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Strategies & Market Trends : Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: regli who wrote (41390)11/18/2005 10:39:09 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Global: Asian Complacency

Stephen Roach (in Beijing)

Back in Asia for the second time in a month, I have heard two recurring (and related) themes -- amazement at the ever-resilient American consumer and astonishment over the dollar’s strength. This fixation only reinforces my conviction that an externally focused Asian economy remains very much a levered play on US demand. Consequently, it would be a big deal out here in Asia should the terms of engagement with the United States change -- through either a shift in demand or a swing in relative prices (i.e., currencies). In my view, that’s precisely the risk that looms in 2006.

Currency fluctuations have long been one of Asia’s biggest wildcards. That is very much the case again in 2005 -- largely due to the surprising strength of the US dollar. After nearly three years of declines from early 2002 through late 2004, the greenback reversed course this year. Many of Asia’s dollar-pegged currencies have followed suit -- especially the Chinese renminbi (RMB) but also the currencies of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and India. The Japanese yen has been a striking exception to this trend, having weakened by 14% against the US dollar since early 2005.

A continuation of this counter-trend rally by the dollar could pose a serious problem for Asia. Lacking in solid support from internal demand, Asia needs super-competitive currencies to keep its export machine running. To the extent the dollar’s surprising strength drags Asian currencies along for the ride, that could prove troubling for the region’s growth outlook.

China could make or break the all-important Asian export story. While much was made of Beijing’s abandonment of the decade-old dollar peg on July 21, China has been reluctant to cut its currency loose. After an initial 2% adjustment vis-à-vis the dollar, the RMB has traded in a very tight range against the US currency in subsequent months. That means as the dollar has gone up, so, too, has the Chinese currency. On a broad trade-weighted basis, the RMB is up about 10% in real terms from levels prevailing at year-end 2004.

So far, that hasn’t made much of a dent in China’s export trajectory. Year-over-year gains in Chinese exports held at 30% in October -- down only slightly from the 35% surge in 2004. China competes largely on the basis of extraordinary cost differentials, product quality, increased technological savvy, and state-of-the-art infrastructure. As such, it would take a much larger appreciation in the RMB to cut into the Chinese export business.

In recent years, China’s increasingly powerful export machine has turned the Chinese economy into an engine of pan-Asian trade. China draws heavily on imports from its neighbors to provide inputs into Asia’s increasingly China-centric export platform. A dollar-led strengthening of the RMB actually boosts China’s purchasing power of such foreign made components. Chinese import growth was still running at a 23% annualized clip through October 2005 -- especially good news for its Asian suppliers such as Taiwan, Korea, and Japan.

In the end, however, China’s export prowess is balanced on the head of a pin -- a pin made in America. Fully 35% of all Chinese exports go to the United States. Should US domestic demand falter -- hardly idle conjecture for an over-extended American consumer that looks exceedingly vulnerable to the twin pressures of an energy shock and a possible bursting of the housing bubble -- China would quickly be in trouble.

Everywhere I go in Asia, I hear the tale of the tough American consumer who has once again triumphed over adversity -- this time, making it through the energy shock of 2005 without even flinching. The latest estimates of 4Q05 real consumption growth by our US team -- an anemic 1.5% increase versus a 10-year trend of closer to 3.75% -- certainly draw that perception into question. In addition, mounting US-China trade frictions pose a different set of risks to the biggest piece of the Chinese export business. Whatever the reason -- a capitulation of the American consumer or Washington-led trade bashing -- there is good reason for concern on the Chinese export prognosis.

China’s Asian trading partners can hardly afford to take those concerns lightly. A faltering of Chinese export demand would deal a serious blow to the rest of Asia. That would be especially the case in Japan, Asia’s newest and possibly most exciting recovery story. In recent years, China has emerged as Japan’s largest export market. Should Chinese exports falter, China’s demand for Japanese-made components would slow -- posing a potentially serious problem for Japan’s long-awaited rebound.

