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Politics : I Will Continue to Continue, to Pretend.... -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/14/2006 6:37:17 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Remember a few weeks ago the MSM & DNC were all a twitter about the huge "White house shake up" when Andy Card resigned (as the longest serving Chief of Staff since the 1950's)? Something tells me that they aren't getting the mass resignations they so deeply desire to fulfill their world view of a Bush Admin in disarray, scandal & corruption. Next to Bush/Cheney, Rumsfeld was the next most reviled Admin official. Ya think that so much positive attention would be made to 6 generals going public with their dissatisfaction with Clinton or his Sec of Defense? Or would they balance it with a multitude of generals with the opposite POV? Uh huh - me too. Wanna bet they have all manner of hit pieces ready to run for each top Admin official the day they announce their departure? Uh huh - me too.

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/14/2006 6:46:01 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

President Bush Expresses Full Support, Appreciation for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld For Immediate Release Office of the Press Secretary April 14, 2006 Earlier today I spoke with Don Rumsfeld about ongoing military operations in the Global War on Terror. I reiterated my strong support for his leadership during this historic and challenging time for our Nation. The Department of Defense has been tasked with many difficult missions. Upon assuming office, I asked Don to transform the largest department in our government. That kind of change is hard, but our Nation must have a military that is fully prepared to confront the dangerous threats of the 21st Century. Don and our military commanders have also been tasked to take the fight to the enemy abroad on multiple fronts. I have seen first-hand how Don relies upon our military commanders in the field and at the Pentagon to make decisions about how best to complete these missions. Secretary Rumsfeld's energetic and steady leadership is exactly what is needed at this critical period. He has my full support and deepest appreciation. whitehouse.gov

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/15/2006 12:00:21 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Griping ex-generals are always with us. President Clinton certainly had his detractors among the military brass, and not just retired brass. If I recall correctly, the MSM tended to attirbute this phenomenon to the neanderthalism within the military. Those griping ex-generals Posted by Paul Power Line Dafydd ab Hugh has an excellent post about the retired generals who have lambasted Defense Secretary Rumsfeld recently. Dafydd notes that the generals in question are (1) mostly, in effect, Clinton appointees and (2) "old school" generals who object to Rumsfeld's pet theories of pushing towards smaller units, more unit independence, much greater reliance on Special Forces, and a reorganization of units to be self-sufficient rather than specialized. As to the second point, Dafydd compares the griping generals to "vice presidents at General Motors or IBM who furiously denounce splitting those companies into self-reliant business units instead of the normal corporate divisions they've had for twenty years." He also notes that "the fact that an old general dislikes the new style of warfare is not a refutation of that style. It just [the general] is 'Old School.' But Old School is not necessary the best school." You should definitely read the whole thing (linked below). Griping ex-generals are always with us. President Clinton certainly had his detractors among the military brass, and not just retired brass. If I recall correctly, the MSM tended to attirbute this phenomenon to the neanderthalism within the military. In any case, the existence of griping generals, without more, means little. The "more" is a close analysis of the substance of the griping. This seems largely lacking in the MSM accounts. SCOTT adds: See also Victor Davis Hanson's NRO column "Dead-end debates" (linked below). powerlineblog.com biglizards.net nationalreview.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/15/2006 12:03:25 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

JOHN (from Power Line) adds: Before September 11, Rumsfeld thought that his tenure would be defined by his determination to shake up the Pentagon, of all organizations in the world one of the most resistant to change. He knew that many generals would bitterly resist his innovations. It is hardly a surprise that there are many officers--still serving and, especially, those who are now retired, in some cases because they didn't fit with the new program--who bitterly resent the changes that Rumsfeld brought to the armed forces. One of the ironies is that September 11 and the ensuing war on terror have verified the correctness of Rumsfeld's approach. The kind of army that was appropriate for defending Europe against land attack would be close to useless in the current conflict. It is, therefore, one more in a long series of sins on the part of the mainstream media that this context is almost completely absent from the media's gleeful coverage of these disgruntled generals. http://powerlineblog.com/archives/013760.php

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/15/2006 1:41:13 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Should he stay or should he go? Posted by Paul Power Line David Ignatius argues that President Bush should replace Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, but not because of the criticism from certain generals. As Ignatius says: <<< Military officers often dislike the civilians they work for, but in our system strong civilian control is essential. On some of the issues over which he has tangled with the military brass, Rumsfeld has been right. The Pentagon is a hidebound place, and it has needed the "transformation" ethic Rumsfeld brought to his job. >>> Ignatius argues instead that Rumsfeld needs to be replaced in order to increase domestic support for the war. He thinks that by appointing someone like Senator Lieberman or Senator Hagel, Bush could rebuild a consensus in support of the war. Consider me skeptical. The war has lost domestic support because it is perceived as not going well. That perception is based in part on reality and in part on biased reporting. Bringing in Lieberman, Hagel, or whomever will change neither the reality nor the biased reporting. JOHN adds: When you're President, you get lots of free advice. Some of it is well-intentioned; much of it is not. Here is why I think so many liberals are anxious for President Bush to replace Rumsfeld: they have staked a great deal on the proposition that the Iraq war has not gone well, and, in fact, has been a disaster. But they are troubled because they are not at all sure that is true. By any reasonable standard, casualties have been low and Iraq's progress toward democracy has been impressive. This doesn't mean the project couldn't still go off the rails; it clearly could. But it is also possible--likely, I think--that the Iraqis will succeed in forming a government, violence will continue to decline, our troops levels will be substantially reduced, and, in a year or two, the consensus will be that the war was pretty successful after all. This, I think, is what liberals fear most. They want President Bush to stipulate, in effect, that the war has been poorly conducted and has been a failure. That's the way in which firing Rumsfeld would rightly be interpreted. This would largely insulate liberals against the consequences if the war does, in fact, turn out to be successful. The same logic, I think, explains why liberals are always hectoring President Bush to "admit his mistakes." What they fear, deep down, is that the President's policies haven't been mistakes at all. powerlineblog.com washingtonpost.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/15/2006 2:21:19 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Why they hate him so Vasko Kohlmayer The American Thinker This quotation from Winston Churchill, one of the great military leaders of modern times, seem to speak directly to the ongoing controversy surrounding Donald Rumsfeld: Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events. Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent, or arrogant commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations — all take their seats at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war. War is the most difficult thing of all. Secretary Rumsfeld has proven himself to be a supremely competent war commander under very difficult circumstances. The current conflict is all the more trying for the fact that we have in our midst those who loathe their own country so much that they seek to effect our defeat. And all these people without exception share one thing in common – they hate Donald Rumsfeld with a blinding passion. They hate him, because he stands in their way. It is almost impossible to conceive that the United States could lose while this man is at the helm of our armed forces. And this thought drives the America haters into utter frenzy, because they know that they will not be able to prevail as long as people like him are in charge. Their spouting and gnashing of teeth is the best testimony to the Secretary’s effectiveness. This nation needs Mr. Rumsfeld more than ever. When the history of our time is written many years from now – long after these sick and treasonous maligners have been swept into the sewer of history – this nation will fully recognize its debt of gratitude to this excellent man. May God give him the strength to complete his mission. americanthinker.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/17/2006 2:26:39 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

