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Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Ilaine who wrote (169664)	6/12/2006 10:28:40 PM
From: D. Long	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 794534

No less than George Tenet, former Director of the CIA, says that both the CIA and the State Department disputed claims that Saddam was attempting to purchase yellowcake in Niger, more than Iraq had already acquired, was already known to the UN weapons inspectors, and was, in fact, under lock and key That is not the substance of Tenet's statement. Tenet stated, in the link you provided, that a "former official" (ie Joe Wilson) contacted Nigerian officials who said that Iraq inquired about "expanding commercial relations", taken to mean obtaining uranium. The CIA felt this was not definite enough, and that is why it was excluded from briefings to Congress, and why it should not have been included, in Tenet's opinion, in the State of the Union. CIA also chose not to be as confident as British intelligence on the matter. British intelligence was confident. The alleged Nigerian uranium is separate from the issue of the existing 550 tons of yellowcake known to inspectors. The Niger uranium was sought in 1999 - when inspectors were not in Iraq. The above is plain from the link you provided, CB. Tenet did not say CIA and State "disputed" claims, Tenet says CIA did not feel the claims were definite enough. Big diff. Derek

To: Ilaine who wrote (169664)	6/13/2006 7:29:34 AM
From: kech	Respond to of 794534

Tenet and the CIA can say something shouldn't have been in a speech for a lot of reasons. Indeed it might even be the case that it shouldn't be in unless it can be proven to be 100% correct. But saying it should be dropped is not the same as saying that something didn't happen. Now turn to the front page of the June 28 Financial Times for a report from the paper's national security correspondent, Mark Huband. He describes a strong consensus among European intelligence services that between 1999 and 2001 Niger was engaged in illicit negotiations over the export of its "yellow cake" uranium ore with North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and China. The British intelligence report on this matter, once cited by President Bush, has never been disowned or withdrawn by its authors. The bogus document produced by an Italian con man in October 2002, which has caused such embarrassment, was therefore more like a forgery than a fake: It was a fabricated version of a true bill. Given the CIA's institutional hostility to the "regime change" case, the blatantly partisan line taken in public by Wilson himself, and the high probability that an Iraqi delegation had at least met with suppliers from Niger, how wrong was it of Robert Novak to draw attention to the connection between Plame and Wilson's trip? Or of someone who knew of it to tell Novak? slate.com Even Wilson acknowledged in his classified report that a trade delegation from Iraq had come to Niger in 1988. After eight days in the Niger capital of Niamey (where he once served), Wilson made an oral report in Langley that an Iraqi uranium purchase was "highly unlikely," though he also mentioned in passing that a 1988 Iraqi delegation tried to establish commercial contacts. CIA officials did not regard Wilson's intelligence as definitive, being based primarily on what the Niger officials told him and probably would have claimed under any circumstances. The CIA report of Wilson's briefing remains classified. townhall.com