The Middle East Cauldron
By Edward Gnehm
J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro Visiting Professor of International Affairs
(As delivered) :
From some distant age no longer recorded in time comes the legend of Pandora's box. There are several versions in the mythology that comes down to us from ancient Greece; but the basic story line remains. On a lovely evening midst the dancing of mortal men, Mercury, Jupiter's messenger, arrives burdened with a beautiful box. He asks permission to leave the box in the care of Pandora and her husband Epimetheus promising to return soon to retrieve it. Pandora's curiosity leads her first to untie the chord and, then, when tempted further by voices from within, to raise the lid of the box. Jupiter had malignantly crammed into this box all the diseases, sorrows, vices, and crimes that afflict poor humanity; and the box was no sooner opened, than all these ills flew out.
From September 10, 2001 until last summer, I was serving as the US Ambassador in Jordan. I watched from my vantage point the decision to move militarily against Iraq, the build up before the war, the war itself and its aftermath. As events unfolded, this story of Pandora's box came to haunt my thoughts. For our entry with US ground forces into the heartland of the Arabs and of Islam was a momentous and cataclysmic event --- an opening of Pandora's box Baghdad style. With this action what was is gone. What is, is. What follows is unknown and very much unpredictable. It certainly will be influenced by the decisions that we and others make --- by the actions we and others take or --- of equal consequence --- do not take. The players influence but do not control events. And like the evils of old, the crosscurrents and counter forces of the issues that are in motion, themselves further complicate the uncertainty of the outcome.
Tonight I want to share with you some of the forces and issues that I see now in motion in the Middle East fanned and kindled anew by our military intervention in Iraq.
1. Regional Relationships
Since the 1967 Seven Day War relationships among the regional states and a power balance in the Middle East have had some considerable predictability. There have certainly been conflicts and wars; but I am referring to a seemingly broad understanding of where the various players in the region stood on major issues and how they would likely react to events. You had the conservative monarchies, the party-based "democracies," the troublemakers, and the generally "unseen/unheard-from." When major developments occurred, even the governments in the area had a fair sense of the probable position of others in the region. Simply said, countries tended to act a certain way; others were generally "on tune."
This overall environment was in sharp contrast to the 1950s and 1960s and the ascendancy of Nasser in Egypt, several ideological movements, and certainly the continued reaction to the Arab defeat in 1948 by Israel. In those years the Pan Arab fervor of Nasser and others challenged the very legitimacy of existing states, states whose boundaries were largely a creation of the victorious European allies after WWI.
Our military action in Iraq removed --- certainly in the short term --- one important player in the regional constellation--- and impacted significantly on its traditional role. Iraq was a state on the left and radical side of the political spectrum. Even in the period it was under UN sanctions, other states had to be wary of Saddam's political activism, for example, against a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as his use of agents to eliminate opposition (even individuals in other countries). Saddam was a force to be reckoned with and other countries adapted policies to cope with Saddam's antics. At one point, of course, many Arab states joined the coalition to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait. Yet at the same time within the region Iraq was seen as an important bulwark against Iran --- the front line against Iranian moves westward.
The positions of various states in the region --- with and among each other --- are now seeking a new basis. You see this in Syria's relative isolation, the Saudi relationship with its small neighbors, Jordan's efforts to rebuild ties with Gulf States, and the general jockeying for leadership in the region. Still unknown is the influence that the new Iraq will play in the region.
2. The Arab-Persian Conflict
There is a historic and deep cleavage between the Arabs and the Persians --- Iranians today. Recall that the boundary today between Iraq and Iran has been (roughly speaking) a battle line between empires: the Romans and Persians; the Byzantines and the Persians; the Arabs and the Persians and then the Ottomans and the Persians. The peoples of the Middle East have a very different attitude toward history than do Americans. One must never forget that in dealing with the Middle East. History lives as part of today not a study of things past. For example, the Arabs still talk of the Persian sack of Jerusalem as a horrifying event. You would think it was a decade or two ago. In fact the year was 614 AD.
