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To: Sully- who wrote (21209)7/5/2006 9:50:34 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Mobile Labs Could Not Have Produced Hydrogen As Described, Part I

By Captain Ed on Iraq
Captain's Quarters

In Part I of ChemicalConsultant's analysis of the mobile weapons laboratories, he calls into question the CIA's calculations of the production capability of the facilities described. In his calculations, he posits that these mobile facilities could not have produced the hydrogen necessary for the mission the CIA claims.

1. The reaction to produce hydrogen gas from aluminum, sodium hydroxide is:

2Al(s) +2NaOH (aq) +6H2O-> 2Na+ (aq) + 2[Al(OH)4]- +3H2 (g)
This means that it takes 80 grams of NaOH (molecular weight about 40) to make 6 grams of H2 (molecular weight about 2) and uses 54 grams of Al (atomic weight about 27) in the process. On a kilogram basis, 1 kg NaOH makes 6/80 = 0.075 kg or 75 g H2 and uses 54/80 = 0.675 kg or 675 g Al.

My reference is www.webelements.com/webelements/elements/text/Al/chem.html.

2. According to the Fast Facts link on the website of a major hydrogen producer, 1 kg of hydrogen gas at 1 atmosphere at 70o F occupies 11.986 cubic meters (m3) or 1 m3 weighs 1/ 11.896 = 0.084 kg or 84 g.

My reference is www.airproducts.com/products/fastfacts/charts_n_tables/32100/hydrogen.asp. Please note that the spaces on either side of n are underlined.

3. The Iraqi Survey Group Final Report, Annex D, Biological Weapons

Process Description section, states that “This is a batch process designed to produce sufficient H2 to fill 5x40l bottles to a pressure of between 40-50 bar”. This is equivalent to 50x5x40l =10,000 liters or 10 m3 at atmospheric pressure. Thus, from 2. , 0.84 kg of hydrogen must be produced. The next sentence in Process Description; the report states “This requires 10-12 kg of Aluminum powder, 1-1.5 kg flaked/ granulated NaOH, and 25-30 liters of water.” 1 kg of NaOH would only make 0.075 kg. However, from 1. , what is actually needed is 0.84/0.075 = 11.2 kg NaOH, using up 7.56 kg aluminum.

4. At first I thought that there might have been a typo. I went back to the Process Outline section of the report which described the purported Russian system which is one tenth the volume of the Iraqi reactor. I found that the ratio of reagents for the Russian system is the same as the report states for the Iraqi system. Thus the 100 g or 0.1 kg NaOH would only make 7.5 g hydrogen instead of the 84 g needed for the 1 m3 balloon. How is it that the “experts” who wrote the report and those who approved it did not catch these errors?

In part II tomorrow, ChemicalConsultant talks about how the residue in the mobile labs should not have been present and appear to be a deliberate ruse. He also shows how the formulas used for the Duelfer analysis would have produced hydrogen so impure as to be useless.

captainsquartersblog.com

webelements.com

airproducts.com

cia.gov



To: Sully- who wrote (21209)7/5/2006 10:33:40 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Mobile Labs Could Not Have Produced Hydrogen As Described, Part II

By Captain Ed on Iraq
Captain's Quarters

In Part II of ChemicalConsultant's analysis, he addresses the residue left in the mobile labs and the quality of hydrogen assumed in the CIA's explanation of the hydrogen production explanation.

5. I am surprised that both the Iraqi and “Russian” systems use an excess of aluminum instead of an excess of sodium hydroxide. Since the product sodium aluminate is soluble in water at the amount of water used (see the Handbook of Chemistry and Physics), there would be almost no residue if there were an excess of sodium hydroxide relative to aluminum. There is no explanation why so much aluminum would be used, especially when using excess sodium hydroxide would mean that the tank would only need to be washed out, instead of removing an alleged residue. Once it became apparent that the trailers were in danger of being captured, I think the Iraqis put the described residue in the reactor.

6. The Process Description describes how the solids are added, the reactor sealed and then water is added. Since only 25-30 liters are added and the useable capacity is given as 633 liters (see Comment and assessment- Reactor capacity), there are 600 liters of space occupied by air above the reactants. Air Products data for nitrogen (MW= 28) close to air (effective MW =29) show that 1 m3 weighs 1 kg/ 0.862 m3 = 1.16 kg so 600 liters of air weighs about 1.16x0.6 = about 700 g. Thus, if the actual amount of hydrogen were made to fill the 5 bottles to 50 bar (this means not following the Process Description but rather the amount I calculated in the last sentence of 4.), the mix pumped into them would be 0.84/ (0.7+0.84) = about 55% by weight hydrogen. This would substantially lower the buoyancy of the balloons reducing the weight of instruments that could be carried by the radiosonde balloon. Furthermore, no explanation is given for why only 10% of the available reaction volume was used.

