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Politics : Israel to U.S. : Now Deal with Syria and Iran -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Yaacov who wrote (8252)	5/10/2005 5:17:53 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER	Respond to of 22250

Re: The CIA did all possible to undermine the French rule in Algeria for the Pertoleum. FLN was assisted indirectly by the United States. Yahia Zoubir, "U.S. and Soviet Policies Towards France's Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa, Canadian Journal of History, Vol. 30, no. 3, December 1995 [...] In sum, in the context of the Cold War, the U.S. was unwilling to sacrifice its alliance with France on the altar of the nationalists' ideals and was reluctant to take into account "the fundamental psychological alignment of the American people in the formulation of United States policy." The major American objectives in the Maghreb remained the same: a) ". . . to insure that the area and its resources are available to the United States and its allies. . .; b) to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and communist ideology within the area; c) to increase stability within the area; d) to insure the association of the peoples of the area with the free world."(27) The various U.S. government agencies seemed to concur that the major danger in the Maghreb did not stem from the menace of a direct Soviet incursion, but rather from "the conflict between native nationalism and the French position."(28) Further, increasing self-government for Tunisia and Morocco looked to U.S. policymakers inevitable because of the little progress made by the French in the realm of socio-economic reforms. But, the U.S. was unwilling to openly endorse it, for, maintaining the existence of American military bases and building new ones in the Maghreb appeared more certain under French control in the area than with an independent Morocco and Tunisia, although the nationalists gave clear indications that they would continue cooperating both politically and militarily with the West. The U.S. planned on pursuing what it described as a "middle-of-the road" policy in North Africa; but, it did foresee the possibility of tilting towards the nationalists and openly favouring independence in case French control in the area broke down.(29) This, though, was only a contingency; in the meantime, whatever support the Maghrebi nationalists drew came from American public opinion, the media, the business community, and labour organizations,(30) and not from the U.S. government. From that government's perspective, official support, if any, must be discreet and cautious lest it infuriate the French. [...] The war in Algeria was seen by American policymakers as a threat to their country's national interest. Therefore a quick resolution, brought about by France, "the only competent power," was considered the inevitable option. Following Moroccan and Tunisian independence, American policy towards the Maghreb included, inter alia, the following objectives: 1. Encourage Morocco and Tunisia to maintain friendly relations with France - an objective quite difficult to achieve in view of the popularity of and support for the Algerian cause in the region. 2. Use Moroccan and Tunisian nationalism as a bulwark against Egyptian and Soviet influence in the Maghreb. But, the continuation of the Algerian war would prevent the moderate elites from fulfilling such a task. 3. Maintain U.S. military bases in Morocco and renegotiate their use with its Sultan. 4. Integrate countries of the region into the western world through economic co-operation, technical assistance, and like means. France must continue to play the key role. 5. Help France in its "psychological and political adjustment to the rapid loss of its external territories." 6. Limit the damage on the Arab and Afro-Asian world caused by U.S. support to France in the Algerian war. 7. Seek Moroccan and Tunisian help in moderating demands of the Algerian nationalists. 8. Dispel any suspicions among the French that Americans are intent on replacing them in the region. Assure them of U.S. readiness to help them maintain their influence. 9. Prevent the Soviets from exploiting the Algerian situation to their own advantage. Despite the difficulty of reconciling such objectives, U.S. policymakers were convinced of their soundness and urged that they be realized. The apparent contradictions seemed in fact to reflect growing dissension within the different policy-making institutions as to how best preserve American interests. III America's middle-of-the road policy in North Africa was not gratifying, for despite the almost unconditional backing it offered France, the French continued to be highly suspicious of American objectives in the Maghreb, France's chasse gardee. In March 1956, Douglas Dillon, U.S. ambassador to France, and Henry Cabot Lodge, representative at the U.N., were distressed by the strong anti-American sentiment in France. In their judgement, the French were convinced that the U.S. was opposed to their position in Algeria. A similar feeling was prevalent amid the colonial administration in Algeria, where French authorities were now openly charging the Americans with pursuing double tactics. Relations between the two allies had reached such a low ebb that the U.S. government felt compelled to issue a public statement through its ambassador in Paris in which he reiterated American support for France, stressing that "Algeria is an internal French problem and therefore not appropriate for discussion by the U.N." [snip] mtholyoke.edu

To: Yaacov who wrote (8252)	5/10/2005 5:27:38 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 22250

The change in rhetoric may well have been influenced by Senator John F. Kennedy, the most outspoken critic of the U.S. position on the Algerian question. Indeed, on 2 July 1957, Kennedy delivered a speech in the Senate in which he criticized the Eisenhower administration for pursuing what he described as an erroneous policy. Kennedy upset the prevailing opinion among American policymakers who readily confused nationalism with international communism. Excerpted from the Y. Zoubir paper: mtholyoke.edu Likewise, as regards today's Iraq, "American policymakers [...] readily confused nationalism with international [terrorism]."