As I mentioned above, our military defeat of Iraq removed the one Arab state that other states in the region saw as a bulwark against the Persians. The adage in the ME has always been: "Never let the Persians over the Zagros Mountains," a reference to the mountain chain that essentially defines the current border between Iraq and Iran. Now in the minds of Arabs, the Persians are over the Zagros and are the dominant influence in southern Iraq with no force or even geographic barrier between them and the rest of the Arab world.
The Saudis and other Gulf Arabs have always feared Iranian hegemony and in this they don't have to go far back into history. As recently as 1970 the Shah of Iran claimed the State of Bahrain as part of Iran. In 1971 the Iranians seized control of three small islands in the Persian Gulf that were claimed by the UAE. The Arabs remember the Shah and his statements that Iran was rightfully the hegemonic power in the Gulf. The 1979 revolution only compounded Arab fears. The Iranians were not only attempting to dominate the region territorially but were now seeking to change existing regimes through the export of their revolution.
And now the Arabs are deeply concerned about the unbridled presence of Iran --- even as Iran seems bent on developing a nuclear military capability --- and Arabs fear what will befall them given Iraq's current military impotence.
3. Sunnis versus Shia
The Sunni-Shia division in Islam overlies the Arab-Persian issue. Most Moslems in the world are Sunni or orthodox Moslems, including most of the Arab world.
Most Persians adhere to the Shia branch of Islam. The Shia divided from the mainstream of Islam in the early years following the death of the Prophet. They believed, and continue to believe, that the rightful heir to Mohammed was through his family. The assassination (or martyrdom) of Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, is the seminal point of divergence and hostility between Sunni and Shia. There are other differences but the important point for our discussion is the history of internecine conflict between the two. With the exception of Iran, Shia populations in other countries have generally been suppressed or controlled, depending on what word you choose to use.
Iran, as the single Shia state up to now, has the position and power to lead the Shia communities in the region. That is big trouble for many of the Sunni countries. With our toppling the Sunni-controlled government in Iraq, the Shia of Iraq are asserting their right to run the country. They are, after all, 60% of the population. Iran is right there with money, religious influence, and its power interests. Shia in other Sunni Arab countries are emboldened to seek their rights. They are a majority in Bahrain and 30% of the population in Kuwait. They are 10% of the population in Saudi Arabia (but far more importantly they are the people who live in the oil rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia).
Several leaders in the region fear a Shia dominated encirclement. They point to the Shia Hizballah in Lebanon, the Allawite (Shia) domination of Syria, coupled with a Shia Iraq and Iran. They warn of an arc of Shiism in the region.
The Sunni-Shia religious animus is serious and we should not underestimate how this factor bears on the other issues at play.
4. Aggressive Religious Wahhabi'ism Gone Political
Another force in motion and today far more political and menacing is the Wahabbi movement out of Saudi Arabia. About 200 years ago a religious movement arose in the central Arabian Desert allied with the al-Saud family that rules Saudi Arabia today. It focused on bringing Islam back to its purist tenants (as they defined them of course). In a sense they were and are the Puritans of Islam. They object to all sorts of practices and social customs that they believe are un-Islamic, such as the celebration of the Prophet's birthday, the marking of graves, the veneration of the dead, and the shrines of martyrs. We see the modern manifestation of their Islamic rigor in Saudi Arabia.
The Wahabbis have historically been aggressive and fanatical religious proselytizers --- going out in great numbers to convert others including Sunni Moslems to their view of Islam. The Arab states around Saudi Arabia have long been a target and have long been concerned about the encroachment of the Wahabbis into their domain. And these are Sunni Islamic states. I heard concern in Jordan in the 1980s about Wahhabi proselytizing in southern Jordan. I heard similar concerns in Kuwait after its liberation in 1991.
