IRAN
The Realists vs. the Ideologues
"Almost from the beginning of Bush's presidency," two groups within the administration -- realists seeking to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, and ideologues more interested in regime change -- have been "waging an intense struggle over Iran, while the U.S. government went month after month without an official policy." Coupled with the fallout of the Iraq war, the administration's policy paralysis not only weakened the hand of the United States, but facilitated an historic expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East. Now after over five years of scatter shot strategy, the realists may have gained an upper hand. In an "historic about-face" marking the "biggest foreign policy shift" of the Bush presidency, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced this week that the United States is willing to engage in direct negotiations with Iran, provided several preconditions are met. Moreover, the United States and five major world powers agreed yesterday "to offer Iran 'far-reaching proposals' that would 'bring significant benefits' if it halts its drive to master nuclear power." Though many experts doubt whether the new U.S. offer will be sufficient, these shifts are a significant and welcome sign. Two critical variables remain, however: Does the Bush administration truly want to make diplomacy work? Does the Iranian administration truly want to make diplomacy work? Both variables are unknown, as both governments have factions fighting for control of policy.
ADMINISTRATION LOST YEARS OF OPPORTUNITIES: "Repeatedly -- and most dramatically and explicitly in 2003 -- overtures from Tehran were extended to the administration, and the administration rejected them." In Oct. 2004, the Washington Post reported that the White House had "left three secret overtures from Tehran unanswered and a presidential directive on Iran unsigned after 31 months of drafting attempts." In the spring of 2003, Iranian officials "not only proposed to negotiate with the Bush administration on its nuclear program and its support for terrorists but also offered concrete concessions that went very far toward meeting U.S. concerns." (Read the full text of the offer.) The Bush administration's failure to capitalize on these opportunities has undermined the U.S. negotiation position. For instance, in 2003, Iran did not possess a functioning centrifuge cascade capable of producing enriched uranium; now it does, and one precondition for the United States to join direct negotiations is that Iran suspend its enrichment processes. In other words, because of the delay, the cost of merely approaching the bargaining table has increased.
CONSERVATIVES STILL SET ON REGIME CHANGE: Administration officials involved in the decision to shift the Iran strategy question "whether this was an offer intended to fail, devised to show the extent of Iran's intransigence." Noting the long-standing opposition to engagement by administration hawks, one former Bush official said "it came down to convincing Cheney and others that if we are going to confront Iran, we first have to check off the box" of trying talks. On Wednesday, U.N. Ambassador John Bolton explicitly said that unilateral military action was still "on the table," and added diplomatically, "This is put up or shut up time for Iran." The National Review editorialized that the offer of direct talks merely "affords an incremental measure of diplomatic cover should the use of force prove necessary," and concluded: "If this offer is the prelude to a decisive confrontation, so be it. Otherwise, we have made a mistake."
FACT CHECK -- 'IRAN IS TOO RADICAL FOR DIPLOMACY': Conventional thinking holds that under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a virulently anti-Semitic hardliner, "Tehran’s nuclear decisions are made by a narrow cadre of conservatives, determined to acquire the bomb. But in reality a subtle but real debate has broken out within the theocratic regime on how to proceed." Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of the powerful Expediency Council, said at a rally in February that "instead of relying on strength, we must try to fix the situation wisely," while a former speaker of Parliament told demonstrators that Iran must "try to adopt dialogue and act wisely." These pragmatists, aided by like-minded officials in Iran's diplomatic corps, have the potential to moderate Iran's policy and steer the nation away from nuclear weapons. Even among everyday Iranians, support for developing nuclear power is becoming "tempered by growing misgivings about the cost" to the country's economy and global reputation. The question remains whether moderates in the United States and Iran will gain influence at the same time.
FACT CHECK -- 'NOTHING CAN DETER IRAN FROM THE BOMB': During the 2004 presidential race, Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) urged the Bush administration to call Iran's bluff and offer it remote access to nuclear fuel "to test whether Iran was serious about pursuing a peaceful nuclear energy program." Rice responded to Kerry's proposal on Fox News: "This regime has to be isolated in its bad behavior, not quote-unquote 'engaged.'" Clearly Rice has had a change of heart. A draft of the U.S.-backed proposal announced yesterday "offers help in 'the building of new light-water reactors in Iran,' offers an assured supply of nuclear fuel for up to five years, and asks Tehran to accept a plan that would move its enrichment program to Russia." The reason for the incentives is simple: Iran must be persuaded from "abandoning the same nuclear option that India, Pakistan and Israel have successfully chosen," as Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations writes. "Only an array of incentives will allow Iran’s leaders to justify suspending the program in the face of nationalistic public opinion, aroused in no small degree by continual US threats."
FACT CHECK -- 'NEGOTIATIONS REWARD BAD BEHAVIOR': As President Bush's former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage said recently, "[D]iplomacy is not simply meant for our friends. It is meant for our enemies. … In fact, our enemies need diplomatic engagement more. We ought to have sufficient self-confidence in the correctness of our policy and the ability of our diplomats." Parallels have been drawn between the letter sent by President Ahmadinejad to President Bush last month and a letter sent to President Kennedy by Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev 44 years ago in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis. Both letters had "the appearances of an emotional, ideological rant, worthy of prompt dismissal." Yet President Kennedy recognized that the Khrushchev letter's "most significant feature was not what it said or did not say, but that it was sent at all," and Kennedy used the opening to help avert nuclear destruction. Likewise, "even Ronald Reagan negotiated arms reductions with 'The Evil Empire' itself, the Soviet Union, as well as with Communist China," demonstrating "the wisdom of trying to avoid disaster in the short term, so that in the long term the historic expansion of democracy has time enough to play itself out." As President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate."
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