Long, but excellent and well worth reading:
Compromise or time-bomb?
By Bashdar Ismaeel
The euphoria surrounding the Iraqi elections of January 30 has fast evaporated over the past months, with politicians bogged down in protracted negotiations over the shape of the government, and the key characters who will head it.
In the first breakthrough on Sunday, delegates to the National Assembly chose Hajim al-Hasani, a US-educated Sunni economist who currently holds office as minister of industry, as Speaker of parliament. His two deputies will be Dr Husayn al-Shahristani (Shi'ite), one of the most prominent opposition leaders under Saddam Hussein, and Arif Tayfour, a Kurd.
The deputies are due to meet again on Wednesday to name a president and two vice presidents. After that they will select the premier, and the National Assembly is then charged with writing a new constitution by mid-August.
Wrangling over the past weeks has been intense and highly frustrating, with predominantly bilateral negotiations between the two main benefactors of the elections, the Kurds and the majority Shi'ite group.
The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and masterminded by the influential and most powerful figure in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, won a principal majority, with just over half of the seats in the new National Assembly - 146 of the 275 seats available. The Kurdistan Alliance scored 26% of the electoral turnout, representing 77 seats, and find themselves in the prime position of kingmakers. The strong turnout in the Kurdish-dominated areas of Iraq gave them a prized if not resented wild card that effectively means that no government can be formed without their approval and cooperation.
A union between the Kurdish and Shi'ite lists is logical, given that between them they control 223 seats or almost 81% of the overall quota. If an agreement can be struck between the long oppressed groups on the Iraqi mosaic, then the required two-thirds majority will never be in danger, although seemingly oppression and brutality under Saddam's disposed regime and a newly found status of power is all they have in common.
In principle, a high-level deal on the future makeup of Iraq was struck even before the advent of the Second Gulf War among the many exiles now in the assembly. However, the finer implementation of any agreement is much harder than a vague common concord, that Iraq will be governed by a constitution that will be democratic, federal and pluralistic. The protracted negotiations, and even the lack of overall representation, with the main Sunni group forming less than 5% of the assembly, is an ominous step for Iraq - the real political jostling and fiery dealings have just begun and must be negotiated successfully to ensure that progress continues.
Protracted negotiations
Negotiations to date have left a bitter taste in the mouths of many, with the see-sawing situation highlighting restlessness and frustration, with each group at times blaming the other for stalling. Crucially, the US, clearly still jubilant from the apparent success of the first Iraqi elections in 50 years, decided to opt out as an influencing factor in the negotiations, and smartly left the Iraqis to sort it out themselves.
The impact of the negotiations on the Iraqi geographical, political and ethnic showground is the obvious reason why they have became so protracted. In theory, the US-sponsored Transitive Administrative Law (TAL) should have set the wheels and basis for these negotiations in motion, however, somewhat ironically, the TAL, which was reviled by many and only signed after days of delays and US pressure, was a debating factor and a hindrance.
The TAL in principle was most notorious for the "Kurdish veto", where a majority in three provinces can reject a constitution, effectively allowing the Kurds the ability to reject any article that is not deemed in their best interest. However, how a group that only composes 20% of the Iraqi population can be granted such power, where 65% of the population is Shi'ite, clearly left many a politician questioning the dominant and power-broking role of the Kurds. Conversely, however, many of the secularist groups within Iraq, and significantly the US, are quietly pleased with the lack of an authoritative Shi'ite grip on power, thus diluting demands, such as Sharia law, which the US feared would align the Shi'ites in Iraq closely with the Iranian theocracy only a short drive across the border.
The Kurdish wild card
The UIA candidacy for prime minister, Ibrahim Jaafari, was announced shortly after the elections. However, forming an agreement with the Kurds has proved a touch more elusive. The Kurds, conscious that their new historical role of power-broker won't last, are keen to maximize their gains, and for the first time in their less than colorful history, imprint their mark on the new Iraq.
Coupled with the virtual de-facto independence they have been enjoying since 1991 under a US military umbrella, they are very reluctant to bow down to the pressures of the greater Iraq once more. This is an Iraq that most of the new generation in the north have not seen, and that only reminds them about their oppressive and bitter past. Clearly, as two referendums have shown, most Kurds aspire to independence, which is widely acknowledged in the present climate as political suicide, with hostile neighboring countries ready to pounce. The second best for them would be a form of federalism that is close to their current status, and in reality very close to outright independence. However, this has been a crucial stumbling block in the negotiations, with the Shi'ite's adopting a line that either the Kurds are partners in the new Iraq or not.