My reason for mentioning the Wahhabis in the context of our action in Iraq centers on their very aggressive and militant involvement in Iraq. Now, with our intervention in the Arab heartland, the Wahhabis are fighting in Iraq against our occupation of a Moslem land and they cite the Prophet as urging all the faithful to resist the infidels who seek to subjugate Moslems. Their religious zeal seems imbued today with a political content that we have not seen before and it comes dangerously close to the preaching of Osama Bin Laden. I will pick up on that point later.
There is, however, an important additional aspect of the Wahhabi fighting in Iraq that needs elaboration. The Wahhabis (going back to the schism with the Shia) believe that Shia are apostates --- that they are Moslems who left the true faith. Since they are Moslems who turned on Islam, they are people who should be destroyed. In Iraq therefore we see a religious motivation for Wahhabi (Sunni) attacks on the Shia population. This view coincides with others in Iraq who do not want to see the Shia in power and is a powerful obstacle to reconciliation or compromise between these groups.
5. International Terrorism (OBL & Zarqawi)
I separate Osama Bin Laden and what he represents as part of international terrorism from the Sunni-Shia and Wahhabi issues. While they intersect and seem to overlap, the international terrorist groups are at play in their own right. They work through and with other groups but they have their own presence and need to be considered as a separate issue given our intervention in Iraq.
Our intervention has given Osama Bin Laden yet another example of the US threat to the region and to Islam --- a new rallying point for disaffected Arabs and Moslems. It proves in the minds of his followers or those who listen to his words that the US does intend to dominate the region for its own purposes and that this must be fought in every way possible --- including violence and terrorism. In Iraq we are easy targets.
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian, has emerged as the leader of another terrorist group that targets the US and acts resolutely and ruthlessly to defeat our efforts to stabilize Iraq. He was not and, I believe, is not a part of OBL's al-Qaeda network in a formal sense; but we know they are in touch. Zarqawi has offered to work with OBL and OBL is prepared to do so. There are other terrorist organizations with activities in Iraq as well.
Iraq has our attention; but Arabs see the threat from OBL and types like Zarqawi as a serious one for them and their countries. Jordan, for example, has been a key target of Zarqawi. In fact he was responsible for the assassination of Larry Foley in Amman. In Kuwait there have been at least three shooting incidents between security forces and armed groups since the first of this year. OBL (we must all remember) is focused on overthrowing the al-Saud family in Saudi Arabia, which he has labeled as apostates. OBL has also mentioned other regimes in the Arab world as apostates and thus as targets for elimination by al-Qaeda, including those of Egypt and Jordan. Al-Qaeda is a real threat to these regimes and to the region's stability --- not just to the U.S.
6. Regimes and their Publics
Even as current regimes are facing threats from radical groups such as al-Qaeda, they have significant internal problems. Certainly the problems are different in each country; but overall it is possible to generalize that populations are not happy with their governments.
In the first instance they are opposed to many of their government's policies --- foremost among those any close relationship with the US. Citizens are angry about America's policies vis-à-vis both the Palestinians and Iraq. They scoff at our pronouncements of principles --- especially our reasons for going into Iraq --- and find them hollow. In their opinion we do not apply them to the Arab-Israeli dispute and we do not apply them to regimes in the region that are undemocratic or abusive of their people --- certainly not if they have oil that we need! They conclude that our use of ideals and principles is a cover to justify the actions we want to take.
There are, in addition, severe economic problems in virtually all of the Arab countries. Most populations are very young (often more than 60% of the population under the age of 18). Unemployment is rampant. As most countries have improved their education systems, they are now producing graduates who see no employment opportunities. Frustration and hostility are a natural consequence. Recent surveys of the region point out that the countries of the Middle East have least benefited from the economic growth that has taken place globally. That is readily seen and apparent to the peoples of the region.
