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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Win Smith who wrote (166680)7/20/2005 9:55:03 PM
From: Win Smith  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Ability of Iraqis to Fight Rebels Is Weak, U.S. Says nytimes.com

[ Elsewhere on the conventional reality front, we have this report on how, as usual, things are continuing to go really, really well in Iraq, as they have been ever since W got his war. Mission accomplished and all that. ]

By ERIC SCHMITT

WASHINGTON, July 20 - About half of Iraq's new police units are still in training and cannot conduct operations, while the other half of the police units and two-thirds of the new army battalions are only "partially capable" of carrying out counterinsurgency missions, and only with American help, according to a newly declassified Pentagon assessment.

Only "a small number" of Iraqi security forces are capable of fighting the insurgency without American assistance, while about one-third of the army is capable of "planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations" with allied support, the analysis said.

The assessment, which has not been publicly released, is the most precise analysis of the Iraqis' readiness levels that the military has provided. Bush administration officials have repeatedly said the 160,000 American-led allied troops cannot begin to withdraw until Iraqi troops are ready to take over security.

The assessment is described in a brief written response that Gen. Peter Pace, the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided last week to the Senate Armed Services Committee. It was provided to The Times by a Senate staff aide. At General Pace's confirmation hearing on June 29, Republicans and Democrats directed him to provide an unclassified accounting of the Iraqis' abilities to allow a fuller public debate. The military had already provided classified assessments to lawmakers.

"We need to know, the American people need to know the status of readiness of the Iraqi military, which is improving, so that we can not only understand but appreciate better the roles and missions that they are capable of carrying out," Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, said at the hearing.

General Pace's statement comes as the Pentagon prepares to deliver to Congress as early as Thursday a comprehensive report that establishes performance standards and goals on a variety of political and economic matters, as well as the training of Iraqi security forces, and a timetable for achieving those aims. The report was due on July 11, but the Pentagon missed the deadline.

The Defense Department is required to update the assessment every 90 days.

From a single American-trained Iraqi battalion a year ago, the Pentagon says there are now more than 100 battalions of Iraqi troops and paramilitary police units, totaling 171,500 troops. Of that force, about 77,700 are military troops and 93,800 are police and paramilitary police officers. The total is to rise to 270,000 by next summer, when 10 fully equipped, 14,000-man Iraqi Army divisions are to be operational.

American commanders have until now resisted quantifying the abilities of Iraqi units, especially their shortcomings, to avoid giving the insurgents any advantage.

In General Pace's seven-sentence response, a copy of which was obtained by The New York Times, he stressed, "The majority of Iraqi security forces are engaged in operations against the insurgency with varying degrees of cooperation and support from coalition forces."

At a Pentagon news conference on Wednesday, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld defended this approach of describing the Iraqi units' abilities in general terms only.

"It's not for us to tell the other side, the enemy, the terrorists, that this Iraqi unit has this capability, and that Iraqi unit has this capability," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "The idea of discussing weaknesses, if you will, strengths and weaknesses of 'this unit has a poor chain of command,' or 'these forces are not as effective because their morale's down' - I mean, that would be mindless to put that kind of information out."

Iraqi and American commanders have set up a system that grades Iraqi units in six categories: personnel, command and control, training, equipping, ability to sustain forces, and leadership. Using these measurements, Iraqi battalions are graded on a scale of one (strongest) to four (weakest).

Level 1 units are able to plan, execute and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations. By late last month, American commanders said, only 3 of the 107 military and paramilitary battalions had achieved that standard. At the lower end, Level 4 units are just forming and cannot conduct operations. Units graded at levels in between need some form of allied support, often supplies, communications and intelligence.

Mr. Rumsfeld said such measurements were just part of the calculus in judging individual units or their parent organizations.

"One way is to look at it numerically," he said. "How many are there? How many have the right equipment? The other way to look at it is the softer things. How is the experience? Are they battle-hardened? How's the morale? What kind of noncommissioned officers and middle-level officers do they have? How's the chain of command functioning? What's the relationship between the Ministry of Defense forces and the Ministry of Interior forces?"

American commanders have said for months that training Iraqis in Western-style policing tactics and techniques would be one of the most challenging tasks, in large part because of the lack of a law-enforcement tradition among the Iraqi police under President Saddam Hussein.

Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the Armed Services Committee's ranking Democrat, visited Iraq this month and praised the military for devising a system for rating Iraqi units akin to what the American military uses to judge the combat readiness of its own forces.

But in a report issued July 11, Senator Levin said American and Iraqi officials needed to develop a detailed plan to set measurable benchmarks for when Iraqi units are deemed capable enough of dealing with insurgents to allow American forces to begin to withdraw. "Without such a plan, Iraqis may never assume the responsibility for taking back their country," he said.

Senior American commanders maintain that the Iraqis are making steady if sometimes fitful progress. In the past few months, more than 1,500 American troops have joined Iraqi units as advisers, in most cases living and working with individual units. In addition, dozens of American Army and Marine Corps units are working closely with Iraqi in counterinsurgency missions.

American commanders have offered cautiously optimistic prospects for Iraqis to assume more control over security duties, despite the recent rash of suicide bombings aimed largely against Iraqi security forces and civilians.

Maj. Gen. William G. Webster Jr., commander of the Third Infantry Division, which is responsible for Baghdad and the surrounding area, predicted earlier this month that by October, when Iraqis are to vote on a new constitution, there should be a full, 18,000-member division of Iraqi soldiers sufficiently trained to take the lead in securing the Iraqi capital.



To: Win Smith who wrote (166680)7/20/2005 11:17:23 PM
From: Sun Tzu  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Win this article is has as much half truth and false info in it as truth. On the factual front, 300,000 Shia did not die during the rebellion; I think that was the figure of the dead during 8 years of Iran Iraq war. The Sistani list did not win by a "narrow" margin, it was a huge win (Alawi's bearly managed 9%). "Agha Panayi" is not a name. Agha means "Mr." so the name is only Panayi...etc...etc.

What is really wrong with this article is that it implicitly assumes any diviations from the neoconian fantasy Iraq is a bad outcome:

(1) US should push for a confederation in Iraq (instead of Federal system). Despite Peter Galbraith's implication that confederation is a bad thing, it is the best solution for Iraq's very diverse factions and if US resists it too hard, Iraq may well disintegrate into a bloody civil war with the end results of 3 states. Remember that the entity we call Iraq has no historical accuracy and was simply forged by the British from 3 Ottoman provinces. Why should they behave as one unified nation?

(2) Iran is Iraq's most important neighbor. Any government in Iraq (even a very pro-America one) has to work hard on good relations with Iran if it cares about Iraq's welfare.

(3) It is an indisputable fact that Iraq invaded Iran and caused countless death and destruction. Why should it not pay for that? And how come it is (and has been) paying for the much smaller damage it caused Kuwait for the past 13 years?

(4) Kurds have a very valid claim to Kirkuk.

(5) Kurds are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically very different from the rest of Iraq. Why should they they be subservient to a foreign culture? What is wrong with them being part of a confederation?

(6) The Iraqi Shia do not love Iran. They do not even like Iran. And in his recent visit to Iran the Iraqi prime minister politely refused to accept Iran's claim for damages. I see nothing wrong with them having their own state within the confederation.

(7) The insurgents can be defeated easily by the combined Shia/Kurdish alliance. They can easily create a Sunni state within the confederation and force the Sunni Arabs to migrate there (just as Saddam moved Arabs into Kurdistan and Kurds away).

The real issue is this: US has zero, zilch, nada credibility in the middle east. Worse if Muhammed himself was to return from the grave and shake hands with Bush, the Arabs would go back to paganism. Nor is America in any shape to dictate terms to Iraqis, Iranians or Afghans. US needs to take a realistic look at the situation and clear its head (and its priorities). The best solution, imo, is to kiss and make up with Iran. Having a friendly Iran will make the difference between day and night in the region. To see this for yourself, reread the article again and this time assume Iran is on the US side.



To: Win Smith who wrote (166680)8/5/2005 5:43:57 PM
From: geode00  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
"The Bush administration should, however, draw the line at allowing a Shiite theocracy to establish control over all of Iraq."

------Why do people keep assuming that this is any of our business at all? Aside from the oil which isn't ours anyway and is up to the ExxonMobil's of the world to negotiate production of, this isn't our business AT ALL.

