazy.

I don't know the specs on the new weapon that our soldiers have, but I will say this: if those troopers had fired half of what that [woman] claims, and at close range at that, she would have wound up looking like bloody hamburger spread all over the rear compartment.

I have yet to see a picture of the actual car, but that really doesn't matter. If only one person in that car was killed, and the [woman] in question is still walking- let alone still equipped with two arms- then there is no way she could be telling the truth, because a squad's worth of firepower would have shredded the El Cheapo tin cans that pass for cars over there.

It appears, so far, that what happened is that the Italians came up to a checkpoint that they hadn't anticipated on a road that is the most dangerous in Iraq. Not sure of who the people were waving for them to stop -- remember, they were still a ways off -- they intended to drive straight through it to get to the checkpoint they knew. The Americans tried warning the car and when it failed to stop, shot out the engine with a few rounds from an M-16 or similar weapon. The rounds bounced through to the interior or missed their intended target and went straight into the cab.

Long-time readers of CQ will probably find some similarity between this incident and one described by a friend of mine, a Special Forces veteran of three decades who worked checkpoints in Iraq last year. In his letter to his group of friends, he describes an encounter at his checkpoint that thankfully resulted in no fatalities:

A Taxi from Baghdad approached our front gate. Unknown to the gate guards, he was carrying one of our translators. He was ordered to slow down. When he didn’t comply he was forcefully ordered to stop and get out of his vehicle. In panic he floored his accelerator pedal thinking it was the brake causing his vehicle to lurch forward toward the gate. Appropriately, the gate guards fired eight 5.56 caliber rounds into the taxi.

The vehicle veered off into a field and came to a stop. Miraculously, no one inside was seriously injured by the gunfire. After the vehicle and both Iraqis were searched it was determined that the driver made a near fatal mistake but it was not deliberate.

If the guards were blood thirsty, they could have continued to fire their weapons until they were sure that both Iraqis were dead. But they are professionals and they followed their current ROEs until the car was not a threat and then safely reassessed the situation.

The Italians understandably grieve at the loss of their serviceman in the kind of accidents that occur when communication fails between units. It doesn't give them license to accuse Americans of having an assassination policy, one by the way that would never have allowed Sgrena to leave the shooting site alive, and it definitely should not overshadow the fact that the Italians have started caving in to ransom demands from terrorists. That only guarantees that more hostages will follow and that the terrorists continue to receive funds to commit mass murder on Iraqis.