Stratfor update, and my read is that China will fail ...
in the mean time, I find the N.Korean behavior amusing, in that they do not play according to any rules, and apparently does not respond to the usual push and pull.
North Korea: Beijing's Diminishing Power of Persuasion [EDIT by J: what did I tell you since 5 years ago?] -
Summary
As rumors of an imminent North Korean nuclear test continue to swirl, all eyes are turning once again to China to see if Beijing can or will intervene to dissuade Pyongyang from proceeding with a test. Though Beijing remains North Korea's single-largest supplier of food and energy, its influence over Pyongyang is not as strong as it once was -- or as the United States and others might perceive.
Analysis
Chinese-North Korean relations have waned considerably over the past few months, and Beijing is finding it increasingly difficult to restrain its neighbor. For its part, North Korea has been losing faith in China as Beijing strengthens ties with the United States. Beijing supported U.S.-led sanctions on North Korean banking in Macau and elsewhere in China. Beijing also backed a U.N. Security Council (UNSC) statement condemning North Korea's July missile tests -- a much stronger U.N. step than the minor document of concern the UNSC released following North Korea's 1998 tests.
These worsening bilateral relations have become increasingly public. Before its July missile tests, for example, Pyongyang simply refused to allow high-ranking Chinese officials to visit North Korea. Pyongyang knew in advance the message the Chinese would deliver, and had little interest in listening. Though it initially appeared that China at least gave the nod to -- if not encouraged -- the North Korean missile tests, Beijing vehemently rejected that interpretation. Significantly, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao condemned North Korea's tests from Seoul, rather than Beijing, signaling Pyongyang that China was more interested in its ties with South Korea than with North Korea.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il also refused a Chinese summons to go to Beijing -- a visit that could have shaped Pyongyang's calculations surrounding a nuclear test. Pyongyang sees Chinese actions as unreliable, and increasingly hostile, with regard to North Korean interests. And if China will not backstop North Korea in the face of a perceived U.S. threat, North Korea must prove its own capabilities. Pyongyang saw U.S. actions in the Gulf War, Kosovo conflict and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and in each case, Washington did not perceive a nuclear threat. But Washington has not exercised such a free hand with China or Russia, both of which are nuclear powers. So Pyongyang has now made its desire to test a nuclear weapon public -- a step from which it cannot easily back away.
North Korea, however, does not want to risk inviting a war with the United States by carrying out a test. Instead, Pyongyang hopes this final threat will convince the United States to lift the banking sanctions. Unlike other sanctions on North Korea, which hurt the country as a whole, the banking sanctions have hurt the government -- and hence Pyongyang's adamant position that the sanctions be lifted before any further negotiations take place. (Washington, on the other hand, likes the banking sanctions for the same reason North Korea hates them.) China and South Korea are trying to convince Washington to lighten up on the banking sanctions, and Beijing is continuing to warn North Korea against testing.
But China fears its own efforts ultimately will fail [EDIT by J: no need to worry, for there is no uncertainty, because China will fail in this thankless effort]. Beijing deployed a new ambassador to North Korea, an expert on American affairs, to assist the North Koreans in better understanding U.S. reactions to North Korean moves. Soon thereafter, North Korea announced the imminent test anyway.
China's strongest lever when dealing with North Korea is the economic and fuel assistance it provides. Beijing fears a refugee crisis, however, if the North is completely cut off. By some accounts, China has already strengthened its defensive forces along the Korean border to prevent any potential exodus from North Korea.
Beijing has relied before on inducements for North Korea to return to the fold. However, the North Koreans deem anything short of a change in the banking restrictions unacceptable. China wants a stable region, particularly ahead of the 2008 Olympics, and a North Korean nuclear test will not help fulfill that wish. But neither would cutting off food and fuel to North Korea as the region's frigid winters approach. Beijing feels it has few other choices, though, with North Korea rejecting high-level visits and not sending its high-level officials to China just to hear Beijing berate North Korean for its actions.
At present, China is offering continued cooperation with the United States coupled with inducements for North Korea to change its mind. Beijing's main threat to Pyongyang is that, should North Korea test and the U.S. respond militarily, China will not intervene on the north's behalf. This would only be a useful tool if Pyongyang really thought Washington would respond militarily, and in North Korea, the answer to that question is still up in the air. Ultimately, while China and the United States both want to see North Korea step back from the brink, Beijing's leverage is limited unless it wants to risk a more immediate problem with its neighbor.
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