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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Bid Buster who wrote (34495)7/29/2005 11:52:38 AM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
Does this look deflationary?

On the surface No. Perhaps that should be THE point for inflationists to consider. Housing prices declined for 18 straight years in spite of that!

Deflation can happen in an increasing money supply situation.
Contrary to popular belief it happened in the early stages of the great depression as well.

globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

The classical definition of inflation and deflation from Ludwig von Mises
The Theory of Money and Credit is as follows:

"In theoretical investigation there is only one meaning that can rationally be attached to the expression inflation: an increase in the quantity of money (in the broader sense of the term, so as to include fiduciary media as well), that is not offset by a corresponding increase in the need for money (again in the broader sense of the term), so that a fall in the objective exchange value of money must occur. Again, deflation (or restriction, or contraction) signifies a diminution of the quantity of money (in the broader sense), which is not offset by a corresponding diminution of the demand for money (in the broader sense), so that an increase in the objective exchange value of money must occur. If we so define these concepts, it follows that either inflation or deflation is constantly going on, for a situation in which the objective exchange value of money did not alter could hardly ever exist for very long."

When was the last time we saw speculation in real estate this high?

The answer is the mid to late 20's, especially Florida. We have land speculation not seen since then. Unbuildable swamp land in Florida is once again being sold for tens of thousands of dollars. People are buying houses and condos sight unseen. Here we are staring into the jaws of an enormous property bust (one that even the hyperinflationists see) but all hyperinflationists can see is "We have not seen deflation since the early 30's". No deflation since the 30's huh? Is it a coincidence that we have not had huge real estate speculation, mammoth overcapacity, and an enormous credit bubble since then either? I think not.

Here is my take.
Hyperinflationists refuse to respond to the implications of a housing bust in conjunction with overcapacity and a blowoff top in credit speculation for one reason only. They can't (at least not in any logically believable scenario).

The biggest argument the inflationists seem to have is money supply: it never seems to go down. But... Can money supply rise and prices still fall through the floor? Of Course! Witness Japan. Japan suffered the deflationary affects of a property bust for the last 18 years even though the Japanese government was printing like mad. Japan went from being one of the world's biggest creditors to a nation with a national debt about 250% of their GDP.

If one ponders the Mises definition, then one can finally relate to the 18 year deflation in Japan while Japan's national debt rose from zero to 250% of GDP.

In short, the FED can print but it can not force people to borrow or banks to lend. In a housing bust just what demand will there be for money from people that have jobs, that banks would be willing to lend to, in an ocean of overcapacity? The bottom line is that we are indeed headed for a Japanese style liquidity trap as explained in UK / US Housing and the upcoming liquidity trap.

In Which Flation Is It? Pater Tenebrarum discusses viewpoints of Austrian scholar Frank Schostak in a Mises article entitled "Does a falling money stock cause economic depression?" ... an excellent article with many charts depicting the 30's depression's macroecnomic and monetary data - which prove, beyond a shadow of doubt, that the Fed was priming the pump madly at the time, contrary to popular mainstream economic misconceptions. but it didn't work - a deflation of both the money stock and bank credit, as well as a vicious price deflation ensued. note that prices at one point registered an aggregate annual decline of over 10%). as an added bonus, there's a chart detailing the change in the BoJ's holdings of government securities during the 1990's - which contradicts Saville's contention that Japan relied 'mostly on fiscal deficit spending' as opposed to monetary pumping. it relied in fact on both.

Consider these supporting opinions from highly respected economist Stephen Roach:

In Inflation Phobia Stephen Roach writes:
Two years ago, the core CPI slowed to just 1.2% in the six months ending February 2004 before rebounding quickly back toward 2% by the final quarter of the year. For reasons noted above, in the face of a China slowdown, downside risks to the core CPI hint at an outcome that might even go beyond the concept of just a deflation scare. The next time, it may be the real thing. So much for inflation phobia!

In Inflation Convergence Stephen Roach writes:
the increasingly powerful forces of worldwide pricing convergence suggest that domestic attempts to exercise pricing leverage will encounter stiff global headwinds in a climate where non-US world inflation is likely to remain subdued. Consequently, barring the unlikely reversal of globalization, I continue to believe that persistently low global inflation will prevent a meaningful deterioration on the US inflation front. Needless to say, that has especially important implications for Fed policy and fixed income markets -- underscoring what I still believe could be a surprisingly bullish outlook for bonds.