While the US dollar has continued to strengthen in recent weeks, Asia should not count on a continuation of this trend. America is suffering from its largest current-account deficit in history -- presently running at 6.4% of US GDP and, reflecting a further shortfall of domestic US saving, probably headed into the 7.5% range by year-end 2006. Nor has the world ever had to fund such a large external shortfall -- running at nearly an $800 billion annual rate in the first half of 2005. History and established economic theory point to a resumption of the dollar’s decline as a logical response to this extraordinary imbalance. A weaker dollar would change America’s relative price alignment with the rest of the world -- making imports more expensive and US exports more competitive. It would probably also add to US interest rate pressures, as America’s foreign creditors seek compensation for taking inordinate currency risk. The combination of a weaker dollar and higher US interest rates should finally allow the United States to turn the corner on its massive current-account imbalance.

A renewed decline in the dollar underscores another risk that Japan could face -- a reversal of the recent depreciation of the yen. A decoupling of the yen from other Asian currencies in 2005 has provided an important prop to the nascent recovery of the Japanese economy. Yet if Japan’s recovery is for real, then there is no overriding reason why its currency should continue to sag. That’s especially the case given Japan’s outsize current-account surplus -- an external imbalance that is normally associated with a strengthening currency. With all eyes focused on the Chinese currency issue, Japan has slipped under the currency radar screen. The day will come -- sooner rather than later, in my view -- when the yen will strengthen again. That will undoubtedly prove vexing to Japanese exporters. And with Japan’s internal private consumption growth unlikely to exceed 2% by year-end 2006, according to our Japan team, the possible combination of a stronger yen and a slowing of Chinese demand could be especially problematic for a still fragile recovery of the Japanese economy.

Asia is the most currency-sensitive segment of the global economy. That was a painful lesson from the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and is still very much the case today. And it’s especially the case for the region’s two export powerhouses -- China and Japan. If the US dollar strengthens further and Asia’s dollar-linked currencies continue to follow suit, the region’s export-led growth dynamic could be in trouble. If the dollar resumes its decline, as I suspect it will, those pressures would be tempered. China, however, could be an important exception. If its currency stays tightly linked to a weaker dollar, an increasingly competitive RMB may well be the breaking point for Washington’s protectionist-prone politicians. That slippery slope should be avoided at all costs.

Asia is relatively carefree these days -- riding the waves of US-centric global growth and benefiting from the strength of China and a nascent recovery in Japan. It’s as if nothing could go wrong. Such complacency is always worrisome -- especially for a region that remains so heavily dependent on others for its economic sustenance.

morganstanley.com



To: regli who wrote (41390)11/18/2005 10:59:31 AM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Global: The Recession of 2007
Joachim Fels (London)

Economists don’t like the “R” word…

Economists are usually reluctant to predict recessions before they have actually occurred. One reason is that recessions are rare events: they don’t happen very often and don’t last very long. The United States’ economy has been in recession only nine times in the last 60 years, or roughly once every seven years. Before the last recession in 2001, the economy even expanded for a full ten years. And the average recession has only lasted for about four quarters. Thus, at any point in time the chances are high that a doomsayer will be proved wrong.

Another reason is that there is no broad consensus amongst economists on what actually causes recessions. The most frequently cited candidates are monetary and fiscal policy mistakes, oil price shocks, wage cost pushes, sharp exchange rate adjustments, technology shocks and financial crises. But opinions remain divided on which of these factors are the most important and what combination of these factors will tip an economy from prosperity into recession. The safer bet to make for a risk-averse forecaster is thus to predict that the economy will usually grow at around its perceived trend rate, and sometimes a bit above or below that.

