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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: unclewest who wrote (112205)5/2/2005 2:14:03 AM
From: KLP  Respond to of 793957
 
Hillary should be VERY careful...this much was public info, nearly a year BEFORE the election, and nearly two years BEFORE 9-11..... Hillary is trying to play politics as usual, and this could be her undoing....

This is JUST Part of the Report on US House on North Korea dated Oct 29, 1999.......

B. Do the North Korean chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?

The recent increase in the North Korean CBW threat is derived from its assumed efforts to develop CBW
warheads for its long-range ballistic missiles, now capable of striking the continental United States.

KEY FINDINGS

North Korea possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons on missiles.
The DPRK is generally credited with possessing a full range of chemical warfare agents, including nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. The South Korean government believes that the DPRK followed the Russian pattern of developing chemical warfare (CW) weapons for a wide range of weapons systems, including artillery above 82 millimeter (mm), multiple rocket launchers, Soviet-derived FROGs (Free Rocket Over Ground), SCUD missiles, aerial bombs and spray tanks.

The DPRK biological weapons (BW) effort is believed to focus on traditional agents: plague, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers. It is generally assumed that, to the extent capable, the DPRK would seek to provide BW munitions for the same range of weapons as it does with chemical munitions.
Political-Military Significance
While most of the attention regarding North Korea's CBW weapons has been focused on technological capabilities or stockpiles, an equally important element in considering the DPRK CBW threat is trying to understand how North Korea views the strategic utility of these weapons, and the consequences of using them.

The concept of international abhorrence regarding CBW carries little weight with the DPRK.(24) This could be attributed to North Korea's apparent belief that the United States and South Korea would use CBW in a conflict, international agreements notwithstanding. This belief is reflected in North Korean propaganda, but more significantly in the extensive CBW defense preparations undertaken not only for its military forces, but also for its civilian population. It is also frequently argued that the DPRK would consider any military conflict as a fight for its survival as a nation, and hence would adopt an "Armageddon" attitude, unconstrained by international law.

Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack.

Since the Aum Shin Rykio nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway, the possibility of unconventional or terrorist CBW use by North Korea could be a real danger. Such an attack might play a role in an invasion scenario. North Korea might also use CW against Japanese facilities, in addition to ROK and U.S. facilities in South Korea, to discourage or impede Japanese cooperation with U.S. and South Korean armed forces.

Biological weapons can present significantly different considerations. For example, highly infectious diseases, e.g., smallpox, have the obvious potential to affect one's own forces or population if used in close proximity. Hence their more likely use would be strategic, i.e., as a threat against the United States or Japan. The less infectious diseases, e.g., anthrax, could be used as a destabilizing tactic or to interdict passage through certain areas in an invasion scenario. Outside of an invasion scenario, unconventional terrorist use of BW is a possibility, particularly of naturally-occurring diseases, which would make attribution difficult.

Background and Status of the DPRK Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs

The U.S. government has released no specific details on North Korean CBW capabilities, but the Department of Defense has stated that the DPRK has a "sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons," and "has pursued research and development related to biological warfare capabilities."(25)

Chemical Weapons

North Korea's CW program is generally assumed to have started in the mid-1950s with heavy dependence upon Russian and Chinese assistance. Development of an offensive capability appears to have been a lengthy process, with early detectable efforts concentrating on defensive preparations. An oft-quoted estimate of the DPRK CW stockpile in 1989 was about 180-250 metric tons.(26) By 1997, estimates placed the DPRK CW stockpile at about 5,000 metric tons.(27)

The DPRK is generally credited with possessing a full-range of chemical warfare agents, including nerve, blister, choking, and blood agents. The North Koreans have recently emphasized their work on nerve agents. It is also believed that the DPRK is interested in developing binary nerve agents.(28)

Estimates of the number of DPRK production, research, and storage facilities have remained stable over the last decade, with the ROK government estimating current peacetime annual production capability (if not actual production) at 4.5 tons, with the likelihood of a surge capacity.(29) A 1993 report estimates that the DPRK was operating eight CW and BW production plants, and that there were six storage facilities in the country, and three research institutes.(30)

The ROK government believes that the DPRK followed the Russian pattern of developing CW munitions for a wide range of weapons systems, including artillery above 82 mm, multiple rocket launchers, Soviet-derived FROGs, SCUD missiles, aerial bombs and spray tanks. Unconventional delivery means, e.g., clandestine aerosols and balloons, are also suspected.(31)

In terms of recent increases in the DPRK CW threat, it is not the types of agents or stockpile levels that have attracted the most attention, but rather the assumed efforts to develop CW warheads for its No Dong and Taepo Dong ballistic missiles. The ROK government assesses the No Dong as CW capable.

