This is from Tom's newsletter
newrulesets.com
The Asian Tsunamis as a
System Perturbation
Written by Thomas P.M. Barnett
Editorial Director | Partner, The New Rule Sets Project, LLC
My basic description of a system perturbation is “a vertical
shock in the global economy” that disrupts
global connectivity, perversely shocks the global community
with its apparent magnitude, resets a range of interstate relationships,
exacerbates some existing conflicts and mitigates
others, and leaves behind a boil of new rule
sets in its wake. These horizontal waves take
time to work themselves out. Meanwhile,
those who are affected by the initial vertical
shock may set in motion follow-up horizontal
scenarios of their own, hoping to take
advantage – in good ways and bad – of the
apparent disruption of existing rule sets; and
by doing so, create some new rules of their
own.
Judging by the events and news reports of
the last several weeks, the Asian Tsunamis
qualify as a system perturbation, and not just because the
imagery was so apt (i.e., a vertical shock of tectonic plates
slipping and generating resulting gigantic tsunamis is, you
have to admit, about as literal a vision of a system perturbation
as you can imagine). The global community was
shocked by the devastation, triggering a huge response.
Many interstate relationships were re-jiggered; changes of
recent years were suddenly revealed. Experts spoke of new
rule sets all over the place, and especially for China, Japan
and India. Conflicts were both exacerbated and mitigated in
a very complex ebb and flow. And yes, major players in the
region learned big lessons and on that basis will alter their
approaches to future cooperation.
In short, the tsunamis changed everything in their path just
so and altered life in many ways beyond their zone of
destruction. South Asia will be different, and the rest of the
world will interact with South Asia differently, because of
this.
That, my friends, is a system perturbation to a “T,” right
down to the fact that its magnitude was defined by the connectivity
its impact destroyed and the resulting connectivity
it triggered. The regional network was reset, rules were reset
between the region and the outside world, and the planet as
a whole got a strong reminder that definitions of international
security today have more to do with rapid shifts in
connectedness and disconnectedness than they do with
interstate rivalries and balance-of-power theories best left in
the 20th Century.
A little background here: I set up Barnett Consulting in 2001
after being approached by the United Way of Rhode Island
to help them strategically plan their future organizational
approaches. I needed at least a DBA business entity (a
“doing business as” name) to sign the contract and accept
payment on behalf of myself and a sub-contractor colleague.
The work we ended up doing for the United Way
resulted in an entirely new paradigm of community activism
for the organization. Instead of just accepting donations and
distributing them to community groups in the field, the
United Way of RI decided it wanted to play a stronger coordinating role: it no longer acted merely as a
bank for charities, but proactively convened
summits of provider groups with the explicit
goal of improving coordination among
them, to meet big, local social needs.
We started this work right after 9/11. Within
months of their new operational system
being put in place, little Rhode Island experienced
its own 9/11-like event, the disastrous
Station Nightclub Fire that killed almost 100
and injured twice that number. As you can
imagine, the same dynamics that characterized
the Asian Tsunamis response were experienced here in Rhode Island (immediate response by professional rescue and medical, outpouring of support from public, long-term issues emerge, and a certain amount of political and moral tension ensues regarding spending all that money). This was expected. I’d spent a good chunk of my career studying a similar phenomenon in the multi-year run-up to the anticipated Y2K event, and learned it again with 9/11 itself. I wasn’t surprised that after the fire response quelled down, I heard from the United Way of Rhode Island again, asking Barnett Consulting to do an after-action, lessons-learned report.
What we found was this: much as the Y2K effort molded
the mindset of the U.S. government and much of the private
sector into being better able to deal with 9/11, the United
Way’s prior strategic planning process that we led, with its
focus on heightening the activist profile of the organization,
went a long way to getting the organization ready for the
System Administrator role it was called to play in response
to the disastrous fire. The United Way got tapped for this
SysAdmin role just as the U.S. military routinely gets tapped
to play this type of coordinating role on a macro scale, in
what it calls “HADR” operations (humanitarian assistance/
disaster relief). In their respective domains, these
agencies are the natural go-to guys for this sort of thing.
For the United Way, the role seems quite natural, but you
know what? It’s actually quite natural for the U.S. military as
well, something it does several dozen times a year, year after >
6 MARCH 2005 Copyright © 2005 by The New Rule Sets Project, LLC
year, all over the world but overwhelmingly inside the Gap.
