To: Hawkmoon who wrote (176595 ) 11/30/2005 10:49:11 PM From: Win Smith Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500 That was Tommy Franks' decision. He made the call about the force levels versus possessing the element of surprise as to the actual date of the attack. Not Bush.. And Franks was correct. The Iraqi Army dissolved in the face of that relatively small force. Oh dear. That's totally contrary to every account I ever read. And the "surprise" thing is a total crock, as everybody knew what was coming, and when, everybody kept blabbing about the weather window. A long version:The military's fundamental argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat. The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a rapid return to order, and would behave accordingly—or they would see the opposite. This was the "shock and awe" that really mattered, in the Army's view: the ability to make clear who was in charge. "Insights from successful occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down fast," Conrad Crane, of the Army War College, told me. That is, a larger force would be necessary during and immediately after the war, but might mean a much smaller occupation presence six months later. "We're in Baghdad, the regime is toppled—what's next?" Thomas White told me, recounting discussions before the war. One of the strongest advocates of a larger force was General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. White said, "Guys like Shinseki, who had been in Bosnia [where he supervised the NATO force], been in Kosovo, started running the numbers and said, 'Let's assume the world is linear.' For five million Bosnians we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the size of California. How many people is this going to take?" The heart of the Army's argument was that with too few soldiers, the United States would win the war only to be trapped in an untenable position during the occupation. A note of personal rancor complicated these discussions, as it did many disagreements over postwar plans. In our interview Douglas Feith played this down—maintaining that press reports had exaggerated the degree of quarreling and division inside the Administration. These reports, he said, mainly reflected the experience of lower-level officials, who were embroiled in one specific policy area and "might find themselves pretty much always at odds with their counterparts from another agency." Higher up, where one might be "fighting with someone on one issue but allied with them on something else," relations were more collegial. Perhaps so. But there was no concealing the hostility within the Pentagon between most uniformed leaders, especially in the Army, and the civilians in OSD. Donald Rumsfeld viewed Shinseki as a symbol of uncooperative, old-style thinking, and had in the past gone out of his way to humiliate him. In the spring of 2002, fourteen months before the scheduled end of Shinseki's term, Rumsfeld announced who his successor would be; such an announcement, which converts the incumbent into a lame duck, usually comes at the last minute. The action was one of several calculated insults. From OSD's point of view, Shinseki and many of his colleagues were dragging their feet. From the Army's point of view, OSD was being reckless about the way it was committing troops and high-handed in disregarding the military's professional advice. One man who was then working in the Pentagon told me of walking down a hallway a few months before the war and seeing Army General John Abizaid standing outside a door. Abizaid, who after the war succeeded Tommy Franks as commander of the Central Command, or CENTCOM, was then the director of the Joint Staff—the highest uniformed position in the Pentagon apart from the Joint Chiefs. A planning meeting for Iraq operations was under way. OSD officials told him he could not take part. (from theatlantic.com ) A much pithier version:I know a General officer who was in contact with General Franks throughout the planning. He first went to Rummy with a request for 400,000 troops and was sent back to his office to cut the number. This happened 3+ times with Franks lowering the no. each time. He finally said to rumsfeld "give me a number." The idea that the generals have been in league with the administration is false. They are just trying to protect their very nice retirements. They worked 30+ years without all this kind of garbage. They are fed up...but hey...give up that money? washingtonmonthly.com Everything I've ever read points to Rummy micromanaging the force level. Trying to pin it on Franks fits with W's model of "personal responsibility", where the buck must be kept as distant as possible from its traditional stopping place, but otherwise seems pretty inconsistent with conventional reality.