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Strategies & Market Trends : The Epic American Credit and Bond Bubble Laboratory -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: mishedlo who wrote (53756)2/13/2006 5:13:30 PM
From: gpowell  Respond to of 110194
 
From Heinz...there have been incidences in the past when large gold discoveries led to some monetary upheaval, e.g. in 17th century Spain. still, when one looks at the US quasi gold standard of the 19th century, most economic upheavals were clearly the result of some sort of state intervention…..

No one claims that a gold standard leads to economic upheaval, although a botched return to the gold standard is one of the conditions that led to the great depression. The contention was that a gold standard is not as stable, in the short-run, as some of its most recent proponents would have you believe.

…and yet, economic growth was faster than during the fiat regime

Neither the gold standard, nor a fiat regime as currently practiced has much effect on long-term economic growth.

..and the aggregate level of prices stayed stable over the entire century.

You are making an error in assuming that a long-run stable relationship between the marginal value of gold vs. goods and services implies a short-run stable relationship. The historical record is pretty clear on this. But let’s not overstate the case; the short-run stability of a gold standard is on a par with the best of the currently practiced fiat regimes.

in modern times, the world's stock of gold grows at about 2% p.a.

That isn’t much different from the 3.29% rate that obtained from 1839 to 1929, but within those years were growth rates over 7%, such as between 1849-1859.

as Fekete explains, there is no limit to the marginal utility of gold - just because you own say 10 gold coins, your desire to own an 11th isn't less than your desire to own a 10th was back when you owned

To the extent that any asset, including a fiat currency, can be exchange for goods and services then there is no limit to the marginal utility of that asset (notwithstanding the limit of complete satisfaction of wants and needs).

not to mention, the State finds it impossible to take on ever more debt.

The state can take on as much debt as the public is willing to lend it, and given a growing economy that implies a continuously expanding debt. You can’t really be seriously asserting that governments finance primarily through money supply expansion?

and yes, it's true that fractional reserves banking was a feature of some of the 19th century financial crises. nevertheless, most of those crises were met with a laissez faire approach, and they didn't last long as a result. The first US economic crisis that the State tried to combat with interventionism was the Great Depression. it became such a disaster precisely BECAUSE the state and the monetary authorities intervened.

Most of the 19th century US financial crises were the result of an overly restrictive money supply, i.e. an inability for currency supply to meet a rising demand, due mostly to bond collateral requirements, restrictions on portfolio diversification, and the prohibition on branch banking. That is far from a laissez faire approach. The fact is 19th century banking failures were a direct result of banking regulation, i.e. government failure, and the creation of the Federal Reserve was the governments attempt to solve the inelastic currency problem it had created in the first instance. And while the Federal Reserve has a lot of the blame to share for the great depression, the botched return to the gold standard, and state controlled and encouraged price fixing must share at least equal blame. Hence the entire great depression was an inevitable consequence of socialist/progressive tendencies that prevailed from 1850 to 1980.