[T]here's a reason the Founders provided for civilian control of the military, and a danger in military men using their presumed authority to push elected Administrations around. As for Democrats and their media allies, we can only admire their sudden new deference to the senior U.S. officer corps, which follows their strange new respect for the "intelligence community" they also once despised. U.S. military recruiters might not be welcome on Ivy League campuses, but they're heroes when they trash the Bush Administration. The Generals War What's behind the attacks against Rumsfeld. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE Monday, April 17, 2006 So when did Generals cease to be responsible for outcomes in war? We ask that question amid the latest calls by certain retired senior military officers for Donald Rumsfeld to resign over U.S. difficulties in Iraq. Major General Charles H. Swannack Jr., for one, was quoted last week as saying the Defense Secretary's "absolute failures in managing the war against Saddam in Iraq" mean he is not "the right person" to continue leading the Pentagon. Mr. Swannack, who commanded the 82nd Airborne in Iraq, joins other ex-uniformed Iraq War critics such as former Centcom Commander Anthony Zinni and retired Army Major General John Batiste. But there's far more behind this firefight than Mr. Rumsfeld's performance. Mr. Zinni in particular neither fought the Iraq War nor supported it in the first place. He is a longtime advocate of "realism" in the Middle East, which is fancy-speak for leaving Arab dictators alone in the name of "stability." What Mr. Zinni really opposes is President Bush's "forward strategy of freedom," not the means by which the Administration has waged the Iraq campaign. As for those who've raised the issue of competence, we'd be more persuaded if they weren't so impossibly vague. If their critique is that Mr. Rumsfeld underestimated the Sunni insurgency, well, so did the CIA and military intelligence. Retired General Tommy Franks, who led and planned the campaign that toppled Saddam Hussein, took a victory lap after the invasion even as the insurgency gathered strength. If their complaint is that Mr. Rumsfeld has since fought the insurgents with too few troops, well, what about current Centcom Commander John Abizaid? He is by far the most forceful advocate of the "small footprint" strategy--the idea that fewer U.S. troops mean less Iraqi resentment of occupation. Our point here isn't to join the generals, real or armchair, in pointing fingers of blame for what has gone wrong in Iraq. Mistakes are made in every war; there's a reason the word "snafu" began as a military acronym whose meaning we can't reprint in a family newspaper. But if we're going to start assigning blame, then the generals themselves are going to have to assume much of it. A recent article by former Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor for the Center for Defense Information details how the U.S. advance on Baghdad in March and April 2003 was slowed against Mr. Rumsfeld's wishes by overcautious commanders on the scene. That may have allowed Saddam and many of his supporters to escape to fight the insurgency. General Abizaid also resisted the first assault on Fallujah, in April 2004, which sent a signal of U.S. political weakness. We don't agree with all of Mr. Macgregor's points, but it is likely that these Rumsfeld critics are trying to write their own first, rough draft of historic blame shifting. Our own view is that the worst mistakes in Iraq have been more political than military, especially in not establishing a provisional Iraqi government from the very start. Instead, the U.S. allowed itself to be portrayed as occupiers, a fact that the insurgency exploited. But the blame for that goes well beyond Mr. Rumsfeld--and would extend to then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and to Mr. Bush himself. Mr. Rumsfeld's largest mistake may have been giving L. Paul Bremer too free a hand to govern like a viceroy in 2003 and 2004 when a more rapid turnover of political power to Iraqis, and more rapid training of Iraqi forces, might have made a big difference. More than anything else, that unnecessary delay in Iraq's political and self-defense evolution has contributed to the current instability. But that is for the historians to sort out. What matters now is doing what it takes to prevail in Iraq, setting up a new government and defeating the terrorists. How firing Mr. Rumsfeld will help in any of this, none of the critics say. They certainly aren't offering any better military strategy for victory. More than likely, Mr. Rumsfeld's departure would create new problems, starting with a crisis of confidence in Iraq about American staying power. What do Mr. Rumsfeld's critics imagine Iraqis think as they watch former commanders assigning blame? And how would a Rumsfeld resignation contribute to the credible threat of force necessary to meet America's next major security challenge, which is Iran's attempt to build a nuclear bomb? Sacking the Defense Secretary mid-conflict would only reinforce the Iranian mullahs' belief that they have nothing to worry about because Americans have no stomach for a prolonged engagement in their part of the world. The anti-Rumsfeld generals have a right to their opinion. But there's a reason the Founders provided for civilian control of the military, and a danger in military men using their presumed authority to push elected Administrations around. As for Democrats and their media allies, we can only admire their sudden new deference to the senior U.S. officer corps, which follows their strange new respect for the "intelligence community" they also once despised. U.S. military recruiters might not be welcome on Ivy League campuses, but they're heroes when they trash the Bush Administration. Mr. Rumsfeld's departure has been loudly demanded in various quarters for a couple of years now, without much success, and on Friday Mr. Bush said he still has his every confidence. We suspect the President understands that most of those calling for Mr. Rumsfeld's head are really longing for his. opinionjournal.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/17/2006 2:59:54 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Retired Generals Defend Rumsfeld By Captain Ed on National Politics Captain's Quarters And now, at least one media outlet brings us the other side of the Rumsfeld debate. The Washington Times reports on three now-retired generals who worked closely with Donald Rumsfeld during the war on terror and who support his continued tenure as Secretary of Defense: <<< "I think what we see happening with retired general officers is bad for the military, bad for civil-military relations and bad for the country," retired Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs under Mr. Bush, said in an interview with The Washington Times. He said he would elaborate his views in an op-ed essay. "I'm hurt," said retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Michael P. DeLong, who was deputy commander of U.S. Central Command during the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and briefed Mr. Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. "When we have an administration that is currently at war, with a secretary of defense that has the confidence of the president and basically has done well -- no matter what grade you put on there, he has done well -- to call for his resignation right now is not good for the country," he said. ... Retired Gen. John Keane, former Army vice chief of staff under Mr. Rumsfeld, said the secretary involved himself in war planning "just like other strong secretaries of defense." "Generals bring forward their campaign plans, and the civilian leaders apply their judgments," he said. "As a result of that, those plans are changed. The secretary has done the same thing as pertains to our plans for invading Afghanistan and Iraq. In my view, this is healthy and in my view this collaboration-making is healthy and it serves the nation well." >>> This is an impressive cadre of voices speaking on Rumsfeld's behalf, and if they continue to express their support for the SecDef, it may help re-sell Congress and the American electorate on Rumsfeld and his leadership. I look forward to reading the op-ed essay promised by General Myers on this point. I hope more of Rumsfeld's former senior officers speak out, and hopefully more media outlets report on it. I notice the Washington Post failed to report it, but interestingly, the New York Times did, although they missed Gen. DeLong: <<< Mr. Bush's statement was followed hours later by supportive comments from Gen. Richard B. Myers, the retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. Tommy R. Franks, the retired commander of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both appeared on cable news programs, and General Myers pointedly criticized former colleagues for publicly questioning civilian leadership. >>> I've received some excellent comments on my previous post regarding Rumsfeld, most of which disagreed with me, and that's OK -- in fact, it's encouraging. I think Rumsfeld has done an excellent job as SecDef and would prefer he continue until 2009. If more retired generals speak out in support of Rumsfeld, then I think that his political liability ebbs and Rumsfeld strengthens the continued political efforts in the war on terror. But make no mistake: the political temperament here is a critical factor in winning this war, and the Bush administration has to find a way to rebuild political support for it. That's not just important for winning elections, it's important for keeping large numbers of Americans alive. That takes priority over the unfairness of the politics surrounding Rumsfeld. If Bush cannot re-energize the electorate on fighting terrorism, then we will face a strong possibility that voters in 2008 will put an isolationist in office and take us right back to the 1990s in dealing with terrorists. I for one do not want that. I want this nation focused and as unified as we can get these days on fighting the forward strategy on the war on terror, rather than return to the law-enforcement model that got us 9/11. I'd much prefer we can do that with Rumsfeld on board, but if fresh leadership at the DoD is what's needed to restore confidence with the American public in the war effort, then the Bush administration should consider it. captainsquartersblog.com insider.washingtontimes.com nytimes.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/17/2006 4:23:23 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Ignatius ignites an officer Posted by Scott Power Line Last night Paul and John commented here about David Ignatius's Washington Post column supporting the removal of Secretary Rumsfeld. This morning at RealClearPolitics, Tom Bevan posts an officer's response to Ignatius. The officer writes: <<< I would beg to differ with that assessment by Mr. Ignatius. I am a combat arms officer, a combat veteran of the Global War on Terror, currently serving on the faculty of one of the Staff Colleges. My assessment from extensive and continuous contact with young field grade officers, most of which are combat arms branch, combat veterans, is that Secretary Rumsfeld is considered the finest Secretary of Defense of the last forty years. This is in addition to my "peer group," of which many of us maintain contact with each each other regardless if we are in CONUS or SW Asia... >>> Tom has the rest of the officer's message in his post. Yesterday we also received a related message from Air Force Major General J.C. Toomay in response to Victor Davis Hanson's NRO column. General Toomay seconds Hanson's argument and adds another point: <<< Hanson's article is beautiful and correct but there's supplemental information. Undergirding the operational aspects of the services where decisions have to be made instantly is a huge planning organization which worries about the future -- the near future, where quick fixes are feverishly sought (as with HumVee Armor and roadside bombs), and the far future, where the changes in the services, which policy and technology demand, are agonizingly investigated, discussed, and finally approved. These arguments are incessant, and sometimes bitter, especially when the ultimate decisions are made (as they should be) by civilians who may have little or no detailed knowledge of the issues in question. Yet there is a discipline in force which defines the military role: make your arguments before the decision is made; after the decision, execute it. Period. If you don't like it, resign. That's it. If you resign, you become a Monday-morning quarterback who can vent to the extent supported by the MSM and allowed by security considerations which are in effect until the day you die. Ex-generals should shut up, but that's really not the problem. The problem is the credence the media give to such people. Sincerely, John C. Toomay, Major General, USAF (ret.) >>> powerlineblog.com powerlineblog.com realclearpolitics.com realclearpolitics.com nationalreview.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/17/2006 7:34:44 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

