“A population’s adherence to Islam will inevitably imply the cessation of purely secular legislative and administrative phenomenon”.
Zachary Latif
It is oft commented in general punditry that the Islamic propensity towards theocratic regimes threatens to destabilize not only the Crescent but also the entire world. Nevertheless this post, in a long line of commentaries on the Crescent, seeks to explore and establish the underlying motivations behind the Islamic perception. From topics ranging from jihad to the latent theocratic impulse, this post attempts to provide an overview of the theological issues besieging the Islamic world and possible resolutions.
The rapid diffusion and acculturation of Islam to a milieu stretching from the Deserts of Africa to the Tropics of Asia implies the malleability of Islamic doctrine and mores. Its borders were defined in the West by Orthodox Christianity and in the East by Sinic pork consuming populations. Nevertheless despite the inherent diversity latent within the Islamic world there is one constant; the pervasive character of Islam in any society it happens to predominate in. In secular Turkey, Ataturk attempted to disestablish Islamic customs in favour of a European orientation. Indeed secularism has such a staunch hold that the Swiss Legal Code replaced the reformed Islamic code (predicated on Shariah precepts) as the law of the land. Nevertheless recent elections have propped the Islamists to power giving further credence to the axiom,
“A population’s adherence to Islam will inevitably imply the cessation of purely secular legislative and administrative phenomenon”.
In light of the recent September 11 attacks, there has been a concerted effort by the Occidental weblogger to understand the nature of Islamic civilisation. Nevertheless their analysis fall short since virtually all debate tends to obscure the true state of affairs and correct perspective*.
The most notable instance is the exploration of the underlying raison d’etre for the virulent hatred of America. Oft forwarded are incomplete explanations like “America’s support of Israel” or “envy of the American way of life”. Rather more accurately Muslim hatred can be analogised to a Moroccan festival called “Boujloud”, father of the skins. In this festival, which is of decidedly pagan origin, a man labelled the “Boujloud” will run through the street clothed in the skins of freshly slaughtered sheep running. This ritual has clear psychological implications since it arose to alleviate the collective guilt of the community. The “impure” man, clothed in sheepskin, running through the town “draws off guilt” from its inhabitants and in the same manner the intense hatred of America by Muslims can be explained. America, an emblem of the West, draws the guilt and hatred of Muslims since it “discharges the tensions of the awareness of one’s own spiritual impurity”. Islam, oft interpreted as an absolutist faith, has values difficult to constantly maintain and a common refrain amongst Muslims is “I’m not pure since I don’t follow all of Islam’s rules”. The underlying stress causes a dual mentality to surface and can only be ameliorated by holding an allegedly “inferior” American culture as the source of the spiritual failings.
Another intense debate was the furore of the meaning of Jihad between two of three pre-eminent Muslim webloggers (the third to complete this trio is Abdus Salaam of "TheBit Says"), Muslim Pundit & Shi’ite Pundit. In the first article Muslim Pundit tried to prove that qitaal, the Arab term for “fight”, with its associative semantics of violence & death has oft been treated as an acceptable synonym for jihad, which in turn means “sacred fight”, in classical Islamic literature thereby underlying the belligerent aspect of jihad. Shi’ite Pundit effectively rebutted by stating the Holy Quran has always made a clear distinction between qitaal and jihad. In any case a supplementary yet valid point is that Muslim Pundit’s scepticism of certain Hadiths**, which tend to corroborate the most philosophical aspects of the jihadi struggle, must extend to critique of all Hadiths*** and thereby put in doubt the foundation of Islam. Finally Shi’ite Pundit’s last observation is that the Caliph Ali, who by any criterion was the designated successor to the Holy Prophet as leader of the Islamic community, indeed pursued a course that was markedly different from the three different Sunni Caliphs whose reigns were characterised by the greatest jihadi conquests of all time.
Nevertheless in spite of these valid points it does not detract from the fundamental fact that Muslim Pundit is correct in asserting that Jihad is an inherently aggressive doctrine that seeks to expand the border of Dar-ul-Islam. The Holy Prophet (PBUH) conducted pre-emptive raid campaign hence legitimising aggressive Jihad.
Muslims are sanctioned by Allah to spread their faith through any possible means. There are certain conditions attached to the call of Jihad, for instance it is incumbent upon all adult males to take up jihad unless a sufficient number has already been provided. A Jihad cannot be taken upon wilfully, and is only consider authentic if its underlying purpose is to either summon unbelievers to belief or in the defence of Islam. A Jihad may only end when the unbelievers have been subjugated and reduced to Dhimmitide (or converted through the grace of Allah) otherwise it is an ongoing & incomplete struggle. We need only discern the Prophet’s own history to seek the necessary precedents, the Jihad against Mecca only ceased when the pagan inhabitants accepted Islam (the pivotal moment in Islam is when Hind, the treacherous wife of the equally vile Abu Sufyan**** stands before the Prophet Muhammad pledging her eternal allegiance). Later under the Prophet’s direct supervision the Bedouin tribes of the Empty Quarter & the Arabian Peninsula were “invited*****” to join Islam.
As Muslim Pundit correctly noted that to twist the very meaning of Jihad is to deny the very essence and the indeed the genius that characterises the effervescent Islam world. When Western apologists and Muslim liberals deliberately obscure the meaning of “Jihad” by claiming that it implies effort and striving to better oneself they are in fact referring to “Itijihad”. This is perhaps the most important concept to understand in Islamic theology for it characterises the various attitudes of the Shi’ite and Sunni sects. Itijihad****** is the art of elucidating and interpreting new laws, which is not covered by the Holy Quran or the Sunna, and in effect an adaptive feature, which allows Islamic states to realign themselves with the world in which they live.
