Conduct unbecoming from retired generals.
BY ELIOT A. COHEN
Sunday, April 23, 2006 12:01 a.m. EDT
One could say much to defend Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld against the recent attacks of half a dozen retired generals--that the indictments are either old ("not enough troops," a trope from April 2003) or vague ("ignoring the Powell doctrine"), plodding ("violating the principles of war," a hazy collection of often-ignored, self-contradictory military platitudes), or downright silly (being disrespectful in meetings, as though generals would never, ever, be caught dressing down subordinates in front of their peers). Generals, one might note, may yield to vanity and pique, institutional parochialism and thwarted ambition, limited introspection and all the other foibles of proud men. One might, finally, observe that in the unhappy generals' account of Iraq there is no alternative strategy proposed, no fellow general held to account by name, scant acceptance of personal responsibility for what went awry on their watch, little repudiation of contrary statements made on active duty.
Still, let us stipulate, for the purpose of argument, elements of truth to their fundamental charge of strategic mismanagement, attribute to them only pure motives, and note that serious public figures--Sen. John McCain, chiefly--have indeed called for the beleaguered secretary's resignation, which he in turn, according to press reports, has twice offered the president, to no avail. Is this behavior on the part of the retired generals proper? After all, this is a politically cleaner deed than endorsing candidates for the presidency, a partisan act that meets the silent disapproval of most retired generals, who know that such behavior taints their reputations for politically neutral professionalism.
Even making these assumptions and conceding the narrowly defined nonpartisanship of these denunciations, for recently retired general officers to publicly denounce a sitting secretary of defense is wrong, destructive of good order and discipline in the armed forces, and prejudicial to functional civil-military relations. It is not the same thing as speaking candidly before Congress, telling all to civilian or military scholars collecting oral histories, or indeed writing one's own memoirs after the heat of contemporary passions has cooled, and the individuals in question have left public office. Rather, this kind of denunciation means leaping into a political fight, and tackling the civilians still charged with the nation's defense. Not the charges themselves, but the arrogation of responsibility is the problem: When things go wrong at the top the civilians should, no doubt, take the heat. But not this way.
Begin by noting that public denunciation will almost surely fail, because no president who thinks much of his role as commander in chief will throw the top Pentagon civilian overboard to please officers of any kind. If he did, he would establish the precedent that secretaries of defense serve at the pleasure of their subordinates, overturn the most fundamental feature of civilian control of the military, and neuter his own effectiveness in the conduct of national defense.
Even if ineffectual, however, these declarations do great harm. Retired generals never really leave the public service--that's why, after all, we still call them "general." They set examples for those junior to them in rank, and still on active duty. Imagine, for example, the disgruntled major in the Office of the Secretary of Defense deciding to subvert policy with which he disagrees by, say, leaking confidential memoranda to the press. "Not the same thing," one might respond, but remember that angry majors do not, for the most part, make discriminating moral philosophers. The retired generals have, in effect and perhaps unwittingly, made a case for disloyalty. Indeed, their most troubling belief is that an officer's civilian superiors--and the secretary of defense stands in the chain of command just below the president--do not merit the loyalty that they, as military superiors, would deserve and expect.
This controversy has already, predictably, produced anti-Rumsfeld generals and pro-Rumsfeld generals, as earlier controversies produced the pro- and anti-Clinton and pro- and anti-Bush generals. Such squabbling among flag officers brings discredit upon the lot. Furthermore, a politician who, after these and like events, does not think carefully about whether a military subordinate will likely turn on him the moment he takes off the uniform must be exceptionally naive. No matter how low an opinion a general has of politicians, he is a fool if he thinks them unaware of their own interests. And those interests will lead them to promote flunkies over the prickly but able officers they conceive themselves to be.
A general is equally a fool if he thinks he can engage in partisan polemic without becoming a political target, with all the miseries for himself, and degradation to his honor and profession, that that entails. Generals have not always enjoyed the high reputation for integrity, independence and dispassionate judgment they do today. That regard stems in large part from the example of soldiers such as Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, who held his tongue in public, even as he argued vehemently with (and often loathed) his president in private. Accustom the American people to the public sniping and bickering of generals, and generals will soon find that the respect on which they now count has evaporated.
Again, the civilians brought us to this, and in particular politicians of both parties manipulating soldiers as campaign props, and using disgruntled generals to badmouth a president of the opposing party. Democrats and Republicans alike have behaved disgracefully--and the generals are the only ones who can limit the damage. It remains up to them, no matter what, or how well grounded, their dismay about civilian leaders, to grit their teeth and maintain an honorable and discreet silence, leaving it to those responsibility it is--the president, the Congress and ultimately the voters--to decide whether and when a secretary of defense to leave his office.
Mr. Cohen is a professor at Johns Hopkins University and the author of "Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime" (Free Press, 2002).
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