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To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (9825)10/6/2006 10:31:23 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 12465
 
Re: 10/6/06 - NY Times: Bring On the Bears

Bring On the Bears

By RICHARD SAUER
Published: October 6, 2006
Arlington, Va.



SHORT sellers occupy a position in the stock market like that of predators in nature: necessary but unloved. Corporations, which like to see their stock always rising, despise these traders, who borrow shares and sell them in the expectation that the price will fall soon and they’ll make a profit. There are signs, however, that these vilified traders might be coming into a measure of respect for the critical balance they provide in a market frequently dominated by the puffery of companies and sell-side analysts.

The short sellers’ skeptical scrutiny of companies they feel are overpriced has led them to uncover many of the major financial frauds of recent years. Yet they continue to be burdened by a regulatory scrutiny of their own actions that springs more from rumors than fact. In the 1930’s, short selling was hobbled by restrictions intended to prevent the “bear raids” many thought then (but few think now) underlay the market collapse of 1929. These included the “uptick rule,” which prohibits short sales when the price of a stock is in decline.

In an unusual (and laudable) effort to measure whether a long-lived regulation actually works, the Securities and Exchange Commission recently completed a pilot program to suspend the uptick rule for a third of the stocks on the Russell 3000 index and compare their performance to stocks still subject to the rule.

At a meeting of prominent economists held by the commission last month, consensus held that price restrictions on short selling were a regulatory anachronism of no benefit to the market. Stocks freed from the uptick rule had shown no greater vulnerability to momentum selling than the control group. A few panelists, in fact, uttered the heresy that bear raids are now so uncommon that they no longer need be of concern to regulators.

No such view was expressed, however, regarding the flip side of the bear raid: the “pump and dump,” a scheme in which someone promotes a worthless stock he owns, then sells it as gullible investors fall for the promotion. Panelists noted that these schemes remain commonplace, particularly among small-cap stocks, with fax and spam e-mail messages joining more traditional methods to tout toxic stocks.

They also suggested that the first line of defense against such schemes has not been the S.E.C., which acts slowly when it acts at all, but rather the much disdained short seller. By putting their money where their mouths are, short sellers are the only market participants with an incentive to deflate bubbles and inject pessimistic information into the market.

As an enforcement lawyer at the S.E.C., I received from short sellers early warnings on certain companies that led to the capture and return to investors of hundreds of millions of dollars taken by stock frauds. Such information came from no other source — certainly not from institutional stock analysts, whose failures of objectivity were made notorious by the Attorney General Eliot Spitzer of New York. Representing short-biased hedge funds as a part of my practice as a private lawyer, I continued to be impressed by their ability to spot stock frauds in the early stages.

But if short sellers are friends to the S.E.C., the commission has been no friend to short sellers. The agency has saddled short sellers with trading restrictions and has looked the other way when companies have taken potentially illegal actions to silence short sellers’ criticism.

One of the tools of the pump-and-dump scheme is the “short squeeze,” in which companies contrive to goose their share prices or restrict the supply of stock that can be lent out for shorting, thereby increasing the cost of maintaining a short position. The S.E.C. and the courts have recognized that such activities can constitute market manipulation. Yet the S.E.C. has shown so little interest in remedying such abuses that companies blatantly promote actions explicitly intended to force the wholesale covering of short positions. Average investors are also taken for a ride when a company’s share price spikes as a result of a short squeeze.

In addition, the S.E.C. staff has been willing, indeed eager, to pursue investigations against short sellers based on complaints from companies that the shorts have said mean things about them. One recent case made national news: the S.E.C. staff sent subpoenas to financial journalists suspected of using short sellers as sources for their articles — as if that were somehow improper.

These investigations seem never to lead to enforcement actions against established funds, suggesting that shorting a stock and then spreading false rumors about the company is not a common investment strategy.

The number of short-biased funds is in decline. Those still operating are less likely than before to bring contrarian information about companies to the attention of regulators and the press, in part because of the S.E.C.’s stance toward a group that should actually merit its gratitude, and also because of the recent trend among troubled companies to sue those who have the temerity to short their stock.

This is not to propose a program of affirmative action for short-sellers, or to deny the possibility that misconduct can occur. But the S.E.C. can and should take a more balanced approach toward the only actors in the marketplace who share its interest in exposing financial fraud.

It can begin by jettisoning the antiquated uptick rule. It should view with greater skepticism companies that attribute their woes to conspiracies by short sellers. It should take appropriate enforcement action against companies that retaliate against critics through defamation campaigns and manipulative short squeezes.

