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Politics : I Will Continue to Continue, to Pretend.... -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/8/2006 6:42:35 AM
From: Sully-	Read Replies (7) \| Respond to of 35834

OK, how many hours will it be before some leftist claims that the Al-Zarqawi news is BS put out there to get Haditha off the front pages?

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/8/2006 6:48:38 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Al Qaeda Leaders Are Going to be Even More Depressed Betsy's Page Two months ago we captured documents in Iraq from an Al Qaeda leader bemoaning how difficult things had gotten for them in Iraq. The author acknowledged that Al Qaeda could do no more than be a "daily annoyance." <<< It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. >>> The author fretted about the difficulties Al Qaeda had in organizing and leading attacks in Iraq. <<< There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations >>> Well, that leadership is going to be in a tougher place now. When they realize that someone they know rolled over on Zarqawi, they're going to all start suspecting each other and have a harder time organizing themselves. And other Iraqis are going to be more willing to turn in the insurgents as they gain more confidence in the Iraq government. The one really strong weapon that Al Qaeda has in Iraq is the ability to kill a bunch of civilians and then use the media to spread terror. In other words, they are using the media as one of their weapons of terror. <<< The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction. >>> Of course, we haven't seen much talk on the media analyzing their own role as a strategic part of Al Qaeda's terror policy. The media loves to have navel-gazing symposia all the time about how they're doing their job, and love talking about how dangerous it is for the journalists reporting in Iraq, which it certainly is, but little discussion of how the terrorists have been killing people especially to get media coverage. Captain Ed had an extensive analysis of this captured Al Qaeda document a month ago and had a lot more , but I thought the self-acknowledged weakness of Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to be revisited in light of Zarqawi's death. You'll see a lot of people on the media and politicians talking today about how this doesn't mean the end of the terror in Iraq, and that is true. But it is one more sign of how weakened they are. betsyspage.blogspot.com centcom.mil captainsquartersblog.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/8/2006 7:24:47 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Watch Zarqawi Receive Justice Betsy's Page You can watch the video of Zarqawi's no good, horrible, very bad day. youtube.com betsyspage.blogspot.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/9/2006 1:00:27 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

More Zarqawi Fallout Power Line Our friend Tom Bevan of Real Clear Politics wrote to point out this excellent analysis of the impact of Zarqawi's demise by Peter Wehner. Here are a couple of excerpts: <<< What happened in Iraq yesterday was not only a severe blow to al Qaeda and Islamic fascism, it was also an important moral moment. A man of almost incomprehensible cruelty and savagery has met his end; his days of orchestrating murders, beheadings, car bombings, and assassinations are over. The death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi also underscores the difficulty al Qaeda terrorists have been encountering in Iraq. Most of the media narrative about Iraq has been on the difficulties the United States faces. Those difficulties are real -- but they are far from the full story. What goes almost unnoticed is the enormous series of body blows our enemies have sustained. We have by now intercepted several key communications among terrorists in Iraq over the years -- and we keep learning about their despair at the progress of democracy and their unhappiness with the course of events. The death of Mr. Zarqawi will add immeasurably to their troubles. >>> It's reported that immediately after Zarqawi's house was bombed, Iraqi and American forces carried out 17 simultaneous raids on terrorists in the Baghdad area. Local commanders have said that our soldiers recovered a "treasure trove" of information from Zarqawi's house in documents and on computer hard drives. That's probably true, although it could also be misinformation intended to demoralize and disrupt the terrorists. (Likewise with the claim that we got a tip from inside al Qaeda's organization.) In any event, with 17 more raids on top of Zarqawi's not-so-safe house, we no doubt did recover lots of actionable information. So the fallout will continue for weeks to come. powerlineblog.com realclearpolitics.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/9/2006 2:59:58 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Day by Day Chris Muir daybydaycartoon.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/9/2006 3:11:31 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Message From Above By Forkum Cox & Forkum coxandforkum.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/9/2006 9:38:00 PM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

