What?s wrong with cutting and running?
ASK THIS | August 03, 2005
Everything that opponents of a pullout say would
happen if the U.S. left Iraq is happening already,
says retired Gen. William E. Odom, the head of the
National Security Agency during the Reagan
administration. So why stay?
By William E. Odom
diane@hudson.org
If I were a journalist, I would list all the arguments
that you hear against pulling U.S. troops out of Iraq,
the horrible things that people say would happen, and
then ask: Aren?t they happening already? Would a
pullout really make things worse? Maybe it would make
things better.
Here are some of the arguments against pulling out:
1) We would leave behind a civil war.
2) We would lose credibility on the world stage.
3) It would embolden the insurgency and cripple the
move toward democracy.
4) Iraq would become a haven for terrorists.
5) Iranian influence in Iraq would increase.
6) Unrest might spread in the region and/or draw in
Iraq's neighbors.
7) Shiite-Sunni clashes would worsen.
8) We haven?t fully trained the Iraqi military and
police forces yet.
9) Talk of deadlines would undercut the morale of our
troops.
But consider this:
1) On civil war. Iraqis are already fighting Iraqis.
Insurgents have killed far more Iraqis than Americans.
That?s civil war. We created the civil war when we
invaded; we can?t prevent a civil war by staying.
For those who really worry about destabilizing the
region, the sensible policy is not to stay the course
in Iraq. It is rapid withdrawal, re-establishing
strong relations with our allies in Europe, showing
confidence in the UN Security Council, and trying to
knit together a large coalition including the major
states of Europe, Japan, South Korea, China, and India
to back a strategy for stabilizing the area from the
eastern Mediterranean to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Until the United States withdraws from Iraq and admits
its strategic error, no such coalition can be formed.
Thus those who fear leaving a mess are actually
helping make things worse while preventing a new
strategic approach with some promise of success.
2) On credibility. If we were Russia or some other
insecure nation, we might have to worry about
credibility. A hyperpower need not worry about
credibility. That?s one of the great advantages of
being a hyperpower: When we have made a big strategic
mistake, we can reverse it. And it may even enhance
our credibility. Staying there damages our credibility
more than leaving.
Ask the president if he really worries about US
credibility. Or, what will happen to our credibility
if the course he is pursuing proves to be a major
strategic disaster? Would it not be better for our
long-term credibility to withdraw earlier than later
in this event?
3) On the insurgency and democracy. There is no
question the insurgents and other anti-American
parties will take over the government once we leave.
But that will happen no matter how long we stay. Any
government capable of holding power in Iraq will be
anti-American, because the Iraqi people are
increasingly becoming anti-American.
Also, the U.S. will not leave behind a liberal,
constitutional democracy in Iraq no matter how long it
stays. Holding elections is easy. It is impossible to
make it a constitutional democracy in a hurry.
President Bush?s statements about progress in Iraq are
increasingly resembling LBJ's statements during the
Vietnam War. For instance, Johnson?s comments about
the 1968 election are very similar to what Bush said
in February 2005 after the election of a provisional
parliament.
Ask the president: Why should we expect a different
outcome in Iraq than in Vietnam?
Ask the president if he intends to leave a
pro-American liberal regime in place. Because that?s
just impossible. Postwar Germany and Japan are not
models for Iraq. Each had mature (at least a full
generation old) constitutional orders by the end of
the 19th century. They both endured as constitutional
orders until the 1930s. Thus General Clay and General
MacArthur were merely reversing a decade and a half
totalitarianism -- returning to nearly a century of
liberal political change in Japan and a much longer
period in Germany.
Imposing a liberal constitutional order in Iraq would
be to accomplish something that has never been done
before. Of all the world's political cultures, an
Arab-Muslim one may be the most resistant to such a
change of any in the world. Even the Muslim society in
Turkey (an anti-Arab society) stands out for being the
only example of a constitutional order in an Islamic
society, and even it backslides occasionally.