They want to see change. In this context the word of the day (at least in Washington) is democracy. In the region that word carries much heavy baggage particularly when packed in Washington. People fear that this democracy we talk about is an American effort to change their culture and traditions as well as an attack on their faith. They believe that we intend to make their society --- their family structure --- look like what they see in Hollywood films or American television programs --- decadent, disrespectful, and irreligious.
We hear much these days about the sweeping winds of change. You would believe from the rhetoric that the Arab people are on the ramparts of freedom as we saw the downtrodden French rebels in Les Miserables! Beware! That is not remotely what we are seeing in the Middle East. We are, however, seeing that people want more "say so" in their governments' decisions and are demanding that their governments act as they, the people, believe they should. They want change but in the context of their own society and traditions. What may come will not look like the democracy of the American textbook. In fact how this issue plays out is as yet uncertain. The change can be good; but it could also be catastrophically bad.
7. Arab Self Identity: Humiliation, Degradation, Impotence, Insecurity
The region is seething for all the reasons mentioned above; but I want to pull it all together from another angle --- the pervasive sense of humiliation and degradation felt throughout the Arab world regardless of the country's name. People feel helpless to influence what happens to them. They see themselves as pieces on a board or "victims" of other peoples' actions --- powerless to change events. It is one wave after another.
I have felt this humiliation and the resulting tension and stress grow enormously over the past few years. I can best describe this with a story that comes right from the television that everyone watches all day long. In fact the pervasive presence of satellite TV has brought into every home pictures and commentaries that move people transnationally toward this common perception of impotence and humiliation.
The news flashes pictures of uniformed soldiers bashing in a door searching for wanted terrorists or weapons. Some women and perhaps children are huddled against a wall terrified. We see the soldiers drag a person out into the street, throw him on the ground and tie his hands behind his back. The soldier with his gun pointed down toward the figure places his foot on his back to hold him down. The place is Gaza; the soldiers are Israeli; the people are Arabs.
The news flashes pictures of uniformed soldiers bashing in a door searching for wanted terrorists or weapons. Some women and perhaps children are huddled against a wall terrified. We see the soldiers drag a person out into the street, throw him on the ground and tie his hands behind his back. The soldier with his gun pointed down toward the figure places his foot on his back to hold him down. The place is Baghdad; the soldiers are American; the people are Arabs.
We have a woefully inadequate understanding of the culture and traditions in which we are called to operate, for example, the depth of religious conservatism throughout the region, the privacy of women's quarters, the sole of the shoe as the symbol of filth and defilement. We do not comprehend that when Iraqis see American troops, they think back to their struggle against British colonial armies. Decades of resentment toward foreigners (westerners) who intervened in their affairs surface as intense and hostile emotions today.
Our military intervention in Iraq no matter how well meaning and no matter how important to American interests has put us into the Arab and Moslem heartland. The very nature of the insurgency --- our need to maintain order and hopefully improve security --- requires us to take actions that invariably result in deaths and injuries. Invariably there will be unfortunate incidents. I am not demeaning in any way our forces or our intentions. I only mean to underscore that while we do what we must, our actions have other consequences.
In fact my motive in laying out these issues as I have tonight is to emphasize how many different currents are now in motion, how they intersect often at cross purposes, how treating one may in fact exacerbate another and yet how we have no alternative but to deal with them all. Pandora's story has a final line. After she lifted the top and all the unseemly evils had escaped, she slammed the top back down. She then heard another voice from within pleading for release. The voice promised that it would help deal with the evils. Pandora opened the box and "hope" flew out. Well, I am glad to have hope and I believe hope is important; but it is no basis for action. As humans God has endowed us with reason and logic --- attributes which, when applied wisely, give us an ability to influence the course of events and even to change the course that events are taking. Our actions in Iraq and the region will impact significantly on the issues I have described at play. The forces in motion need not end in disaster --- need not be the harbingers of the last judgment. But we need to be judicious and wise and, foremost, have more understanding of the social and cultural world that we have entered as a major player.
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