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To: JohnM who wrote (9895)1/26/2006 9:24:18 PM
From: KLP  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 541518
 
Advice and Consent? How Clinton Chose Ginsburg
Did Clinton really let Republicans guide his decision-making?

Good to see you too John. I did find a couple of links (of many) that speak to both sides of the question as far as Clinton checking with Hatch re: Ginsburg.....

The first one is:

Advice and Consent? How Clinton Chose Ginsburg
Did Clinton really let Republicans guide his decision-making?

Byron York

July 05, 2005, 9:49 a.m.

After Republicans cited the confirmation of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as a model of how a Senate confirmation should work — Ginsburg went from nomination to confirmation in less than seven weeks with little Republican opposition and was not forced to give her opinions on hot-button issues like abortion, gun control and gay rights — some Democrats have countered by arguing that Ginsburg succeeded so quickly because President Bill Clinton consulted closely with Republicans, then in the minority in the Senate.

Democrats have cited a portion of Sen. Orrin Hatch's autobiography, Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen Senator, as evidence that Clinton worked extensively with Republican senators. In the following passage, Hatch discusses telling Clinton that his top choice, Interior secretary and former Arizona governor Bruce Babbitt, would have a hard time in the Senate:

I told him [Clinton] that confirmation would not be easy. At least one Democrat would probably vote against Bruce, and there would be a great deal of resistance from the Republican side. I explained to the President that although he might prevail in the end, he should consider whether he wanted a tough, political battle over his first appointment to the Court.

Our conversation moved to other potential candidates. I asked whether he had considered Judge Stephen Breyer of the First Circuit Court of Appeals or Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. President Clinton indicated he had heard Breyer's name but had not thought about Judge Ginsberg.

I indicated I thought they would be confirmed easily. I knew them both and believed that, while liberal, they were highly honest and capable jurists and their confirmation would not embarrass the President. From my perspective, they were far better than the other likely candidates from a liberal Democrat administration.

The lesson, writes Markos Moulitsas of the left-wing website DailyKos, is that "Bush should follow Hatch's wise example." But a look at another account of the Ginsburg case suggests that while Clinton did consult with Hatch — just as President Bush has with some Democrats today — Clinton's preeminent concern was making sure that, after a series of failed executive-branch nomination, members of his own party, then in the majority in the Senate, would support his nominee. And in Babbitt's case, a powerful argument against his nomination was made by a Democratic senator from Babbitt's own state.

The best inside account of the selection process is in George Stephanopoulos's Clinton memoir, All Too Human. Stephanopoulos writes that Clinton's first choice for the court was New York Governor Mario Cuomo, but that Cuomo put the White House on an extended and frustrating period of waiting as he tried to make up his mind about whether to accept a nomination. "Clinton was ready to appoint Cuomo," Stephanopoulos writes — the president had even crafted his description of the idea justice with Cuomo in mind — but "Clinton hated how Cuomo always made everything so difficult."

So the president turned to other candidates. There were dozens. Clinton's next favorite was his friend from Arkansas, Richard Arnold. Liberals wanted Harvard's Laurence Tribe. Yale professor Stephen Carter's name came up, as did that of First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton.

Stephanopoulos writes that the White House viewed an outside-the-box candidate like Mrs. Clinton as a "sexy" idea. But there was a problem. "Clinton's choice had to be ratified by the Senate, where Republicans hadn't forgotten the rejection of Robert Bork, and Democrats were reeling from their recent encounters with Zoe Baird, Kimba Wood, and Lani Guinier. Sexy was good, but safe was better. We simply couldn't afford another failed nomination." Stephanopoulos quotes Clinton himself saying, "We don't need another gang-that-couldn't-shoot-straight story."

After two months, Stephanopoulos writes, the top of the list came to include Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Stephen Breyer, and a group of candidates Stephanopoulos calls "firsts" for diversity purposes: David Tatel, who was blind, Jose Cabranes, was Hispanic, and Ginsburg, who, Stephanopoulos writes, "would be the first Jewish justice since Abe Fortas, and the first woman to be appointed by a Democrat. More important, she was a pioneer in the legal fight for women's rights — a female Thurgood Marshall."

Babbitt was first to go. Contrary to the notion that Hatch shot down Babbitt, Stephanopoulos writes that Babbitt's policies on western issues like grazing fees and mineral rights "had enraged many Senate Republicans and more than a few Democrats, who had accused him of waging a 'war on the West'...Even Babbitt's home-state Democratic senator, Dennis Deconcini, called Clinton to advise against Babbitt." Having a nominee's home-state senator — especially one of the same party — nix a candidate is a very powerful sign, which in many cases would be enough by itself to sink a nomination. (In his own memoir, My Life, Clinton glosses over the story, making no mention of Hatch or Deconcini, instead explaining that, "I hated to lose Babbitt at Interior, as did large numbers of environmentalists who called the White House to urge that I keep him there.")

Breyer was next to go. Even though he was strongly supported by his old boss Sen. Edward Kennedy, Breyer not only had a "nanny problem," then a fashionable issue on Capitol Hill, but he also failed to impress Clinton during a one-on-one meeting.

That left Ginsburg, whom Clinton, after months of deliberating, nominated on June 14, 1993. At the news conference announcing her nomination, Brit Hume, then with ABC News, offended Clinton when he asked about "a certain zigzag quality in the decision-making process here. I wonder, sir, if you could kind of walk us through it, perhaps disabuse us of any notion we might have along those lines." An angry Clinton stopped the news conference right there, saying "How you could ask a question like that after the statement [Ginsburg] just made is beyond me."