4) On terrorists. Iraq is already a training ground
for terrorists. In fact, the CIA has pointed out to
the administration and congress that Iraq is spawning
so many terrorists that they are returning home to
many other countries to further practice their skills
there. The quicker a new dictator wins the political
power in Iraq and imposes order, the sooner the
country will stop producing well-experienced
terrorists.
Why not ask: "Mr. President, since you and the vice
president insisted that Saddam's Iraq supported al
Qaeda -- which we now know it did not -- isn't your
policy in Iraq today strengthening al Qaeda's position
in that country?"
5) On Iranian influence. Iranian leaders see US policy
in Iraq as being so much in Teheran's interests that
they have been advising Iraqi Shiite leaders to do
exactly what the Americans ask them to do. Elections
will allow the Shiites to take power legally. Once in
charge, they can settle scores with the Baathists and
Sunnis. If US policy in Iraq begins to undercut Iran's
interests, then Teheran can use its growing influence
among Iraqi Shiites to stir up trouble, possibly
committing Shiite militias to an insurgency against US
forces there. The US invasion has vastly increased
Iran's influence in Iraq, not sealed it out.
Questions for the administration: "Why do the Iranians
support our presence in Iraq today? Why do they tell
the Shiite leaders to avoid a sectarian clash between
Sunnis and Shiites? Given all the money and weapons
they provide Shiite groups, why are they not stirring
up more trouble for the US? Will Iranian policy
change once a Shiite majority has the reins of
government? Would it not be better to pull out now
rather than to continue our present course of
weakening the Sunnis and Baathists, opening the way
for a Shiite dictatorship?"
6) On Iraq?s neighbors. The civil war we leave behind
may well draw in Syria, Turkey and Iran. But already
today each of those states is deeply involved in
support for or opposition to factions in the ongoing
Iraqi civil war. The very act of invading Iraq almost
insured that violence would involve the larger region.
And so it has and will continue, with, or without, US
forces in Iraq.
7) On Shiite-Sunni conflict. The US presence is not
preventing Shiite-Sunni conflict; it merely delays it.
Iran is preventing it today, and it will probably
encourage it once the Shiites dominate the new
government, an outcome US policy virtually ensures.
8) On training the Iraq military and police. The
insurgents are fighting very effectively without US or
European military advisors to train them. Why don't
the soldiers and police in the present Iraqi regime's
service do their duty as well? Because they are
uncertain about committing their lives to this regime.
They are being asked to take a political stand, just
as the insurgents are. Political consolidation, not
military-technical consolidation, is the issue.
The issue is not military training; it is
institutional loyalty. We trained the Vietnamese
military effectively. Its generals took power and
proved to be lousy politicians and poor fighters in
the final showdown. In many battles over a decade or
more, South Vietnamese military units fought very
well, defeating VC and NVA units. But South Vietnam's
political leaders lost the war.
Even if we were able to successfully train an Iraqi
military and police force, the likely result, after
all that, would be another military dictatorship.
Experience around the world teaches us that military
dictatorships arise when the military?s institutional
modernization gets ahead of political consolidation.
9) On not supporting our troops by debating an early
pullout. Many US officers in Iraq, especially at
company and field grade levels, know that while they
are winning every tactical battle, they are losing
strategically. And according to the New York Times
last week, they are beginning to voice complaints
about Americans at home bearing none of the pains of
the war. One can only guess about the enlisted ranks,
but those on a second tour ? probably the majority
today ? are probably anxious for an early pullout. It
is also noteworthy that US generals in Iraq are not
bubbling over with optimistic reports they way they
were during the first few years of the war in Vietnam.
Their careful statements and caution probably reflect
serious doubts that they do not, and should not,
express publicly. The more important question is
whether or not the repressive and vindictive behavior
by the secretary of defense and his deputy against the
senior military -- especially the Army leadership,
which is the critical component in the war -- has made
it impossible for field commanders to make the
political leaders see the facts.
