Fujianese can survive well in adversity. Does that tell you why Taiwanese are so stubborn sometimes about their self determination? Do you see any similarity between those Fujianese and Taiwanese? All those Fujianese who left their home town (vote with their feet Jay style) just show you how bad the government is/was. There is a town "Fu-Qhing" I passed by when I visited Fujian. 85% of young males left home and worked overseas (Illegally). It is a disgrace to the family if young males were afraid of taking adventures.
I know China history well if you ask me. I know more China history than my Taiwan history because of Chiang's past "reeducation" system. :-) I easily beat out those mainland Chinese about Chinese history and geography many many times.
usinfo.state.gov
What Drives Immigration from Fujian? Historical Roots and Legacy of Emigration
Fujian is the province closest to Taiwan across the Taiwan Strait and is near such Southeast Asian countries as Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It had a population of 31 million in 1993. Fujian can be characterized as "a mountain province in Southeast China"; 80 percent of its geographical area is covered by mountains (CMEC, 1993). Because Fujian is also a coastal province, its fishing industry is an important aspect of its economy and employment.
Emigration from Fujian started during the Ming dynasty in the middle of the fifteenth century and gained significant momentum during the Qing dynasty in the seventeenth century (Zhu, 1991). Some Chinese emigrated voluntarily, but millions (particularly those from Fujian and Guangdong) were imported by European colonials to work at their tropical plantations and tin mines (Alexander, 1973; Kwong, 1996).
The large exodus of the Fujianese did not start until after the Opium War, which China lost to Great Britain. As part of the war settlement, China signed the Treaty of Nanking on August 29, 1842 (Spence, 1991). Article 2 of the treaty permitted the opening of five Chinese port cities -- Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai -- for residence by British subjects and their families. Two of the port cities -- Fuzhou and Xiamen -- are located in Fujian.
The signing of this treaty greatly facilitated the exodus of Chinese laborers (Pan, 1990). This was also a time in which the Industrial Revolution was in high gear. Having abolished the international slave trade, Britain was looking for alternative cheap labor for its colonies. The discovery of gold in California provided a stimulus for the Chinese to emigrate to the United States (Sung, 1967; Zhou, 1992).
With regard to push factors within China, one was the country's unprecedented population growth during the late Ming and mid-Qing periods. The best estimates suggest that in 1685 China had a population of 100 million. About a hundred years later, in 1790, its population was 301 million -- an increase of 200 percent (Ho, 1959; Spence, 1991). The rapid growth of China's population created enormous pressure on the forces of production and plunged many people into poverty. This was especially the case in Fujian, about 80 percent of whose geographical area is covered by mountains. Meanwhile, rich merchants and landlords held large tracts of land, which deprived many peasants of their means of livelihood (Zhu, 1991). Finally, the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), which attempted to overthrow the Qing government, also created some uncertainties for Chinese society, especially in the south.
It was under these historical conditions that a large exodus of Chinese emigrants took place. The majority of Chinese emigrants were either contract laborers or debtor (indentured) laborers, who had to work a certain number of years to pay off their transportation expenses, after which they would be free. However, whether these Chinese came as contract labor or debtor labor, many of them were actually treated as de facto slaves. This chapter in Chinese history is commonly known as "coolie trade" or "piglet" (Ye, 1995; Zhu, 1991).
From 1845 to 1874, Fujian's level of emigration from the port of Xiamen was modest. Emigration began to increase in 1875 when 16,683 left Fujian, rising to 43,613 in 1885, 105,416 in 1990, 126,008 in 1915, and then dropping to 77,781 in 1920 (Zhu, 1991). Unfortunately, statistics for migration by countries of destination are not available for these years. However, there seems to be a consensus among scholars that the majority of these emigrants left for Southeast Asia and that others went to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand.
The massive Chinese emigration has changed the demography of many Southeast Asian countries and others as well (Poston, Mao, and Yu, 1994). For instance, 80 percent of the Chinese in the Philippines, 55 percent in Indonesia, 50 percent in Burma, and 40 percent in Singapore are of Fujian origin (Zhu, 1991).