If Rumsfeld's so bad, why didn't generals resign? BY THOMAS LIPSCOMB Chicago Sun-Times April 17, 2006 There is a great furor over whether the opinions of a number of retired high-ranking officers should tip the balance in the ongoing debate over the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. But the question really isn't whether Rumsfeld should resign. He has already resigned several times and had President Bush tear up his letters of resignation. He clearly is taking responsibility for his actions on a continuing basis. But now that a galaxy of flag officers are raining down on Rumsfeld demanding his resignation, no one seems to have bothered to ask which, if any, of these generals had ever submitted his own resignation in protest against the conduct of the Iraq war, or the bumpy transition we are locked in now. The demands for Rumsfeld's resignation began with Gen. Anthony Zinni. Differences in policy between the Pentagon brass and its civilian leadership are nothing new. At the end of the Clinton administration there was a dinner at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in honor of the Joint Chiefs off Staff that illustrates this well. Over the years the Council has morphed from a small but influential voice in international policy issues to a glorified Rotary Club for Park Avenue investment bankers and lawyers. The once acerbic off-the-record questioning that rattled many of its guests of honor has degenerated into a love fest hosted largely for star-struck millionaires. After listening to subtle and not so subtle digs at national defense policy by the guests of honor and appreciative sniggers from the audience, I jotted a question down on the back of a card and passed it to former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, who was at my table. ''If you have so many significant disagreements with national defense policy, what have you done about it?'' Lehman wrote back that if I asked that question, he'd buy me lunch, and passed it back to me with a smile. So I asked it. ''What do you expect us to do?'' a senior Marine general replied. ''Resign,'' I said. ''Cyrus Vance did. And he was [President Jimmy] Carter's secretary of state.'' ''You are questioning my cojones, and I am a Marine!'' the general shot back as the millionaire fan club gasped at my disrespect. He was right. I was. I still am, his and any general officers who apparently decided discretion was the better part of a nice retirement parade with a medal or two and a couple of offers of board positions. At least Wesley Clark got himself fired and summarily retired as NATO commander in comparative disgrace for submarining the Balkans policies of his Oxford classmate President Bill Clinton and his defense secretary, William Cohen. Gen. Billy Mitchell is regarded by many as having saved American military aviation by accepting a court-martial and resigning from the service he loved because of his differences in policy with the federal government. Retired military and civil servants are receiving ongoing retirement pay from American taxpayers. If they want to give the public the benefit of their experience in consideration of current policies, we are fortunate to get it. But policy differences are one matter and calls for a specific resignation are quite something else. As a book publishing executive for many years, I have always welcomed the opportunity to make a buck by publishing ''now it can be told revelations'' from those formerly in power. And timing those ''revelations'' to promote a forthcoming book is one of the oldest tricks in the trade. But if Generals Gregory Newbold, John Batiste, Zinni and others have believed Rumsfeld's policies have been so dire that they are calling for his resignation, their opinions would have carried far more weight if they had stated them at some personal cost to themselves while on active service by resigning in protest. That action might have also carried some evidence of the courage Americans expect of the highest ranking officers of its uniformed services. Thomas Lipscomb is senior fellow of the Annenberg Center for the Digital Future. He founded Times Books. tom@digitalfuture.org suntimes.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/17/2006 8:14:50 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

And on the Other Side... Mark Levin And Another Thing . . . At least four generals are now defending Secretary Rumsfeld: current Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Peter Pace; Ex-Joint Chiefs of Staff chariman, Richard Myers; ex-CENTCOM commanrder, Tommy Franks; and ex-CENTCOM deputy commander, Michael DeLong. My guess is that there are many, many more. That said, what's next? Will the media take a poll of ex-generals and admirals? I suspect Harry Truman, who relieved Douglas MacArthur of his command in Korea for publicly disagreeing with him, and Abraham Lincoln, who relieved George McClellan of his command for a variety of blunders, would be the first to tell Democrats and the media that in our country the civilian president calls the shots. The six disgruntled ex-generals are just the latest propaganda tools of the Left. Next, back to Cindy Sheehan. levin.nationalreview.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/18/2006 3:27:46 PM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (50) \| Respond to of 35834