Finally, in No Bottlenecks without a Bottle Stephen Roach writes:
At work, in my view, is the globalization of disinflation. Our old closed-economy models have been rendered increasingly obsolete by the emergence of far more powerful cross-border influences on pricing.

With those three article Roach joined the deflation camp. Many treasury bears are convinced the capitulation of Roach and Bill Gross, in conjunction with the repeg of the RMB by China marks the beginning of the end for US treasuries and the US dollar. The plain fact of the matter is there are forces at work that provide powerful resistance to any sort of sustainable inflationary bout.

David Rosenberg, chief ecomomist for Merrill Lynch would also seem to agree.
Every week Mr. Rosenberg puts out "Dave's Top Ten" 10 major macro themes of the past week. Following is point number 5 for the week of July 22, 2005:

5. We do not know why so many believe that the Fed is so accommodative:
Yes, credit spreads are tight but we're not convinced that is saying
anything about the state of monetary policy. The real funds rate is now in
positive terrain based on any inflation measure you want to use at a time
when there is still an output gap—which we estimate at 1.5%—does not
represent a loose monetary stance. That the economy is cruising along
near potential and core inflation trends are low and showing signs of
rolling over. The dollar has firmed this year, notwithstanding yesterday's
FX move by China. Raw industrial commodity prices are well off their
highs. And the money supply numbers, which fell sharply on the July
11th week, are extremely well contained—y/y growth in M1 now at
0.6%; 3.5% for M2; 1.1% for MZM and 4.9% for M3. These are not the
conditions for higher inflation and not the conditions, in our view, for a
sustained selloff in the bond market.

The rest of the list is very interesting as well. I highly recommend reading it.

With those excerpts from various highly regarded economists, let me quickly sum up the three biggest headwinds for inflation:
1) a busting of the housing bubble
2) global wage arbitrage
3) overcapacity

Those headwinds are so formidable that calls for hyperinflation in the face of them seem silly at best. If the world's biggest reflation effort in history along with interest rates at 1% failed to produce hyperinflation, it is borders on nonsensical to believe that a housing crash (the single most deflationary thing I can think of) will bring about hyperinflation.

As usual, timing is everything but the odds seem overwhelming that we will see a destruction of credit and deflation in asset prices before any possible hyperinflation scenario.

....
....

Mish



To: Bid Buster who wrote (34495)7/29/2005 12:06:26 PM
From: mishedlo  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
What Housing Bubble?

By NEIL BARSKY
July 28, 2005; Page A10

If you want to be scared out of your wits these days, you basically have two choices: go watch Steven Spielberg's latest, or listen to the hysterical warnings of economists and journalists about the imminent popping of our so-called housing bubble. Robert Shiller, the ubiquitous Yale economist, says home prices could fall 50% from their peak. Taking things a step further, The Economist recently went so far as to call the global housing boom "the biggest bubble in history."

In a free country, it is fair game for the media and economists to scare homeowners with words of gloom and doom, however knee-jerk, consensual and misguided they may be. But housing is a serious business; for most of us, it is our most valuable asset. For generations of immigrants, home ownership has represented the realization of the American dream.

The reality is this: There is no housing bubble in this country. Our strong housing market is a function of myriad factors with real economic underpinnings: low interest rates, local job growth, the emotional attachment one has for one's home, one's view of one's future earning- power, and parental contributions, all have done their part to contribute to rising home prices. Over the past quarter-century, there has been an explosion of second-home purchases, a continued influx of immigrants, and a significant reduction in existing housing inventory through tear-downs. Not all of these trends are accurately reflected in the unending stream of data published daily. Home prices on average have risen at a 6% annual pace since 1999, and 13% over the past year.

What we do have is a serious housing shortage and housing affordability crisis. Despite robust construction, unsold inventory stands at four months, well below its 25-year average. Private builders complain they can't get land permitted to meet demand. Low-income housing advocates complain housing prices are out of reach for many Americans, and that government subsidies have been slashed.

