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Strategies & Market Trends : The Epic American Credit and Bond Bubble Laboratory -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: ild who wrote (50989)1/23/2006 3:39:21 PM
From: shades  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 110194
 
=DJ Pimco Thumbs Dn Corp Bonds If Cos Indulge Equity Holders

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By Aparajita Saha-Bubna
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES


NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--Pimco will pare down its U.S. corporate debt holdings if companies continue to reward shareholders, said the bond fund behemoth in a February research report released Monday.

While cautioning bondholders against investing in companies indulging shareholders with stock buybacks and dividend payouts, Pimco said in the report that current bond valuations aren't rewarding bond investors enough for taking on the risk of shareholder enriching initiatives.

The current average option adjusted spread, or risk premium, on corporate bonds stands at 90 basis points over comparable U.S. Treasurys - still in the vicinity of the 81 basis points at the beginning of 2005, according to the Lehman Brothers U.S. Corporate Investment Grade Index.

"Companies have been spending...on equity-friendly measures and, in the process, draining valuable cash reserves that would come in handy should economic growth slow and credit fundamentals weaken," Mark Kiesel, head of the investment-grade corporate desk at Newport Beach, Calif.-based Pimco, with over $500 billion in assets under management, said in the report.

"Cash directed towards equity holders is cash that is taken away from bondholders," noted Kiesel.

Typically, moves favoring shareholders erode the value of a company's bonds as they burden the company with more debt or make a dent in its cash holdings.

Pimco advocates in the report that companies - even those flush with cash - would do well to maintain cash-heavy balance sheets amid a likely economic slowdown precipitated by cooling consumer demand as property prices level off.

Kiesel said "...the history of the corporate bond market has shown that liquidity evaporates when companies need it most.

"Therefore, senior managers should resist pressure applied by equity holders."

Pimco will closely follow companies' use of cash, according to Kiesel, because that will likely foreshadow the fate of corporate bonds and their valuations.

That said, Pimco favors credits in the pipeline, utility, gaming and telecommunications sectors, which have hard assets and are in regulated industries with restrictions on aggressive shareholder-favoring moves. It also favors energy, commodities, and the media, cable and lodging sectors.


-By Aparajita Saha-Bubna, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-2248; aparajita.saha-bubna@dowjones.com



To: ild who wrote (50989)1/23/2006 5:03:49 PM
From: Crimson Ghost  Read Replies (4) | Respond to of 110194
 
US Policymakers Sleepwalking into Currency Crisis
by Steven Lachance


"The exchange rate of the US dollar is bound to decrease eventually and could potentially do so in a way that destabilizes the global economy. Policymakers' persistent failure to respond appropriately to clearly unsustainable trends adds to concerns over future developments." William White, Monetary and Economic Department Head, Bank for International Settlements, January 2006

Crying uncle over Uncle Sam's dollar exports

Unbridled credit expansion and asset inflation in the US are the direct cause of excessive consumption by American households and the near total loss of global competitiveness by domestic industries producing consumer goods. The effect is a current account deficit of $800 billion per year, which the International Monetary Fund estimates will reach almost $1 trillion in 2007. This tidal wave of dollars flowing out of the US is recycled by foreign, mostly East Asian, central banks back into dollar assets in an ad-hoc arrangement known as Breton Woods II. In the brief period in which this arrangement has held, the balance sheets of the Bank of Japan and the People's Bank of China have each been weighed down by nearly $1 trillion in dollar-denominated assets, and officials in Beijing and Tokyo have become visibly skittish about further accumulation.

Viewed from the left side of the Pacific, Breton Woods II is simply a mechanism to transmit inflation from the US to other economies. China has long experienced breakneck economic growth and is waging an increasingly futile struggle to prevent overheating. Soaking up another trillion dollars is clearly a risky proposition for a government keen to maintain economic and social stability. Even Japan, which most international observers assume welcomes inflationary impetus with open arms, is by no means a bottomless reservoir for the rising flood of dollars. While the Bank of Japan cites consumer prices as the benchmark for ending monetary easing, policymakers keep a wary eye on asset prices with memories of the late 80s bubble debacle still fresh in their minds. A nearly 50% run-up in the Topix stock index in the second half of 2005 and, more importantly, double-digit annual price appreciation for prime Tokyo real estate are indications that Japan's dollar absorption threshold may be lower than many think.