[T]he last things the media will want to examine are the propriety and motives of these men who have savaged Mr. Rumsfeld. But someone should. An incurious Rumsfeld-bashing media by David Limbaugh Townhall.com Apr 18, 2006 Anti-Bush forces are trying to build a momentum approaching critical mass to oust Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld has been one of the main focal points of the left's antipathy for a number of years. Nothing short of the president's impeachment would satisfy their lust for revenge against President Bush like Rumsfeld's removal. These vultures have hovered over Rumsfeld's stubbornly vibrant carcass for way too long, and they just can't let him sprint out of yet another crisis: the call for his resignation by a half dozen retired generals. Nothing inspires liberals in the press more than the opportunity to glorify liberals in uniform. Conservative military or ex-military types are just jingoistic hacks. But those critical of the military in general or of the Iraq War qualify for the Nobel Peace Prize or Time's Man of the Year. Just look at their endless exaltation of Congressman John Murtha once he demanded withdrawal of our troops from Iraq. Every single story they ran contained the obligatory description of Murtha as a war hero and, more importantly, a longtime hawk. They apparently believe that when military types speak out against the war it's like finding a smoking gun. What can be more effective to undermine the political enemy than defectors from within their own ranks -- like John Dean with Richard Nixon? What could give their long-suffering cause more credibility than a group of retired generals against the war? It never occurs to the media to question the inappropriateness of retired military officers publicly criticizing the U.S. civilian leadership during war. But other retired generals -- John Crosby, Thomas McInerney, Buron Moore and Paul Vallely, among others -- have said it is highly inappropriate. It also doesn't bother the media that the retired officers' demand for Secretary Rumsfeld's resignation during wartime could undermine our war effort and troop morale. They can't stand this war anyway. So the last things the media will want to examine are the propriety and motives of these men who have savaged Mr. Rumsfeld. But someone should. Do retired generals Paul Eaton, Gregory Newbold, Anthony Zinni, John Batiste, John Riggs and Charles Swannack hope to start a public avalanche of criticism against Rumsfeld -- as if he hasn't taken enough heat over the last four years? Do they want to start a public debate involving all 7,000 retired generals and flag officers in this country and put a big smile on Osama's face? Shouldn't it make a difference whether some of these generals, like Zinni, have been longtime critics of Rumsfeld or opposed the war all along? Why is it news when he comes out with another in his long line of criticisms? Would a curious, balanced press be interested in determining whether some of these six men have an axe to grind? Officer Riggs was demoted from three to two stars immediately before his retirement, and he might believe his public statement saying the army was stretched too thin had something to do with it. Should the media be interested in earlier press reports that Gregory Newbold was publicly chastised by Secretary Rumsfeld for announcing that "the combat power of the Taliban has been eviscerated" and that when he requested early retirement in 2002 he said he had grown tired of Rumsfeld's abrasive style? How about Newbold's endorsement of the left's line that the administration distorted intelligence in the lead up to the war and that it alienated our allies? In his administration-bashing piece for Time magazine Newbold even seems to adopt the liberals' familiar "chicken hawk" argument: that the opinions of those who haven't served don't count. He wrote, "My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions -- or bury the results." One of John Batiste's criticisms of Rumsfeld, according to the Washington Post, is that there weren't sufficient troops in Iraq. Should the media explore, then, why this same general, during a meeting with Secretary Rumsfeld and other top commanders in Tikrit, did not complain about insufficient troop levels when expressly invited to by Secretary Rumsfeld himself -- according to an AP report dated Dec. 26, 2004? Despite the inappropriateness of their comments, these retired generals have every "right" to criticize Rumsfeld and the administration to their hearts' content. But an objective media less hungry for allies in their quest to undermine the administration and its efforts in Iraq might shed a little more light on the six generals' motives and predispositions, both of which are important in evaluating their credibility. David Limbaugh is a syndicated columnist who blogs at DavidLimbaugh.com. He is also the author of Persecution and Absolute Power: The Legacy of Corruption in the Clinton-Reno Justice Department. Copyright © 2006 Townhall.com townhall.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/18/2006 3:46:33 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Rumsfeld said, "...it's a test of wills. If they can't win a battle, where can they win? The only place they can win is the capitals of Western countries. And with trying to persuade the American people and other western nations, free people, 'look, it isn't worth the cost, it isn't worth the time, it isn't worth the money.' And to get them to toss in the towel and say it's not worth the effort. Well, it is worth the effort because terrorists are against free people for behaving as free people." Retired summer soldiers by Cal Thomas Townhall.com Apr 18, 2006 What is one to make of the six retired generals who, in recent days, have called not only for the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, but have questioned whether U.S. troops should remain in Iraq much longer? Only that it will further embolden America's enemies who are betting that the United States is weak, morally corrupt and lacks the stomach for protracted conflict. It is apparently less newsworthy that other retired generals, including Richard B. Myers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Gen. Tommy Franks, former commander of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, are supporting Rumsfeld. Appearing on Al Arabiya television, Rumsfeld said, "Out of thousands and thousands of admirals and generals, if every time two or three people disagreed, we changed the secretary of defense of the United States, it would be like a merry-go-round around here." On Fox News Channel, Rumsfeld said, "...it's a test of wills. If they can't win a battle, where can they win? The only place they can win is the capitals of Western countries. And with trying to persuade the American people and other western nations, free people, 'look, it isn't worth the cost, it isn't worth the time, it isn't worth the money.' And to get them to toss in the towel and say it's not worth the effort. Well, it is worth the effort because terrorists are against free people for behaving as free people." Anyone doubting Rumsfeld should consider the testimony of Zacarias Moussaoui. During the death penalty phase of his trial for involvement in the 9/11 attacks, Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert A. Spencer asked Moussaoui if he thought the United States is destined to fall. He coldly replied, "I know it. I know it." "You wake up every day to destroy the United States, don't you?" asked Spencer. "To the best of my ability," Moussaoui responded. Moussaoui said it was "my pleasure" to accept a suicide mission from Osama bin Laden. He mocked relatives of those who died on 9/11, saying he wishes more had been killed. He called those relatives who shed tears during their testimony "weak." Moussaoui isn't retreating or calling for the resignation of Osama bin Laden or any other leader in the terrorist war on America and the West. Neither is Iran retreating or in doubt about its nuclear weapons program. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad openly defies and ridicules the West and the United Nations, as they ponder meaningless resolutions and call for equally meaningless diplomacy against a religious nut case who thinks he has been commissioned by his false god to usher in Armageddon. One can be sure no Iranian general - active or retired - will be questioning Ahmadinejad's politics or theology, if he wants to be around for the "last battle." The growing expressions of negativity in America about the war may be having the effect on public opinion desired by our enemies. A USA Today/Gallup Poll found nearly half of those surveyed said the United States "should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own." That might have worked in another era before terrorism and intercontinental missiles. Today, it is unrealistic. As President Bush has repeatedly stated, if we don't defeat them over there, they will come after us over here. That means 9/11 will not have been a unique event. In an April 14 editorial, The Wall Street Journal correctly noted: "The further we move away from 9/11 without another domestic attack, the more tempting it is to believe that awful day was an aberration, to think that we can return to normalcy if we merely leave Iraq and the other Middle Eastern regimes to their own purposes. But the forces of radical Islam aren't going to leave us alone merely because we decide that resisting them is too hard." This isn't about one secretary of defense or six generals who don't like his policies. This is about winning the most dangerous and important war America has ever fought. By going public with their criticisms in the midst of the war, those generals are making victory more difficult. They are encouraging the enemy to fight on, believing we will ultimately surrender. There can be no good that will come from the comments of the former leaders of our volunteer soldiers, at least no good for what they once called "our side." Cal Thomas is the co-author of Blinded By Might. Copyright © 2006 Townhall.com townhall.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/18/2006 4:50:51 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

"Gutless Military Leadership??" Betsy's Page Judith Apter Klinghoffer is no fan of Rumsfeld, but she has lost patience with the media obsession with six retired generals who have been criticizing Rumsfeld. <<< I am writing in the hope of lowering my blood pressure. Islamists around the world are on a rampage and all the media focus is on retired generals who did not dare confront their superiors or even tell the truth to the president when asked to do so in the most direct manner. I have called for Rumsfeld's replacement months ago but that is besides the point. For the generals to attack the Secretary of Defense on the issue of troop numbers in Iraq in 2003 is ridiculous. I want to know whether they think we need more troops in Iraq today or tomorrow. To hear two and three star generals whine that Rumsfeld is too intimidating causes one to ask who else can so easily intimidate them? Are we talking perhaps of the insurgents, Ahmadinejad, Assad Fils, the North Korean or China? Imagine being a soldier who has served under the command of so easily intimidated a general. Their retired generals' contention that they are speaking for their active duty colleagues merely makes matters worse. On This Week Joe Klein, whom no one can accuse of being a Bush fan, said that Bush repeatedly asked the generals in Iraq if they had everything they needed and they repeatedly assured him they did. But when Jerry Bremer asked them what they would do with an additional division, they said, we'd clear Baghdad. Excuse me? The American army in Iraq does not have a single general with enough guts to respond to the president's question with "depends on what you want us to do?" >>> Sorry, guys, civil control of the military is not our problem. Gutless military leadership is. betsyspage.blogspot.com hnn.us

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/18/2006 5:21:42 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

GOTCHYA Jonah Goldberg The Corner From Brit Hume's "Political Grapevine" <<< Former Clinton CENTCOM commander, Anthony Zinni — the most prominent of the retired generals attacking Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld — now says that, in the run-up to the war in Iraq, "What bothered me ... [was that] I was hearing a depiction of the intelligence that didn't fit what I knew. There was no solid proof, that I ever saw, that Saddam had WMD." But in early 2000, Zinni told Congress "Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region," adding, "Iraq probably is continuing clandestine nuclear research, [and] retains stocks of chemical and biological munitions ... Even if Baghdad reversed its course and surrendered all WMD capabilities, it retains scientific, technical, and industrial infrastructure to replace agents and munitions within weeks or months." corner.nationalreview.com foxnews.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/18/2006 8:25:00 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