Many of the Chinese in Southeast Asian countries have been economically successful (Alexander, 1973). The overseas Chinese also play an important role in the economic development of China by sending remittances back home and by contributing money to educational institutions in China. One of the most prominent Chinese businessmen was Dr. Chen Jiageng, who emigrated from Fujian to Singapore. He founded Xiamen University in Xiamen, Fujian Province, and became a legendary figure of overseas Chinese.
It is because of these earlier emigrants from Fujian that many villages in Fujian are "overseas Chinese villages" (qiao xiang) with intensive networks between them and the overseas Chinese of Fujian origin. Thus it is common for Fujianese to have relatives living abroad. As has been shown, emigration is deeply rooted in Fujian's cultural heritage. However, this tradition of emigration came to a halt with the Chinese Revolution of 1949 to 1978 because its citizens were not permitted to leave China.2
Escaping Poverty or Relative Deprivation?
Do undocumented Fujianese migrants come to the United States because they are poor in China? Our answer is yes and no. The Fujianese are certainly poor according to the standard of living in the United States, but they are by no means poor compared with people in the rest of China. We first analyze Fujian's economic conditions in relation to the rest of China and then analyze the economic conditions of some of the major immigrant-sending regions within the province of Fujian.
Fujian's level of economic development is closely connected to its geographical position in relation to Taiwan. As the province of mainland China closest to Taiwan, Fujian had long been treated by both China and Taiwan as a military frontier province, and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were expecting a war to break out at any time. In fact, the exchange of canon fire between Fujian and Taiwan lasted for about three decades. The tension in the Taiwan Strait began to ease only in the 1970s when Chiang Kai-shek died and his son Chiang Ching-kou assumed power. For this reason, Fujian, which did not have a strong industrial base to begin with, received less investment from the Chinese central government.
However, ever since China initiated the transition to a market-oriented economy in 1978, Fujian has enjoyed a steady economic growth. The quality of life has also improved significantly compared with that in the other provinces. In 1979, China announced the opening of four Special Economic Zones, including Xiamen in Fujian (Crane, 1990), with the intention of attracting foreign investment and stimulating the economy. It is also because of its close proximity to Taiwan that Fujian received a large investment from Taiwan, which further boosted its local economy. In 1992, a year before the ill-fated voyage of the Golden Venture, Fujian received $6 billion in foreign investments, whereas other Chinese provinces received on average only half that amount. The investment capital from Taiwan is particularly noticeable: $6.96 billion from 1978 to 1999 ("Experimental Region of Collaboration," 1999). Because of the relatively flexible economic policies and preferential treatment that Fujian has received since 1978, some sociologists classify it as a laissez-faire province, along with Guangdong Province in southern China (Lyons, 1994; Nee, 1996; Parish and Michelson, 1996).
The overall economic prosperity in Fujian since 1978 is further supported by the statistics on per capita income of rural households in various Chinese provinces in 1991. It is more relevant to study per capita income for rural households because most of the undocumented Fujianese migrants are from rural areas. In 1978, when China's transition to a market-oriented economy had just started, the per capita income in rural Fujian households was only about 134 yuan, compared with 133 yuan for China as a whole. What makes Fujian distinctive is that Fujian's rural household per capita income grew at a much faster rate than that of the average province in China. For example, from 1978 to 1988, Fujian's per capita income for rural households increased by 168 percent, compared with 146 percent for rural China as a whole.3 The difference is even more pronounced for the period 1978-92. During that time, Fujian's rural household per capita income rose by 229 percent versus 179 percent for rural households of China as a whole. As a result, the per capita income of Fujian's rural households rose to eighth place (out of thirty provinces) in 1992 (compared with twelfth in 1978). These data indicate that in contrast to other provinces in China, Fujian has enjoyed a particular advantage in the process of transition to a market-oriented economy. Therefore, at the provincial level, there is no evidence that Fujian is poor compared with the rest of China.
