Speaking of <<wake up call>>, here is probably an example of Stratfor mis-reading of a developing situation, due to its inability to fathom the truth that:
(a) Venezuelan people, in the main, in the majority, support their elected leadership who is channeling ever more wealth their way
(b) Chavez is in the main, in the aggregate, working with othe LatAm ruling parties, supported by the working class of each and just about every nation, as all get wealthy relative to J6P via raw material re-pricing, to the detriment of the old class of haves, to give way to the new class of will-haves
(c) Any and all US threatened actions will simply result in more Iraqs and Irans, in the jungles and on the plateaus, and non-action will result in the fact of many new members to the nuclear club, i.e proliferation, in the US backyard, with the US able to do preciously little, because all are watching, from near and far
(d) The bluster about 'it will cost what it will cost' (regard Katrina) may make good sound bite for TV watchers, assumes Japanese financing, but rings the bell loud and clear for investors, to seek escape, shelter, opt-out, last rite for forgiveness, and redemption.
(e) Whatever happens, more money is called for, whether ending up in wars or pockets of the masses, and so Gold is probably a good LTBH.
I do however note that while Rumsfeld saw fit to lectured China about it not having any need for self defense, Rice lectured Russia on democratic governance, China about econonic reform, and yet Russia did not lecture US on spending, and China did not lecture Rice on not attending the opera while a city drowns.
Strangely, China, Russia and the US all claim India as a strategic partner.
Somebody or all must be wrong.
stratfor.com
U.S., Venezuela: The Tit-for-Tat March Toward Collision
Sep 16, 2005
Summary
The confrontation between Washington and Caracas continued Sept. 15 as the White House decided to decertify Venezuela as an ally in the war on drugs. Although the United States and Venezuela are now clearly strategic opponents, their competition has remained relatively low-grade. The main reason is that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has not crossed Washington's line -- yet.
Analysis
On Sept. 15, as Stratfor anticipated, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns announced that in its annual review Washington had decertified Venezuela as an ally in the war on drugs. In a written statement, U.S. President George W. Bush cited decisions by Caracas to end cooperation with U.S. drug enforcement agencies and to fire many of Venezuela's qualified law enforcement officers. The only other country to be decertified in 2005 is Myanmar.
Normally, decertification leads to a suspension of U.S. aid programs, but in Venezuela's case the White House decided to waive that suspension to keep aid flowing to groups opposed to Chavez. This will increase by a notch the tension between the two countries -- with multiple tirades from Chavez no doubt to come. Still, Washington is not prepared to take stronger measures than this one for now. Given that Chavez is the world leader who most directly is confronting the United States today -- aside possibly from Fidel Castro, who has a close relationship with Chavez -- this is somewhat surprising. The reason, however, is not simply that Washington has bigger fish to fry, but that Chavez has yet to turn himself into a bigger fish.
With Russia, China, Iraq, Iran, North Korea and the Hurricane Katrina disaster to worry about, among other things, the Bush administration has Venezuela low on its list of priorities. There are three things, however, that Chavez could do to immediately vault himself high up on that list. First, he could cut off oil supplies to the United States, which buys 15 percent of its oil imports -- 1.5 million barrels per day -- from Venezuela. Second, Chavez could begin pursuing a nuclear program with the help of Iran or China. Third, he could help bring allied anti-U.S. political parties such as Bolivia's Movement Toward Socialism to power in other Latin American countries.
Chavez has plans to eventually break Venezuela's oil relationship with the United States to push Washington's influence as far out of the country as possible, but he is not prepared to do so yet. He needs to prepare China as an alternative market, and for that China needs refineries capable of processing Venezuela's heavy crude. He also needs to find replacements to take over the drilling and exploration currently being done in Venezuela by U.S. energy firms. This will take time, likely three to four years. Until then, Chavez would only sever oil ties with the United States if he feels directly threatened.
With regards to a nuclear program, Chavez on several occasions of late has mentioned that Caracas is preparing to pursue a nuclear power program and that Venezuelan scientists would be traveling to China to begin learning the ropes. Visits by top Iranian and Russian officials to Caracas also have led to talks on the subject, but no concrete moves. Given that Venezuela cannot develop a domestic nuclear science program on its own, Chavez will be dependent almost entirely on a foreign country to develop the program for him. Any nuclear country -- Iran, China or Russia, for example -- would need to be prepared to confront Washington in bringing nuclear technology to its backyard. Given the interests of these countries in avoiding greater confrontations with Washington, this is unlikely for the time being at least.
There is evidence that Chavez is supporting leftist groups in other Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador, but the relative unpopularity of these groups in their own country and their lack of internal unity has so far kept them from coming to power in elections.
Should any of these three situations change, Chavez will be inviting a concerted U.S. effort to contain him regionally and bring him down internally. In the diplomatic arena -- in an effort to win friends and influence people, in other words -- Chavez is aware of this and is spreading cheap oil and money around the region at a time when oil prices are bringing significant pain to Latin American countries. He announced Sept. 15 that he would buy another $500 million in Argentine bonds to support the government of Argentine President Nestor Kirchner as it tries to restore its financial standing in the world. These measures and the unpopularity of the United States in the region have left Washington unable to win diplomatic support for Chavez containment measures.
Other Latin American governments will not react if and when Chavez decides to cut off oil deliveries to the United States because they will see it as a bilateral issue. Should Chavez become more aggressive in attempting to undermine existing governments through his support for leftist parties, or should he begin to pursue a nuclear program, however, Washington could find some of Chavez's neighbors taking its side. As long as Chavez has piles of oil money to sit on, and global demand continues to rise, however, diplomatic efforts will not succeed. And even in the worst possible scenario, U.S. military action against Venezuela is unlikely, particularly with Chavez arming and expanding his military to make any such effort tremendously costly for Washington.
Should Chavez succeed in getting Washington's dander up, however, it could launch covert efforts to bring Chavez down. Chavez has many opponents in Venezuela, but they currently are simply too fractured or under-equipped to take on Chavez. Should the Bush administration decide that it is time to go after Chavez full bore, instead of poking him occasionally as it is now, efforts to support and unify these groups will intensify. Until then, however, U.S.-Venezuelan relations will continue their gradual tit-for-tat march toward the inevitable collision.
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