ZARQAWI, KA-POWEE: A WIN FOR THE HOME FRONT NEW YORK Post Opinion June 9, 2006 THE killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi yesterday was enormously important, and not only because al Qaeda lost its longtime leader in Iraq and the insurgency lost its chief strategist. This action, taken in the midst of this highly unusual war, was the equivalent of a victory in a major battle in a more conventional conflict. A country can win battles and lose wars, as the voices of gloom were already reminding us only minutes after the announcement of Zarqawi's demise. But wars can't be won unless battles are won. American forces have won battles during the Iraq war - to name just two, the takeover of Fallujah and the roust-out of terrorists from the town of Tal Afar. But since our objective in this war is not to take and hold territory or advance geographically, these victories have seemed isolated and therefore haven't taken hold of the public imagination. And one reason it is so important to win battles is to give heart to the public at home and give them a sense that the sacrifices are not being made in vain - that we can and will win in the end. Another reason Fallujah and Tal Afar didn't do much to stir public opinion is that the nature of the battlefield is hard to understand. After all, our war is not with the people of Iraq but with terrorists who are trying to halt the political progress of that shattered country. So we are defending Iraqis while killing other Iraqis - as well as foreigners like Zarqawi who have taken up the cause of jihad there. And our soldiers are not being killed in battle - in the manner history has taught us is the noble death of the warrior - but as they drive down roads. These acts of assassination seem so pointless and random that they suggest our soldiers are getting injured and dying for no reason, in circumstances that smack of the grossest futility. The killing of Zarqawi is therefore a key moment in this war because it is a visible, comprehensible marker of progress against the terrorists in Iraq. For three years now, we've been told that things are getting better - with elections conducted, areas calmed and a million Iraqis moved from exile back home to help bring about a new future for their country. But why wasn't the terrorism letting up? The Bush administration would warn, properly, that around every milestone moment and every effort to move toward democracy, terrorism would increase. But one could hardly fault the American people for wondering about the purpose of this whole business as this progress-equals-more-terrorism formula continued to hold true. If good news only led to more killings and more death, what good could come of it? Now, finally, there is some plain reason for hope. Wars are not machines that run by themselves. They are planned by generals and strategists. Whatever happens from here on in will have to happen without the man who wrote the enemy's audacious playbook for fighting the insurgent war in Iraq - a playbook that included the strategy of killing Shiites indiscriminately in hopes of provoking a civil war. Zarqawi may have trained his adjutants well. Maybe they can pick up where he left off with no difficulty. But that's by no means a sure thing. And more heartening is the news that at the same moment Zarqawi was hit, U.S. forces staged 17 simultaneous raids against al Qaeda/insurgent targets in and around Baghdad. Major Gen. Bill Caldwell told reporters, "In those 17 raids last night, a tremendous amount of information and intelligence was collected and is presently being exploited and utilized for further use. I mean, it was a treasure trove, no question." With their general gone, their safehouses destroyed and their future plans possibly exposed, the insurgents are in some trouble. They aren't defeated by any means. But they are impaired. And now the American people have something to grab onto that may help make the war in Iraq seem winnable - a clear victory against an unambiguous, unmistakable evil. jpodhoretz@gmail.com nypost.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/13/2006 1:19:56 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