It's wrong to drive without a license, and I submit it's wrong to opine without a clue. I wonder if, in the interest of factually accurate public discourse, maybe we need some sort of stiffer penalty to those who blather first and get the facts later. .... or in some cases NEVER! ON DONALD RUMSFELD, INACCURATE STATEMENTS, AND COLUMNIST FANTASIES ABOUT JOHN MCCAIN TKS jim geraghty reporting I realize that trying to reason with the Rumsfeld-must-go crowd is probably a waste of time, but here goes… Brain Shavings has a wonderful graphic depiction of how many retired generals have called for Rumsfeld's departure, and how many haven’t. brainshavings.com (Maybe I'm a bit more irritable than usual, but I just feel like when a figure like Katrina Vanden Heuvel, the editor of The Nation, writes, "Is there a retired general left in the States who hasn't called on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to fall on his sword?" and the answer to her question is, "Yes, there are roughly 4,700," that the person who writes the spectacularly wrongheaded statement should be subjected to two or three days of being pelted with tomatoes everywhere they go. Not enough to cause bodily harm, just some public humiliation to rebuke their; a) ignorance or b) extreme exaggeration to the point of a falsehood. I think much of life comes down to incentives and deterrents, and right now there are no deterrents to just blurting out statements like that, or my other recent irritants, << "The 9/11 Commission Report said there was no passenger revolt on Flight 93" >> and << "Kofi Annan was Time's Man of the Year in 2001." >> Clearly, being fact-checked by the blogosphere isn't enough. It's wrong to drive without a license, and I submit it's wrong to opine without a clue. I wonder if, in the interest of factually accurate public discourse, maybe we need some sort of stiffer penalty to those who blather first and get the facts later.) So - looking at the question of whether there would be any advantage to Rumsfeld's departure, I’m reminded of my attitude towards changing a sports team’s head coach. (When you’re a New York Jets fan, you contemplate this issue a lot.) There’s no point in firing the current guy unless you’ve got a better guy to replace him with. If your current guy is Rich Kotite (4-28 over two years) and you have a chance to get Bill Parcells (two Super Bowl rings), you make that move. If your current guy is Pete Carroll (9-7) and your option for replacing him is Kotite, change will not necessarily be synonymous with progress. I’d like to see Rummy’s critics give some sense of who they think would be an improvement. You know that if Bush appointed anyone currently at the Pentagon, the new nominee would be greeted with the same whining, wailing, and moaning that Josh Bolten heard when he stepped in as the new chief of staff. (I’m a fan of former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Eric Edelman, currently Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, but I have no idea if he would want the job.) There was the Joe Lieberman rumor of a couple months back, but that didn’t seem serious. Lieberman’s got a reelection campaign to run. And let’s not exaggerate the benefits of “fresh faces.” How much goodwill and good press did Bush get by replacing Andy Card with Bolton? Next to none. The press will treat any personnel change, even the departure of a cabinet member hated by the media and administration critics like Rumsfeld, as a sign that the administration is in disarray, not as a reenergizing burst of new momentum. David Ignatius deserves a half a point for actually suggesting some replacements; unfortunately, he throws out a couple of perennial media favorites, Sens. Chuck Hagel and John McCain. Not. Gonna. Happen. Why should these guys leave the comforts of the Senate (and botch possible presidential runs) by going across the river and getting grief and aggravation for not immediately fixing Iraq? (And what’s with all the dreamy wish-fulfillment column themes lately? The New Republic’s Peter Beinart wants John McCain to run for president as an independent. sigh Whatever. Jeez, if these guys can write about their wildest dreams, I can write a column saying I want Abu Zarqawi to resign in disgrace and turn himself in, that I want to sell a million books, for the Jets to win the Super Bowl, and for pizza to suddenly become a health food. And I want a pony!) So – with no immediate, obvious choice to step in and do the job for the next two and a half years, the benefits to replacing Rumsfeld to placate individuals like Anthony Zinni (a smart man with a book to sell) and Wes Clark (a man who wanted Bush’s job a few years back) seem pretty thin. If a figure appears who would be the ideal Secretary of Defense for the next two years, then great. Thank Rummy for his service, give the new guy a shot and watch him go. (Maybe then the President could name Rummy to replace Scott McClellan and let him mock, browbeat and berate the White House Press Corps for hours every day. If that wouldn’t fire up the GOP base, nothing would. “Mr. Secretary, isn’t your new position just another sign of disarray and panic within the administration?” (the trademark Rummy irritated squint) - “Gregory, have you been drinking again? You smell a bit of curry, you have a flashback to New Delhi, and you go on a bender, is that it?”) But most of the Dump-Rummy crowd isn’t falling for his ouster because they think it will really change anything or improve anything on the ground in Iraq; they’re saying it because they want more fodder for “the Bush administration is in disarray” columns. And let’s remember, much of the criticism of Rumsfeld comes from generals who want to fight the last war – and by that I mean the 2004 election. UPDATE: TKS reader Josh asks, "How many tomatoes can we throw at you for getting Caroll's record with the Jets wrong?" He's right, it was 6-10. I blame post-traumatic stress disorder....<snip> tks.nationalreview.com brainshavings.com washingtonpost.com tnr.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/20/2006 1:29:19 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

In the Defense Department, More Consultation Than Ever Posted by John Power Line So far, seven out of approximately 7,000 retired generals have publicly criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. I've never considered that a particularly impressive total, especially given the shakeups Rumsfeld has imposed at the Pentagon. The generals' chief complaint, other than general unhappiness with the situation in Iraq, has been that Rumsfeld is arrogant and autocratic, and doesn't pay enough attention to the generals--not to the seven who complained, anyway. For what it's worth, the truth is that Rumsfeld has institutionalized a system of consultation with his generals that is probably unprecedented in American history. The Bush administration has deferred to military professionals to a remarkable, and commendable, degree. The Defense Department points out some of Rumsfeld's innovations, all of them designed to improve coordination between the civilians who run the Department of Defense and the armed services' commanding officers: Beginning in 2001, Rumsfeld created two new decision-making bodies to ensure that military judgment and perspectives are woven into all aspects of Department of Defense policy-making. These include: * The Senior Level Review Group, which meets at least monthly, and more often during the development of the annual budget. It includes the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the individual chiefs of the military services, and the senior civilian officials of the Department at the Service Secretary and Under-Secretary level. It is also open to combat commanders who choose to participate. * The Defense Senior Leadership Conference, which meets three times a year. This is a three-day planning and decision-making conference in which the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the nine combatant commanders focus on a full range of issues before the Department. These processes have been instrumental in developing the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, annual Strategic/Defense Planning Guidance, Contingency Planning Guidance, and every budget and appropriations request from 2001 to the present. In addition, Rumsfeld meets four mornings a week in the Roundtable, a review of activities of the department that includes, along with Rumsfeld, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Chiefs or Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Military Departments. And Rumsfeld has been personally involved in personnel matters involving the services; he meets approximately twice a year with each of the service chiefs to review general/flag officer personnel assignments down to the two-star level. Which, I suppose, could account for the fact that seven generals don't like him. As a result of these extraordinary measures, Rumsfeld, since the beginning of 2005, has participated in no fewer than 110 meetings involving the Service Chiefs, and 163 meetings involving combatant commanders. The truth is that under Rumsfeld's direction, we have benefited from unprecedented communication and coordination between the uniformed services and the Defense Department's civilian leadership. If a tiny percentage of retired generals don't like the decisions that resulted from these processes, fine. But to suggest that DoD decision-making is somehow insulated from the input of commanding officers is ridiculous. powerlineblog.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/20/2006 9:55:26 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