To which Stephanopoulos responded, "But not beyond the pale. Brit just didn't know how right he was."

— Byron York, NR's White House correspondent, is the author of the book The Vast Left Wing Conspiracy: The Untold Story of How Democratic Operatives, Eccentric Billionaires, Liberal Activists, and Assorted Celebrities Tried to Bring Down a President — and Why They'll Try Even Harder Next Time.


nationalreview.com



To: JohnM who wrote (9895)1/26/2006 9:27:05 PM
From: KLP  Respond to of 541518
 
And another, and different view on the same subject....re Clinton, Ginsburg and Hatch.....

Consultation and the Clinton/Hatch

Example:
volokh.com

Posted by Orin Kerr:

Lots of blogs are linking to

[1]this post at ThinkProgress.org
recalling that President Clinton consulted with Republican Senator
Orrin Hatch when Clinton was looking to fill the seat left open by the
retirement of Justice White in 1993. Some suggest that this example
shows how a President should treat the opposing party's ranking member
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Clinton consulted with Orrin Hatch
and took Hatch's recommendations seriously, the thinking goes, so Bush
should consult with Patrick Leahy and take Leahy's recommendations
seriously.
The difficulty with this comparison is that it leaves out the
broader context of Clinton's decisionmaking process. Here's my
recollection, aided by some Westlaw searches and David Yalof's


[2]Pursuit of Justices:
According to press reports at the time, Clinton very much wanted to
nominate a Warren-style liberal to the Supreme Court. Clinton wanted
to find a free-thinking politician for the Court instead of a
technocratic career judge. He flirted with the idea of nominating New
York Governor Mario Cuomo, but Cuomo eventually withdrew from
consideration. Clinton then asked Richard Riley, Secretary of
Education and the former Governor of South Carolina, but Riley
declined. Clinton then wanted to name Bruce Babbitt, the Interior
Secretary.
During the many weeks in which Clinton was weighing his options,
however, the need to find someone who would be easily confirmed grew
paramount. (I'm not sure, but I gather it was at this stage that
Clinton consulted with Hatch.) Clinton had encountered tremendous
opposition to some of his executive branch nominees in the early month
of his Administration, and the failed nominations of both Zoe Baird
and Kimba Wood for Attorney General and Lani Guinier for head of DOJ's
Civil Rights Division had caused his administration considerable
political embarrassment. Further, by June, almost three months after
Justice White had announced his retirement, the media was ridiculing
Clintion's inability to even settle on a nominee. Under political
pressure, Clinton decided against nominating a Warren-style liberal
and instead opted to nominate a Hatch-approved more moderate nominee
who could be easily confirmed.

Here is how Thomas Friedman described Clinton's thinking on the
Ginsburg nomnination in the June 15, 1993 issue of The New York Times:

The President's original aspiration was to name a political
figure, with real-world experience and a "big heart," not
automatically another federal judge. But in part because some of
those who fit that description, like Gov. Mario M. Cuomo of New
York, turned him down, and in part because of his political
predicament, those criteria had to be subordinated.
What dominated was his need for a nominee who was risk-free, one
who would not only sail smoothly through the Senate but might
eclipse some of his most recent embarrassments, reconfirm his move
to the political center and give new momentum to his
administration.

Clinton ended up nominating Ginsburg over Breyer for Justice White's
seat, in part because Breyer had not paid social security taxes on a
domestic worker. (This had been Zoe's Baird's problem, and the White
House wasn't sure that they wanted to spend the political capital to
get Breyer confirmed in light of it.) When Justice Blackmun retired
the next year, however, Clinton nominated Breyer. Breyer was not
Clinton's ideal of a model judge, either. Consider Jeffrey Rosen's
description of President Clinton's nomination of Breyer to fill
Blackmun's spot, from the June 6, 1994 issue of The New Republic:

Of course it was painful to watch Clinton's distress on May 13 as
he announced the selection of a man who was plainly not his first
choice. Though Clinton remained sentimentally attached to the model
of a big-hearted politician in the tradition of Earl Warren, he
forced himself, for want of a politically or medically viable
alternative, to choose the antithesis of his own ideal.



As the U.S. News & World Report covered the Breyer nomination in its
May 23, 1994 issue:

Breyer was never the president's first choice. In 1993, he was a
runner-up when Clinton selected Ginsburg. And Clinton first hoped
Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell would succeed Blackmun. The
president also considered Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and
Judge Richard Arnold of Arkansas but decided late Friday afternoon
that the Breyer nomination posed fewer questions and less
controversy in the Senate confirmation process.

The same article notes that liberals were upset with Clinton's
choosing an easily-confirmable nominee over a more ideologically pure
one:

Some liberals were disappointed that Clinton did not tap a
reliable vote for their cause. Abortion-rights leaders expressed
concern about Breyer's murky record on that subject. And consumer
advocate Ralph Nader assailed Breyer as "hostile to regulatory law
enforcement." Nader charged that Clinton had "locked the court into
an anticonsumer, antiworker, antienvironmental mode," and predicted
that various labor unions and other liberal groups would oppose
Breyer.

In sum, it's true that Clinton did call Hatch at some point during
the process; Hatch did suggest to Clinton that Breyer and Ginsburg
could be confirmed; and Clinton did in fact nominate Ginsburg and
Breyer. But my sense is that Clinton's consultation with Hatch was a
matter of political necessity more than anything else.

References

1. thinkprogress.org
2. policyreview.org