We further examine the economic conditions of major immigrant-sending regions in Fujian-Fuzhou (the capital of Fujian), Fuqing, Changle, Lianjiang, and Pingtan -- all of which are concentrated in the eastern part of Fujian and are geographically very close to one another. Fuzhou is a large metropolis with a population of 5 million and is the center of political and economic activities in the province. Fuqing and Changle are extremely close to Fuzhou. Pingtan County is an island off the east coast and is the farthest county from Fuzhou of the immigrant-sending regions. Unlike the northern provinces of China where Mandarin is the standard language, people in Fujian speak many local dialects. Thus a person who speaks the Fuzhou dialect, for example, would not be able to communicate in Xiamen, another well-known city in Fujian that is not in these five regions. However, because of the geographical proximity of these five immigrant-sending regions, they all share a common dialect: the Fuzhou dialect. This common local dialect has implications once Fujian immigrants move to the New York metropolitan area.
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Table 3. Characteristics of Major Immigrant-Sending Regions in Fujian Province, 1993
Region Population (thousands) Average Salary (yuan) Per Capita Income (yuan)
Fuzhou city 5,507 4,803 N.A.
Fuqing city 1,101 4,853 1,640
Changle County 654 4,176 1,538
Lianjiang County 613 4,101 1,305
Pingtan County 344 4,101 1,065
Fujian Province 30,992 4,890 1,211
Source: State Statistical Bureau (1994).
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Table 3 reveals several characteristics of Fujian's five major immigrant-sending regions. Column 3 shows the average salary for urban workers in each region. The average yearly salaries for workers in urban Fuzhou and Fuqing are almost equivalent to the average of Fujian Province as a whole. These data indicate that Fuzhou and Fuqing are not poor by Fujian standards. Workers in the urban areas of the other three regions (Changle, Lianjiang, and Pingtan) are paid slightly lower than the average for Fujian. However, as we discussed earlier, since most undocumented Fujianese are from rural areas, it is more relevant to examine the corresponding figures for such areas.
The per capita incomes for rural households in these immigrant-sending regions are quite different. In fact, with the exception of Pingtan, rural households in these regions enjoy an advantage in per capita income, especially in Fuqing and Changle. This finding is consistent with the macrolevel portrait of development in Fujian in general. Kristof (1993), a reporter for the New York Times, went to Fujian after the Golden Venture episode and made similar observations.4
If absolute poverty is not the reason for migration, why are Fujianese risking their lives to come to the United States? We argue that a sense of relative deprivation is causing Fujianese peasants to make desperate attempts to migrate. The theory of relative deprivation was first suggested by Stouffer et al. (1949) in their study of army life, especially in relation to promotions during World War II. According to this theory, an individual makes judgments about his or her welfare that are based not only on his or her absolute level of material possessions (such as income) but perhaps more important on the relative level of welfare in reference to others in the community. This sense of relative deprivation has strong implications for an individual's behavior.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the concept of relative deprivation was used to study mobilization and rebellion (see, e.g., Gurr, 1969; Tilly, 1978). More recently, economist Stark and his associates have used this concept to study migration, and the concept is now a major component of the "new economics of migration" (Stark, 1991). In a study of migration from Mexico to the United States, Stark and Taylor hypothesized that "given a household's initial absolute income and its expected net income from migration, more relatively deprived households are more likely to send migrants to foreign labor markets than are less relatively deprived households" (Stark and Taylor, 1989: 4). This hypothesis is supported by data on migration from Mexico (Stark and Taylor, 1989; see also Portes and Rumbaut, 1996).
We argue that the relative deprivation approach has particular relevance for explaining undocumented migration from Fujian Province. China's transition to a market-oriented economy has dramatically increased overall income inequality because many people seized the opportunity to get rich quickly by whatever means possible (Khan and Riskin, 1998; Liu, 1995). The most commonly used measure of income inequality is the Gini index (Xie and Hannum, 1996). A Gini index of .4 or larger is considered to be exceptionally high inequality. The World Bank (1996) reported that China's Gini index was .374 in 1992. More recently, according to a study conducted by the People's University of China in Beijing, China's Gini index was .434 in 1994 (He, 1996). The large and growing value of the Gini index is consistent with the findings from social surveys in China that have suggested that a substantial proportion of respondents have complained about the rising income inequality over time (CND, 1996). The increased inequality in China makes people at the bottom feel a sense of relative deprivation and desperate to find ways to make money and become rich. Going to the United States, through either legal or illegal channels, is an alternative way of getting rich, they think.