7. In the Process Trials section the report claims that a 2.5-3.3 m3 balloon was inflated from the 5 cylinders filled to a pressure of 50 bar. The Iraqis deserve the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for making 0.21-0.26 kg of hydrogen using 1-1.5 kg of NaOH! Even if the bottles were really filled only with hydrogen at 50 bar, only 3 to 4 balloons could be filled and then the more than 3 hour process would have to start again. On the other hand, one standard industrial gas cylinder filled to standard commercial pressure would fill two balloons. Since these cylinders have been available for decades, I find it hard to believe that there have been nothing like them available in Iraq. Iraqi refineries could produce hydrogen, either as a byproduct, by cracking a refinery liquid or gas or reacting petroleum coke, another refinery product with steam. Coke gas was used for observation balloons in the US Civil War. 20th Century technology removes the impurities in coke gas leaving nearly pure hydrogen.

The Notes on the Process section states the target purity for the hydrogen product is 99.9%. This is impossible with the on-site process unless those Nobel Prize nominee Iraqis also converted nitrogen into hydrogen while the gases were going from the reactor to the cylinders. The target purity is routinely achieved by conventional hydrogen manufacture which is probably where the Republican Guard got their specification. Maybe this is the hint that conventionally manufactured hydrogen was available in Iraq. Also, since Russia has modern chemical technology, I’m surprised nobody asked the Iraqis why the Russians would have made a small water dependent hydrogen production system. Such a reactor couldn’t work in most of Russia for a large part of the year because the water would freeze.

In Part III tomorrow, ChemicalConsultant addresses the engineering of the mobile labs in relation to the hydrogen production explanation, as well as the folly of using these facilities instead of simply buying trucks to transport prefilled containers of hydrogen.

captainsquartersblog.com



To: Sully- who wrote (21209)7/5/2006 10:46:08 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
A Brief Aside On Mobile Labs

By Captain Ed on Iraq
Captain's Quarters

George at Seixon has followed my posts about the mobile laboratories that the CIA and the Iraqi Survey Group now insist were designed for hydrogen production. I'll post Part III of ChemicalConsultant's critique of that analysis later tonight, but George has a few pertinent questions of his own. Besides the fact that Iraq's oil refineries could have produced all the high-quality hydrogen needed for any meteorological needs, George points out that the Iraqis had already bought several mobile production facilities abroad, and at a much lower cost:


<<< The simplest question one could have asked would be whether or not Iraq was able to easily obtain hydrogen generators rather than having to fabricate their own. Many have scoffed at this question, claiming that Iraq was so bogged down with sanctions that they probably had to make do with DIY solutions. A lazy assumption will often lead to a wrongheaded conclusion, and in this case, quite horrendously wrong. One only needs to comb through the Oil for Food Program Distribution Plans to find a most inconvenient fact that would seem to blow the whole story out of the water.

In January 2000 during Phase VII, the UN approved the delivery of one 1 m3/hour electrolytic hydrogen generator (07-30-01065), in addition to 2500 meteorological balloons of various sizes ranging from 10g to 1000g (07-30-01064). During Phase VIII in July 2000, the UN approved the delivery of two 3 m3/hour electrolytic hydrogen generators (07-55-01143), in addition to 2000 weather balloons (07-55-01145). February 2001, during Phase IX, the UN approved the delivery of two 3 m3/hour electrolytic hydrogen generators complete with spares, installation materials, and consumables for 5 years (07-55-00017). Also approved were 100 3KVA electric gasoline generators (07-55-00016) and an assortment of weather balloons. In August 2001, for Phase X, the UN approved five 3 m3/hour electrolytic hydrogen generators with consumables for 5 years, 100 more electric generators, and more weather balloons. The same order was approved in January 2002 for Phase XI. For June 2002 during Phase XII, three more hydrogen generators, 100 more electric generators, and of course more balloons. The itemized list for January 2003 and Phase XIII, the last phase of the program, is not available on the Oil for Food website.