It would be nice to wave a magic wand and make the entire world a liberal democracy that's superior and more progressive than our own but that isn't even remotely possible. The Sunnis have been a minority AND have wielded the power. It could happen again.



To: Win Smith who wrote (166680)8/27/2005 9:16:57 PM
From: Win Smith  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Divided They Stand nytimes.com

[ This column is contrarian or confusing, take your pick. Anyway, Brooks has kind words for maligned Peter Galbraith, though he also throws in a bunch of stuff on Reuel Mark Gerecht, who I don't much like in his current AEI W flack-in-training incarnation. michael97123 should enjoy this particular line of analysis anyway, being a long-time semi-breakup advocate. ]

By DAVID BROOKS

President Bush doesn't lack for critics when it comes to his Iraq policies, but the smartest and most devastating of these is Peter W. Galbraith, a former United States ambassador to Croatia.

Yesterday, after reading gloomy press accounts about the proposed Iraqi constitution, I thought it might be interesting to hear what Galbraith himself had to say. I finally tracked him down in Baghdad (at God knows what hour there) and found that far from lambasting Bush, Galbraith was more complimentary about what the administration has just achieved than anybody else I spoke to all day.

"The Bush administration finally did something right in brokering this constitution," Galbraith exclaimed, then added: "This is the only possible deal that can bring stability. ... I do believe it might save the country."

Galbraith's argument is that the constitution reflects the reality of the nation it is meant to serve. There is, he says, no meaningful Iraqi identity. In the north, you've got a pro-Western Kurdish population. In the south, you've got a Shiite majority that wants a "pale version of an Iranian state." And in the center you've got a Sunni population that is nervous about being trapped in a system in which it would be overrun.

In the last election each group expressed its authentic identity, the Kurds by voting for autonomy-minded leaders, the Shiites for clerical parties and the Sunnis by not voting.

This constitution gives each group what it wants. It will create a very loose federation in which only things like fiscal and foreign policy are controlled in the center (even tax policy is decentralized). Oil revenues are supposed to be distributed on a per capita basis, and no group will feel inordinately oppressed by the others.

The Kurds and Shiites understand what a good deal this is. The Sunni leaders selected to attend the convention are howling because they are former Baathists who dream of a return to centralized power. But ordinary Sunnis, Galbraith says, will come to realize this deal protects them, too.

Galbraith says he is frustrated with all the American critics who argue that the constitution divides the country. The country is already divided, he says, and drawing up a constitution that would artificially bind three divergent societies together would create only friction, violence and civil war. "It's not a problem if a country breaks up, only if it breaks up violently," Galbraith says. "Iraq wasn't created by God. It was created by Winston Churchill."

One of my other calls yesterday went to another smart Iraq analyst, Reuel Marc Gerecht, formerly of the C.I.A. and now at the American Enterprise Institute. Gerecht's conclusions are often miles apart from Galbraith's, but they have one trait in common. Both of them begin their analysis by taking a hard look at the reality of Iraqi society. Neither tries to imagine what sort of constitution might be pretty to our eyes or might be good in some abstract sense. They try to envision which system comports with reality.

Gerecht is also upbeat about this constitution. It's crazy, he says, to think that you could have an Iraqi constitution in which clerical authorities are not assigned a significant role. Voters supported clerical parties because they are, right now, the natural leaders of society and serve important social functions.

But this doesn't mean we have to start screaming about a 13th-century theocratic state. Understanding the clerics, Gerecht has argued, means understanding two things. First, the Shiite clerical establishment has made a substantial intellectual leap. It now firmly believes in one person one vote, and rejects the Iranian model. On the other hand, these folks don't think like us.

What's important, Gerecht has emphasized, is the democratic process: setting up a system in which the different groups, secular and clerical, will have to bargain with one another, campaign and deal with the real-world consequences of their ideas. This is what's going to moderate them and lead to progress. This constitution does that. Shutting them out would lead to war.

The constitution also exposes the canard that America is some imperial power trying to impose its values on the world. There are many parts of this constitution any American would love. There are other parts that are strange to us.

But when you get Galbraith and Gerecht in the same mood, you know something important has happened. The U.S. has orchestrated a document that is organically Iraqi.

It's their country, after all.