With regard to Fujian Province, Lyons (1998) conducted the most systematic study on trends in income disparity in Fujian. Using county-level data from Fujian Province from 1978 to 1995, Lyons analyzed changes in income distribution. He found that the county coefficient of variation (a measure of relative disparity in income) in rural households increased from .209 in 1983 to .273 in 1995. One source of increased relative income disparity is remittance. Although no direct information is available on the amount of remittance sent to Fujian each year, one can gauge the impact of remittance through other channels. As Lyons (1998) argued, part of the remittance was used to start nonagricultural enterprises that have increased rapidly since 1978.
The impact of remittance can also be detected through consumption patterns. One of the ways emigrant households spend the remittance is to build new houses or improve housing conditions. On our recent trip to Changle, one of the major immigrant-sending regions in Fujian, we saw many newly built brick houses. Using data from the 1995 China 1% Population Sample Survey, Liang and Zhang (1999) further analyzed the impact of emigration on housing conditions in Fujian. They found that, controlling for other important sociodemographic characteristics (such education, age, and occupation), families with emigrants are more likely to live in larger houses and have better housing conditions (including the type of cooking fuel used and the availability of a private bathroom and kitchen).
Local Fujianese also like to build fancy tombs for their ancestors to symbolize the good virtue of the ancestors in making the overseas venture possible. We also saw some elementary schools that were supported by money from overseas, many of which bear the names of the overseas Fujianese who donated money for them. The flow of a large amount of remittance also changes the income distribution in the communities, creating a sense of relative deprivation for those Fujian peasants who do not receive it, and provides further impetus for going abroad.
The lavish spending and consumption patterns of Fujianese who return from abroad also contribute to a sense of relative deprivation by the local Fujianese. From the founding of the People's Republic of China to 1977, having a relative abroad was not something of which to be proud. In fact, during the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, it was a major source of trouble and cause for political persecution. Many families with relatives abroad were accused of spying for foreign countries and therefore severely punished. However, since 1978, China has changed its policy toward the overseas Chinese and has encouraged them to visit China and especially to invest in businesses. As a result, more and more of the overseas Chinese return to visit relatives (sheng qin) and to do business in their hometowns.5
Most of the overseas Chinese of Fujian origin visit relatives during the Chinese New Year. They stay in luxury hotels, bring fancy gifts from abroad, give hong bao (red purses, money) to friends and relatives, go to karaoke clubs, and have big feasts in expensive restaurants for relatives. Ye (1995) estimated that almost 80 percent of the customers who stay in hotels in Fuzhou during the Chinese New Year are overseas Chinese of Fujian origin who are visiting relatives. Because of the large volume of overseas Fujianese who visit, some hotels depend on them for business. One manager at a hotel in the city of Fuzhou put it in this way: "To tell you the truth, without the Fujianese returning home for visits, our business could not survive."
Local Fujianese are overwhelmed by how much wealth one can accumulate abroad. What they are rarely told is how hard one has to work to make it and often under subhuman conditions; they only see how glamorous it is to work abroad. The return of the overseas Chinese has particularly motivated peasants in Fujian to migrate internationally because of the extravagant lifestyles that the visiting overseas Fujianese display.
The large volume of emigration and remittance have had a major impact on the local economy. In other provinces of China, it is customary to build the major airport in the capital city of the province. In Fujian, however, the biggest airport was built in Changle, not in the capital city of Fuzhou. In a casual stroll along a street in Changle, one sees many business banners with the word hua qiao (overseas Chinese) attached. To accommodate overseas Chinese, several hotels and travel agencies are named hua qiao hotels or hua qiao travel agencies.
Under such circumstances, migration is perceived as "the thing to do" -- the only way that young people can advance economically (Portes, 1997). In some villages in Fujian, almost 90 percent of the young people have gone abroad (Ye, 1995). Young people who are reluctant to go abroad are considered mei chu xi (no great future). As more and more people emigrate to other countries, more and more Fujianese communities emerge (especially in New York), which further facilitates the process of migration for other family members from the same communities in Fujian. This is the nature of the cumulative causation of migration, which has been documented clearly in the case of Mexican migration to the United States (Massey et al., 1994).