I am not an economist, though if you keep reading, you'll find I can use selective data points to my advantage with the best of them. I was a real estate reporter for this newspaper through several real estate crises, as well as a Wall Street REIT analyst; I am now a money manager. I currently own stocks in several homebuilders; so I am putting my money where my mouth is.

Of course, over the past 25 years we have seen numerous real estate busts. However, steep price declines have typically been driven by local economic factors -- oil woes lead to weakness in Texas in the '80s; aerospace and defense layoffs soften up prices in LA in the '90s; a contraction on Wall Street hurts New York co-op prices.

What we have never seen in this country is a collapse of home prices without also seeing local economic weakness or significant capacity growth. Absent those factors, housing markets just don't collapse under their own weight. Herewith are some of the myths put forth by the housing bubble Chicken Littles.

• Myth #1. There is too much capacity: According to Census data, over the past 10 years, housing permits have averaged about 1.63 million units per year -- including multifamily units. Household formation has averaged 1.49 million families per year. So far, so good. But here is where the data gets murky. Roughly 6% of the new home sales were for second homes (I have seen estimates that the number is actually twice as high), according to UBS. And while there are no precise numbers on this, approximately 360,000 units every year were torn down either because they were nonfunctional, or because they were "tear-downs." When the latter two numbers are taken into account, the real number of new homes is closer to 1.2 million, or 19% fewer than the average number of new households formed each year.

• Myth #2. Risky mortgage products are fueling house appreciation: Sages from Warren Buffett to Alan Greenspan have warned of the increased risk from the use of new mortgage products, particularly adjustable-rate mortgages and interest-only mortgages. The theory here is that buyers are extending themselves to make payments, and when their mortgages reset they will be in trouble. Put aside the fact that only a year ago Mr. Greenspan was advocating the use of ARMs ("American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage," he told the Credit Union National Association last year), these concerns are wildly overstated. As virtually every mortgagee in the country knows, most ARMs are fixed rate for the first two to seven years. Virtually all have 2% interest-rate caps. The average American owns his home for seven years. Why pay several hundred basis points to lock in rates he is highly unlikely to take advantage of? Moreover, very little equity has been paid off by a homeowner in the first seven years of a 30-year loan, so consumers have been effectively overspending on interest rates for generations. As Mr. Greenspan said in his 2004 speech, "the traditional fixed-rate mortgage may be an expensive method of financing a home."

• Myth #3. Speculators are Driving Home Prices: The media today is chock-full of stories of day-trading dot-com refugees who have found their calling buying homes and condos "on spec," with the hope of flipping the property for a higher price. Earlier this month, one Wall Street analyst published an article with the catchy headline: "Investors Gone Wild: An Analysis of Real Estate Speculation." Scary stuff. Here, again, some common-sense thinking is in order. In Manhattan, where I live, friends buy apartments kicking and screaming, convinced they top-ticked the housing market. Is Manhattan special? Are speculators flipping Palm Beach mansions? Bay Area three-bedroom homes? Newton, Mass., Tudor homes? I don't think so. Yet these markets are experiencing the same price appreciation as Las Vegas, Phoenix and Florida, where real estate investors are supposedly driving prices higher.

Anyone waiting for prices to collapse before buying a home is likely to be in for a disappointment. According to the Homeownership Alliance, new household formation, replacement demand and second-home demand will require about two million homes per year to be built over the next decade. This year, the number is likely to be around two million, the highest number since the 1970s -- even as the number of households has grown by over 50% since 1975. Therefore, there is a large cumulative deficit in housing that will take years to correct even if annual housing starts continue at these record levels.

* * *
To the cynical, it is seductive to claim that every piece of good news is a bit fraudulent. And real estate has certainly been subject to boom and bust cycles. But bubbles happen when prices become unhinged from intrinsic value. Homes are not stocks; their "intrinsic value" can only be in the eye of the beholder. A house has utility. Rational people might be willing to pay more for a water view, or for living close to work, or for a larger loo. Such voluntary economic decisions are neither irrational nor exuberant.

It's time to stop being alarmist about home prices. To the extent policy makers want to modulate home-price appreciation, they would do well to relax zoning laws, or stimulate development of low-income housing through tax subsidies. Since those things are not likely to happen overnight, housing prices are likely to cool off slowly, if at all.

Mr. Barsky is managing partner of Alson Capital Partners, LLC