Taking Oil Out Of The Equation
Michael T. Klare
September 21, 2006
Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author of Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum (Owl Books).
In his September 11 address to the nation, President Bush declared that the war against on terror is the “decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century,” pitting the ideals of Western civilization against a “perverted vision of Islam.” Bush is certainly correct that ideology plays a critical role in the war on terror and that this struggle cannot be won if Washington fails in the “battle of ideas” (which its abysmal record in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo is helping to ensure). But ideology is only part of the equation.
Just as significant, if far less acknowledged, is the relationship between oil and Islamic extremism. If it weren’t for our dependence on Middle Eastern oil, we wouldn’t project such a conspicuous and over-bearing presence in the Middle East—and it is this presence, more than anything else, that has generated the toxic anti-Americanism on which al-Qaida feeds. Doing better in the battle of ideas is not enough; if we ever hope to prevail in the war on terror, we must also remove oil from the strategic equation.
To fully appreciate the relationship between America’s oil dependency and contemporary Middle Eastern terrorism, it is necessary to know something about the historical trajectories of both. Prior to World War II, the United States had very little official presence in the Persian Gulf area—at that time we were self-sufficient in oil, and in any case were content to allow Great Britain to control the region. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt correctly surmised that the United States would eventually become dependent on imported oil as our domestic reserves were drained, and so he set out to establish American control over a major foreign source of supply—eventually selecting Saudi Arabia to assume this role.
On February 14, 1945, he met with King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud aboard a U.S. warship in the Suez Canal and forged an oil-for-protection arrangement under which the United States pledged to defend the Saudi royal family in return for privileged access to Saudi petroleum reserves. All else that has occurred in the Gulf, including 9/11, has followed from this fateful encounter.
To carry out the terms of the 1945 Roosevelt-Ibn Saud agreement, successive American presidents deployed an ever-larger U.S. military presence in the region and helped establish both the Saudi Royal Army and the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), responsible for internal security. The growing U.S. military presence was coupled with the growing presence of American oil companies, which helped turned Saudi Arabia into the world’s leading producer. With fields in most other parts of the world in decline—the United States reached its “peak,” or maximum sustainable output in 1971—production from the Persian Gulf became increasingly essential for the smooth operation of the global economy.
The conspicuous presence of American soldiers and oil company personnel in the Gulf area was not without its detractors, however. Many devout Muslims saw this as an unwelcome intrusion of non-believers in the Islamic heartland, and others saw it as a form of imperialism. America’s close association with Israel was also a source of irritation for many. Still, it was the British who first experienced the intractable wrath of Islamic militants: when state-controlled British Petroleum (BP) refused to cede control over its refinery at Abadan in southwestern Iran, the company’s vast Iranian assets were nationalized by Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1951 with strong support from the Muslim clergy. London responded to this perceived affront by persuading President Eisenhower to spearhead a coup against Mossadegh and to install the playboy Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, as the absolute ruler of Iran. The Shah, in turn, invited U.S. and British oil firms back into the country while suppressing the Shiite clergy, thus setting the stage for the Islamic Revolution of 1979-80 and all else that followed.
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The Iranian Revolution of 1979-80 had several major effects whose consequences are still felt today. The first was the elaboration of an Islamic-inflected anti-Americanism that views the United States as the modern incarnation of British imperialism and as the “Great Satan” that is responsible for all that ails the Muslim world today. The fact that Washington collaborated with Britain in overthrowing Mossadegh and with the Shah in suppressing the Shiite clergy no doubt played a significant role in shaping this argument and in supplying its powerful venom. This outlook first took root in Iran, under the tutelage of Ayatollah Khomeini, but its echoes can be seen throughout the Middle East today.
In Washington, the Iranian Revolution was seen as posing a mortal threat to the safe flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and its allies, generating considerable panic among top U.S. officials. The result was the “Carter Doctrine,” initially enunciated by President Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union Address of January 23, 1980. Identifying the free flow of Persian Gulf oil as a “vital interest” of the United States, he vowed to employ “any means necessary” to protect that interest, “including military force.” Recognizing, however, that the United States at that time possessed little capacity to carry out this pledge, Carter announced the establishment of a new military force—the nucleus of what was to become the U.S. Central Command—along with the acquisition of new basing facilities in and around the Gulf.
To implement the Carter Doctrine, successive American presidents have established an elaborate U.S. military infrastructure in the greater Gulf area and have authorized a more direct and conspicuous American role in protecting the flow of oil from the region to markets abroad. When Iranian gunboats menaced Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, President Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to plant American flags on the tankers and then to escort them into and out of the Gulf. Later, when Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in 1990 and threatened Saudi oilfields around Dhahran, President Bush Sr. ordered American troops to defend Saudi Arabia and later launched Operation Desert Storm to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait.