We have so far discussed changes in income disparity in Fujian from 1983 to 1995 and examined various ways remittances have been spent and their impact on the local economy and in further stimulating more emigration. To substantiate further our argument about relative deprivation, we turn now to the question of who migrated internationally from Fujian. Table 4 compares the sociodemographic characteristics of emigrants and nonemigrants from Fujian Province. This comparison is important, because research on Chinese immigration to the United States usually focuses on the Chinese immigrants and rarely examines how immigrants compare with the people who choose to stay. As table 4 shows, men are heavily represented in the emigrant population, accounting for 74 percent of the emigrants. The mean ages of the emigrant and nonemigrant populations are similar, but they actually mask a major difference in the age distribution of the two groups. Nearly 70 percent of the emigrants versus 27 percent of the nonemigrants are in the working age of twenty to thirty-four. Another major difference is education. Almost 16 percent of nonemigrants, but fewer than 1 percent of the emigrants, have no formal education. Nearly half of the emigrants have junior high school education, whereas close to 50 percent of the nonemigrants have only an elementary school education. Thus, if education is used as a proxy for socioeconomic status, it is clear that emigrants from Fujian are not at the bottom of socioeconomic hierarchy.6
Culture of Seafaring
Unlike earlier Fujian emigration to either Nan Yang (Southeast Asia) or the United States, the current illegal immigration is highly risky. For example, the Golden Venture traveled 112 days, passing Thailand, going through Africa (Kenya and the Ivory Coast), and finally reaching Queens in New York City (Schemo, 1993b). The Fujianese aboard suffered from the lack of food and poor nutrition, isolation, and extremely poor sanitary conditions (Schemo, 1993b; 1993a). It is hard to imagine that the average Chinese could endure such an ordeal. Do Fujianese have any particular characteristics that make them exceptionally risk taking? We argue that their familiarity with sea life facilitates the voyage to the United States.
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Table 4. Sociodemographic Characteristics of Emigrants and Nonemigrants, Fujian, 1995
Variable Emigrant (%) Nonemigrant (%)
Sex
Male 74.10 50.79
Age (yr.)
0-14 0.55 29.59
15-19 8.26 8.2
20-34 68.04 27.43
35+ 23.14 34.77
Mean Age 29.21 29.03
Marital Status
Unmarried 37.95 22.41
Married, spouse present 61.22 68.02
Remarried, spouse present 0.55 1.7
Divorced 0 0.65
Widowed 0.28 6.53
Education
No formal education 0.28 15.88
Literate 0 3.75
Elementary school 27.42 48.23
Junior high school 47.92 22.42
High school 19.39 7.32
Junior college and above 4.99 1.56
Place of Origin
City 17.36 14.34
Town 17.08 8.33
Rural 65.56 77.33
Source: Liang and Zhang (1999).
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The sea is a way of life for many Fujianese. Because Fujian is located on the southeastern coast of China, many Fujianese depend on fishing for a living. They are more familiar with life at sea and are not afraid of its difficult conditions. Mr. Chen, a fisherman in Fujian, said: "There is a risk of not being able to return for every fishing trip. But how can you catch fish without going to the sea? For me, going to America is just like another fishing trip." Another informant expressed it this way: "I am from Changle, we are sons of the sea. Our life depends on the sea for generations.... My wife does not worry about me when I go on a fishing trip for days because she knows I am going to be okay." (cited in Xin 1993). This unique way of life and culture helps the Fujianese overcome the fear of a voyage of several months and of enduring the conditions that would perhaps be unbearable for most non-Fujianese.
The deep connection with sea life can be traced throughout in Fujianese history and in Fujian's folklore. A well-known Chinese scholar of the Ming dynasty wrote: "Hai zhe min ren zhi tian ye" [sea is the field for Fujianese] (Wang, 1994: 4). Because of the lack of arable land, the Fujianese have for many years earned their living by fishing. There is also a saying that Fujian has a silk road on the sea. During the Ming dynasty, Fujianese took advantage of several port cities and the ready availability of good-quality lumber for shipbuilding to transport silk and cotton from Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces for export to other countries (Wang, 1994).
The most famous folktale is of Mazu, the sea goddess. Legend has it that Mazu always helps people through hardships and, in particular, rescues fishermen when they face crises at sea. Even today, before fishermen in Fujian go fishing, they pray to Mazu to protect them. This tradition has been carried over to the Fujianese immigrant community in New York. In February 1999, during the annual parade of the Lunar Chinese New Year in Flushing and Manhattan's Chinatown, we observed floats carrying statues of Mazu.