Even more unsettling, however, is the prospect of the coupling of a CW weapon with the Taepo Dong 1 or 2 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under development, with the capability to strike Japan and virtually all U.S. military installations in East Asia, including Guam.(32) While testing of the Taepo Dong 2 has been suspended per the Berlin Agreement with the United States, a three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could strike the United States with a chemical or biological warhead.(33)

The efficient and accurate dispersal of chemical agents by a ballistic missile presents a number of technical challenges.

Biological Weapons (BW)

The North Korean BW program is thought to have begun in the 1960s, but did not attract attention until the 1980s. It appears to have developed slowly, owing to the poor state of biotechnology in the DPRK. Japanese officials, however, point out that DPRK scientists have recently won international recognition for the development of a new Hepatitis-B vaccine -- an event that could indicate a more sophisticated biotech capability than previously thought.(34) The DPRK BW effort is believed to have focused on the traditional agents: plague, typhoid, cholera, anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fevers.(35) There is no publicly available evidence that the DPRK has undertaken development of genetically-engineered BW agents. However, given that the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was openly discussing interest in such agents 30 years ago, it seems reasonable to assume that the DPRK would explore this avenue to the extent possible.(36) There are no reliable public estimates of the DPRK's BW agent or munitions stockpile. It is generally assumed that, to the extent capable, the DPRK would seek to provide BW munitions for the same range of weapons as it does with chemical munitions, i.e., artillery, rockets, bombs, and missiles.

As with CW, any recent increase in the BW threat profile can be attributed to the DPRK's ballistic missile programs, and the assumption that BW warheads will be forthcoming. Long-range missiles are particularly attractive for biological warfare because they remove or reduce the chance of affecting one's own forces or population. However, even more than CW agents, BW agents present significant technological challenges for effective delivery by a missile warhead. Nevertheless, North Korea possesses biological weapons production and dispensing technology, including the capability to deploy chemical or biological weapons on missiles.(37) This is primarily because BW agents are live organisms and must be able to survive the stresses of missile flight and impact. As with CW, however, the psychological effect of BW strikes are likely to be so great that accuracy and efficient dispersal are not necessarily critical to having political or military consequences.

C. Does the North Korean missile program pose a greater threat to U.S. security than five years ago?

Today, North Korea ranks with Russia and China as one of the greatest missile threats in the world due to: the
progress made over the past five years in improving its missile capabilities; its record as a leading proliferator of
ballistic missiles and missile technology; and its development of high explosive, chemical, biological, and possibly
nuclear weapons.

KEY FINDINGS

Unlike five years ago, North Korea can now strike the United States with a missile that could deliver high explosive, chemical, biological, or possibly nuclear weapons. The United States currently is unable to defend against this threat.


According to the 1999 ballistic missile National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "the proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles - driven primarily by North Korean No Dong sales - has created an immediate, serious and growing threat to U.S. forces, interests, and allies, and has significantly altered the strategic balances in the Middle East and Africa."(38)North Korean No Dong transfers have all occurred within the last five years.

In the last five years, North Korea has made significant progress in improving its missile capabilities. It has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched a three-stage missile (Taepo Dong 1), and continues to develop a larger and more powerful longer-range missile (Taepo Dong 2).

Exports
North Korea is one of the world's leading suppliers of ballistic missiles and missile technology, and has developed, produced, deployed and exported a broad range of missiles (see Fig. 1.1). By selling complete missile systems, components, and missile technologies to Iran, Syria, Egypt, and Pakistan, North Korea undermined regional stability in the Middle East and South Asia.

It is probable that North Korea will also export the longer-range missiles it is developing to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and perhaps Libya, if political or economic developments do not intervene.

Taepo Dong 1
North Korea attempted to orbit a small satellite using the Taepo Dong 1 in August 1998, but the third stage failed during powered flight; other aspects of the flight, including stage separation, appear to have been successful.

If it had an operable third-stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight, North Korea could now strike the continental United States with a Taepo Dong 1. In such a case, about two-thirds of the payload mass would be required for the reentry vehicle structure. The remaining mass is probably too light for an early generation nuclear weapon, but could strike a target in the United States with a biological or chemical warhead.

Taepo Dong 2
A two-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms (enough for an early generation nuclear weapon) to Alaska or Hawaii, and could deliver a lighter weapon to the western half of the continental United States.
A three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms, an early generation nuclear weapon, anywhere in the United States.

Weaponization
North Korea's development of ballistic missiles specifically threatens the United States and its allies because it is developing, or may have developed, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons which could be delivered by these missiles.>>>>
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