Groping for an exit

The East Asian product vendors and financiers face two challenges for a repudiation of the Breton Woods II arrangement: 1) finding alternative buyers for their industrial output; and 2) procurement of raw materials, particularly energy sources, without dollars. Fortunately for China, Korea, and Japan, a potential alternative market is readily available: Asia itself. The region's consumers have the world's highest savings rate and around two-thirds of the total global savings pool. For the most part, their incomes are also expanding robustly. From a lender's perspective, this makes them attractive credit risks, certainly a better option than lending indirectly to consumers without liquidity or income growth. China is rapidly building a consumer credit infrastructure while Japanese banks, solvent again, are sending staff eastward in search of borrowers. Japan and China are already each other's largest trading partners and inter-region trade now dwarfs trade flows across the Pacific.

Procuring raw materials without dollars is a much more difficult and politically sensitive challenge. Unsurprisingly, Japan has taken a very low profile approach, enhancing energy efficiency at home while its corporations expand stakes in raw material suppliers overseas. In contrast, time is a luxury China does not have much of. It is being inundated with dollars just as its economy is on the brink of overheating. As a result, it has become much more aggressive, particularly in trying to secure oil and gas through agreements with such suppliers as Russia and Iran. The benefits for China are obvious; immediately useful materials in exchange for industrial output instead of IOUs with unpredictable future value. For suppliers, yuan acquired either directly or by conversion through euro can be used to procure essentially any type of consumer good, a trade that helps their governments buy the support of mostly impoverished populations.

From MAD to SAD

These efforts amount to East Asia attempting to alter the stakes of repudiating Breton Woods II. At the outset, the region had found itself locked in a relationship of mutual dependence with the US, comparable to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine of the Cold War. Led by China, the region is trying to shift away from MAD toward a situation that could be described from the US perspective as Singularly Assured Destruction (SAD). With the US unwilling or unable to restrain its imbalances, East Asia is running out of time to alter the stakes. Given the vulnerability of its economy to further inflation, China will almost certainly be the first to have to make the inevitable choice: certain economic collapse as a result of overheating or a chance, however slim, that the result of the end of Breton Woods II will be SAD for the US, rather than MAD for both the US and itself.

A repudiation of the Breton Woods II arrangement by either Beijing or Tokyo would be the seminal event that ends the post-war era. Not only would it terminate the global currency system constructed on the dollar as the international reserve unit, it could also terminate the dollar itself by triggering cascading cross-defaults in the US through a spike in interest rates. Whether this event proves consistent with either the MAD or the SAD doctrine, the outcome for the US would be a sharp contraction in consumption with catastrophic implications for employment and living standards. You would expect a threat of such proportions to elicit an appropriate response by US policymakers.

Zoned out

The present Secretary of the Treasury, John Snow, is fond of quoting Dick Cheney: "deficits don't matter". Alan Greenspan insists the exchange value of the dollar is not the Federal Reserve's responsibility and his successor, Ben S. Bernanke, is best known for threatening to drop dollar bills from helicopters. Recent meetings of the G7 finance ministers and central bank governors discussed aid to Africa, Islamic fundamentalists, and the price of heating oil. It is highly unlikely that the central banks of Japan and China will absorb another trillion dollars worth of inflation from the US, yet the issue is not even on the agenda. At the most basic level, Breton Woods II is a short-term vendor-financing scheme, capable of nothing more than buying time, which US policymakers appear intent on squandering.
Talk Back



To: ild who wrote (50989)1/27/2006 2:46:07 PM
From: shades  Respond to of 110194
 
=DJ Bondholders Squeezed By Increasingly Powerful Vise

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By Simona Covel
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES


NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--It isn't easy holding bonds.

For months, bond investors have lamented companies' swing to shareholder-friendly practices like equity dividends, which often lead to credit rating downgrades and take money away from bond-friendly pursuits like debt repayment.