History and folklore are suggestive of the Fujianese's close attachment to the sea, but they are not a substitute for a rigorous and systematic analysis. Therefore we measured the importance of the fishing industry in the current Fujianese economy. Compared with other provinces in China, the fishing industry accounts for 117 percent of the total agricultural output in 1992 -- the highest proportion among all the provinces of mainland China (SSB, 1993). The fishing industry is clearly more important in Fujian than in other provinces. Moreover, the total value of the fishing industry output places Fujian in fourth place behind Guangdong, Shandong, and Zhejiang (all coastal provinces) (SSB, 1993).
The importance of fishing is even more evident if one looks at the five immigrant-sending regions -- Fuzhou, Fuqing, Changle, Lianjiang, and Pingtan. On average, more than half (54%) the agricultural output value is related to fishing industries of these regions (SSB, 1994). This is particularly the case for Lianjiang and Pingtan Counties, whose fishing outputs account for 69 percent and 75 percent of the total agricultural outputs, respectively (SSB, 1994).
Despite the unique economic structure in the immigrant-sending communities, which is dominated largely by fishing-related industries, the rich historical evidence, and folklore linking Fujianese culture with sea life, we are by no means suggesting that most emigrants are fishermen before their departure.7 Instead, we argue that life at sea is familiar to many Fujianese who live in these regions and that this familiarity prepares them well for the sometimes dangerous journey to the United States or other destination countries.
Snake People and Snakeheads
Given the significant income and wage differentials in Fujian, the Fujianese are clearly motivated to migrate to the United States. However, many Fujianese cannot make the journey on their own. Many players assist in this process: snakeheads, or sbe tou (smugglers), who organize the entire smuggling process; corrupt Chinese officials, who make sure that the Chinese Coast Guard conveniently disappears when ships carrying illegal immigrants leave for international waters (Kwong, 1997); contacts in many transit countries who arrange for charter flights to the United States or are subcontracted to help the immigrants across the U.S. border; enforcers in New York whose task is to threaten and torture illegal immigrants until they pay their debts; and, finally the snake people, or ren she8 (the illegal migrants), who usually endure long journeys to and harsh working conditions in the United States. The smuggling of undocumented Fujianese is a complex and difficult operation that does not succeed without an extremely careful plan and collaboration around the globe.
The snakeheads are much more sophisticated than the "coyotes" who help Mexicans cross the U.S.-Mexican border. Their organizations are transnational and have access to the most advanced technology for communication. Their passport and visa factories have the capacity to make fake passports of any country, fake visas to the United States, and any other documents that are needed. They are also able to obtain the most up-to-date information and plan the best possible routes for smuggling people.
The smuggling process typically begins in the communities in Fujian, where smugglers go to recruit potential migrants. Most experts in the study of human smuggling believe that the mastermind of today's smuggling organization is located in Taiwan (Kwong, 1997; Myers, 1997).
Such earlier smuggling was pretty much a mom-and-pop operation with a limited contacts around the globe and involved smuggling only a few individuals at a time. These operations were run mostly by Cantonese, people from Guangdong Province, another coastal province not far from Fujian (Myers, 1997). However, it was not until the "Taiwan connection" was established that smugglers had access to sophisticated technology and were able to transport large numbers of people with high rate of success.
The ability to establish a global smuggling network seems to be an unintended consequence of the Cold War. After the defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) by Mao Zedong's People's Liberation Army in 1949, KMT head Chiang Kai-shek was preparing to regain mainland China when the opportunity arose. As an integral part of this strategy, the Intelligence Bureau of the Military National Defense (IBMND) was cultivating all its connections among those who fled China (many of whom had connections with criminal organizations [Kwong, 1997]). According to Myers (1997) and Kwong (1997), with funding and training from the CIA, the IBMND turned the KMT Third Army in Myanmar and Thailand into "Chinese Irregular Forces," who were alleged to be involved in heroin production and export. In the late 1950s, again with further support from the CIA, Taiwan expanded its technical and economic assistance to countries in Africa, Central and South America, and the Caribbean islands. "Thousands of Taiwanese were transferred to work in aid programs...and many thousand more Taiwanese emigrated to these obscure countries" (Myers, 1997: 106). Although there is no direct evidence of the Taiwan government's involvement in human smuggling, there is no doubt that Taiwanese crime organizations have taken advantage of the foundations laid by the Taiwan government, and the U.S. law enforcement officials strongly suspect that Taiwan's military and intelligence communities are involved in and profit from the human smuggling trade (Kwong, 1997:87). In any event, it is clear that smugglers have a dense network that reaches every part of the world: Fujian, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Golden Triangle (northern mountain region of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos), Latin America, Africa, and New York's Chinatown.
