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Politics : Israel to U.S. : Now Deal with Syria and Iran -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: philv who wrote (10332)3/12/2006 4:57:17 PM
From: sea_urchin  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 22250
 
Phil > If you could impose a border, I guess you would stick to the post 1967 one?

Basically, yes.

> Even the original land, carved out of Palestine after WWII was disputed by the Arabs, was it not? Why then is that particular border important?

1967 marked the Six Day war and the pre-1967 border was "decided" in 1948 at the War of Liberation/Independence at the time when the UN recognised the State of Israel. The UN also stated that there should be a Palestinian state made simultaneously but did not mention where the common border should be. It is that omission which has been the bone of contention ever since and the cause of all the trouble. Nevertheless I, and others, argue that if only by default the border should be where it was at that time. It certainly wasn't geographically or strategically ideal for anyone, as you know, it just happened to be where they stopped fighting prior to the critical moment of recognition.

> but borders change over the years through military conquest. Have a look at the map of Europe before WWI. Or even before WWII.

Yes, that was the case prior to WW2 but with the creation of the UN that was stopped and it became a a violation of international law to keep land which was won in war.

> Because what is now Jordan was part of the British Mandate of Palestine until 1921, many Jordanians of Palestinian descent cannot be described as refugees. They never fled, or were forced to flee, their original homes because of war.

The situation with Jordan (formerly TransJordan) is very complex because Britain did not identify where the Jewish homeland would be that it gave in terms of the Balfour Declaration. In fact, it did not even make known the Balfour Declaration for a long time. Thus it is not clear whether the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was intended to be for the Arabs and the West side of the Jordan for the Jews or the West side was for both Jews and Arabs. It simply wasn't mentioned. Clearly, Britain was duplicitous -- in fact, the land that Britain "gave" didn't "belong" to Britain in the first place.

britishempire.co.uk

>>To further complicate the diplomatic waters, the British entered into an agreement with the French and Russians to divide the entire Middle East into areas of influence for each of the imperial powers but leaving the Holy Lands to be jointly administered by the three powers. This was a secret arrangement that was known as the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916. It directly contradicted the promises made to the Sharif of Mecca

Indeed, the waters were even further muddied by a third commitment entered into by the British in 1917. the British government made a promise to prominent Jews in Britain that the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine would be looked on with favour by the British. The reason for this pledge is not exactly clear, but it seems to have been made for two reasons. The first was to secure financial support from prominent Jewish financiers in Europe. The second seems to have been a way of breaking their own secret arrangement with the French and Russians by promoting their own influence into Palestine at their expense. Whatever the reason for this diplomatic chicanery, the diplomatic timebomb of these conflicting promises was about to explode as a direct result of the Russian revolution. The newly formed Bolshevik government took great pleasure in releasing the imperialistic designs of the British and French governments by publishing the Sykes-Picot agreement publicly and in full. The idea was to expose these capitilastic nations as morally bankrupt in their prosecution of the war and these secret agreements seemed to confirm that fact.

The publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement was not to be as politically devastating as feared for the simple fact that, at this point in time, the Arabs were advancing swiftly and assuredly against their Ottoman enemies. The Arabs felt that if they could make even further gains against the Ottomans that they would have more leverage in dealing with the imperial powers after the fighting had finished. The British were also advancing steadily through Palestine, capturing Jerusalem in December 1917. The British decisively defeated the Turks at Megiddo in September 1918, although the Arabs managed to enter Damascus before the British were in a position to do so. The Ottomans capitulated soon after leaving all of their previous dominions up for grabs.

The peace conference was used to impose allied plans and ideas on the defeated Central Powers, amongst whom was the Ottoman Empire. Faisal travelled in person to the peace conference to set forth the case of the Arabs in the divisions of the lands that they inhabited. He was not to be successful in promoting Arab independence, but had some success in persuading a border commission that Jewish immigration was not a good idea. Unfortunately, by this time, the British had already been declared as holding the mandate over Palestine and had independently reaffirmed the Balfour declaration opening the way for a Jewish homeland.

Meanwhile, a group of Arabs convened a congress in Damascus claiming an independent Syria with Faisal as the king. Soon after, Abdullah was declared as king of Iraq. The League of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements, and in April the San Remo Conference decided on enforcing the Allied mandates in the Middle East. French troops occupied Damascus in July, and Faisal was served with a French ultimatum to withdraw from Syria.

As a response to this action, Abdullah raised a force of 2,000 tribesman and advanced towards Damascus with a view of returning Faisal to the throne. By the March of 1920 he had advanced as far as Amman and was about to invade the French mandate of Syria. At this point, the British High Commissioner for Palestine intervened, calling for a conference of Arab leaders at As Salt. The Arab leaders were open to the idea partly as a response to the success of the fundamentalist Wahabbis in Arabia under the leadership of Ibn Saud. His power and influence was growing throughout the region at the expense of traditional rulers and families. So, when the High Commissioner offered Abdullah the leadership of Transjordan and a hefty financial subsidy the Hashemite ruler quickly called off his invasion of Syria. As part of the deal, his brother Faisal was offered the position of king of Iraq. The advantages for the British were clear, not only had they prevented the invasion of their allies lands, but they had also formed a reasonably legitimate and a strong bulwark state to protect their other interests in Palestine and Egypt. This strategic thinking was confirmed by Winston Churchill at the Cairo conference on Middle Eastern policy held in 1921. Britain subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River to Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion, called Transjordan, was to have a separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine and with Jewish immigration specifically avoided. The League of Nations agreed and confirmed the borders of this mandate the following year. Not for the first time, a state had been created for the express strategic convenience of the British. <<

> The outright hatred and obvious mistrust between Jews and Arabs makes any compromise very difficult.