The U.S. military’s HADR operations rarely receive any press
coverage, unless the disaster being relieved is really huge and
newsworthy. Ditto for the United Way.
Naturally, when this happens, pressure builds in terms of
politics (yes, I’m talking the endless train of politicians who
show up to “tour the site”) and network strain, also. This is
what we ended up modeling conceptually for the United
Way: how to deal with stress in the system. They liked the
model so much, they shared it with the national United Way
(every state has its own chapters, which learned
about it from national). After a similarly disastrous nightclub fire occurred in Buenos Aires, the United
Way provided a copy of our report to relief officials there in order to help them prepare for the dynamics they would encounter.
Here’s my nutshell description of the model:
1. The opening response is dominated by professionals.
It mostly has to do with recovering bodies of
victims and rescuing the injured and those otherwise
harmed or stranded.
2. On the heels of this response comes a massive
media interest wave that continues for as long as
there is good video, which typically extends to the
end of the burying of the victims.
3. After the media coverage comes a huge public outpouring
of support, some of which is great and
much of which can easily turn into a waste of time,
money, and effort unless it’s immediately and deftly
organized (something the United Way did in spades,
as a funding agency and in its new, community
group-convening role).
4. Once the immediate disaster response is complete
and the efforts shift to reconstruction, the camera
lights dim and public attention shifts to the next
great whatever (there is always something “better” –
or worse – just around the bend). It’s at that
moment that the relief community gets a real sense
of the enormous long-term problems emerging as a
result of the disaster, such as families whose breadwinners
are gone, long-term rehabilitation needs for
survivors, etc.
5. The scariest moment for the response/charity community
is right at that nexus of declining public
interest and rising long-term needs – a real “trigger
zone,” as we called it in our original Y2K work. The
biggest trick: how to take that huge sum of donated
supplies and money and translate it beyond the
current response needs, to meet as many of the
long-term needs as possible. This is huge, because
the anger that eventually and inevitably emerges
from events like this is never about the immediate
response or the public outpouring, but about how
responsible parties in the charity/relief world deal
with the temporal mismatch of attention/donations
and long-term needs.
The way the philanthropic community responds is everything. All these dynamics can be seen in the Asian Tsunamis event, and I guarantee you this: three years from now any ill will directed toward the United States, any other responding nation, or any
responding international organization won’t be over their
immediate effort, but rather over their follow-throughs.
Commentators will have you believe that the immediate
response is where hearts and minds are won, but it’s not
true: anyone with a heart expects that sort of response. After
all, we’re all human and we recognize and respond to suffering
in our ranks. That’s why we’re amazingly successful as a
species.
The reality is that South and Southeast Asia, as a consequence
of this event, will be “won” or “lost”
in a larger sense over the coming years, and it will all be
about follow-through. The dollar totals of various countries’
contributions offer bragging rights for now, but the smarter
major powers will use this lengthy recovery process to
improve their influence in the region, while those who sit on
their laurels will see theirs wane. The question won’t be,
“Did the U.S. do enough right away in response to this vertical
shock?” Rather, the real question regarding this system
perturbation will be, “Did the United States take advantage
of the various horizontal scenarios that emerged from this
event, perhaps implementing one or two of its own in the
process, to bring about a more stable region, one that’s better
connected to the global economy?”
You don’t win a Global War on Terrorism by merely handing
out charity. You win it by increasing a society’s globalization
connectivity in a fair and just manner. Connectivity creates
opportunity that kills the allure of terrorism as a tactic
and a career option. Terrorists come mainly from the ranks
of those whose options are limited, whose expectations are
diminished, whose hopes for a future they judge as worth >
The biggest trick: how to take that huge
sum of donated supplies and money
and translate it beyond the current
response needs, to meet as many of the
long-term needs as possible.
Copyright © 2005 by The New Rule Sets Project, LLC MARCH 2005 7
creating simply don’t exist. Terrorism isn’t about poverty; it’s
about disconnectedness.
Other things I take note of following the Asian Tsunamis:
?? True to form, Core charities and especially American
ones tended to be overwhelmed by the generosity of the
general public. Americans tend to be big donators to
overseas charities, even if their government isn’t
(although it does invest far larger amounts in disaster
relief than in long-term conventional aid). The
American Red Cross actually had to ask people to stop
sending money after it had raised $1.2 billion, enough
for 10 years of current disaster-relief programs. Charity
officials fear this sort of in-the-moment effect: a big
(newsworthy) disaster sucks up a lot of giving in a particular
year, beggaring all the usual problems and their
responding charities.