At the same time, the syndicated loan market - debt that carries recovery claims senior to bonds - has exploded. That means reduced recovery prospects for bondholders in some cases, because bank debt holders have the first claim on collateral.

Bondholders are forced to become more vigilant, keeping one eye trained up to the bank debt on the top of a company's capital structure and one eye below them on stockholders, who are growing increasingly insistent on shareholder-friendly moves.

"If they can find ways to go above us, they are," said Eric Misenheimer, who manages $500 million in high-yield assets as head of the high-yield group at J. & W. Seligman & Co. in New York, referring to issuers' increasing reliance on the bank debt market. "They don't really need us." Companies like now-bankrupt Calpine Corp. (CPNL) made a habit of stacking more debt on top of existing bondholders, he added.

And a slew of recent giant leveraged buyouts - including the recent NRG Energy Inc. (NRG) deal - includes billions in bank debt that has first dibs on collateral. That's a shift from the LBOs of yore, which were more heavily reliant on junk bonds.

Earlier this month, Moody's Investors Service knocked Georgia-Pacific Corp.'s ratings further into junk territory after the company's acquisition by Koch Forest Products Inc. (KOH.XX). Bondholders were slammed by billions in new bank debt that came as part of the $21.5 billion deal.

The growth of the loan market "should raise alarm bells for bond investors," said Steven Kerr, director in Standard & Poor's bank loan and recoveries group. "Additional senior secured debt almost certainly reduces recovery opportunities for bond investors."

Buyer Beware


The robustness of the loan market - especially in leveraged loans of riskier companies - has profound implications for credit markets. Demand for the loans has soared. Last year, leveraged loan issuance topped the $500 billion mark, dwarfing the junk bond market's $95 billion in new deals.

Investors like loans' floating interest rates, which reset periodically. They also appreciate loans' senior spot in a company's capital structure. That factor has helped the loan market hold steady when bond markets sold off following such events as the downgrades of General Motors Corp. (GM) and Ford Motor Co. (F) to speculative grade last May.

The demand in that market means that issuers and their bankers can practically name their terms, unlike in the high-yield bond market, where investors are pickier. Loan investors are more willing to accept higher debt levels and other risky measures because they have a greater chance to recover their investment in the case of default and because unlike bondholders, bank debt holders are privy to periodic financial status updates from an issuer.

"Even participants who have trepidation about the increasing leverage can't really speak up because if they do, they won't get a good allocation in the deal," said one Wall Street banker who didn't want to be named.

The growing loan market brings with it opportunities for bond investors who have the flexibility to expand into that market. Loans are becoming increasingly liquid and available for intraday trade, a factor that kept some investors from that market in the past. As the market matures, bond investors "have a tremendous opportunity" to diversify outside of traditional fixed-rate subordinated debt, said Lorraine Spurge, managing director at Post Advisory Group LLC in Los Angeles, which has $8 billion in assets under management.

Even before the advent of leveraged loans, companies could still come in and pile more bonds senior to existing debt, point out veteran investors. Unsecured bonds are "buyer beware," said Steve Persky, managing partner at Los Angeles hedge fund Dalton Investments LLC, with $1.2 billion in assets under management. "That's why debt that's secured by covenants trades at a much tighter spread (to Treasury bonds)."

Years of historically low default rates and a benign credit environment may have led some investors to become less vigilant about their recovery prospects. That factor will suddenly matter when companies begin to default more frequently, as is predicted over the next couple of years. As a bondholder, "you have to make sure the covenants protect you from (other debt) securing all of the assets above you," said Spurge. "Our job is to make sure you read through the prospectus."

When the defaults begin to trickle in, the growing role of hedge funds in the risky loan market - they now hold about 30% of that debt - means those sophisticated investors will have a seat at the creditors' table. "Many have more resources to apply, both legally and structurally," said S&P's Kerr. Hedge funds, for example, may have short positions in certain securities, giving them different motivations as a creditor.

Hedge funds "have the opportunity and the wherewithal to be more aggressive," Kerr added.
-By Simona Covel, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-2371; simona.covel@dowjones.com