From Phase VII through Phase XII a total of 17 electrolytic hydrogen generators were approved for sale to Iraq under the Oil for Food Program. One of these produced 1 m3/hour, while the remaining 16 produced 3 m3/hour. By comparison, the supposed setup for the production of hydrogen in the (mobile lab) trailers would produce considerably less than 3 m3/hour, according to the Duelfer report’s analysis of the documentation provided by the Iraqis. The exact production rate is never specified in the report, only that half the process of filling up 10 m3 on the tanks (5 x 40l x 50 bar) would take 3 hours, for an estimated 1.7 m3/hour production rate.

With these facts, which have most likely never been revealed until now, it would seem that Dr. David Kay may have been more right than wrong in suggesting the notion of hydrogen production to have been a rather silly one. Why would the Iraqis go to so much trouble to fabricate large, inefficient, road-bound hydrogen generators when they already had access to and could order smaller, efficient, portable systems? In fact, the Iraqis were importing and ordering hydrogen generators far more suitable for their needs while building the (mobile lab) trailers. The preponderance of evidence suggests that the Iraqis had no reason to create these systems to produce hydrogen, and evaded UN inspection of these vehicles, with a cover story on the shelf in case they were ever found. >>>

Indeed. George wrote this post three months ago, and it covers much more than just this question. In fact, George reminds us that the al-Kindi facility's main purpose was missile development, not meteorological research. Why did Iraq need to build these superfluous and much less efficient mobile hydrogen generators at the same place they developed missiles -- which could conceivably carry CW and BW warheads?

Many questions remain about these mobile laboratories, and the official ISG explanation -- which David Kay called "the silliest one" -- does not begin to answer them.

captainsquartersblog.com

seixon.com

edition.cnn.com



To: Sully- who wrote (21209)7/6/2006 12:39:04 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Mobile Labs Could Not Have Produced Hydrogen As Described, Part III, And Rebuttal

By Captain Ed on Iraq
Captain's Quarters

In the final installment of ChemicalConsultant's analysis, he addresses the engineering of the mobile labs in relation to the hydrogen production explanation, as well as the folly of using these (outrageously expensive - ed) facilities instead of simply buying trucks to transport prefilled containers of hydrogen. He also provides a rebuttal to comments made in the thread for Part I.

8. A bank of 5 Air Storage Cylinders is reported in the Major Components of the Trailers section. These serve no purpose for making hydrogen, although Annex D suggests that perhaps they were used as a source of sparging gas (see Comment and Assessment, Aeration and stirring). The investigators do point out that the sparging tube is too short to reach the alleged reaction liquid. Even if the tube were long enough, the air would dilute the hydrogen produced. Also mentioned in the Major Components section are two feed tanks. If the trailers were really used for making hydrogen, these would be unnecessary since water could be monitored and fed directly from the main water tank.

9. Annex D does not report whether the Iraqis ever explained why a mobile system would be preferable to using only pre filled cylinders. Instead of wasting space with a reaction system, 10 or more cylinders could be easily cushioned to be driven over rough terrain and used to fill at least 20 2.5 m3 balloons far more rapidly, thus decreasing the system vulnerability in a combat situation.

10. I have also read an article from The Observer, June 15, 2003 which quoted an “experienced” observer, Martin Furmanski. He claimed that large numbers of balloon launches are required to collect meteorological data for unguided rockets and field artillery. He also claimed that typical balloons require 4 m3 of hydrogen. The alleged Iraqi process takes 3 hours (see Process Description) to miraculously make 10 m3 from 1 kg of sodium hydroxide. This means that supposedly three hours are spent out in the field, then, even if 10 m3 were produced, less than 3 balloons are filled and then the process is repeated. Sounds hard to get large numbers of launches this way.

Mr. Furmanski also mentions the Marconi Military Meteorological System manufactured in the UK, reportedly purchased by Iraq in 1985. Back in 2003, I found a link on the Marconi website to this equipment. Regrettably, I failed to print it out at the time, but as I recall, it made no mention of in-field hydrogen production. The photos didn’t show any of the equipment that appeared in Annex D. Marconi also claimed that the balloons could be filled within 20 minutes and then the mobile unit could move elsewhere. That would only be consistent with pre filled hydrogen cylinders.

Rebuttal For Part 1 Comments

Thanks [to Dave] for providing the links to the two patents you cited in your response to my Part I. Some of us 120 year olds like to keep up with what’s going on. I did take a look at the 2003 patent application which you say deals with the same process as the 1909 patent.