The Taiwanese have another advantage in smuggling Fujianese to the United States other than geographical proximity: the cultural linkage between Fujian and Taiwan. Many people in Taiwan (8o% by some estimates; see "Experimental Region of Collaboration," 1999) are the descendants of Fujianese who migrated to Taiwan many years ago. Though the local dialects are not entirely identical, the Taiwanese and Fujianese have many similar cultural traditions, such as praying to the sea goddess Mazu for safety. This cultural homogeneity facilitates communication and builds a sense of trust, which is essential for smuggling people thousands of miles away from their homes.
There are several strategies for smuggling snake people into the United States. One strategy is to use fake documents that allow them to land directly at airports in the United States. In this case, the snake people first buy fake Taiwanese, Singaporean, Malaysian, or South Korean passports to apply for U.S. visas as citizens of these countries. Often through travel agencies in the United States and China, snake people also mingle with different delegations from China. The only difference is that snake people will simply disappear upon arrival at the destination. Often they are picked up by the smugglers and assigned to work in restaurants or garment factories in the New York metropolitan area. This strategy continues to be used. On December 27, 1997, eight Fujianese were about to board Air China Flight 981 from Shanghai to New York's JFK airport. Chinese immigration inspector Chen Haiyin noted that all eight Fujianese held Chinese passports and U.S. immigration visas but looked suspicious, so she detained them for further inspection of the documents. It turned out that all eight visas were forged ("$120,000 Bought 8 Pages," 1997).
The second strategy requires snake people to pass through transit countries in other parts of the world before they reach the United States. Some snake people travel on foot and by bus from China's Yunnan Province (southwestern China) to Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries and then take flights to the United States (Liu, 1996; Myers, 1997). "Between eastern and western processing and holding centers, more than 43 countries played a transit role in airborne and seaborne smuggling" (Myers, 1997: 117). Mexico is a major transit country for snake people. Once they arrive in Mexico, local subcontractors take them across the U.S. Mexican border.
Another variation of this channel is for snake people to arrive in Canada using Hong Kong passports, since holders of Hong Kong passports do not need visas to enter Canada. Once in Canada, the snake people will be transported to the United States. On December 10, 1998 Doris Meissner, the commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, announced the crackdown of a smuggling ring that had brought more than thirty-six hundred illegal Chinese immigrants into the United States over the previous two years (Chen, 1998; Holmes, 1998). The ring, consisting mainly of Chinese and members of a Native American tribe, transported immigrants through an upstate New York Indian reservation that was guarded minimally by the U.S. Border Patrol.
Another strategy is to smuggle snake people by sea. Snakeheads often use crumbling freighters or fishing vessels owned by Taiwanese. Between 1991 and 1993, thithirty twoips with a total of fifty-three hundred Chinese were found in the waters of Japan, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, Hawaii, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and the United States (Chin, 1996: 157). In sum, whatever strategies snake people use to enter the United States, it is clear that they cannot make it to the United States without the involvement of snakeheads.
New York's Chinatown plays a pivotal role in this process as well. For a good part of this century, crime and gang activity have been part of life in New York's Chinatown (Chin, 1996; Kwong, 1996), but it was not until recent years that members of Chinatown's organized crime organizations became involved in smuggling immigrants from China, among other things (Cooper, 1996).9 In New York, the smugglers (often in the name of "welcoming and receiving organizations") are responsible for picking up the snake people and escorting them to Chinatown for employment and sometimes sending them to work outside New York if opportunities are available. They also make sure that all snake people are taken care of by enforcers to collect the smuggling fees. In some cases, enforcers use severe physical torture and sometimes sexual abuse to collect the smuggling debt (Chin, 1997; Kwong, 1997).
