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Politics : Don't Blame Me, I Voted For Kerry -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Dan B. who wrote (76095)5/3/2006 3:28:01 PM
From: OrcastraiterRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 81568
 
You'd obviously be surprised what I've read and understand on this subject

Not really. You've been duped, and you still think the trailers are mobile weapons labs...even after the official government determination is that they are not. Ah ha! My non-expert gut feeling was right. And you are wrong.

msnbc.msn.com

May 16: Secretary of State Colin Powell says he is "deeply disappointed" that much of the information he was given to present before the U.N. on Iraq before the war has turned out to be flawed.

In April, Powell used more vague language in discussing the intelligence that led him to believe the Iraqis had mobile biological weapons labs. “It appears not to be the case that it was that solid,” he said.

Current and former U.S. officials, including David Kay, the former chief weapons inspector in Iraq, have said that most of the evidence came from an Iraqi defector code-named “Curveball.”

According to newspaper accounts, U.S. officials didn't know the defector's name until after the war, when they learned that he was a brother of one of the top aides of Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi exile who was an important advocate for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

The Los Angeles Times reported in March that the most of the information about the supposed mobile laboratories was passed to the CIA by the German Intelligence Service (BND).

Kay has said that Curveball was a "downright swindler," and charged that the case suggested "a lack of due diligence and care" by U.S. officials.

In May 2003, the CIA said it had found two suspicious trucks in northern Iraq. The agency later backtracked, but some Bush administration officials continued to cite the discovery as supporting the prewar intelligence.

As recently as January, Vice President Dick Cheney referred to the trucks as "conclusive" proof that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destruction. But CIA Director George Tenet later testified to Congress that he had called Cheney to warn him that the evidence was in doubt.

**********************************************************

On May 29, 2003, 50 days after the fall of Baghdad, President Bush proclaimed a fresh victory for his administration in Iraq: Two small trailers captured by U.S. and Kurdish troops had turned out to be long-sought mobile "biological laboratories." He declared, "We have found the weapons of mass destruction."

The claim, repeated by top administration officials for months afterward, was hailed at the time as a vindication of the decision to go to war. But even as Bush spoke, U.S. intelligence officials possessed powerful evidence that it was not true.

A secret fact-finding mission to Iraq -- not made public until now -- had already concluded that the trailers had nothing to do with biological weapons. Leaders of the Pentagon-sponsored mission transmitted their unanimous findings to Washington in a field report on May 27, 2003, two days before the president's statement.

The three-page field report and a 122-page final report three weeks later were stamped "secret" and shelved. Meanwhile, for nearly a year, administration and intelligence officials continued to publicly assert that the trailers were weapons factories.

The authors of the reports were nine U.S. and British civilian experts -- scientists and engineers with extensive experience in all the technical fields involved in making bioweapons -- who were dispatched to Baghdad by the Defense Intelligence Agency for an analysis of the trailers. Their actions and findings were described to a Washington Post reporter in interviews with six government officials and weapons experts who participated in the mission or had direct knowledge of it.

washingtonpost.com

Go on being mislead. It fits you well.

Orca