Is the AP now in the business of reporting anything anyone says about any event without doing some rudimentary investigation first? We call that gossip, not news, and we expect better than a National Enquirer standard at the AP. Zarqawi Said Beaten To Death By Witness Who Could Not Have Seen It By Captain Ed on War on Terror Captain's Quarters The AP has caused quite a stir today by publishing an uncorroborated account by a supposed eyewitness to the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The witness, identified as Mohammed, says that Americans beat and stomped Zarqawi until blood flowed from his nose and he died: <<< The Iraqi, identified only as Mohammed, said he lives near the house where al-Zarqawi was killed. He said residents put a bearded man in an ambulance before U.S. forces arrived. "When the Americans arrived they took him out of the ambulance, they beat him on his stomach and wrapped his head with his dishdasha, then they stomped on his stomach and his chest until he died and blood came out of his nose," Mohammed said, without saying how he knew the man was dead. >>> Interesting. Of course, Reuters reported earlier tonight that the house could not be seen from any of the local houses, screened off from the roads and other dwellings by the palm groves that hid it from prying eyes: [T]he house where al-Zarqawi last lived was extremely isolated. It was surrounded by thick palm groves that hid it from mud and cement houses a few hundred yards away. The site is also well hidden from the main road 400 yards away, which cuts through lush green flatlands. Finding it must have required precise intelligence. The U.S. military has spoken of a painstaking process, including human sources and electronic surveillance, that led them to the house. So picture this mission as the Americans and Iraqis on the ground must have conceived it. They need to attack a well-hidden house in the middle of a palm grove in Baquba in a way that ensures the occupants cannot escape if the bombing fails to kill them. They know exactly where this house is, drop two bombs on it -- and then wait around for the locals to rush into a house they cannot see to dig the bodies out? And having done that, the American soldiers then get around to arriving on scene without any concern about whether their quarry may have escaped, pull Zarqawi out of an ambulance where he is secured, and beat him to death in front of the witnesses? Uh-huh. The logistics of the site appear determinative that the residents of the village could not have seen any of what transpired at the safe house. The sequence of events show that the US had timed their raid for maximum security and efficiency, and that the ground forces of Iraqi and American troops would have acted immediately to secure this very remote site to ensure no one escaped. The AP apparently didn't read the Reuters description of the attack site before publishing this uncorroborated account of a supposed atrocity. Is the AP now in the business of reporting anything anyone says about any event without doing some rudimentary investigation first? We call that gossip, not news, and we expect better than a National Enquirer standard at the AP. captainsquartersblog.com news.yahoo.com msnbc.msn.com

To: Sully- who wrote (20499)	6/13/2006 3:04:55 AM
From: Sully-	Respond to of 35834

The Beat Didn't Go On By Captain Ed on War on Terror Captain's Quarters Contrary to the AP's uncorroborated witness who claimed that American servicemen beat Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to death, an autopsy performed on his corpse reveals that the al-Qaeda leader died from injuries consistent with close encounters to two 500-lb bombs. This should put an end to a very strange episode where people accused soldiers of murdering a man by beating him instead of blowing him up: <<< Abu Musab al-Zarqawi lived for 52 minutes after a U.S. warplane bombed his hideout northeast of Baghdad, and he died of extensive internal injuries consistent with those caused by a bomb blast, the U.S. military said Monday. Col. Steve Jones, command surgeon for Multinational Forces, said an autopsy concluded that the terrorist leader died from serious injuries to his lungs. An FBI test positively identified al-Zarqawi's remains. ... "Blast waves from the two bombs caused tearing, bruising of the lungs and bleeding," he said. "There was no evidence of firearm injuries." The al Qaeda in Iraq leader also suffered head and facial wounds, bleeding in his ears and a fracture of his lower right leg. >>> Now that we have that information, perhaps someone can explain what the fuss was all about. Zarqawi never operated within the rules of war, and also did not surrender. When faced with such an enemy in the field, soldiers kill them rather than attempt an arrest. Had they discovered that Zarqawi had survived the explosion and could still present a danger, they would either shoot him or attempt to capture him, depending on their orders. If the latter was the case, the methods used to restrain Zarqawi would appear rough and violent -- and since this isn't a law-enforcement exercise, such tactics in handling an enemy would not be out of place. As it stands, though, the entire story has now been discredited. Now we must ask the AP about their witness and their decision to publish the uncorroborated story. Based on the descriptions of the site and its remarkable isolation, the AP should have treated "Mohammed's" story with considerable skepticism. Without having any sort of corroboration, the editors need to weigh the informative value of the story against the damage done to the soldiers involved and the military as a whole by promulgating what amounted to gossip and conspiracy theorizing. Since the entire point of war is to kill one's enemy -- and no one doubted that Zarqawi qualified as such -- the publishing of this story under the circumstances is indefensible. The AP owes its readers an apology and a retraction. Will we get either? Doubtful. We must maintain the level of skepticism that the AP itself failed to keep in this instance. Unlike with the US military, we have a long history of transgressions with the AP on its reporting for our assumptions. captainsquartersblog.com captainsquartersblog.com cnn.com