The presence of Itijihad is the only variable, which allows for the successful emergence of a modern Islamic state. Nevertheless in Sunn’ism and the Akhbari Shi’ite sect, “the door of itijihad is closed” and has been for the past 900 years. The tendency in these two schools has been to produce commentaries upon commentaries thereby reflecting the apolitical state of the Sunn’ite and Akhbari sects. Nevertheless in the Usuli Shi’ite world Itijihad is seen as a perennial necessity. In the absence of the Imam*******, the Mujtahidun (one who strives) are empowered to make original decisions of canon law and are considered a reference point of emulation. Few at the beginning of the century, their numbers began to considerably grow until it was considered obligatory for every Usuli Shi’ite to have a Mujtahidun.
This is fundamental factor why Sunni theocracies (Afghanistan & Sudan come to mind) are not endowed with the stability and longevity of Shi’ite Iran. Saudi Arabia is not a theocracy for it is governed by a monarchy, albeit divinely ordained, and not by a clergy. Secular princes, who are educated in the States and track the S&P 500, take the national decisions rather than bearded Wahabis.
The Islamic crescent will never become a ring of theocracies and thus it would counter productive to even speculate such an eventuality. Through doctrinal chance Iran, was the only country, which had the latitude to successfully adapt and adopt a theocratic government. Usuli Twelver Shi’ism is remarkable in that it alone can spawn a theocracy because of its historical and canonical framework.
The related concepts of Ikhtilaf al-fiqh and Ijma are equally important to understand for they relate to tolerance & consensus. Islam, as opposed to the contrary belief, traditionally does not require absolute accord since it is accepted by the Sunni world that Ikhtilaf (divergence) is a providence of Allah.
Ikhtilaf has come to be accepted in Shi’ite doctrine and therefore the divergence of interpretations amongst the various Ayatollahs is a perennial feature. Thus when Ayatollahs do indeed criticise the Iranian regime, it does not imply a necessary loss of legitimacy (as is commonly assumed by uninformed war web-loggers) rather it is a continuation of a deeply Islamic tradition.
The Ijma concept, which concerns the will of the majority, relates to the foundation of any democracy and is essential to a successful state. The concept of Ijma allows the emergence of a consensus, which can guide the Islamic community when it is not possible to rely on the Holy Quran, Hadith or the Sunnah. This is an abstract concept for most Islamic sects and rarely invoked nevertheless the doctrine has grown under Shi’ism, where the religious authority must form a majority consensus among themselves or of the people before they can legitimately govern.
Indeed in Sunn’ism there is virtually no central authority thus it is heavily deregulated as opposed to Usuli Shi’ism. Akhbari Shi’ism (prevalent in South Iraq, Eastern Saudi Arabia & Bahrain) borrows certain concepts from Sunn’ism thereby inhibiting its ideological principle for a theocracy. Therefore the formation of a predominantly Akhbari state, as I argued in Arab trilogy 3, will not fall prey to an Islamic theocracy.
Within Blogosphere, confident assertions are made that the chain reaction effect of a post-Saddam Iraq will permeate other Middle Eastern societies deeply. Commonly adhered to, is the fallacious idea that Iran will undergo fundamental ramifications and a “counter revolution” within the next few years. Such forecasts are indicative of an inherent lack of familiarity amongst webloggers of the Middle East and Islamic civilization in particular.
The Iranian case study is perhaps the must constructive insight into the very nature of Islam. Iran of 1979 and present mirrors that of France during 1789. The notion that Iranian student, who operate under an exceptionally hierarchical society******** , will one day rise to depose their clergy from the position of power is wishful thinking to say the least. Tehrani students are a microcosm of Iranian society and their sentiments are primarily fuelled by the depressed economic situation in Iran. The surfeit of graduate students flooding the Iranian job markets is the present cause of the unrest and it is the failure of the theocratic regime to liberalise the economy. Nevertheless Iran has been opening its economy and consequently made a marked effort to defuse the underlying tensions.
The Iranian theocracy is not so much Islamic as it is the quintessential expression of the Iranian people. Before Islam, during the Sassanid era, Iran was a Zoroastrian theocracy and Shi’ite Islam has incorporated Persian elements that lends to the emergence of a hierarchical clergy. Iran is the only fundamentalist Islamic nation primarily because fanaticism runs deep in the Iranian character. A successful Islamic movement plagues Tajikistan, a Persian-speaking nation, whilst the Iranian speaking Pathans & Baluchis form the Islamic fringe element of Pakistan. Afghanistan, which is another Persian-speaking nation, is just recovering from an imposed theocracy.
I have extensive familial connections to Iran; indeed before her ascent to a Pakistani nationality my very own mother was an Iranian, and am deeply aware of its cultural intricacies. My interactions with Iranians********* over the years have further strengthened my belief in the aforementioned theory.
Nevertheless Iran is a unique nation for it has a viable theocracy. I believe this theocracy will not fall rather the path to reform will ensure that down the line Iran will evolve into a nation that will manage to incorporate its unique Shi’ite Islamic culture and modernity. Furthering my earlier analogy of 1979 Iran to 1789 France one must not forget that France is on its Fifth Republic. Despite the Napoleonic and imperial interim the roots of the Republican spirit held firm in France and thus the Islamic impulse will deepen in Iran. The Iranian theocracy is not on its last leg and though it has mind fundamental miscalculations I find it *worthy of redemption**********. There is a healthy spirit of checks and balance within the theocracy and Khatami is continuing the path of political reforms. Iranians do not want to see the cessation of a theocracy rather the moderation of the hardliner elements. Strategic policy predicated on the replacement of the theocracy is wholly redundant.
posted by MACHIAVELLIAN AFFLATUS at 6:13 AM
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