A telling illustration of forecasters’ reluctance to utter the “R” word is the post-mortem of professional forecasters’ performance in predicting the 2001 recession conducted by James Stock and Mark Watson, who used the forecasts compiled each quarter for the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). Stock and Watson find that as late as the fourth quarter of 2000, when US industrial production was already declining, the median SPF forecast was predicting strong economic growth throughout 2001. Moreover, even during 2001 the SPF failed to forecast the sharp declines in GDP as they were occurring. The authors conclude dryly: “Evidently, this recession was a challenging time for professional forecasters.” (see How Did Leading Indicator Forecasts Perform During the 2001 Recession? Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, Summer 2003)

…but the bond market is toying with the idea

Financial markets are definitely less shy than economists about forecasting recessions, as illustrated by Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson’s famous quip: “The stock market has predicted nine out of the last five recessions”. A more reliable indicator for impending recessions than the stock market appears to be the bond market or, more precisely, the slope of the yield curve. A series of empirical studies suggest that the spread between long-term and short-term interest rates is a good predictor of future economic activity. Typically, an inversion of the yield curve has been followed by recession about a year later. Arturo Estrella from the New York Fed, who authored or co-authored many of these studies during the 1990s, notes that this empirical relationship appears to be robust over time and across different countries, with particularly strong results obtained using data for economies in Europe and North America. (A. Estrella, “Why Does the Yield Curve Predict Output and Inflation? The Economic Journal, July 2005, pp.722-755).

Against this backdrop, I take the dramatic flattening of the US yield curve this year seriously. Two-year-Treasury yields are currently trading only 8 basis point below 10-year yields, so it doesn’t take much from here for the yield spread to slip into negative territory. Based on past experience, there is now a significant risk that the US economy will slow sharply or even fall into recession in late 2006 or early 2007. In fact, this is precisely what the Eurodollar futures curve seems to be suggesting, too. While the futures markets suggest that investors are betting on another two or three Fed rate hikes between now and the middle of next year, the same market sees the implied Fed funds rate easing slightly (by 10 basis points or so) between June 2006 and June 2007. Thus, investors appear to be attaching a significant probability to an economic slowdown or a recession over the next 6-12 months, leading to a policy reversal at the Fed.

Taking the bond market seriously

Given professional forecasters’ apparent inability or reluctance to forecast recessions, and given the decent track record of the yield curve in forecasting recessions, the warning signals from the relentless flattening of the curve and the inversion in the June 2006 to June 2007 Eurodollar futures contracts should not be dismissed easily. A recession in 2007 is definitely very high on my radar screen.

Of course, there is no magic in the link between the yield curve and the business cycle. Fluctuations in the yield curve tend to be largely driven by the ups and downs in short rates, which are controlled by the central bank. Sharp cuts in interest rates usually lead to a steeper yield curve slope, while a monetary tightening would lead to a flatter curve. Thus, the established fact that inverted yield curves predict recessions is just another manifestation of the power that monetary policy wields over the business cycle. In fact, a recent high-calibre econometric study suggests that the short rate alone has actually been an even better predictor of GDP growth than the yield spread since the early 1990s (A. Ang, M. Piazzesi, M. Wei. “What Does the Yield Curve Tell us About GDP Growth?” Journal of Econometrics, 2005 forthcoming). Well, the Fed has now raised short rates by 300 basis points and is widely expected to add at least another 50 basis points to the bill over the next several months. In my view, it is first and foremost the combination of monetary tightening and a highly leveraged and asset-dependent economy that raises the spectre of a sharp economic slowdown or even a recession in 2007.

Of course, there are weighty counterarguments to this punchline. One is that despite 300 basis points of rate hikes, nominal and real short rates are still low in historical comparison. While that is certainly true, I would argue that the change in short rates matters as well, not only the level, and that the US economy must have become more sensitive to interest rate changes due to the massive expansion in household sector balance sheets. Easy monetary conditions have made the economy addicted to debt and rising asset prices. As for a heavily addicted junkie, a significant reduction of the dope should already be enough to cause cold turkey for the economy.

Another counterargument is that while short rates have gone up, asset prices in general, which are the main transmission mechanism from short rates to the economy, have held up well or have even gone up further. My response: watch out for the cracks to appear in high yield, equities and real estate next year for a sign that the transmission mechanism is working. Naturally, higher short rates and a flatter or inverted yield curve are only the first step in a series of events that will lead to a sharp slowdown or recession. The logical next step would be for high yield spreads to widen, house price increases to slow (early signs of which are starting to appear in the coastal regions) and, perhaps, equities to tank at some stage next year, which in turn would set in motion a financial accelerator leading to a significant slowing of economic growth.