Finally, Congress should provide the S.E.C. with discretion to pay bounties, similar to those available in insider trading cases, for tips resulting in successful financial fraud cases. This would give some degree of recognition to those contrarians who help keep the market honest by flagging problems concealed by companies — and missed by institutional analysts.

Richard Sauer, a former administrator in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement division, joined the management at a short-biased hedge fund this week.

nytimes.com



To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (9825)8/6/2007 5:42:07 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Respond to of 12465
 
Re: 8/4/07 -- NY Times: Report Says S.E.C. Erred on Pequot

Report Says S.E.C. Erred on Pequot



Gary J. Aguirre, a former staff lawyer for the Securities and Exchange Commission who was fired in September 2005, testified last year. [Picture credit: Michael Temchine for The New York Times]

By GRETCHEN MORGENSON and WALT BOGDANICH
Published: August 4, 2007

The Securities and Exchange Commission bungled a promising investigation two years ago into suspicious trading at Pequot Capital Management, a giant hedge fund, according to the final report released yesterday by Congressional investigators looking into the matter.

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Text of the Senate Report on the S.E.C.
finance.senate.gov
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Among the commission’s failings, the report said, were delays in the Pequot investigation, disclosure of sensitive case information by high-level S.E.C. officials to lawyers for those under scrutiny, a detrimental narrowing of its scope after a meeting with a Pequot lawyer, and the appearance of “undue deference” to a prominent Wall Street executive that resulted in the postponement of his interview until after the case’s statute of limitations had expired.

The 108-page report by the Senate Finance and Judiciary committees under the leadership of Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, and Arlen Specter, Republican of Pennsylvania, caps a yearlong investigation into the S.E.C.’s firing of Gary J. Aguirre, a former staff lawyer, in September 2005.

Mr. Aguirre, who led the commission’s investigation into suspect trading by Pequot and its founder, Arthur J. Samberg, was fired after he complained that superiors had thwarted his efforts by barring his interview of John J. Mack, currently the chief executive of Morgan Stanley and a close friend of Mr. Samberg.

Mr. Mack was asked to testify before the S.E.C. last summer after Mr. Aguirre’s allegations had become public and Congress had begun investigating the commission’s handling of the matter. The S.E.C. closed the Pequot inquiry last fall without taking action against the fund or its management. A Pequot spokesman declined to comment on the report.

The Senate report said there was no evidence that Mr. Mack had provided information to Mr. Samberg or that Mr. Mack had done anything to prevent or delay his testimony.

“The investigation of Pequot Capital Management could have been an ideal opportunity for the S.E.C. to develop expertise and visibility into the operations of a major hedge fund while deterring institutional insider trading and market manipulation through vigorous enforcement,” the report said. Instead, the S.E.C.’s inquiry was undermined by a series of missteps, according to Senate staff workers who took the testimony of 30 people and reviewed 10,000 pages of documents.

Mr. Aguirre responded to the report yesterday, saying that Christopher Cox, the S.E.C. chairman, “can bless” the conduct of those senior S.E.C. officials criticized in the report “or he can protect the capital markets by cleaning house.”

Mr. Cox issued a statement last night saying he looks forward to reading the full report, adding, “The agency’s commitment to prosecuting insider trading has never been stronger, and initiatives such as our hedge fund insider trading task force in the enforcement division will ensure that remains true in the future.”

Pequot Capital came under regulatory scrutiny in 2004 after stock exchange officials had identified 17 to 25 sets of suspicious trades by the hedge fund. Such transactions are routinely turned over to the commission, whose officials then decide whether to investigate them.

One series of trades, which made Pequot $18 million, came just ahead of the announcement in 2001 by the General Electric Capital Corporation that it would buy Heller Financial. Advisers on the deal were Credit Suisse, a firm that was wooing Mr. Mack to be its chief executive at the time, and Morgan Stanley.

But after Mr. Aguirre’s investigation was under way, the report said, lawyers for both Mr. Samberg and Morgan Stanley’s board, which was then considering hiring Mr. Mack as chief executive, received access to high-level S.E.C. enforcement officials — outside the presence of Mr. Aguirre, who was leading the Pequot inquiry. After these contacts, the scope of the Pequot investigation narrowed and Mr. Aguirre was barred from interviewing Mr. Mack.

