The Oil Depletion Protocol
Big Systems - Global Institutions, Governance and History
(I'm traveling right now, off on a brief energy-related scenario project, so my postings will be a bit spare. Please let me know if you'd like to see more detailed examinations of any of the issues posted about this week. --Jamais)
Whether the oil peak happens over the next few months or next few decades, it's widely acknowledged that global conventional production of petroleum will see a sharp decline soon, with natural gas following thereafter. We know, in broad strokes, what needs to be done to keep that decline from turning into a global economic and political disaster, and the major recommendations -- such as an aggressive shift to alternative energies and transportation technologies, widespread adoption of higher-efficiency building designs, greater reliance on organic/local/smart agriculture techniques, and the like -- parallel what's needed to forestall the worst effects of global warming-induced climate disruption.
So how do we do it?
Richard Heinberg has a fascinating proposal, one that could reduce the risk of oil wars and economic ruin. It's simple to understand, and its logic is compelling. Heinberg, a professor at the New College of California and author of Powerdown -- Options and Actions for a Post-Carbon World, calls his proposal the Oil Depletion Protocol, as it is a formalization of what is already happening worldwide: oil reserves are declining, and all too soon demand will overtake production.
What makes the Oil Depletion Protocol (ODP) particularly appealing is that it doesn't require everyone to participate to be effective. Any nation -- petroleum producer or importer alike -- adopting the ODP would benefit. Of course, the more nations that choose to adopt the Protocol, the better, in terms of both their particular and the global future.
The ODP is simple and, as Heinberg notes, the exact phrasing of it is less important than its broader concept. Producing countries will limit themselves to producing at or below their current "depletion rate" (defined as annual production as a percentage of the estimated amount left to produce); this would gradually slow production, allowing the exporters to wean themselves off of oil and shift to a non-extractive economic base. Importing countries, in turn, would act to reduce their imports every year by a set amount; Heinberg proposes that amount should be the current World Depletion Rate, or 2.59% annually.
Heinberg accepts that such a target will be difficult to achieve, and that cheating and backsliding would happen. But the logic of the proposal is clear and inexorable:
However, it must be recognized that a decline in the availability of oil is inevitable in any case; only the timing of the onset of decline is uncertain. Without a structured agreement in place to limit imports, nations will be inclined to put off preparations for the energy transition until prices soar, at which time such a transition will become far more difficult because of the ensuing chaotic economic conditions. With the Protocol in place, importers will be able to count on stable prices and can then more easily undertake the difficult but necessary process of planning for a future with less oil.
This is hardly news to those of us who pay even the slightest attention to these matters. But without a concrete target, the amount of change required can appear overwhelming. It becomes all too easy for policymakers to say, in effect, "there's too much to do, so we can't do anything."
However, for me, the part of the proposal that most hit home was the following:
Poor importing countries may object that by using less petroleum they will have to forego conventional economic development. However, further development that is based on the use of petroleum will merely create structural dependency on a depleting resource. Without the Protocol, these nations will be financially bled by high and volatile prices. With the Protocol in place and with prices stabilized, these nations will be able to afford to import the oil they absolutely need; meanwhile they will have every incentive to develop their economies in a way that is not petroleum-dependent.
Emphasis mine. This is the leapfrog driver, the recognition that the old way doesn't work anymore, and that there are better approaches available. It fits in with what I wrote back in February, in relation to a post-Kyoto future:
Kyoto will become a leapfrogging lure. China, India, Brazil and the host of fast-rising leapfrog nations will never come close to the per-capita carbon output of the US, because they will increasingly adopt post-Kyoto technologies and industries and designs -- not because they'll be strong-armed into it, nor because they'll suddenly be infused with the desire to do the right thing, but because that will be the self-evident pathway to growth. Who wants to adopt outdated technologies and industries? Who wants to follow a failed model of long-term development when a more successful one is unfolding before their eyes? The leapfrog nations may get worse before they get better, but they already know the writing's on the wall for coal-fired power plants, dirty diesel engines and smoky, choking skies.
Heinberg does his best to answer some of the more obvious questions arising from the Oil Depletion Protocol proposal. Undoubtedly other questions need to be asked -- and I would encourage you to ask them.
The Oil Depletion Protocol may not be the best way to manage a transition to a post-petroleum world, but it has potential. It has the advantages of being relatively straightforward, scalable, and of clear benefit. Will it happen? Is it possible? Who knows? But there are definitely worse choices.
(Via Energy Bulletin.net, and suggested by Peak Energy Jon S. -- thanks!)
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