Risk of 2007 recession also rising in Europe

As in the US, I believe the risk of a 2007 recession in Europe has risen recently, even though it is not as high (yet) as in the US. The recession risk is lower so far because the yield curve remains comfortably in positive territory. Note that an ECB working paper shows that the yield spread is a useful recession predictor in the euro area, too (F. Moneta, “Does the Yield Spread Predict Recessions in the Euro Area?” ECB Working Paper No. 294, December 2003). However, a potentially more aggressive monetary tightening by the ECB than the market currently foresees could flatten the yield curve further in the course of next year. Moreover, the new German government coalition is planning a sharp fiscal tightening consisting mainly of tax increases for 2007. (For details, see my colleague Elga Bartsch’s note Recovering on Borrowed Time, 15 November 2005). In Italy, where an election is scheduled for next spring, a new government might also slam of the fiscal brakes in 2007. Fiscal tightening in two large euro area countries accounting for about half of euro area GDP, combined with the lagged effects of monetary tightening during 2006, which could slow house price inflation, might well result in a sharp economic slowdown or even a European recession in 2007. Needless to say, this would be even more likely if a US recession came to pass. Thus, what I’ve described as type-II stagflation — a combination of relative economic stagnation in the euro area economy coupled with asset price inflation — could morph into an even more nasty combination of recession and asset price deflation — not too dissimilar from the Japanese experience during the 1990s.

Bottomline: New lows for bond yields?

The warning signs to watch out for on the road to possible a recession in 2007 are: (1) an inversion of the US yield curve and a further flattening of the euro area yield curve in the next several months; (2) a widening of high yield spreads; (3) a significant slowing of house price inflation; (4) a decline in equity prices. The road towards recession will be bumpy though. I wouldn’t be surprised to see temporarily stronger economic growth in both the US and the euro area as we go into the new year, which would lead to a further sell of in bond markets and more monetary tightening in response. But as night follows day, the latter would eventually bring on the slowdown or recession. I still see bond yields trending higher as we move into 2006. But if the recession of 2007 comes to pass, US and European bond yields could make new lows eventually. And Dr. Bernanke might actually have to climb on board of his proverbial helicopter in 2007 to flood the economy with paper money. In the meantime, all eyes on the yield curve!

morganstanley.com



To: regli who wrote (41390)11/18/2005 12:48:10 PM
From: mishedlo  Respond to of 116555
 
Nov. Philly Fed index slips to 11.5 -
Thursday, November 17, 2005 5:54:29 PM
afxpress.com

WASHINGTON (AFX) -- The manufacturing sector expanded at a slower pace in November in the Philadelphia region, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia reported Thursday. The Philly Fed diffusion index fell to 11.5 in November from 17.3 in October. Readings over zero indicate expansion. The index is based on surveys of firms in the region. "Indicators continue to reflect growth in the manufacturing sector," the bank said. The Philly Fed index is closely watched by economists and traders for clues it might shed about the national manufacturing sector. It is one of the first indicators released for November. Economists polled by MarketWatch were expecting the index to fall to about 16.9. The new orders index dropped to 12.7 from 18.6, while the shipments index rose to 23.4 from 19.5. Employment indexes showed expansion in hiring and the average workweek

The unfilled orders index fell to a negative 7.8 from 0.8, indicating fewer backlogged orders. Inflationary pressures eased modestly. The prices paid index dropped to 56.8 from 67.6, while the prices received index was just about steady at 32.5. More than 80% of firms expect to pay higher prices for energy next year, with 38% expecting energy prices to rise more than 10%. Manufacturing firms in the area were more optimistic about the near term. The expectations index rose to 29.2 from 22.0. In other reports, the Federal Reserve said industrial production bounced back in October, rising 0.9%. Manufacturing output rose 1.4%, the most in six years. Meanwhile, housing starts slipped in October to a still-strong 2.014 million annual pace, the Commerce Department said. First-time jobless claims fell to the lowest level in seven months last week, the Labor Department said