To: Frank A. Coluccio who wrote (10904 ) 8/4/2005 11:20:04 AM From: fred g Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 46821 Frank, the Internet is insecure by design. The PSTN is secure by design. That's really all that matters. Recall that what we call the Internet is an extension of the original ARPAnet design, built for the private use of the government and its contractors. If you misbehaved, you could be penalized or cut off, and there was no anonymity. So through the 1980s, the Internet was pretty nice -- no spam, no break-ins to speak of. The Morris worm was newsworthy, and he got caught. And that worm was somewhat of an accident; Morris probably didn't intend it to be that virulent or get loose as it did. Usenet, which was a separate entity, was a bit of a toilet, but even that was not really anonymous, and not badly spammed until the 1990s. Since it was just a bunch of friends talking to each other, so to speak, insecurity was a feature. And the connectionless nature made it easier to hide, or do hit-and-runs, since it made accounting of connections essentially impossible. Contrast with the PSTN, where every call is logged someplace. And *67 is not much help to a miscreant, since it only prevents the recipient from knowing the caller's ID, not the networks along the way. The PSTN, on the other hand, always had connection accounting. That one feature did wonders for security, as did revenue protection (stopping a blue boxer protected revenues, but also prevented other security breaches). But it also had a more exclusive membership, with a distinction between "carrier" and "subscriber". So there are no big "pink" (spam-friendly, or their equivalent) phone carriers. Data locality and bandwidth are entirely secondary. A new Internet could be designed with security in mind. It would probably not be fully connectionless. But neither does it have to go into Deep Packet Inspection the way the Fat Wasteband (IMS, IPspheres) model does. Those are horrific kludges that claim to offer QoS benefits, but at a huge cost; a more connection-aware (but payload-unaware) network would offer the end user benefits without the unbridled potential for abuse.