Summary and Discussion
This chapter has striven comprehensively and systematically to examine undocumented immigration from China's Fujian Province. It first provided a historical overview of emigration from Fujian Province, showing that emigration from Fujian is not a new phenomenon. This historical legacy has stimulated contemporary out-migration because of the lifestyle overseas Fujianese display when they visit Fujian. What is new, however, is the extremely dangerous form this new migration has taken. One important fact that has often been overlooked is that since they live on the east coast of China, many Fujianese are used to life at sea and risk taking as a way of life. This trait makes them particularly good candidates for being snake people.
We suggest that the sense of relative deprivation driven by China's transition to a market economy and the large amount of remittance sent to Fujian are other critical factors in the decisions of Fujianese to immigrate to other countries. Even though the standard of living in Fujian has risen, people at the bottom of the income hierarchy feel poorer than they actually are when they see others getting rich so quickly. In addition, our data clearly show that people who live in these immigrant-sending communities are not poor compared with those in the rest of China or in the rest of Fujian. We suggest, as Massey (1995) pointed out, that in one way or another China's transition to a market-oriented economy has planted some seeds for migration.
What distinguishes Fujianese immigration from other cases (such as the Mexican) is the heavy involvement of the transnational smuggling network. Although the involvement of this network increases the success rate of smuggling, it also increases the cost, which makes this type of migration not accessible to everyone. However, this pattern began to change recently. During our fieldwork in the summer of 1994, we found that snakeheads have started using some new tactics in recruiting potential snake people. For example, they send women with children to chat with potential snake people, which makes the recruitment less threatening, and recruiters often tell potential snake people stories of success of former townspeople to show how easy it is to go to the United States and become rich.
There have also been some changes in the way smugglers collect money. Although the smuggling fee in most cases is still $30,000-$35,000 or even higher, the way snakeheads collect money is different. Some snakeheads do not collect any money until the snake people arrive in the United States (most likely New York City). Other snakeheads lend snake people some money before the departure, which makes the emigration option very attractive. Over time, snakeheads seem to make offers that are difficult to refuse, and because of the high success rate, more and more Fujianese are drawn into the process of illegal migration to the United States.
The entry of large numbers of Fujianese into New York and especially their concentration in Manhattan's Chinatown have implications for the ethnic economy and politics of the city. Increasingly, the Fujianese, as new blood in Chinatown, are playing a greater role in the Chinese community and in many ways are rivaling the old-timers from Guangdong and Taiwan. Lii (1996a, 1996b, 1997) noted that Fujianese have taken control of almost all the takeout places in the New York area that used to be owned by ethnic Chinese from Guangdong and Southeast Asia. The entry of a large number of Fujianese immigrants is also providing a new source of labor for the garment industry, which often pays less than the minimum wage (Kwong, 1996). Furthermore, there has been a heavy concentration of Fujianese immigrants in some sections of Manhattan's Chinatown; for example, some have called East Broadway "Fuzhou Street" (Cooper, 1996; Kinkead, 1992). At the same time, there is also evidence that Fujianese are expanding their businesses to Texas and Indiana (Einhorn, 1994). 10
The emergence of the Fujianese community introduces new dynamics of "transnational politics" in Chinatown. Most Fujianese are pro-mainland China. In contrast, the Chinatown old-timers are more likely to be pro-Taiwan. So, for the first time in 1995, a Fujianese-led organization (the United Chinese Associations of New York) celebrated China's National Day on October 1 (Kwong, 1996), but the Chinatown old-timers (led by the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association) continued to celebrate October 10 ("double 10" as some call it), the day of the birth of the Republic of China. So far both celebrations have been peaceful.
However, Tommy Chan (the deputy inspector of the Fifth Precinct, where Chinatown is located) is caught in the middle of these "transnational politics" and tries to keep a balance between the pro-Taiwan Cantonese old-timers and pro-mainland Fujianese newcomers (Lii, 1996b). As more and more immigrants from Fujian arrive each day, the extent of "transnational politics" is likely to be further intensified. |
