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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (48981)8/30/2005 6:38:44 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF  Respond to of 50167
 
A Price to Pay
Asia will suffer if soaring energy costs dent U.S. consumer spending
BY STEPHEN ROACH

We are in the midst of the first oil shock in the modern era of
globalization. In today's U.S.-centric world, that spells unusual
vulnerability. If higher oil prices take a toll on the over-extended
American consumer, nations that rely on exports to the U.S. as
major sources of growth will be hurt. That puts Asia right in the
crosshairs of the energy shock of 2005.
The risk is mounting of a sharp global slowdown—and possibly a
recession—sparked by rising oil prices. U.S. consumer spending is
likely to slow markedly if oil prices just stay at about $60 a barrel.
This is true for several reasons. First, U.S. households have
precious little flexibility in their budgets. They have drawn their
personal average savings rate down to zero—far below the 9.5%
average during the two oil shocks of the 1970s and the 7% rate
during the shock just prior to the Gulf War in 1991. Today, the only
backstop for most consumers is the transitory wealth created by
America's increasingly precarious housing bubble.
Second, just prior to the two oil-price
spikes of the '70s, discretionary
spending of U.S. households had
become excessive—setting the stage
for America's most severe consumer-led
recessions. A similar overhang is
evident today: spending for consumer
durables and residential construction
has averaged 14.3% of America's
GDP over the past year. That's
virtually identical to levels reached
just before the energy-shock-induced
consumption collapses of the '70s.
With real (i.e. inflation-adjusted) oil
prices having more than tripled since
the last recession ended in late 2001,
a pullback by the heretofore
unflappable American consumer is a
distinct possibility that would spell
trouble for the rest of the world. Particularly worrisome is the
possibility of a double whammy for the world's fastest growing
region, non-Japan Asia. This economic bloc is likely to be hit
especially hard by the combined impacts of its inefficient energy
consumption technology and its excess dependence on the
American consumer.
China is the most obvious case in point. Its oil consumption per
unit of GDP was double that of the developed-world average in
2004. China, like many Asian countries, tends to subsidize the price
of retail energy products. While that means the blow of higher oil
prices is softened for Chinese consumers, a heavy toll is taken on
the government's finances. Moreover, about a third of China's total
exports go to the U.S. That means one of China's largest and most
dynamic sectors is very much a levered play on the staying power
of the American consumer. That's a tough place to be for any
economy during an energy shock—even China's.
The rest of Asia may not be in much better shape. Still lacking in
support from domestic demand, most other Asian economies have
become tightly integrated into a Chinese-centered manufacturing
supply chain. To the extent that China's exports to the U.S. slow as
American consumers are shaken by surging energy bills,
production adjustments will ripple through Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Malaysia. That's yet another manifestation of the
interdependencies of globalization.
Japan and India may fare a little better. Japan has seen an
improvement recently in domestic demand, which—if sustained—
would cushion any shortfall in exports. Japan also benefits from the
extraordinary progress it has made in improving its energy
efficiency. Since 1973, Japan's oil intensity ratio—a measure of the
amount of oil consumed as a
proportion of economic
output—has fallen by 83%, well
in excess of the 50% decline
experienced by the U.S. over the
same period. Nevertheless, with
China now Japan's largest
export market, any weakening in
Chinese economic growth
traceable to the energy shock
could do real damage to the
nascent recovery in the Japanese
economy.
For India, it's a different story—
less of a China connection and
more a tale of inefficient use and
pricing of energy. India, like
China, uses energy only half as
efficiently as the developed
world. Like China, India heavily
subsidizes its domestic pricing structure of retail energy products,
meaning that rising energy costs will adversely effect its already
strained fiscal position. Consequently, while Japan and India are
somewhat less exposed to soaring energy prices than other Asian
economies, they can hardly be expected to emerge unscathed.
For the most part, globalization is a blessing for the world economy.
But for a world that relies too much on U.S. consumption, it faces
grave risk if that growth engine gets derailed. Such is the case with
the energy shock of 2005. If the over-extended American consumer
gets hit—as I suspect will happen—Asia could be in serious trouble.
Stephen Roach is chief economist and director of global economic
analysis at Morgan Stanley
TIM BOYLE / GETTY IMAGES
America’s appetite for Asian exports has been a huge boon.
Will it last?