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To: elmatador who wrote (64428)5/30/2005 5:27:42 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 74559
 
Re: Labour markets can't be made flexible. Protects the employed to th detriment of the unemployed. People who are -today- employed don't want to compete with the unemployed in their own country. As a result industry migrate and they handpver their jobs to the Romanians and Czechs.

Well... yes, that's all very true --but what has it got to do with the EU Constitution?!? Zilch, I'm afraid. Layoffs, globalization, chronic unemployment, etc. have been plaguing Europe for the past 30 years anyway, and will continue to do so no matter what. The EU Constitution was irrelevantly hyped up as a cure-all for Europe's sluggish economics....

Hence my opinion that the real French malaise ain't about euro-economics but, rather, stems from geopolitics. I believe the Iraq War was/still is the seminal event that send France on its centrifugal orbit, so to speak. It's still intolerable for French authorities that, on such a crucial issue of "War and Peace", EU newcomers (Poland, Romania, the Baltic States,...) so openly, rashly, and eagerly aligned themselves with the US-UK-Israel axis and against France, their EU senior partner. Besides, as I pointed out on another thread, the isolation of France is going from bad to worse as most observers anticipate a landslide victory for Angela Merckel in a couple of months.

Since the EU Constitution was basically about the POLITICAL integration of the European Union, it shouldn't be surprising that it no longer makes sense for the French!!! I mean, France is a Mediterranean country with special relationships with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, and even Egypt, to an extent. Only 50 years ago, she was still fighting one of the bloodiest wars of decolonization in Algeria.... Yet France is now, if slowly, integrating her sizable Arab/Muslim minorities. Hence there's no point for France to follow US, Israeli, and UK crusaders in their global war against Islam and the Arab world. There's no point for France to support the occupation of Iraq today nor the (impending) assault against Iran tomorrow!

Of course, I'm well aware that the whole issue (of the EU constitution) was NEVER argued along these lines: nobody in France ever called the French to vote against the constitution because France must remain in peace with the Arab/Muslim world, and the whole issue was debated along socio-economic lines --unemployement, the so-called Polish plumber and so forth. I contend, however, that the chief, if unspoken, reason for the French NO is all about geopolitics and Middle East policy.

Gus



To: elmatador who wrote (64428)5/30/2005 6:03:36 AM
From: GUSTAVE JAEGER  Respond to of 74559
 
Polemologist S. Huntington blurts out the official, if secret, US agenda regarding Turkey's EU bid(*):

May 28, 2005

Turnabout for Turkey
By Ehsan Ahrari


It is a sad day for Turkey when it has to consider the advice of Samuel Huntington (of The Clash of Civilizations fame) about whether it should continue to pursue its membership in the European Union (EU), or think about other options. Huntington is an intellectual whom Muslim intellectuals love to dislike. But he is also an intellectual who has created a highly influential, if contentious, framework of analysis regarding Islam, a framework that remains a powerful source of reaction and reflection about Islamic perspectives on the great power struggle of our time. Thus, the advice to Turkey from the old Harvard University professor is worth considering.

On a visit to Turkey this week, Huntington is reported to have observed, "Turkey's history, culture, religion and economy are so different from those of the EU that its chances of being accepted into the EU are virtually nonexistent." What should be Turkey's other option, then? According to Huntington, it should either lead the Islamic world, or focus on nationalism. If it opts for the latter, it should completely forswear the other two options and focus on its security and development.

Huntington's suggestion for Turkey deserves close examination. Ankara's near obsession with becoming a member of the EU might be an outcome of a deep sense of inferiority that it has inherited as an integral aspect of the legacy of Kemalism, the political philosophy of Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, the founding father of modern Turkey. He came to the conclusion in the early 1920s that his country's backwardness was related to Islam, especially in its unwillingness to incorporate the separation of religion and politics, as if that type of arrangement could have become a panacea to Turkey's role as the "sick man of Europe".

In that conclusion, Ataturk demonstrated complete ignorance of the great heritage of the Ottoman Empire, which saw its civilizational peak under the banner of Islam. Not that the Ottomans were devout Muslims. In fact, an argument can be made that they used the title of "caliph" to acquire legitimacy in their vast Islamic domain. Even in that capacity, the Ottoman rulers' actual behavior was more like a traditional sovereign than an actual caliph, whose role is classically defined as a legitimate leader of Muslims, whose legitimacy stems from his complete devotion to the glory of God and Islam.