As these events unfolded, the trajectories of Islamic-inflected anti-Americanism and the U.S. military buildup in the Gulf converged—with Osama bin Laden positioned at the precise intersection of these two trajectories. Bin Laden, who had returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero from his exploits in Afghanistan, considered the presence of so many American soldiers in the kingdom to be a sacrilege and suggested that he and other Afghan veterans—not the troops sent by Bush Sr.—take primary responsibility for defending Saudi Arabia from the Iraqis. When rebuffed by King Fahd—who had been pressured by Washington into accepting a large American military presence—bin Laden swore to overthrow the House of Saud and to oust the Americans from the region. He began by attacking American targets inside Saudi Arabia itself—beginning with the SANG headquarters—then moved on the U.S. embassies in the region, the USS Cole, and eventually the Twin Towers.
It is certainly true that bin Laden has come to express ever more messianic ambitions in the past few years, occasionally alluding to the establishment of a unified Islamic “caliphate” stretching across the Middle East. These are the images that President Bush was apparently referring to in his speech of September 11, when he said that al-Qaida’s ultimate goal is to build “a radical Islamic empire.” But in his original statements, bin Laden’s declared goals were far more limited and pragmatic: to drive the United States out of Saudi Arabia, oust the royals, and put Muslims in control over the production of oil. “We cannot let the American army stay in the Gulf area and take our oil, take our money, and we have to do something to take them out. We have to fight them,” he said in one his original fatwas, from the early 1990s. For students of Middle Eastern politics and history, this is much closer to the anti-imperialist diatribes that arose in the shadow of British imperialism after World War II than to the millennial mysticism cited by Bush, and helps to explain bin Laden’s continuing popularity in the region.
Against this backdrop, American claims that the war in Iraq and other facets of the U.S. military presence in the region have nothing to do with oil will fall on deaf ears in the Middle East so long as the United States remains dependent on Persian Gulf oil, continues to stand by its alliance with the Saudi royal family, and retains its belief in the legitimacy of using military force to protect the flow of oil. However obscure to ordinary Americans, these bedrock features of our policies in the Gulf policies are common knowledge to virtually all Middle Easterners and constitute the core elements of their understanding of their basic world outlook. This explains, for example, why Middle Easterners are more likely to believe what Osama bin Laden and his associates have to say about current affairs than what American officials routinely dispense as news. Clearly, it is high time that we acquire a similar grasp of the underlying realities.
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What would it take to refashion the war on terrorism in light of these fundamental realities? First, it means acknowledging that oil is not a neutral commodity in the eyes of many in the Middle East: Oil has too many associations with British imperialism and American economic power. If we keep turning to the Middle East for a large share our petroleum, we will keep stirring up local antipathies, and we will have to be prepared to deal with that—presumably, by keeping a very low profile.
Second, it means recognizing that we will continue to provoke hostility in the Middle East so long as we rely on military force to protect our oil imports and those of our allies. Whatever explanation is provided by Washington, the conspicuous presence of American troops and warships in the region will always be viewed by many as an expression of imperialism and dominance, and so will provoke bitter resentment—a sentiment that can easily be exploited by those seeking to inflict pain on this country.
Finally, it means distancing ourselves from entrenched, authoritarian regimes like the House of Saud that are considered overly friendly to U.S. oil interests and insufficiently attentive to the needs and concerns of their own people. Polling data suggests that the perceived intimacy between these regimes and Washington—an intimacy fueled by oil—is one of the most potent sources of discontent in the Middle East, and a main rallying cry for al-Qaida and its ilk. Moreover, our protestations on behalf of democracy in the region will never be taken seriously so long as we continue to prop up these corrupt and repressive petro-regimes.
Can we adopt a lower profile in the Middle East, distance ourselves from the oil regimes, and reduce our reliance on military force to protect our energy supplies? Yes we can—but only if we can gain greater control over our craving for imported oil. This means using less petroleum (through conservation measures, higher fuel efficiency requirements, lower speed limits, and so on), employing more substitutes (especially ethanol), and relying on mass transit. The greater our self-discipline at home, the stronger will be our capacity to fashion a new strategy in the Middle East—one that allows us to repudiate the Carter Doctrine and withdraw our forces from the region, thereby robbing the terrorists of their principal recruiting appeal.
No matter how hard we try, we cannot prevail in the "war on terror" so long as we continue to ignore the oil dimensions of the conflict. Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants understand full well that America’s presence in their backyard is driven by our addiction to Middle Eastern oil, and that so long as we do nothing to curb this addiction we will continue to embrace policies that will generate ever more recruits for al-Qaida. Only through self-discipline and the elimination of our oil dependency can we break this cycle and so win the war against terror.
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