RAILING AT RUMMY NEW YORK POST Editorial April 20, 2006 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says he has no intention of giving in to the so-called "revolt of the generals" - six retired Army and Marine commanders who have recently demanded his resignation, claiming he mismanaged the Iraq war. And President Bush has made clear that Rumsfeld continues to enjoy his full confidence - which is, ultimately, the only real criterion for whether he should remain in office. Let's be clear here: We do not question the right of these generals, all of whom served their country with honor and dignity, to criticize Rumsfeld. Nor do we doubt that their remarks have been sincerely made - though, it must be noted, their assessment has been refuted by equally noteworthy generals, including the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his immediate predecessor and the overall commander of the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters. But we do take issue with the appropriateness of their challenge to the nation's civilian leadership during wartime. This can only energize America's enemies - especially given the unseemly glee with which congressional Democrats have joined the fray. Yes, Rumsfeld is a stubborn man. Yes, he's shown scant strategic flexibility since the fall of Saddam - even as American troops in the field have demonstrated amazing tactical adaptability. The men and women in the field have handled every challenge thrown their way, and it is a measure of the Pentagon's inability to get the news out that most Americans don't know just how good a job they've done. The secretary has complicated his problems by pleading plaintively that he gave his generals precisely what they asked for at the outset - especially the number of troops that they requested. In a culture that reveres loyalty, it's no surprise that such a downward deflection of criticism would generate bitterness among senior officers. As it has. But civilians control the military in America, and they have since George Washington stared down his own revolt of the officers in a Newburgh, N.Y., grange hall on March 15, 1783. President Bush placed Donald Rumsfeld in charge of the Pentagon - and in charge means: in charge. And it's difficult to gainsay America's stunning success in the initial phases of the war. The Taliban was toppled in Afghanistan, as was Saddam Hussein's Iraqi regime, more quickly and smoothly than anyone - including many military senior officers - believed possible. Fact is, for at least two of the generals now demanding Rumsfeld's head, the problem is not how the Iraq war was implemented, but the fact that it was waged in the first place. Former Lt. Gen. Greg Newbold has called it an "unnecessary war," while ex-Gen. Anthony Zinni (who is also plugging a new book) has long been an advocate of "containing" Islamist terrorism, rather than defeating it. But if these generals truly believe that Secretary Rumsfeld erred grievously enough to warrant his removal, where was their concern when they were still on active duty? Resignation on principle isn't common in the American tradition; maybe it should become so. But let's get down to cases. This debate is animated less by Rumsfeld's prosecution of the War on Terror than by the mandate he accepted when he took office, long before 9/11: to modernize the military for a new century. He favored smaller, quicker task forces fighting with state-of-the-art, high-tech weaponry. A lot of people in the Pentagon didn't like the idea - and still don't. On Iraq, it's true that mistakes were made. But then, mistakes are made in every war. Frankly, we're of the view that there is nothing wrong with the current state of affairs in Iraq that couldn't be cured quickly by killing a lot more insurgents. But it remains that the policies driving the War on Terror will be - must be - formulated by civilians, beginning with President Bush. The challenge to Rumsfeld's leadership can be seen as a challenge to the notion of civilian control of the military - and that must be resisted. There can be only one priority now, and that is winning this war - both the immediate battle in Iraq and the global war against Islamist terrorism. Rumsfeld has rightly noted that the war is a test of wills - and that the only hope the enemy has is to persuade the American people that defeating terrorism isn't worth the time, effort and sacrifice. Do the retired generals really want to make that task that much easier? nypost.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/21/2006 2:32:57 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

General Amnesia: A Tale of Two Zinnis Noel Sheppard The American Thinker April 20th, 2006 Have you ever considered the peculiar yet convenient amnesia that regularly strikes members of the drive-by media when it fits their political agenda? Given the development of the Internet, the accuracy and ease of search engines, and the ready access of more detailed media devices such as LexisNexis available for truly inquiring minds, the contagion no longer threatens the general public. But the as yet un-named malady (Rodham’s Syndrome, perhaps?) still remains virulent among those whose at-risk behavior persists. Heedless of the investigative tools presently at the disposal of all interested in the grand search for information, the at-risk population who are paid to disseminate the news seem to conveniently forget what has been reported almost as soon as it happens. They appear to be counting on the population to suffer from this same instantaneous mnemonic dysfunction. No finer example of such media memory lapse has occurred recently than what is transpiring with all the military generals now waxing publicly philosophic about why we never should have gone to war with Iraq. One of the more prominent members of the hindsight-worshipping crowd is former Clinton CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, who has now conspicuously stated that he never saw any proof that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction or was in any way an imminent threat. Of course, this has been thoroughly debunked by the recent revelation (linked below) of a February 29, 2000 briefing by Zinni to Congress, wherein the general made it quite clear that “Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region,” stating quite unequivocally that Iraq either possessed or was aggressively pursuing WMD. Needless to say, if not for new media, Americans would never have been reminded about this briefing. The antique media hoped that this had been totally forgotten by now, and still does its best to avert its eyes. Zinni’s War Plan Still, an even more bizarre oddity concerning the media’s acceptance of Zinni’s current position is another revelation from 2000 that the general actually briefed senior Clinton administration officials concerning a massive military strike to overthrow Saddam. Hadn’t heard about this? Well, as reported by the Chicago Tribune on October 2, 2000: <<< Zinni has briefed senior administration officials on a secret war plan that details how the U.S. military, with limited allied help, would seek to topple Hussein. The effort would be massive, involving possibly as many as half a million troops, according to one knowledgeable official. >>> The article continued: <<< Although he has confidence in U.S. forces, Zinni has no illusions that such a scheme could win public support, considering the cost in lives and dollars it would almost certainly involve. >>> Yet, conceivably the most telling statement made by Zinni in this piece was the following: <<< Containment is what you do when you can’t come up with the popular will to take decisive military action. [emphasis added] Clearly, Zinni was expressing frustration with containment, which, if you read the entire Tribune article, put him in quite good company, for this passive strategy was certainly not achieving its intended goal. However, as Zinni made quite clear, without popular support for a grander military solution, his options were limited. By contrast, prior to the March 2003 Iraq invasion, Bush and Company were indeed able to come up with the “popular will” that Zinni spoke of so longingly. In fact, over seventy percent of the nation was behind the incursion when it first began. If Zinni were to be totally honest today, he would make it clear that the only reason he didn’t go with this aggressive military option back in 2000 was because he didn’t think the public would have supported it. As a result, the disingenuity today is that the left, the media, and these generals – including Zinni himself, it would appear – have conveniently forgotten that regime change and ousting Saddam was a huge pillar of U.S. foreign policy from 1998 through 2000. Contrary to what is being espoused regularly today by all the usual amnesiacs, the idea that Saddam was a very bad man, and that the world would be a much safer place without him, didn’t first surface in January 2001. In fact, this same Tribune article quoted Clinton’s undersecretary of state Thomas Pickering as having said, “‘We would like to see Saddam gone.’” And, it appears that even he wasn’t happy with the Clinton strategy of containment: <<< But I can’t tell you that there is a magic formula to see this done. Our magic formula, in reality, is patience. ... It is not a perfect policy. >>> No, it certainly wasn’t a perfect policy, and, judging from this Tribune piece, Zinni knew it. In fact, what is truly revealing is that the Clinton administration was actually considering such a huge attack in a pre-9/11 world, and without much allied assistance or Arab support. Can you say “unilateral?” Yet, the left and their amnesiac media minions pretend that such discussions only began to occur in December of 2000 as Bush and Company started making transition plans to move into the White House. Indeed, this was a point that MSNBC’s Chris Matthews harped on in an April 3 “Hardball” interview with Zinni: <<< You know, Bill Cohen said the other day, defense secretary, that he was told back in 2000 when they lost the election in the Supreme Court that the first thing Cheney wanted to do was go after Iraq. He wanted all the Intel on Iraq, nowhere else in the country. >>> Why is this so shocking, Chris? After all, the expressed position and foreign policy edict of the latter part of Clinton’s second term was indeed the ousting of Saddam. Given the existence of said strategy, along with it having been some years since U.N. inspectors had been to Iraq, as well as the then recent testimony to Congress by Zinni concerning Iraq representing the greatest short-term threat to America in the Mid-East, wouldn’t it have been logical for the new administration to place such a strong focus on this issue? In fact, wouldn’t it have been inexcusable if the Bush team hadn’t made familiarizing themselves with this threat a top priority? If Zinni believed that Saddam either didn’t possess WMD in 2000, or wasn’t an imminent threat to American security and sovereignty at that time, why would he have offered a plan that would involve up to 500,000 American soldiers to overthrow this non-threatening dictator? Nobody in the media has yet asked Zinni this question. Moreover, if all Zinni’s grand plan needed to succeed was “the popular will to take decisive military action,” why would he oppose today’s war that was initially waged with the kind of public support that was lacking when he offered his own overthrow strategy three years earlier? Nobody in the media has yet asked Zinni this question either. In fact, why hasn’t any major media outlet uncovered this October 2, 2000 Tribune story, revealed its existence to the public, and asked Gen. Zinni why he felt so strongly about overthrowing Saddam in 2000, but thinks it was a mistake in 2003? Of course, unless you yourself are suffering from amnesia, you likely already know the answer to that question. Noel Sheppard is an economist, business owner, and contributing writer to the Free Market Project. He is also contributing editor for the Media Research Center’s NewsBusters.org. Noel welcomes feedback. americanthinker.com americanthinker.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/21/2006 5:43:13 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

