To: Pluvia who wrote (3466 ) 4/8/2005 11:42:10 AM From: ravenseye Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5425 Speaking of Gryphon, check out TheTruthseeker in action: Message 20172631 lma(zz)o he wrote on 5/27/2004 IDN INTELI CHECK SERVED SI WITH A SUBPOENA FOR MY IDENTITY. THEY HAD NOT EVEN FILED A LAW SUIT. SI REFUSED TO HONOR THE SUBPOENA. FUNNY THING WAS ALL THAT I EVER DID WAS POST THIS RESEARCH REPORT ON SI Message 20172631 and supplied the 9/4/2003 link to it which has very suspicious commentary about Gryphon.10. IDN's sole item of tangible value is its market capitalization, calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the price of each share, which was about $100 million in early August 2003. With cash running low during the first quarter of 2003, IDN management turned to a floorless convertible in a deal with a Bahamian entity named Gryphon Master Fund to raise additional cash. This type of financing, also knows as a "toxic convertible" or "death spiral financing", gives the lender a security which can require the company to sell however many shares are necessary until the lender is repaid. This form of financing became more frequent during the late 1990's, when managements of some companies seeking to raise cash were unable to make outright sales of stock. Nevertheless, the lower the price of the shares, the more shares which must be sold to repay the holder of the floorless convertible, which can result in the "death spiral" of infinite dilution to shareholders. 11. Upon financing the floorless convertible, Gryphon began to sell IDN shares short, and by 24 June 2003, the date the prospectus was issued, had already sold short 240,000 shares plus a derivative representing the short of an additional 65,000 shares. It is difficult to borrow IDN stock for use in short selling; stock promotion schemes typically lock up all shares which they control with brokers who have instructions not to lend the stock. Indeed, we consider the difficulty of borrowing a stock to sell short to be an important indicator in itself, that the more difficult it is for an investor to borrow a stock for short sale, the more likely it is that that stock is a promotion scheme. We believe that in order for Gryphon to sell short such a large amount of IDN stock in such a short period of time, IDN insiders must have loaned IDN shares specifically to Gryphon for this purpose. We note that as lender of last resort to IDN, Gryphon had access to complete information on IDN, information which led it to sell shares short immediately so as to cover its risk. At the same time as these events, IDN engaged in an especially active round of press release issuance in order to maintain and increase the price of IDN shares. The toxic convertible allowed IDN to obtain more cash; if the arrangement between Gryphon is closer than arms length, then the net effect is that IDN insiders were able to liquidate more shares.