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Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: GROUND ZERO™ who wrote (736551)	4/12/2006 6:35:39 PM
From: pompsander	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 769670

That answer, like most answers of important questions, can never be answered with absolute certainty. But in weighing the decisions that a government must make when faced with difficult questions it is legitimate to observe and critique the process they follow. This gives guidance to how they will make decisions the next time a critical question is on the table for decision. If there was a 1% probability that Saddam had Nuclear capabilities, what kind of decision would our government have made. If the probability was 50%, what would they do? If it wasn't nuclear but biological...or chemical, and the certainties were greater or less, how does a government collect intelligence, sift the wheat from the chaff, gather concurring and dissenting opinions.....then reweight the risks and the need for action based on the best possible decision process. I don't think this is what our Government did in Iraq. So how will they apply the same decision making process to Iran? When faced with a question about whether one can be absolutely certain Saddam did not have WMD, the rebuttal question should be, was there such a certainty that the action taken (drastic - invasion) was mandated? Not warranted, but mandated by what Government knew..and its level of certainty about what it knew? Every day there seems to be more evidence that within the Administration there was doubt. Significant doubt. Doubt in the State Department, the Energy Department, Counterterrorism, the CIA....There was no concensus. There were instead sharp disagreements about the level of any threat he presented. Hans Blix on one end, others more in the middle...but many, many expressing the belief the level of threat proven or even likely did not warrant the action contemplated. Wasn't (Isn't) North Korea even more of a threat than Iraq? Wasn't (Isn't) Iran more of a threat? Weren't they in fact a greater threat in 2003? I don't think anyone can deal with certainties in life. But if Saddam was a 5% risk, or a 10% risk....was the action justified? Or could it have been done a year later...or two years later? What was the rush? Imminent threat? According to whom? Were we sure? The President told all of us we were sure. He was sure. I think facts have shown he was wrong. I'm not saying he lied. I think the process was terribly flawed, and controlled by one set of conclusions desired by one set of players in the discussion.