The civilian leadership of the Pentagon is decided on Election Day, not by the secret whispering of generals. The Generals' Dangerous Whispers By Charles Krauthammer WASHINGTON -- Last time around, the anti-war left did not have a very high opinion of generals. A popular slogan in the 1960s was ``war is too important to be left to the generals.'' It was the generals who had advocated attacking Cuba during the missile crisis of October 1962, while the civilians preferred -- and got -- a diplomatic solution. In popular culture, ``Dr. Strangelove'' made indelible the caricature of the war-crazed general. And it was I-know-better generals who took over the U.S. government in a coup in the 1960s best-seller and movie ``Seven Days in May.'' Another war, another take. I-know-better generals are back. Six of them, retired, are denouncing the Bush administration and calling for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation as secretary of defense. The anti-war types think this is just swell. I don't. There are three possible complaints that the military brass could have against a secretary of defense. The first is that he doesn't listen to or consult military advisers. The six generals make that charge, but it is thoroughly disproved by the two men who were closer to Rumsfeld day-to-day, week-in-week-out, than any of the accusing generals: former Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard Myers, and former Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong. Both attest to Rumsfeld's continual consultation and give-and-take with the military. A second complaint is that the defense secretary disregards settled, consensual military advice. The military brass recommends X and SecDef willfully chooses Y. That in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. Rumsfeld's crusade to ``transform'' a Cold War-era military into a fast and lean fighting force has met tremendous resistance within the Pentagon. His canceling several heavy weapons systems, such as the monstrous Crusader artillery program, was the necessary overriding of a hidebound bureaucracy by an innovating civilian on a mission. In his most recent broadside, retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste accuses the administration of ``radically alter(ing) the results of 12 years of deliberate and continuous war planning'' on Iraq. Well, the Bush administration threw out years and years and layer upon layer of war planning on Afghanistan, improvised one of the leanest possible attack plans and achieved one of the more remarkable military victories in recent history. There's nothing sacred about on-the-shelf war plans. As for Iraq, it is hardly as if the military was of a single opinion on the critical questions of de-Baathification, disbanding Saddam's army, or optimal coalition troop levels. There were divisions of opinion among the military as there were among the civilians, and indeed, among the best military experts in the country. Rumsfeld chose among the different camps. That's what secretaries of defense are supposed to do. What's left of the general's revolt? A third complaint: He didn't listen to me. So what? Lincoln didn't listen to McClellan, and fired him. Truman had enough of listening to MacArthur and fired him too. In our system of government, civilians fire generals, not the other way around. Some of the complainers were on active duty when these decisions were made. If they felt so strongly about Rumsfeld's disregard of their advice, why didn't they resign at the time? Why did they wait to do so from the safety of retirement and with their pensions secured? The Defense Department waves away the protesting generals as just a handful out of over 8,000 now serving or retired. That seems to me too dismissive. These generals are no doubt correct in asserting that they have spoken to and speak on behalf of some retired and, even more importantly, some active-duty military. But that makes the generals' revolt all the more egregious. The civilian leadership of the Pentagon is decided on Election Day, not by the secret whispering of generals. We've always had discontented officers in every war and in every period of our history. But they rarely coalesce into factions. That happens in places such as Saddam's Iraq, Pinochet's Chile or your run-of-the-mill banana republic. And when it does, outsiders (including United States) do their best to exploit it, seeking out the dissident factions to either stage a coup or force the government to change policy. That kind of dissident party within the military is alien to America. Some other retired generals have found it necessary to rise to the defense of the current administration. Will the rest of the generals, retired or serving, now have to declare themselves as to which camp they belong? It is precisely this kind of division that our tradition of military deference to democratically elected civilian superiors was meant to prevent. Today it suits the anti-war left to applaud the rupture of that tradition. But it is a disturbing and very dangerous precedent that even the left will one day regret. letters@charleskrauthammer.com (c) 2006, The Washington Post Writers Group realclearpolitics.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/24/2006 8:44:48 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Republicans Old and New Posted by John Power Line It's been a long time since I've heard much about former President Gerald Ford, and I've tended to consign him to the bad old days of pre-Reagan Republicans. But, as Blog of the Week Betsy's Page notes, Ford, at 92, is standing by his former Chief of Staff and Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. The AP quotes President Ford's statement: Allowing retired generals to dictate our country's policies and its leadership would be a dangerous precedent that would severely undermine our country's long tradition of civilian control of the military. It would discourage civilian leaders at the (Defense) Department from having frank and candid exchanges with military officers. And, today, at a time of war, such an effort sends exactly the wrong message both to our troops deployed abroad and to our enemies who are watching for any signs of weakness or self-doubt. Ford correctly diagnosed, I think, the cause of dissension on the part of seven (or possibly even more!) out of 7,000 retired generals: [President Bush] knew that Don, who had been in the job before, was extremely well-suited to take on this challenge and contend with a bureaucracy that has a built- in resistance to change. The president knew that successfully carrying out these missions, against stiff resistance, takes someone with a certain amount of steel. Well done, Mr. President. Betsy's Page also comments on a study that purports to show that entry into a market by Fox News increased Republican voting between 1996 and 2000. The study concludes, somewhat hilariously: <<< Our estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 8 percent of its viewers to vote Republican. We interpret the results in light of a simple model of voter learning about media bias and about politician quality. The Fox News effect could be a temporary learning effect for rational voters, or a permanent effect for voters subject to non-rational persuasion. >>> Given that the researchers are from Berkeley and the University of Stockholm, those comments about "rational" voters are not surprising. I would draw, though, a somewhat different lesson. Let's accept the authors' unsubstantiated claim that their study somehow evaluated "media bias." If you'll remember, prior to the 2004 election a prominent Democratic pundit--who was it? One of our readers will no doubt remember--acknowledged that the media are liberal and favor Democrats, and estimated that this factor gives the Democrats a 15 percent advantage at the polls. He later recanted. But if it's true that the introduction of a single non-liberal news source can sway 3% to 8% of its viewers (a sample much smaller than the entire voting population) then it is quite plausible that the overwhelmingly liberal tilt of all the broadcast networks, CNN, and virtually every daily newspaper and news magazine could produce a 15% advantage for the Democrats. powerlineblog.com betsyspage.blogspot.com hosted.ap.org betsyspage.blogspot.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/24/2006 9:19:58 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Secretary Rumsfeld and his enemies Posted by Paul Power Line The folks clamoring for the scalp of Donald Rumsfeld fall essentially into three categories: retired military brass and bureaucrats who don't like the Secretary for reasons having little or nothing to do with Iraq; opponents of the war who want Rumsfeld out as the first step in changing our policy to one of "cut-and-run"; and supporters or former supporters of the war who attack him for the self-serving purpose of pretending that the difficulties we face in Iraq are not the inherent consequences of a decision they supported, but instead stem from the administration's incompetence. The burden for those in the third camp is to point to specific decisions by Rumsfeld that, if made differently, would have avoided the current difficulties. This they are unable to do. Some point to the decision to disband the Baathist army. But Rumsfeld's detractors can't show that this decision would have avoided the current bloodshed. Indeed, it seems at least as likely that the continued existence of Saddam's army would have caused an uprising by the Shiite majority, thus leading to a real civil war instead of the civil war that administration critics constantly say we are "on the verge" of. The more intelligent detractors argue that Rumsfeld should have sent in more troops when we invaded. But even with the benefit of hindsight, I haven't seen a persuasive explanation of how sending in, say, an extra 100,000 troops would have avoided the current difficulties. The folks who are terrorizing the country now were not (or did not remain) in the field of battle during the invasion, and thus could not have been taken out of play at that time by any force no matter how large. Nor have I seen anyone demonstrate that, in a country as vast as Iraq, extra troops would have enabled us to find enough additional munitions to prevent the terrorists from blowing things. Once the terrorists came out of the woodwork, we could have sent in more troops, but for the most part Rumsfeld's critics haven't advocated this; nor can anyone really say even now how many troops it would take to significantly reduce the level of terrorism. Finally, the most mindless critics resort to asserting that we "went in without a plan," a claim for which I have seen no evidence. This contention is nothing more than a means of avoiding real discussion of the type presented above, and cannot be taken seriously. powerlineblog.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	4/25/2006 1:37:07 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Rumsfeld derangement syndrome Posted by Paul Power Line In a post below, I discussed the three main categories of Rumsfeld critics. But some criticism is so inane as to defy categorization. Consider this piece by Lawrence Korb and Peter Ogden who work for "The Center for American Progress," an outfit run by Democratic operative John Podesta (linked below). Korb and Ogden argue that "personal responsibility demands" that Rumsfeld resign over the events at Abu Ghraib. However, Korb and Ogden make no attempt to explain how Rumsfeld bears "personal responsibility" for those events. At the time they occurred, some argued that various actions by Pentagon set a tone that made Abu Ghraib inevitable (these hacks, though, couldn't explain why the same actions failed to lead to similar abuses at other prisons). But Korb and Ogden don't even make this half-hearted argument. Instead, they demand Rumsfeld's resignation as a "public acknowledgment that something profoundly unacceptable has taken place, in spite of one's best efforts." Under this logic, the Secretary of Defense would be obliged to resign anytime a major mishap occurs on his watch. But this consequence is absurd -- public officials must be judged by the totality of their work not by one event, particularly an event like Abu Ghraib that cannot reasonably be attributed to anything the official did or didn't do. Instead of recognizing the absurdity of their stance Korb and Ogden embrace it. Indeed, they end up suggesting (as best as I can tell -- the piece is badly written) that a series of former Defense Secretaries also should have resigned in the name of personal responsibility -- William Perry over the Khobar Towers bombing; Harold Brown over the failed attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran; Caspar Weinberger over the truck bomb in Beirut that killed 241 American servicemen; and Les Aspin over the killing of 18 Army Rangers were killed in Somalia. Ironically, though, Korb himself has refused to take personal responsibility for flip-flopping on whether we should withdraw from Iraq, electing instead to dissemble on the subject. powerlineblog.com baltimoresun.com powerlineblog.com

