Don't feel bad if you don't accept it. I had a number of debates with many of the folks I supported over there related to the FRE presence within AQIZ. A few of those debates were "quite heated" because the analysts in question had ignored the information I had seen in arriving at their analysis. And the hardest thing for many analysts is to be willing to accept facts as they are, and not try to ignore them or manipulate them to create the type of analysis they want, not what is.
The question is whether the AQIZ effort in Iraq is a "false-flag" operation by former FRE leaderhip, which finds Zarqawi's group a convenient "scape-goat" for any blame that results from the FRE elements to restore their previous positiion of power in Iraq. The question I've had is what will they do with Zarqawi should they succeed in regaining power? Kill him? Permit him to operate and use Iraq as a Al Qai'da base for his future operations?
freeinternetpress.com
American and Iraqi officials believe that al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia is largely made up of Iraqis, with its highest leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian. Even so, among Iraqis, the group is still perceived as a largely foreign force.
And a very interesting link that was VERY difficult to find:
jamestown.org
In Zahner's view, which marks a shift in perception by the U.S. military command, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al-Qaeda in Iraq group has supplanted Iraqis loyal to the deposed president Saddam Hussein as the insurgency's "driving element." Instead, the Saddam Hussein loyalists (former Ba'ath Party members and military and intelligence officers) are effectively riding the current, considered less of an immediate military danger and more of a longer-term political concern in their efforts to subvert the political process towards democracy.
Meanwhile, on the jihadi forum al-Farouq (www.al-farouq.com), a posting dated October 2 defined much of the Islamist opposition in Iraq, conversely, as "Ba'athism in the cloak of religion." The author, signing himself sarcastically "the Degenerate, Base Salafist," describes how the present Sunni religious violence dates back to the era of Saddam Hussein. He details, in what is a surprising essay to find on a jihadist forum (and subsequently removed), the innovation under Saddam's rule of the "Return to Faith Campaign" directed by Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, the former Vice President of Saddam's Revolutionary Council. The campaign aimed at fanning sectarian flames to secure the suppression of the Shi'a in the south following the 1991 uprising in the wake of the allied operation to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait. The author of the posting explains the plethora of Islamist groups as fronts for the fallen regime's intelligence departments, shrewdly exchanging the Arab nationalist label for one more in tune with the times--Salafism. In addition, by associating actions with extremist takfirism (the doctrine of excommunicating non-jihadist Muslims) the escalation of violence against other Iraqis passes with less criticism......
...The writer goes on to attribute the formation of the "Association of Muslim Scholars"--on the anniversary of the fall of the regime--to Ba'athist remnants, along with the Sunni Shura Council, and dozens of other Sunni organizations "at whose core are the official preachers, adherents of the former Saddamist foundations." He singles out the head of the Association of Muslim Scholars, Harith al-Dari, as "the leading advisor to Izzat al-Douri" who is "brazenly working to return Saddamist[s] to power in Iraq, after calling takfiris from abroad to kill Shi'ites." (Note: Izzat Al Duri is a major player, as well as Muhammad Yunis Ahmad. Al Duri is a fervent Sufist.)
(note: Harith Al-Dari, IN MY OPINION, and others' opinions, is the primary source of funding between the FRE leadership in exile, inlcuding Hussein's daughter and wife and AQIZ/FRE elements within Iraq. But he's very powerful politically and religiously, and his apprehension is just not yet in the cards at the moment.)
globalsecurity.org
The last report included in the CTC summary was a HUM INT report on (DELETED) an offer of safehaven from Saddam Hussein (DELETED).48 According to a press report from the Italian Milan Corriere Delia Sera dated September 17, 1998, an Iraqi delegation to the Sudan agreed to accept Usama bin Ladin should he no longer be permitted to stay in Afghanistan. Another press report from the Paris Arabic newspaper Al-Watan Al-'Arabi dated January 1, 1999, stated that an Iraqi delegation visited Usama bin Ladin in the summer of 1998 and "bin Ladin tried to feel the Iraqi official's pulse about the possibility of being received in Baghdad" should he be expelled from Afghanistan. According to this press report, however, the Iraqi envoy was not authorized to offer safehaven to bin Ladin and instead returned the discussion to the possibility of cooperation.49
Now.. I admit that there exists a varying amount of information, with different perspectives on the involvement of Ba'thist and Al Qai'da cooperation prior to the war. I saw some circumstantial information, but I was more focused on current information...
And unfortunately, there are quite a few diamonds lurking in the "dirt" that have been ignored, or forgotten, because of the dysfunctional manner in which information that is obtained is evaluated and analysed. There is tremendous information overload and too few analysts availabe, or capable, of putting all the pieces together. And most of this information will not been seen by the public for at 25 years.
But I just call them as I see them. And admittedly, my analysis is based upon more broad-based of constant repeat information that displayed re-occuring ties between former FRE leadership and Zarqawi and other Salafist groups.
The question is whether the dog (Zarqawi) is wagging the (FRE/Sunni) tail, or the other way around.
Hawk |