When the Ottoman Empire began to falter, the underlying reasons had little to do with Islam. Rather, it was the empire's inability to keep up with the ever-changing requirements of being a great power, which included, first and foremost, remaining at the cutting edge of the revolutionary economic and technological changes of that era. While an island nation like Great Britain and an equally minor nation like the Netherlands emerged as great maritime powers and acquired empires in far-off lands, the Ottoman Empire was caught napping about the glories of a bygone era.

But when Ataturk attempted to understand the reasons underlying the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, his imagination (or the lack thereof) became mired in the inability of the Ottoman rulers to create a distance between religion and politics, at the expense of other, more significant, reasons related to the ignominious fate that was awaiting the remnants of that empire in the early 1920s. He saw the primacy of Islam as the chief cause for the backwardness of the Ottomans, and found his refuge in a new "religion", the Western notion of secularism.

Turkey has paid a price for that decision of 1923 - a decision whereby it emerged as a secular nation-state after the dissolution of the caliphate - and has yet to be envisaged in the ranks of Muslim nations as shining example of success. In reality, it is constantly seeking an identity - nervously outside the ivory palaces of European castles, hoping to be admitted as a European nation, but sometimes glancing anxiously at the world of Islam to see whether it can play a major role. European nations are reluctant to offer it a seat in their midst, for it is regarded as a Muslim country. The world of Islam considers it as less relevant, since it has long refused to become a part of the hullabaloo and turbulence of their societies regarding the relationship between God and Caesar, or become involved in the vibrant debates over the relevance and modalities of an Islamic government.

Today's Turkey also suffers from a collective sense of schizophrenia, whereby a large portion of its populace is devout Muslim, but the ruling elites have decided to remain strongly committed to the notion of secularism. While Turkey's ruling elite envisions EU membership as a symbol of prestige, and even a magnificent feat, many Turkish people view it only as a way of improving their quality of life and standard of living. According to a study published in Turkey in 2002, "The Turkish public, living under economic crisis, sees the EU as a prosperity project but also as a way to fight against corruption and to develop democratic life. Ninety percent of the Turkish public is unhappy with the functioning of democracy; briefly, EU membership is also a democracy project."

There is little-to-no evidence that Turkey as a secular government has much admiration at the popular level in any Muslim country. Only Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf is reported to have shown admiration for Ataturk, but that was most likely because he spent part of his childhood in Turkey, while his father served in the Pakistani Embassy in that country. Right after ousting Nawaz Sharif as Pakistan's elected leader in 1999, Musharraf, during a trip to Turkey, publicly expressed his admiration for Ataturk, and compared himself with General Kenan Evren, who overthrew Bulent Ecevit and Suleiman Demirel in a coup in 1980. Needless to say, the Turkish military wasn't exactly elated at Musharraf's reminder to the world of its past role in sabotaging democracy. Even Musharraf's public admiration for Ataturk drew loud criticism from Pakistan's hardline Islamists, who said they would reject any attempt to temper Islamic rule in their country.

By mentioning a potential role for Turkey as a leader of Muslim countries, Huntington might be implying that Turkey rightly claims that role on the basis of becoming a secular democracy. He might not realize that by remaining a secular state, Turkey is popular or seen as a source of emulation only in Washington, or in some European capitals. No Muslim country has manifested even public curiosity about following the Turkish example of becoming a secular state. On the contrary, in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, the centrality of Islam is uncontested. By the same token, in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, no one dares question the primacy of Islam. So, one wonders what would be the basis of Turkey's claim to the potential leadership of Muslim nations.

In fact, Huntington's other suggestion is the right one: Turkey should focus on nationalism, and, along with it, on security and development. Turkey emerged as a nation-state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. As a successor state of that great empire, it nurtures the dream of becoming a great power again. Even if that dream appears to be beyond its reach now, Turkey has the examples of two currently rising powers to follow: China and India, which have also emerged from conditions of near abject poverty. Admittedly, those two countries represent two different civilizations and religions, and also have radically different political systems. However, what Turkey shares with China and India is the aspiration - the dream - of becoming a great power once again. Ankara has to study the blueprints of what those countries have done in the realm of economics and politics to create a vibrant economy, and how they are using their respective economic power to bankroll their fledgling military power. As a democracy, India would be a better example for Turkey to emulate; however, in the area of economic policies, it must pay close attention to China's developmental blueprint, since China's economic progress has thus far been more impressive than India's.

Turkey is most likely to become a source of emulation for Muslim countries if it becomes a world-class economic and military power. In this sense, without exactly saying so, Huntington might be asking Turkey to concentrate on becoming a great power once again.

Ehsan Ahrari is an independent strategic analyst based in Alexandria, VA, US. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. He is also a regular contributor to the Global Beat Syndicate. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com.

atimes.com

(*)Told you so:
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