To: Sully- who wrote (19438)	5/3/2006 3:49:04 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Rumsfeld and His Critics Did the military really have a better understanding of Iraq? by Mackubin Thomas Owens The Weekly Standard 05/03/2006 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD has taken a serious beating recently. His critics, including several retired Army and Marine Corps generals, have accused him, in essence, of being personally responsible for perceived failures in Iraq. His critics charge that he ignored military advice and insisted on a plan for Iraq that employed too small of a force, that he failed to adapt to new circumstances once things began to go wrong, that he failed to foresee the insurgency that now rages, and that he ignored the need to prepare for post-conflict stability operations. The first thing to realize is that disagreements between civilians and soldiers about the conduct of a war are not uncommon in American history. But the critics' charges against Rumsfeld are based on two false premises: (1) in general--that the military, is always right when it comes to military affairs; and (2) in particular, that the things Rumsfeld got wrong in Iraq, the military got right. The historical record illustrates that the judgment of soldiers is not always on the money. Abraham Lincoln constantly prodded George McClellan to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862; McClellan just as constantly whined about insufficient forces. Despite the image of civil-military comity during World War II, there were many differences between Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. George Marshall, the greatest soldier-statesman since Washington, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940 and argued for a cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. History has vindicated both Lincoln and Roosevelt. Many are inclined to blame American defeat in Vietnam on civilians. But the U.S. operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed military. The conventional wisdom today is that the operational strategy of General William Westmoreland emphasizing attrition of the Peoples' Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in a "war of the big battalions"--sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy the enemy with superior fire power--was counterproductive. By the time Westmoreland's successor could adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late. During the planning for Operation Desert Storm in late 1990 and early 1991, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command presented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions in southern Kuwait followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that this plan was unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the ground war: the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam's Republican Guard. The civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by CENTCOM and ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative and effective. WHILE RUMSFELD made some critical mistakes, it is clear that no one did better than when it came to predicting what would transpire. Did Rumsfeld foresee the insurgency and the shift from conventional to guerilla war? No, but neither did his critics in the uniformed services. Last year, Tom Ricks of the Washington Post publicized a study by Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the Iraq campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq. Wilson charged that Army commanders had failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and were still pursuing a flawed approach. "Plainly stated, the 'western coalition' failed, and continues to fail, to see Operation Iraqi Freedom in its fullness. . . . Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of a collective cognitive dissidence on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting it." How about the charge that Rumsfeld's Pentagon has shortchanged the troops in Iraq, by failing to provide them with armored humvees? A review of Army budget submissions makes it clear that the service's priority, as is usually the case with the uniformed services, was to acquire "big ticket" items. It was only after the insurgency and the IED threat became apparent that the Army began to push for supplemental spending to "up-armor" the utility vehicles. It is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for post-conflict stability operations, but in this he was merely ratifying the preferences of the uniformed military. When it comes to post-conflict stability operations, the real villain is the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of principles long internalized by the U.S. military that emphasizes the requirement for an "exit strategy." But if generals are thinking about an exit strategy they are not thinking about "war termination"--how to convert military success into political success. This cultural aversion to conducting stability operations is reflected by the fact that operational planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom took 18 months while planning for postwar stabilization began half-heartedly only a couple of months before the invasion. IN RETROSPECT, it is easy to criticize Rumsfeld for pushing the CENTCOM commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, to develop a plan based on a smaller force than the one called for in earlier plans--as well as for his interference with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) that lays out the schedule of forces deploying to a theater of war. But hindsight is always 20-20, permitting us to judge another's actions on the basis of what we know now, not what we knew then. Thus the consequences of the chosen path--to attack earlier with a smaller force--are visible to us in retrospect while the very real risks associated with an alternative option--e.g. take the time to build up a larger force, perhaps losing the opportunity to achieve surprise--remain provisional. The debate over the size of the invasion force must also be understood in the context of civil-military relations. The fact is that Rumsfeld believed that civilian control of the military had eroded during the Clinton administration. If the Army didn't want to do something--as in the Balkans in the 1990s--it would simply overstate the force requirements: "The answer is 350,000 soldiers. What's the question?" Accordingly, Rumsfeld was inclined to interpret the Army's call for a larger force to invade Iraq as just one more example of what he perceived as foot dragging. In retrospect, Rumsfeld's decision not to deploy the 1st Cavalry Division was a mistake, but again he had come to believe that the TPFDL, like the "two major theater war" planning metric, had become little more than a bureaucratic tool that the services used to protect their shares of the defense budget. Retrospective criticism is easy. Rumsfeld's detractors would be much more credible if they could point to an instance in which their ability to discern the future was substantially superior to that of the man they have attacked. Mackubin Thomas Owens is professor of national security at the Naval War College. weeklystandard.com