To: JeffA who wrote (45691 ) 5/10/2005 2:50:40 PM From: JeffA Respond to of 173976 ...but destroy the Senate By Lawrence R. Butler Out of frustration over Democratic filibusters of some of President Bush’s judicial nominees, Senate Republicans are considering a procedural gambit to end such maneuvers. Before they decide, Republicans should examine what happened when similar tactics were used in 1975. Senate Rule 22 states that debate on proposals to amend the standing rules of the Senate can only be limited with the support of two-thirds of all senators. Thus, any effort to change the cloture rules for judicial nominations would require a two-thirds majority vote. Nonetheless, Senate Republicans have suggested the possibility of using the so-called “nuclear option” of amending the rules by a simple majority vote. This could be done by having the presiding officer, Vice President Cheney, rule that supermajority requirements related to judicial nominations are unconstitutional. The Senate could then vote to uphold that ruling by a simple majority vote. Approving such a reinterpretation by majority vote would achieve the goal of ending filibusters on judicial nominations. On Jan. 14, 1975, a bipartisan group of Senate liberals led by Walter Mondale (D-Minn.) tried a similar tactic in frustration over successful conservative filibusters of progressive reforms in previous congresses. Mondale offered a proposal to reduce the cloture requirement from two-thirds of the Senate to three-fifths. He then moved to end debate, claiming that the U.S. Constitution allows a simple majority of senators to establish the chamber’s rules of procedure at the beginning of a Congress. On Feb. 20, the Senate voted 51-42 to adopt Mondale’s constitutional interpretation, thereby accepting that Senate cloture rules could be changed by a simple majority vote at the beginning of a Congress. Among current senators, Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) voted for this use of the nuclear option, while Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) and Pete Domenici (D-N.M.) opposed it. However, before Mondale was able to obtain a vote on the substance of his proposal to reduce the cloture requirement to three-fifths, Sen. James Allen (D) of Alabama found a back-door way to launch a filibuster. Allen and his allies blocked all Senate legislative activity until Feb. 28, when Mondale’s forces agreed to abandon the nuclear option and use normal procedures in their effort to change the Senate cloture rule. On March 3, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) stage-managed a vote to undo the precedent for the nuclear option that had been established Feb. 20. In the midst of Allen’s filibuster, a second attempt was made to shut off debate by a ruling of the chair. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was presiding over the Senate on Feb. 26 while Allen was making a series of dilatory motions to tie up the proceedings. Eventually, Rockefeller ignored Allen’s manic cries for recognition and forced a vote. The Senate erupted in bipartisan rage at a vice president who would dare to insult a senator in such fashion. On April 26, Rockefeller addressed the Senate to apologize for his actions. To emphasize that vice presidents are not allowed to impose themselves on the Senate except to cast a tie-breaking vote, Rockefeller was permitted to speak for five minutes, but not to control his own time. What lesson should today’s Senate Republicans learn from this story? In the words of that symbol of Southern persistence, Scarlett O’Hara, “Tomorrow is another day.” Even if Republicans managed to get a few judges through by majority vote, the precedent would not last long. An agitated minority of 41 can always find procedural mechanisms to bring the Senate to a halt. The only way for Senate Republicans to overcome such a counteroffensive would be to use the nuclear option a second time to eliminate all filibusters. The nuclear option cannot succeed in half-measures; its proponents must be willing to go all the way by eliminating all filibusters. During the Cold War, the nuclear trigger was never pulled because both the United States and the Soviet Union knew that it would lead to mutually assured destruction. The same is true of the United States Senate. A successful use of the nuclear option would demolish the Senate as it has existed for more than two centuries. Out of the rubble would arise a new institution — a mini-House of Representatives — in which a passionate minority would have no way of blocking, or even stalling, the will of a unified majority. Butler is assistant professor of political science at Rowan University and author of the book Claiming the Mantle: How Presidential Nominations Are Won and Lost Before the Votes are Cast.