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Politics : Canadian Political Free-for-All -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Ichy Smith who wrote (10349)	9/1/2006 2:09:40 PM
From: Stephen O	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 37138

get this back to Canadian politics. The Chinese are whining that the form they need to complete to get the head tax back is in English and French, not Chinese. Good God they've been here since the early 1900s, you would think they could have learned enough English in that time, and if they were too damn lazy, like the 90 year old on Global TV last night, at least their progeny can read and write English.

To: Ichy Smith who wrote (10349)	9/1/2006 2:10:45 PM
From: Richnorth	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 37138

Harper could have reneged on Martin's promise because he heads a new government. Why didn't he? Seems to me he believes in toadying to the the US government! You may not agree. But that is a well-known fact! .

To: Ichy Smith who wrote (10349)	9/1/2006 2:16:51 PM
From: Ichy Smith	Respond to of 37138

"Revised operational plan for NATO ’s expanding mission in Afghanistan" One thing to be clear on, no doubt, is that Canadian troops in Afghanistan would be in the same new situation they are in today even if Stephen Harper’s Conservatives had not managed to win a slender minority government on January 23, 2006. Paul Martin’s previous Liberal minority government had already agreed to what a March 10, 2006 update of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization briefing note calls "a revised Operational Plan ... which will guide the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to assist the Afghan Government to extend and exercise its authority and influence across the country" — formally endorsed at a December 8, 2005 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels. In fact, it seems clear enough that former Liberal foreign minister Pierre Pettigrew did not actually attend the December 8 meeting in Brussels. He does not appear to be in the official photograph of the NATO foreign ministers who were present — presumably because he also reportedly gave a speech at an international climate change conference in Montreal on the same day. By this point of course the latest Canadian federal election campaign had already begun, and virtually all Canadian politicians (and journalists) were preoccupied with that. (Or, as the Globe and Mail’s John Ibbitson has now aptly summarized the real situation: "It is perfectly clear that many Canadians feel they were not properly informed of the risks and obligations in the Kandahar deployment. That is the fault of the previous government, the opposition parties and the media, none of which paid sufficient attention.") Assuming that it is still "the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)" that Canada is supposed to be a part of (and not "the separate U.S. counterinsurgency force to hunt Taliban and al-Qaida holdouts, which will remain under U.S. military command" — aka "Operation Enduring Freedom"), the new plan outlined in the March 10 update of the NATO briefing note still seems a rather mushy and uncertain concept . Just what, e.g., are ordinary concerned Canadian voters to make of the following diplomatic boilerplate: "The Plan addresses the tasks and challenges ISAF will face as it continues to expand its area of operations to the south and subsequently to the east of the country ... It provides the strategic focus to create the conditions for stabilisation and reconstruction across the country. It recognizes the primacy of the Afghan Government and the paramount importance of continued, coherent and consistent development of Afghan political institutions and security capability. In addition, it outlines clear arrangements for enhanced coordination and deconfliction between ISAF’s stabilisation mission and the Coalition counter-terrorism mission. It also highlights the need for ISAF to cooperate effectively with the other key international community agencies in Afghanistan, notably the UN, the EU, the G8 lead nations and the NGO community." The very bottom line would seem to be that, as matters stand, the international community still has a rather diffuse and open-ended notion of just what it is doing in Afghanistan right now. Between now and early next year (the apparent initial time frame for Canada’s current expanded commitments) different national participants in ISAF’s stabilisation mission would appear to have some considerable leeway in carving out exactly what their longer-term role in the region will be. Canadian politicians and the Canadian people owe it to their soldiers to ensure that the role Canada carves out for itself makes practical sense — and contributes realistically to enhanced international security in the challenging new global village of the 21st century. There is an undeniably strong case for some kind of "huge debate" on this subject in Canada today. And one way or another, we do "need to have it." Vague rhetoric about never "cutting and running" in an endless "war on terror" is no longer cutting the mustard, even among our very good friends, neighbours, and relatives next door.