When Mr. Aguirre complained, the S.E.C. retaliated by firing him, Senate investigators concluded.

The report paints a picture of an agency that does not always treat prospective witnesses equally.

“By allowing the perception that ‘going over the head’ of S.E.C. staff attorneys yields results,” the report said, “the S.E.C. undermines public confidence in the integrity of its investigations and exacerbates the problems associated with ‘regulatory capture.’ ”

For example, on June 26, 2005, Linda Thomsen, the director of enforcement, spoke by telephone about the Pequot case to Mary Jo White, a lawyer at Debevoise & Plimpton, who was representing the Morgan Stanley board and was concerned about Mr. Mack’s possible involvement, the report said.

Ms. Thomsen said she had told Ms. White nothing about the case during the call. But according to Ms. White’s account of that conversation, Ms. Thomsen disclosed that subpoenaed e-mail messages showed that there was “smoke there” though “surely not fire.”

Earlier in the case, in February 2005, Audrey Strauss, a lawyer at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson representing Pequot, met with Stephen M. Cutler, then director of enforcement at the commission. Two weeks after the meeting, the report said, the investigation into Pequot was narrowed. “The staff was ordered to investigate only a few of the suspicious transactions” flagged by the New York Stock Exchange, the report said.

A spokeswoman for Mr. Cutler said he could not be reached for comment last night.

This narrowing of the case made an already difficult job of demonstrating a pattern of illicit trading more difficult, the report said.

The report also concluded that Paul R. Berger, then an associate director of enforcement and one of Mr. Aguirre’s supervisors, did not recuse himself from the Pequot case “in a timely manner” once he had expressed interest in working for Debevoise, the law firm hired by Morgan Stanley’s board to vet Mr. Mack before naming him chief executive.

Mr. Berger, who eventually took a job at Debevoise, initially told Senate investigators that he had stopped working on any matters involving Debevoise in early 2006, around the time he first considered seeking employment at the firm. But Senate investigators said they had found that the previous September, just days after Mr. Aguirre’s firing, Mr. Berger authorized an S.E.C. colleague to tell Debevoise that he might be interested in working there.

“Mary Jo just called,” the colleague wrote to Mr. Berger, referring to Ms. White in an e-mail message dated Sept. 8, 2005. “I mentioned your interest.”

Asked why he had failed to tell Senate investigators about this earlier exchange, Mr. Berger said that “I was very concerned about having any discussions without first talking with the S.E.C. and getting authorization.”

The Senate report accused Mr. Berger of giving investigators “incomplete” answers, but says it found no evidence of an explicit link between Mr. Berger’s role in the Mack dispute and his subsequent job at Debevoise.

Mr. Berger said yesterday that any suggestion that he had not properly recused himself is “unfair and inaccurate.” He added: “I did what I was supposed to do. I contacted the chief ethics officer in the general counsel’s office of the S.E.C. and they told me I did not have to recuse myself.”

The Senate report suggested that the S.E.C. had failed to pursue the Pequot investigation vigorously after Mr. Aguirre’s firing. For instance, when the commission took Mr. Mack’s testimony on Aug. 1, 2006, the report said, it did not “seriously test” a theory put forward by Mr. Aguirre that Mr. Samberg had rewarded Mr. Mack for information on the Heller deal by letting him invest alongside Pequot in a private company that was sold for three times his investment in little over a year.

Mr. Mack was the only individual investor allowed to participate in the deal, the report noted. The next trading day after Pequot officials allowed Mr. Mack in the deal, Mr. Samberg began his aggressive buying of Heller Financial stock.

A spokeswoman for Morgan Stanley, where Mr. Mack is chief executive, declined to comment on the report.

The report also stated that Liban A. Jama, a staff lawyer, had complained that he was given less than two days to prepare for “critical” testimony from two witnesses. Without more time, Mr. Jama wrote in an e-mail message to Mark Kreitman, his supervisor and assistant director in the enforcement division, “I would not feel comfortable taking the testimony.” Mr. Jama said he was surprised by Mr. Kreitman’s response. “He said, ‘You don’t need to prepare that much for it,’ which I found strange.”

The report also noted that Mr. Aguirre was not the only S.E.C. official to suffer after complaining about practices at the agency. A second unidentified staff investigator had protested what he believed might have been an inappropriate contact between an outside lawyer and Ms. Thomsen, the enforcement director. This investigator also received a negative re-evaluation of his job performance shortly after he complained in July 2005, the report said.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company

nytimes.com