I don't believe that for one moment. In fact, the relations between most Israelis and Palestinians is excellent. The trouble comes with extremists and, in Israel, most of those are American settlers in the West Bank and, of course, political opportunists like Netanyahu and his clique. Don't forget that Rabin nearly secured a land for peace deal and, in fact, would have had not a right-wing extremist killed him.

> I am not advocating an all out war of annihilation, simply stating that in Europe's case, it was effective. For a time at least.

Gee whizz, I certainly hope you are not. Whether we like it or not, and whether it suits Israel or it doesn't, the days of ethnic cleansing are past. That stuff may have been acceptable in the old days in the US "when the West was won" or in Australia or even in SA up to the time of the apartheid regime but the world, at least we are told, has moved on since then.



To: philv who wrote (10332)3/12/2006 5:25:45 PM
From: Thomas M.  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 22250
 
Source of your info? A Zionist propaganda shop called CAMERA.

google.com

Take your canned propaganda elsewhere, please.

If you could impose a border, I guess you would stick to the post 1967 one? Even the original land, carved out of Palestine after WWII was disputed by the Arabs, was it not? Why then is that particular border important?

Because the Palestinians agreed to it in 1976, and have continuously offered this compromise since then.

What kind of pig are you to question if the victims of ethnic cleansing are being gracious enough when they concede 80% of their homeland?

Tom



To: philv who wrote (10332)3/12/2006 7:37:51 PM
From: sea_urchin  Respond to of 22250
 
Phil > Why then is that particular border [pre-1967] important? I have made this point before, but borders change over the years through military conquest. (2)

news.independent.co.uk

>>Israeli ministers were secretly warned just after the Six-Day War in 1967 that any policy of building settlements across occupied Palestinian territories violated international law.

A "top secret" memo by the Foreign Ministry's then legal counsel said that would "contravene the explicit provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention". Growth of Jewish settlements over the next three decades followed.

The official advice that a policy which is now a major obstacle to a peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had no basis in international law has been highlighted by the Israeli historian, Gershom Gorenberg. His new book, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements will generate fresh debate on the legality of the West Bank settlements in the wake of Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw 8,500 settlers from Gaza last August.

Most of the international community has held that Jewish settlement in the territories seized in the 1967 war contravened international law, and the Geneva Conventions in particular, but this has long been publicly contested by Israel.

The highly classified internal advice was given by Theodor Meron, who left Israel a decade later and became a leading international jurist who until the end of last year was president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

After the 1967 Israeli prime minister, Levi Eshkol, made it known he wanted settlements in the Golan Heights, seized from Syria in the war, and in the Jordan Valley, to make Israel's borders more defensible, Mr Meron was asked whether international law allowed such settlement.

The counsel sanctioned short-term settlement "by military bodies rather than civilian ones", but explicitly ruled out civilian settlements which were energetically established by successive Israel governments, leading to an Israeli population of more than 240,00 in the West Bank today.

The Israeli acting Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, has made it clear that while Israel is prepared to withdraw further settlements from the West Bank, it intends, unilaterally if it cannot reach a negotiated peace deal, to annex territory occupied by others, including the three big settlement blocks of Ma'ale Admumim, Gush Etzion and Ariel.

The Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, 78, who is still in a coma, had secured assurances from President George Bush that borders in a "final status" agreement with the Palestinians would allow such blocks to remain in Israel.

Mr Meron's advice, also referred to in another recent book on the 1967 war and its aftermath by the eminent Israeli journalist Tom Segev, also explicitly rejected an argument now used by Israel to defend the legality of settlements, namely that the West Bank was not "normal" occupied territory because it had not indisputably belonged to another sovereign national power and had been unilaterally annexed by Jordan.

Mr Meron said the international community would regard settlement as showing "intent to annex the West Bank", adding that "certain Israeli actions are inconsistent with the claim that the West Bank is not occupied territory". He pointed out that the government specifically decreed military courts had to apply the Geneva Conventions in the West Bank.

Israel has long argued that the policy of settlement conforms with the 1922 League of Nations decision at the San Remo conference in favour of Jewish settlement in Palestine. It also contests that the Fourth Geneva Convention's clear prohibition of transfers of civilian population to occupied lands was drafted to deal with forced population transfers in central and eastern Europe in the Second World War.

Yesterday, Mark Regev, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, said Israel did not accept that settlements properly decided by the government contravened international law. "We distinguish between illegal outposts, which will be demolished, and legal communities established according to the law." He said the original advice had not been upheld by decisions of the Israeli courts.

In yesterday's New York Times, Mr Gorenberg said: "Today it is clear that Israel's future as a Jewish state depends on ending its rule of the West Bank." He adds: "Thirty-eight years after the missed warning, we must find a way to untie the entanglement." <<