Most surprising to me is that no American political
leader today has tried to unmask the absurdity of the
administration's case that to question the strategic
wisdom of the war is unpatriotic and a failure to
support our troops. Most officers and probably most
troops don't see it that way. They are angry at the
deficiencies in materiel support they get from the
Department of Defense, and especially about the
irresponsibly long deployments they must now endure
because Mr. Rumsfeld and his staff have refused to
enlarge the ground forces to provide shorter tours. In
the meantime, they know that the defense budget
shovels money out the door to maritime forces, SDI,
etc., while refusing to increase dramatically the size
of the Army.
As I wrote several years ago, "the Pentagon's
post-Cold War force structure is so maritime heavy and
land force weak that it is firmly in charge of the
porpoises and whales while leaving the land to
tyrants." The Army, some of the Air Force, the
National Guard, and the reserves are now the victims
of this gross mismatch between military missions and
force structure. Neither the Bush nor the Clinton
administration has properly "supported the troops."
The media could ask the president why he fails to
support our troops by not firing his secretary of
defense.
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
So why is almost nobody advocating a pullout? I can
only speculate. We face a strange situation today
where few if any voices among Democrats in Congress
will mention early withdrawal from Iraq, and even the
one or two who do will not make a comprehensive case
for withdrawal now.Why are the Democrats failing the
public on this issue today? The biggest reason is
because they weren?t willing to raise that issue
during the campaign. Howard Dean alone took a clear
and consistent stand on Iraq, and the rest of the
Democratic party trashed him for it. Most of those in
Congress voted for the war and let that vote shackle
them later on. Now they are scared to death that the
White House will smear them with lack of patriotism if
they suggest pulling out.
Journalists can ask all the questions they like but
none will prompt a more serious debate as long as no
political leaders create the context and force the
issues into the open.
I don't believe anyone will be able to sustain a
strong case in the short run without going back to the
fundamental misjudgment of invading Iraq in the first
place. Once the enormity of that error is grasped, the
case for pulling out becomes easy to see.
Look at John Kerry's utterly absurd position during
the presidential campaign. He said ?It?s the wrong
war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time," but then
went on to explain how he expected to win it anyway.
Even the voter with no interest in foreign affairs was
able to recognize it as an absurdity. If it was the
wrong war at the wrong place and time, then it was
never in our interest to fight. If that is true, what
has changed to make it in our interest? Nothing,
absolutely nothing.
The US invasion of Iraq only serves the interest of:
1) Osama bin Laden (it made Iraq safe for al Qaeda,
positioned US military personnel in places where al
Qaeda operatives can kill them occasionally, helps
radicalize youth throughout the Arab and Muslim world,
alienates America's most important and strongest
allies ? the Europeans ? and squanders US military
resources that otherwise might be finishing off al
Qaeda in Pakistan.);
2) The Iranians (who were invaded by Saddam and who
suffered massive casualties in an eight year war with
Iraq.);
3) And the extremists in both Palestinian and Israeli
political circles (who don't really want a peace
settlement without the utter destruction of the other
side, and probably believe that bogging the United
States down in a war in Iraq that will surely become a
war between the United States and most of the rest of
Arab world gives them the time and cover to wipe out
the other side.)
The wisest course for journalists might be to begin
sustained investigations of why leading Democrats have
failed so miserably to challenge the US occupation of
Iraq. The first step, of course, is to establish as
conventional wisdom the fact that the war was never in
the US interest and has not become so. It is such an
obvious case to make that I find it difficult to
believe many pundits and political leaders have not
already made it repeatedly.
Lieutenant General William E. Odom, U.S. Army (Ret.),
is a Senior Fellow with Hudson Institute and a
professor at Yale University. He was Director of the
National Security Agency from 1985 to 1988. From 1981
to 1985, he served as Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, the Army's senior intelligence officer.
From 1977 to 1981, he was Military Assistant to the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs,
Zbigniew Brzezinski. |
