To: TimF who wrote (4812 ) 5/5/2005 5:02:16 PM From: TimF Respond to of 7936 Another excepty from that same pagelegalaffairs.org "Besides, we have already agreed that this is not a debate about results in particular cases or positions on particular constitutional doctrines. It is a debate about how best to take a written Constitution seriously. In this regard, I think you want to have it both ways. On the one hand, you pledge your faith in the entire Constitution as a constraint on judges. On the other hand, you imply that judges should update the Constitution or "interpret" it out of the way when really fundamental issues are at stake. "One-man, one vote" is apparently not fundamental enough, but your last post implies that the maintenance of "independent agencies" outside the control of the President may be. (Perceptive readers may notice that, while I ask you about the meaning of clauses, you keep asking me about particular results and doctrines. But first comes the meaning of the text, then come doctrines and results!) The problem here is that, in our polity, we disagree about what is really a matter fundamental enough to set aside or update the text of the Constitution. Some might disagree with you and believe that helping the starving is sufficiently fundamental. Others might believe that religious values are that fundamental. By your method of interpretation—discarding some outmoded provisions, updating others—how can you complain when your ideological opponents get control of the Presidency and the Senate and appoint justices who agree with their fundamental values and reject yours? Of course you can debate the values themselves, and I am all for that. But on your theory you cannot contend that these judges with different values are doing something that is constitutionally or judicially improper. A commitment to a written Constitution in which its meaning must remain the same until it is properly changed is needed precisely to ameliorate just the kind of political struggle and turmoil that nonoriginalist approaches all but guarantee. The touchstone of originalism is a rule of law provided by the enacted text rather than a particular vision of what the Constitution should have said instead. I guess that is why many originalists were irked by Jeff Rosen's use of the label "Constitution in Exile" as a rhetorical move to redescribe originalism as a movement that aims at achieving a particular set of results—the constitutional doctrines that prevailed in 1920 or 1930, as you put it on Monday. There are constitutional theories that elevate preferred outcomes or doctrines above the constitutional text but, properly practiced, originalism isn't one of them. Even if your willingness to alter the original constitutional scheme is limited to matters of structure and not particular results or doctrines—for example, by urging a judicial "minimalism" by which judges refuse to enforce provisions of the Constitution that you believe unduly impedes legislatures—this is still elevating your views of structure above that in the written Constitution. So let me propose a test for you and other non-originalists to see what constraint, if any, the Constitution itself provides in your approach: Can you honestly trust your own methods of constitutional interpretation in the hands of judges with different fundamental values than yours? Or can a judge with different substantive or structural values than yours use your own methods to reach pretty much any result he or she wishes? "