?? As always is the case with hurricanes and earthquakes,
much of what the public donated in-kind was sadly
inappropriate. Too many households use this sort of
appeal as an opportunity to engage in house-cleaning, so
a lot of garbage and useless bits and pieces are thrust
upon charity groups. What they really need is cash. The
United Way of Rhode Island was very smart in this
regard on the Station Nightclub Fire response, quickly
telling the public only to send money and taking in-kind
donations only through direct negotiations with
providers (like funeral services).
?? The long-term fallout will be among orphans and families
that have lost their breadwinners. We’re already seeing
this, and it isn’t going to be pretty. Most South and
Southeast Asian cultures have strong misgivings about
trans-racial adoptions, so despite the desire of the West
to “save these babies,” most will not be put up for adoption.
(China is very unusual for the region in this regard.)
But the bigger point is this: if you really want to help out
over the long haul, donate to organizations that will deal
with this issue.
?? A lot of tension naturally arises when faith groups
exploit the opportunity of the disaster to spread religion.
Here again, the United Way and the faith community
in Rhode Island were very adamant about not taking
advantage after the Station Nightclub Fire, their
sense being that you deal with the immediate needs and
sense of shock, and let the survivors seek relief in their
faith on their own accord, as the process unfolds.
Already, in tsunami-afflicted regions, a number of
Western missionary groups have been flagged by local
governments for appearing too aggressive in their missionary
work. This can create a lasting impression of
great suspicion.
?? The Core’s long-haul record after disasters of following
through with aid, infrastructure, and housing is very
bad. Check out Honduras today, years after Hurricane
Mitch, or Bam, in Iran, after the earthquake: plenty of
foreign-sponsored reconstruction projects were started,
but few actually completed. This is where the battle for
hearts and minds is won or lost. If this sort of disaster
happens in the Core, the follow-through is thorough;
but in the Gap, most efforts peter out as soon as the
world’s attention is lost.
?? The U.S. military spent $6 million a day during its peak
operational response to the Asian Tsunamis. Thirteen
thousand troops were in-region, although only about a
thousand went ashore (the Marines, naturally).
Seventeen ships delivered massive amounts of supplies.
This is natural work for the military, which like no other
entity can move material in great bulk and with great
speed throughout austere and chaotic environments.
?? America’s military ties in the region facilitated our
speedy large-scale response. Military-to-military ties hit a
nadir in the early 1990s following our pull-out from
Subic Bay in the Philippines, but have been on a steady
upswing ever since, especially with the Philippines and
Singapore. Our response was fast because our ships
were already in the region for routine, cooperative milmil
exercises.
?? Was the U.S. military stretched in its response? Yes and
no. Central Command is plenty busy in Southwest Asia,
but South Asia belongs to Pacific Command, based in
Hawaii. Their big consideration going in was not Iraq,
but the potential for North Korea to flare up. Because
the Taiwanese December election went well in terms of
continued regional peace (the nationalists failed to gain
a majority in the parliament), there was less need to be
concerned about a potential Straits scenario. Frankly,
had China tried anything during this sequence, the negative
political and public opinion fallout would have
been enormous, and yeah, it would have hurt. China
can’t be seeking access to the ASEAN trading bloc while
simultaneously scaring the hell out of Taiwan. The two
just don’t mix, and economics rules all in China right
now, so long as the Communist Party doesn’t feel too
shaky in its grip on power.
?? In this effort, the U.S. military had to plan, execute, and
deploy all at the same time. One officer said it was like
driving your car on vacation while you were planning
your stops and simultaneously trying to load up the
trunk! Tough, but this is what our military is so good ata
natural SysAdmin force. That’s how you mass $20 billion
of platforms (ships, aircraft, etc.) on site within
days. >
8 MARCH 2005 Copyright © 2005 by The New Rule Sets Project, LLC
?? Experts on disaster relief cited three big holes in the
combined efforts of the involved governments and private-
sector charities: (1) lack of central decision-making;
(2) lack of up-front planning; and (3) lack of technology,
especially for communications during the initial
emergency. Guess which institution is good at making
all three of those problems go away in an austere operational
environment? See the above.