This leads on to the logical question in any so-called voluntary union; how far does decentralization go, and what will federalism constitute? The answer to this in turn determines just as importantly how disparate each federation becomes, for example, will the regional resources be a property of the federal region or the central administration, in other words, will distribution of natural resources be based on geography or ethnicity?
Circular negotiations have at times been common, perhaps most evident in the TAL on the role of Islam in the constitution. Although Islam is deemed "a source of legislation", more problematically, it is not the source. Furthermore, under the interim constitution, no legislation can be adopted which may go against the principles of Islam. This is effectively an Islamic veto on legislation. Yet there appears to be a counter veto to that handed to the Islamists - no law can be adopted which contravenes democratic principles or civil rights.
The Kurds have spearheaded the negotiations with a number of principle demands. Kirkuk is to be instated in the Kurdish-administered region straight away, with the resettlement of Arabs who came under the infamous Arabization policy to be expedited. Furthermore, resources of the Kurdish area, including Kirkuk, are to come under the restrain of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). The Kurdish paramilitary force and the protectorate force in Iraqi Kurdistan, the peshmerga, will remain under the authority of the KRG, and the Iraqi army is prohibited to enter without prior consent of the Kurdistan parliament.
Significantly, for the secular-minded Kurds who are predominantly Sunni in origin, the government must not be Islamist in orientation. This was augmented by the Kurdish desire to bring on board the more secular Shi'ite list, the Democratic Alliance of interim premier Iyad Allawi, to dilute Shi'ite Islamist demands. Above all else, the Kurds, who are still distrustful of the greater Iraq, want written guarantees on any agreement.
The Shi'ite demands are slightly more clear-cut than that of the Kurds. It is more of a case of Shi'ites meeting Kurdish demands than the other way round. In reality, the Kurds will not hesitate to agree on demands by the Shi'ites, as long as their federal region incorporates their key demands, and the center does not have an influential control over the area. The main demand of the UIA is that Islam should be the overriding source, if not the source of legislation. For the Shi'ites, Iraq is to remain as much of a centralized unit as possible, where the government in Baghdad will drive resource management and its distribution, foreign policy and defense, among others. They, as the majority, believe that in turn they should have the biggest influence on the makeup of the new Iraq and the subsequent constitution.
Elusive compromise
Compromise is the classical element of any democracy, where those around the negotiating table can ascertain some median ground for cooperation and agreement. However, this principle is foreign to an Iraq that hosted a brutal dictatorship for almost 35 years. And even when compromises arise, it is doubtful that the principles will be all-enchanting and wide-reaching. Many elements are likely to be swept under the political rug at the new assembly for the sake of driving the process forward and thwarting the thriving insurgents who have experienced a field day of late as the politicians bicker.
For example, in reality, to resolve the internal-security question in Kurdistan, the peshmerga will in effect remain intact, with only a handful joining the new army, where they will be referred to differently and as an official unit of the greater Iraqi armed forces. Kirkuk will eventually be returned to the KRG, but according to the terms of the TAL.
Mindful of a Sunni and even Turkmen backlash, the Shi'ites have decreed that Kirkuk will not be returned while the thousands of Iraqis which moved in under the Arabization campaign are still there. This could cause inevitable conflict, and be perceived as breaking to the will of the Kurds among the Sunni clergy already underrepresented and skeptical about their political future.
A number of Kurdish demands will be granted. However, these agreements have to be seen as democratic and not the result of backroom dealings. This will look more justifiable, especially in front of the ever-watchful eyes of bordering Turkey, which has repeated the intervention rhetoric more than once. Conversely, in the eyes of the independent-minded Kurdish population, any agreement must not be seen as a sellout to the Arabic majority. In reality, the Kurds will have more influence from the center than first envisaged, but crucially the Kurdish parties will be mindful to not portray this as a step back for Kurdistan.
As for the crucial question of natural resources, in return for not controlling the abundant oil-fields of Kirkuk in the north, the Kurds will receive a high percentage of oil distribution from the center.
Future repercussions
Even once the elusive first government is formed, the road ahead may be bumpier and rougher than the proportion of the way it has successfully negotiated thus far.
It is important that any agreement is in essence future-proof. If it is formed for the sake of progressing with a new government and utilizing the momentum created by the elections, then problems are sown as opposed to resolved. Any "hot item" postponed on the political agenda has an annoying habit of gaining heat as time goes by, and either way it will burn if precautions are not taken.