Lines 29 through 41, p1, of the 1909 patent describe mixing molten caustic soda (NaOH) with finely divided aluminum. Claim 7 of the patent, lines 24 through 29, p 2, of this patent says that the ratio of caustic soda molecules relative to aluminum ranges from one to three, i.e. an excess of soda. The 2003 patent application (which became a patent later) involves adding small amount of aluminum to a strong caustic solution stepwise until the aluminum is in excess. Is it ok if I tell your boss at the chemical outfit where I assume you work that you view these as the same process?

You and Simon666 didn’t seem to note the typo in the 2003 application, section 0055, You, Simon and the Andersens wrote the equation as

2Al + 6H20 -> Al 2 (OH)3 +3H2

Back in 1909 when I learned how to balance chemical equations I was told that if you have 12 H and 6 O on the left side you are supposed to have the same on the right, not 9 H and 6 O. The compound that’s being made is alumina trihydrate (tri as in three) so you should have had 2 Al(OH)3 on the right.

The 2003 application is quite interesting so I will be following up with a detailed analysis. In brief I would like to point out that the Andersens in part claim that it is essential for add the aluminum and possibly water stepwise for the “catalytic” process to work whereas the Al Kindi process described in the Iraq Survey Group Final Report (i.e the Duelfer report) annex mixes aluminum and NaOH dry, then adds water.

ChemicalConsultant is reviewing the comments on all of the threads and may present further arguments in the coming days.

captainsquartersblog.com



To: Sully- who wrote (21209)7/17/2006 11:25:43 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
ChemicalConsultant's Answers

By Captain Ed on Iraq
Captain's Quarters

CQ's correspondent on the mobile laboratories, ChemicalConsultant, has sent a reply to the questions and the criticisms that he received on the earlier thread. That debate was one of the most intriguing we have had on CQ, and revealed a few of our regulars as having expertise in chemistry. I closed the earlier thread because it had dwindled down to a back-and-forth volley between two readers, but the debate remains as interesting as ever. ChemicalConsultant has a fairly technical argument, and it's above my pay grade, although my son would probably be able to make more sense of it. I'd love to get more of the scientific input that we saw in our earlier thread and put aside the more political aspects.

<<< RESPONSE ON ALUMINUM –NaOH CHEMISTRY

In case the commenters on the Mobile Labs, etc, thread wondered what happened to ChemicalConsultant, well, I’m back. Part of my absence was due to having some paying chemical consulting to do. I also decided to dig deeper into the complex matter of aluminate chemistry.

(a)First let’s review dave’s and Simon666’s comments:

“As Simon pointed out, ChemicalConsultant is using a simplified formula for a complex reaction and drawing conclusions from it that have been proven to be wrong. Back when this type of reaction was first patented, the reaction was described in an equation similar to what ChemicalConsultant uses. See this patent description.

This patent is from 1909. Chemical knowledge has advanced since then. Take a look at this patent from 2003, which deals with the same process.

Starting with section [0053] the chemistry of the process is explained. As Simon said, the reaction is best represented by the following equations:

2Al + 3H2O > Al2O3 + 3H2 (1)
and
2Al + 6H2O > Al2(OH)3 + 3H2 (2)

These equations show that sodium hydroxide is not consumed in the reaction. Earlier patents by Belitskus (1970) and Stockburger (1992) also contain equations that show that sodium hydroxide is not consumed. SODIUM HYDROXIDE IS CATALYTIC. Starting in section [0060], several experiments are done to PROVE that sodium hydroxide is catalytic. “

(b) I agree that the reaction is complex. Here are the equations used by Stockburger and Belitkus according to paragraph 0057, p 3, of AA:

2 Na+ + 2 Al + 2 OH- + 6 H2O ? 2 Na+ + 2 Al(OH)4- + 3 H2 (3)
and
2 Na+ + 2 Al(OH)4- ? 2 Na+ + OH- + 2 Al(OH)3?. (4)

Also, reaction 4 does not go to completion; only a portion of the aluminate disproportionates to alumina trihydrate (ATH). I learned about the non-completion of reaction 4 when my employer sent me to visit an alumina plant in Louisiana. The aluminum industry is 90% based on the Bayer process which involves reacting bauxite which contains the mineral gibbsite, a form of Al(OH)3, with NaOH at high temperatures and pressures. The reaction is the reverse of equation 4, forming a supersaturated solution of sodium aluminate. When this solution cools, it reverses the reaction to equation 4 but there’s still some aluminate left in solution, with an excess of NaOH. This solution is reacted again with bauxite and the process continues.