?? The disaster response efforts of the Indonesian and
Indian militaries represented their first great efforts
beyond their own shores. It was also probably the single
biggest disaster response the U.S. military has mounted.
?? President Bush immediately set up a “Core Group” of
great powers to coordinate relief efforts (gotta like that
name). It consisted of (naturally) only Core powers: the
United States, Japan, India, and Australia. Immediately,
the UN got scared because, as usual, the UN was more
worried about its reputation than the quality of its
response. So the White House backed off. Too bad.
?? India’s government had a lot of explaining to do about
why it was so adamant about helping neighboring states,
like Sri Lanka, when there was plenty of suffering at
home. India’s response to critics was simple (paraphrasing
here): “We’re a big country, we’ve got a big military,
we’ve a growing economy, and we should help without
asking questions or waiting to be asked.” That, my
friends, is a Core pillar. India massed three hospital
ships, 38 navy and coast guard ships, lots of helos and
aircraft, and 15,000 troops. Very impressive, even by U.S.
standards.
?? Where was the great outpouring from Arab Muslim
states to help their co-religionists in Asia? Nowhere, at
first. Saudi Arabia gave almost nothing despite enjoying
a huge inflow of money from these same Asian states,
thanks to the recently hiked price of oil. Very unimpressive,
even by Saudi standards. Then the criticism
started mounting and viola! Saudi Arabia raised $82 million
in a telethon and Kuwait raised its donation from
$10 million to $100 million: unprecedented Arab charity,
after all.
?? Similarly unprecedented private-sector giving occurred
in Japan, China, and India. India’s private sector actually
outperformed the government in many ways – again
unprecedented.
?? China endured much criticism for its perceived nonleading
role, despite its rising economic star. The truth
is, China’s ability to raise cash is limited, and its military
(especially its navy) is more potential than reality. India’s
navy looked big in its response, as did America’s. China’s
navy was nowhere to be found. In the end, China gave
about $65 million, nowhere near what Japan (at least
$500 million) and the U.S. ($950 million) officially
pledged. China’s donation was more on a par with the
smaller Southeast Asian economies. Germany ($680m)
and Australia ($750m) were also leaders.
?? Ancient political tensions flared within India as the
“untouchables” caste (Dalits) perceived that they were
receiving less aid that other caste groups. The Indian
constitution bans such discrimination, but 3,000 years of
tradition does not.
?? In Sri Lanka, an interesting horizontal scenario ensued:
at first it looked as if rebel separatists (the Tamil Tigers)
would take advantage of the chaos, but apparently the
situation created new opportunities for unprecedented
cooperation between the rebels and the government.
?? A similar scenario played out in Indonesia, in Aceh, a
province that has been the site of a long-running (30
years) separatist movement. The Indonesian government’s
strategy has been to disconnect the region from
the outside world as much as possible, instituting a political
quarantine. The Asian Tsunamis disaster required
new connectivity of Aceh with the outside world,
prompting the rebels to independently work with relief
agencies and thank the world for aiding the Aceh people.
Naturally, this raised alarms in Jakarta, which then
demanded that all foreign entities leave Indonesia by a
drop-dead date of March 26. Some backing off from
that demand has occurred since, but don’t expect the
Indonesian government to become less sensitive on this
issue over time. Aussie troops are in Aceh as part of the
Core Group’s response. The last time Aussie soldiers
were in Indonesia, it was to lead a UN-sanctioned peacekeeping
effort that facilitated East Timor’s succession
from Indonesia. Yet, for now, it seems that the disaster
may lead to new negotiations between the Indonesian
government and the Aceh rebels, with talks reopening
for the first time since May 2003. A nice little sliver of
connectivity blessed this vast archipelago of a nationstate.
Allin all, the Asian Tsunamis have been a fascinating
event leading to a fascinating process of relief and
recovery. A human tragedy of great dimensions, it may positively
engender new connectivity in its wake. Disasters don’t
only bring individuals together; they tend to integrate nationstates and the global system. Wars yield new alliances, and disasters can do the same. If the Core plays its cards right, the Asian tsunamis reconstruction effort it supports may
become powerful venue for shrinking the Gap. 2
TOM BARNETT’S website and weblog can be found at
thomaspmbarnett.com. |