The TAL, although a significant agreement, was signed with much reservation and was somewhat even bypassed when, under pressure from Sistani, it omitted any mention of United Nations Resolution 1456, which deals with suppressing terrorism. For some, any agreement in the current climate will not represent a true coalition, but a very loose mutual cooperation.
The consequences of any agreement are obvious if any party, particularly the Kurds, feel that their best interests have not been considered, or that any deal has been reneged; there is the inevitable threat of a breakdown in government and possibly a threat of secession altogether. In turn, no Kurdish participation means that there is no government; the political mind games are far from over.
The problems do not lie just in the formation of a government, but also in the greater Iraqi ethnic landscape. The first Kurdish president in Iraq may not strike well with the Sunni elite, some Shi'ites and surrounding Arabic countries. How a Kurdish president will be perceived at the Arabic League summits remains to be seen. Kurdish control of Kirkuk and the subsequent reaction by the Sunni, and particularly neighboring Turkey, to its annexation to the KRG poses an interesting predicament.
How a common national identity can be placed over the vast Iraqi ethnic mosaic is the most critical of all the key challenges ahead. The official language of Iraq will be both Kurdish and Arabic, but in reality both languages will remain regional-based. It is very likely that essentially Iraq will be composed of disparate if not independent regions. The exact law-making powers of each region remain to be seen. It is unclear if each region will be able to formulate separate trade agreements and foreign alliances; even the proposed international status of the new Arbil airport (KRG capital) became a recent discussion point. An iconic and significant indicator of national identity is the national flag, and even that will cause dispute and controversy in Iraq, as it has in the past.
An overpowering consequence, at this decisive time, will be the non-participation of Sunni Arabs. It is imperative that they are brought on board and given key cabinet positions, despite merely holding 20 seats at the National Assembly, to ensure that elements of the insurgency are appeased and the government is portrayed as incisive and united. The appointment of Hasani will go some way to meeting this requirement. Importantly, the Shi'ite-Kurdish coalition is also eager to carve out a role for outgoing premier Allawi, whose list came in second with 40 seats, to ensure a wider depth to the coalition.
Cabinet posts
The president, along with his two deputies, will be part of the so-called presidential council, which will be formally charged with appointing the prime minister. Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan is widely predicted to assume the largely iconic role of president. Adnan Pachachi, a Sunni, will likely assume one of the roles of vice president, with Allawi holding the other vice presidency. Prominent Shi'ite politician Dr Ibrahim Jaafari is the most likely bet for premier.
Of the 30 ministries available, the government will be divided roughly on the basis of a sectarian quota, leaving 16 posts for Shi'ites, six for the Kurds, six for Sunni Arabs and one each for Christians and Turkmen.
Conclusion
The strength and credibility of any new government is going to be open to debate. Some will argue that whatever results are achieved will be nothing short of classic compromise and a sign that Iraqis truly want to work together in shaping their future. However, just as importantly, some will portray any coalition as a time-bomb, which will rear its ugly head in the not too distant future.
Most reassuringly, Iraqis are trying to reconcile their divergent visions via the medium of political dialogue. For this to remain, however, and to stave off any civil war, all groups, regardless of the results of the elections, must be considered, and any agreement must meet the sensitivities of any one group.
One thing that is apparent, Jaafari, as the new prime minister, will certainly be under the spotlight and has tough times ahead. There was even premature pressure in some UIA circles for him to withdraw as their candidate because of the slow progress on forming a coalition, with some in other circles still a touch apprehensive in terms of his apparent Islamist designs on Iraq.
The first National Assembly which convened on March 15 was ominous to future dealings, with the vast ethnic and religious array on show, a great example of the wide spectrum that is Iraq. Even before the government was sworn in, there was disagreement on whether oaths should be read in Kurdish, Arabic, or both.
The "ripple of change" across Iraq and the Middle East, as hailed by Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, and encouraged by the US, as the new dawn of democracy, has not quite materialized in Iraq, but Iraqis have made progress. Iraq has been marked from its early days by a totalitarian grip on power; it is no surprise that negotiations have been onerous and time-consuming. However, having waited almost 35 years to escape the grip of repression and totalitarianism, it is fair to say that the majority of Iraqis are willing to accept the delays.
Bashdar Ismaeel is a London- based freelance writer who also holds first-class bachelor of science degree honors. The focus of his work is primarily on Iraq, the Kurds and Middle Eastern current affairs. He can be contacted at bashdar@hotmail.com. |
