Apr 30, 2005
atimes.com
COMMENTARY
Why Japan's 'so sorry' doesn't wash in China
By Francesco Sisci
BEIJING - At a recent conference in Indonesia, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi apologized to Asian countries for his country's invasions during World War II. It was certainly a positive gesture, but it is unlikely to appease the Chinese government totally.
The Chinese government does not really want apologies about the past, it wants the Japanese to call their invasion an "invasion" and not minimize it. Beijing also does not want to see future visits of senior politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine, where there are buried together veterans of Japanese wars and some convicted Class A war criminals.
It is difficult for Westerners to nail down what Beijing's position vis-a-vis Japan actually is, because West and East are literally a world apart on the matter of confessing to historic mistakes versus burying them. For its part, Beijing no longer calls the Tiananmen movement in 1989 dongluan (riot or major disorder), as did the official rhetoric at the time, but fengbo (disturbance, incident or controversy), or sometimes even simply liusi (June 4); similarly, Beijing no longer brings up the issue of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) or the Great Leap Forward (late 1950s), meaning that Beijing wants these mistakes buried in the past.
The idea of burying mistakes, avoiding bringing them to the open to avoid embarrassment, is hugely different from the Western attitude. In general, Westerners, following Freudian analysis and the Christian concept of confession, think mistakes should be solved by revealing them in public (to the confessor or analyst). Chinese, and possibly East Asians in general, just want to bury them and never mention them again. There is no culture of confession like that which held sway in the West for hundreds of years. There, confession was the first step to redemption; in East Asia, confessions never brought forgiveness or redemption but just swifter punishment.
These sentiments emerge against the backdrop of conflicting ambitions. Both China and Japan are not satisfied with their present role in Asia, and hope for different and greater status.
Japan is fed up with being considered a political dwarf, and wants better representation for its economy, which is still the second-largest in the world, larger that those of China and India put together. (China supported India's request for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, while opposing the Japanese bid.)
China is afraid that Japan's ambition for higher profile could be inspired by its imperial past to bully (if not invade, which is now out of fashion) its neighbors, including China. There are concrete instances supporting these fears. Take the issue of iron ore. At the beginning of the year Japan's steel industry and the world's largest iron company, the Brazilian Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, reached an agreement on the price of iron ore: on the basis of the 18.6% global price growth of last year, they increased the price by 71.5%, registering a historic price for iron ore. This increase in price will create great difficulties for the Chinese steel market and industry, which is highly inefficient, but it could be digested by Japan industry, which is more efficient. The Chinese feel this is bullying its steel industry out of the market.
And the troubles continue. The Japanese have made a joint decision with the United States openly to consider Taiwan a troubled area - and a key strategic concern of both nations. That's the truth, but it took away the fig leaf that Taiwan is solely China's domestic issue. Furthermore, on the very days of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, Tokyo declared that Japan would open the area around the Senkaku (in Japanese)or Diaoyu (in Chinese) Islands, controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing, to oil prospecting. All of these are very concrete political and economic issues, which are clouded and muddled by the historical animosity.
If Tokyo gets a permanent seat on the Security Council, will it do worse than this? How much is the bullying on iron related to the issue of the Yasukuni war veterans' shrine? A lot, a little, none at all? China has not publicly linked the two issues of the iron ore and the demonstrations, and neither has Japan. However, officials of both government admit there is a tie. And, to roil the waters, the Chinese claim the Japanese twisted Russia's arms to have their hoped-for oil pipeline go to the north of the Korean Peninsula and bypass China, contrary to Chinese interests. China will be getting a railway spur.
In fact, both rivals shy away from all of this because both have skeletons in the cupboard, embarrassing historical bones that neither wants to display openly and discuss frankly. Chinese steel mills wanted to undercut Japanese mills and gain a larger part of the global steel market; Japanese steel wanted to avoid it and create difficulties for its Chinese competitors. It is a commercial tussle, but in such countries as China and Japan, given their past, any tussle can become overburdened and issues distorted by other feelings and fears.
How to make these undercurrents run smoothly? Westerners, who have an interest in the stability of the region, think they should bring the issues into the open and discuss them frankly. East Asians feel that approach would not work, and besides, they are not accustomed to such openness and shy away from it. They would rather go on shadow-boxing about it, second-guessing each other's movements.
If the West were not involved, then the situation would be simpler. But in this globalized economy, America and Europe are involved, and they should try to get a clear picture and not get hoodwinked by either of the parties, while being aware of Asian sensitivities.
The issues appear to be the following:
Japan no longer can endure the perceived role of political dwarf and wishes to fend for itself against a rising China, especially since Japan is not sure to what extent the US economy will still dominate in 10 or 20 years, when China's economy could well be twice or four times as large as it is now.
China is pulled by its youth, who want "revenge" against the "arrogant" Japanese; Beijing is also truly worried that Japanese politics is, or will be, hijacked by the right wing that minimizes the past horrors in order to seek some new kind of hegemony in the region. Things are further complicated because there is a new game in town. In the past centuries China was the regional hegemon and Japan paid tribute to the greatness of China. This changed about 100 years ago, when Japan defeated China and took over Korea and Taiwan. Then for the following decades, Japan was the main political, and then economic, force in the region.
This history raises the question: How will the two countries fare against each other? Will it be the old political paradigm, these two countries vying for hegemony in East Asia?
Can there be a new paradigm of relations in Asia without considering "hegemony"?
How large is the region? Should it be considered to include the South Asian subcontinent? What is or will be the role of Southeast Asia, the United States and Europe in strategic geopolitical thinking?
Perhaps these are the some of the real questions behind the wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.
Francesco Sisci is the director of the Institute of Italian Culture in Beijing. This article represents his views alone and not those of the institute.
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