(c) I went to this reference; Kirk-Othmer (K-O), “Encyclopedia of Chemical Technology”, Volume 2, for information about the reaction of aluminum with alkali hydroxides. I read the sections titled “Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys”,“Aluminum Compounds“ “Activated Alumina” and “Alumina Hydrates”. All of these sections were written by scientists and/or engineers employed by the Aluminum Company of America, also known as Alcoa.

(i)In “Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys”, the authors write “ Because of its amphoteric nature, aluminum is attacked rapidly by solutions of alkali hydroxides evolving hydrogen and forming soluble aluminates. That’s equation 3. In “Aluminum Compounds”, the authors write, “cooling after digestion requires gibbsite ( a form of Al(OH)3 ) seeding to precipitate Al(OH)3.”They also write that this produces a “spent” solution which contains an excess of alkali relative to aluminate, but both are present in the solution.

(ii) Figure 1 in the “Activated Alumina” section of K-O, shows that Al2O3 only forms when aluminum hydrates are heated to over 500o C. The highest temperature experienced by a form of hydrated aluminum oxide in AA is 170 o C ( see paragraph 0116, page 8). Therefore equation 1 doesn’t happen. If equations 3 and 4 are combined, the simplified but incorrect formula is equation 2; the complex reaction begins with equation 3, followed by equation 4. When it comes to the chemistry of aluminum and its compounds, I believe scientists and engineers who have worked for the world’s largest aluminum producer, Alcoa, know more than dave, Simon and the Andersen brothers (AA). The Andersens are resourceful tinkerers but not chemists. Since my group actually found sodium aluminate in the alumina plant “spent” solutions, but the Andersen brothers didn’t analyze their solutions, who should I believe, them or my lying eyes.

I analyzed the AA patent and found its results are explained by equations 3 and 4. I also reexamined the alleged Iraqi Al Kindi process (DAK) reported by Duelfer’s Iraq Survey Group and found it is explained by these same equations. Since aluminate chemistry is truly complex because the active ingredient, hydroxyls (OH-) go in and out of solution, it took a five page analysis to describe the chemistry accurately. I have sent it to Cap’n Ed who may post it as a link for those interested in the chemical details. [I have it here -- CE.]

The bottom line is that at best DAK could make about 5 times more than the 75 g of hydrogen I initially claimed, in the 3 hours they claimed for the process. This is only half the amount needed to fill the 5 storage bottles. If their reaction temperature got up to about 100o F or 40o C, the reaction shuts down. They would certainly not be able to launch balloons at the one per hour rate reported by Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett and Gaby Hinsliff, "Iraqi mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare," The Observer, June15, 2003, quoting “an experienced observer, Martin Furmanski”. This reference came from Joby Warrick of WaPo.

I re-examined the alleged reactor and noted that lines from compressed air bottles lead into two small tanks that also are fed by water. The claim is that the compressed air was used to push water from the main tank through these bottles and into the reactor. Since the system has a metering pump to transfer water, it would serves no purpose to use air. On the other hand, it would possible to transfer volatile materials, collected elsewhere in these high pressure bottles, into these small tanks for reaction with water or another solvent, then into the main reactor. That capability would be more consistent with chemical weapons production rather than bioweapons. The reactor’s temperature probe is located at about 40 cm above the base, far from the alleged reaction mixture which fills the reactor les than 10 cm. The probe would be properly located for a reaction that uses most of the tank volume. As the bioweapons experts point out, the bottom drain valve is located 2 cm above the base, making complete cleanout of the unit very difficult. The reactor I used at my job which produced solids had its drain valve located directly on the bottom. The solids were washed out. The scoop is just a diversion to fool inspectors who are not familiar with the details of the alleged process. It worked! Finally, if gas were the only product being made it would make sense to have the outlet on the top of the reactor to remove it further from potential foaming, plus it would be protected by a removable screen to remove particulates. In any event, the foam would not more than a couple of times the height of the reaction mix so the unit could be made much smaller, making higher quality hydrogen.

In conclusion, the ISG bioweapons experts and associated CIA oversight personnel “connected the dots” in determining that the Al Kindi unit probably did not make BW but they seriously failed to provide competent intelligence when they swallowed the phony Al Kindi hydrogen generation story. As they say in football, “After further review…”, I conclude that the unit was used for making chemical weapons and the ISG was fooled.

Chemical Consultant >>>

captainsquartersblog.com

pat2pdf.org

pat2pdf.org

captainsquartersblog.com