Iraq's kingmaker is no Bush pawn
By Ehsan Ahrari
When President George W Bush toppled Saddam Hussein from power, he never could have imagined he was paving the way for the emergence of Muqtada al-Sadr as a kingmaker in the selection of the first permanent prime minister of Iraq. But that is precisely what happened when Ibrahim al-Jaafari, who had the position on an interim basis, got the nod.
Muqtada made his name in the Western media by his highly voluble opposition to the US invasion and continued occupation of
Iraq. But he already held impressive credentials stemming from his renowned lineage. He is the son of the late grand ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, a legendary figure in Iraq because of his opposition to Saddam's brutal rule. For that opposition, the dictator killed him in 1999.
Muqtada is also the son-in-law of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed in 1980. Baqir al-Sadr was also a prominent theoretician of Shi'ite Islam. As such, he made a significant contribution to the concept of Islamic government, which has become a political reality of the "New Iraq".
The most significant aspect of the role of Muqtada - missed by Western observers, but captured most perceptibly by Shi'ite scholar Faleh al-Jabar - is that he is an heir to the tradition, emphasized by his father, that advocates a highly visible role for "home-grown Arab clerical leadership" in Iraq.
That tradition has become a powerful force during the US occupation of the country. In the tradition of his father, Muqtada not only challenged the US presence, but also questioned the very legitimacy of the elected government stemming from the occupation. In this capacity, he also came into conflict with the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in the following ways.
First, and foremost, the emphasis on the Arab or native-born Shi'ite cleric implicitly challenges the role of Sistani, who remains the most prestigious and revered cleric in Iraq, but was born in Iran. What that means is, given the general reverence toward him as a marja-e-taqleed (source of emulation, which is in essence a tradition of Shi'ite Islam), Sistani's leadership may not be challenged while he is living. However, if there were to be a civil war in Iraq, the consistently and stridently anti-American populist position of Muqtada might enable him to outweigh the nuanced position of Sistani, which never endorsed the Americans' presence in Iraq, but advocated cooperating with them to secure a Shi'ite-dominated democracy.
Second, Muqtada's father, like Sistani, advocated an advisory role for the leading Shi'ite cleric with the government. Muqtada, on the contrary, wants an Islamist government, but appears to be leaning toward the guardianship model advocated by the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. Whether he would go to the extent of endorsing the vilayat-e-faqih (rule of the clergy) model that ensures the primacy of the faqih is not quite clear yet.
What is important here is that Muqtada is deviating from the model of governance that his father had preferred. The most important reality is that he has carved a niche that leans toward the guardianship model that may turn out to be more relevant under the political realities of the new Iraq than what his father had advocated in the Sunni-dominated era of Iraq under Saddam.
Third, by consistently opposing the US presence in his country, Muqtada is very much in conformity with the long-standing legacy of intense nationalism and anti-Americanism in Iraq. That legacy also complements the long-standing tradition of anti-Americanism that Iran and Syria practice. In this sense, there is a basis of further rapprochement among Iraq, Iran and Syria, a potential that goes starkly against everything that Bush aspired to achieve when he toppled Saddam. As much as Sistani has differed from Iran in opposing the vilayat-e-faqih model, he cannot be labeled an anti-Iranian ayatollah. Under the best of political circumstances, he would be in favor of having warm and friendly ties, even rapprochement, with Iran.
Before the selection of the prime minister, Muqtada was reported to have demanded that his candidate, Jaafari, be given the job. He even went to the extent of saying that "there is going to be civil war" if his preferred candidate was not confirmed. He got what he wanted.
Consequently, Muqtada's Islamist vision for Iraq is in the process of being institutionalized. That is a development that is totally befuddling to Bush and to his own messianic template for Iraq, where the US-preferred Western secularism was to be anointed, and then exported to other countries of the region.
What are the ramifications of Muqtada's emergence as a new kingmaker in Iraq? If the proposition that the heavy burden of responsibility also brings with it a sobering necessity for moderation among power-seekers is true, then one has every reason to be hopeful. When Muqtada realizes that Iraq under the premiership of Jaafari has to succeed as an Islamist democracy, Muqtada would do everything not to jeopardize the chances of its success.
To ensure the stability of the first constitutionally elected government, he might strive hard to build bridges with Sunni groups. Iraqi Sunnis are already known to be ambivalent toward Muqtada. That is really saying a lot about a Shi'ite cleric in a country where sectarian differences are responsible for a large number of deaths.
If Muqtada succeeds in "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi Sunnis, he might be able to strike a blow to the Sunni-led insurgency. However, before such a reality materializes, the Jaafari government has to offer major concessions to Sunni groups. The most noteworthy concession would be the abandonment of a previously agreed arrangement that would set up a federal form of government for Iraq. Another Sunni demand would be the incorporation of explicit legislation that would enhance the role of the central government in the distribution of oil revenues.
Any observer of the polity of the new Iraq knows that the Kurds are strongly opposed to any abandoning of the federal principles of governance as well as a heightened role for the central government. They would envisage both measures as inherently deleterious to what they have secured in the framework of the new Iraq. They will do everything to frustrate and undermine the final approval of the premiership of Jaafari in the National Assembly.
So, as Muqtada becomes fully immersed in the power game that all Iraqi groups are currently playing, he will realize that it is comparatively easier to seek power than actually to exercise it. As the new kingmaker, Muqtada will soon realize that dealing with the Kurds might be the second-most-obdurate challenge, the foremost being incorporating the Sunni political demands in order to co-opt them.
He will also have to reach rapprochement with the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), whose candidate, Adel Abdul Mahdi, lost the premiership. The issue with SCIRI is how much Iranian influence will be allowed in the internal politics of Iraq. SCIRI is a decidedly pro-Iranian party.
However, Muqtada, while maintaining a strong nationalistic posture, has not totally ruled out the proposition of placating Iran. His recent visit to that country might be evidence of such overtures. Strangely enough, regarding Iran, Muqtada's nationalistic position is similar to the anti-Iranian position of the Americans. However, it would be folly to think he would do anything to accommodate the Americans, whose continued presence in Iraq he is known to loathe.
So there is decidedly no love lost between his forces and the Americans. One of the reasons Muqtada decided to back the candidacy of Jaafari was that he was amenable to Muqtada's three foremost demands: negotiation of a timetable for the withdrawal of US forces, postponement of decisions about creating autonomous federal regions, and rejection of a Kurdish demand to repatriate the Kurds to Kirkuk, the oil-rich city of northern Iraq.
As a general principle, global politics is as intricate as it is full of surprises and unintended consequences. The emergence of Muqtada as the new kingmaker in Iraq definitely belongs to both categories. As much as Bush created an impression, through his public posturing in the post-Saddam era, that he is driven by his desire to impose his messianic template of secular democracy on Iraq, the election of a decidedly Islamist government and the growing power of Muqtada are major disappointments for him.
The worst part of that development is that if, somehow, the Kurdish and secular Iraqi groups were to coalesce to prevent the Islamists from forming a government (as is being reported by major news outlets), Iraq is likely to plunge into yet another round of chaos and cataclysm. In the evolving Iraqi mess, there is no way one can say that the United States is emerging as a winner.
Ehsan Ahrari is a CEO of Strategic Paradigms, an Alexandria, Virginia-based defense consultancy. He can be reached at eahrari@cox.net or stratparadigms@yahoo.com. His columns appear regularly in Asia Times Online. His website: www.ehsanahrari.com. |
