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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Geoff Altman who wrote (205731)10/13/2006 1:08:29 PM
From: Sun Tzu  Respond to of 281500
 

Debunk the myth of Al Qaeda
- Its size and reach have been blown out of proportion



By Kimberly A. McCloud and Adam Dolnik

MONTEREY, CALIF. – News reports indicate that Al Qaeda, ousted from its camps in Afghanistan, is now on the loose, spreading terror around the world.

Several recent attacks have been claimed by or attributed to the terrorist network, including an assault on a Jewish synagogue in Tunisia, multiple explosions in Yemen last month (including one at the US Embassy compound), attacks in the Philippines, and a fire in the Milan metro.

But is Al Qaeda really behind all these attacks? Analysts cite differences in modus operandi compared with alleged past attacks, as well as more probable perpetrators in those recent incidents. Still, Al Qaeda is likely to be the top suspect in future incidents. Victims, including states, may even blame Al Qaeda for political reasons, namely to gain US sympathy and support.

Would-be terrorists the world over may be inspired to perpetrate attacks, seeking to feel they are part of what they perceive as a large, powerful terrorist movement. The public perception that Al Qaeda is running wild is likely to increase fear, especially among Americans.

Such concern, when translated into a heightened vigilance about one's surroundings – particularly in light of this week's warnings about future attacks in the US – may not be a completely bad thing. But unchecked public fear, taken to an extreme, could immobilize citizens, jeopardize civil liberties, and lead America into too many fights abroad.

The United States and its allies in the war on terrorism must defuse the widespread image of Al Qaeda as a ubiquitous, super-organized terror network and call it as it is: a loose collection of groups and individuals that doesn't even refer to itself as "Al Qaeda." Most of the affiliated groups have distinct goals within their own countries or regions, and pose little direct threat to the United States. Washington must also be careful not to imply that any attack anywhere is by definition, or likely, the work of Al Qaeda.

This phenomenon of "exaggerated enemy" is not new.

In 1983, three spectacular suicide bombings in Beirut were claimed by the previously unknown "Islamic Jihad." Numerous subsequent attacks were attributed to the group. And while the intelligence community concluded that "Islamic Jihad" was a nom de guerre for the Lebanese Hizbullah, it was clear that many of the subsequent attacks were unrelated to the militant Shiia organization.

Still, the campaign succeeded in creating the image of an invincible force, and "Islamic Jihad" became a symbol to follow – much as Al Qaeda is today.

The US must be careful about its use of the term "Al Qaeda." Meaning "the base" in Arabic, it originally referred to an Afghan operational base for the mujahideen during the Soviet occupation in the '80s.

In the current context of Osama bin Laden's terror network, this name was imposed externally by Western officials and media sources. Mr. bin Laden has, in fact, never mentioned "Al Qaeda" publicly.

In the quest to define the enemy, the US and its allies have helped to blow it out of proportion. Posters and matchbooks featuring bin Laden's face and the reward for his capture in a dozen languages transformed this little-known "jihadist" into a household name and, in some places, a symbol of heroic defiance.

By committing itself to eradicating terrorism, the Bush administration has put itself in a difficult position, especially if "Al Qaeda" begins popping up all over the map. While the US government must be diligent in protecting its citizens, it cannot try to extinguish every terrorist flame that appears without further encouraging the phenomenon as well as exhausting its resources. America must choose its battles wisely.

Resisting immediate attribution of attacks to Al Qaeda is the first step in defusing the enemy. While the Bush administration has not necessarily been blaming all post-9/11 attacks on Al Qaeda, it has passively allowed others to claim themselves as Al Qaeda or to blame it.

By allowing Al Qaeda to become the top brand name of international terrorism, Washington has packaged the "enemy" into something with a structure, a leader, and a main area of operation.

An invisible, amorphous enemy may be even more frightening. But we must be honest with the facts in order to construct a viable long-term strategy to combat terrorism.

csmonitor.com



To: Geoff Altman who wrote (205731)10/13/2006 1:17:13 PM
From: Sun Tzu  Respond to of 281500
 
What exactly does al-Qaeda want?

As Islamist attackers threaten further carnage in Europe, terrorism expert Jason Burke looks at what motives unite the disparate militant groups

Sunday March 21, 2004
The Observer

As the shock of the Madrid bombings turns to a more profound sense of insecurity, one question is repeatedly asked of the militants behind the wave of terror: what do they want?

Modern Islamic militancy is varied and complex. Al-Qaeda is as much an ideology or a set of values as a single organisation led by a single leader. The values and ideas, the 'wants', of militants are very varied.

Recent Islamic militants have shown many different motivations. Ramzi Yousef, who tried to destroy the World Trade Centre in 1993, was driven more by a lust for notoriety than religious fervour. He did not pray and flirted with female lawyers while on trial. Mohammed Atta, the leader of the 11 September hijackers, acted because he felt, with absolute certainty, that he had no option but to wage a jihad (holy war). He was obliged to fulfil his religious duty. One of the men who organised the bombing of a night club in Bali in October 2002 said he had been disgusted by the 'dirty adulterous behaviour' of the 'whites' there. Another said he was angered by the war in Afghanistan.

No two bombings are the same, either. The Madrid bombers chose not to kill themselves, unlike previous militants more closely linked to the 'al-Qaeda hardcore' who see the deaths of bombers as an integral part of the message. Instead the Madrid attacks appear to be aimed at the practical, short-term objective of securing the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq.

Recent strikes by Islamic militants in Iraq, whether by suicide bombers or not, are different again. Though their aim is short-term tactical gain - impeding the formation of an Iraqi police force, for example - they also make a statement about the vulnerability of the West and America's inability to protect its allies while at the same time demonstrating the faith of the bombers themselves. The latter is important both to frighten 'unbelievers' and to shame those Muslims who live their lives by values far removed from those of the fanatics into greater religious observance.

However, despite this variety, there are certain universal themes. To understand them we have to redraft our question. 'What do they want?' implies a Western concept of acting to achieve specific goals. Instead we should be asking: 'Why do they feel that they have to act in the way that they do?' The answer is that, from their twisted standpoint, they believe they have no choice.

In every militant statement you can see a mix of the general and the specific. Imam Samudra, the Bali bomber referred to above, saw the night clubs of Bali as part of a general cultural assault mounted by the West against the Islamic world. This is typical.

In Kashmir, locals speak of their repression as part of a global campaign against Muslims. In Chechnya, the war with Russia is seen as a manifestation of the same push to eliminate Islam.

Last week a previously unknown group threatened violence in France and listed the banning of the veil from schools alongside continuing American support for Israel, the war in Iraq and the killing of civilians in Afghanistan as evidence that the West never abandoned the Crusades.

This perception that a belligerent West is set on the humiliation, division and eventual conquest of the Islamic world is at the root of Muslim violence. The militants believe they are fighting a last-ditch battle for the survival of their society, culture, religion and way of life. They are fighting in self-defence and understand, as we in the West also believe, that self-defence can justify using tactics that might be frowned on in other circumstances.

In addition, an explanation for the parlous state of the Middle East must be found. If Islam is the perfect social system, the militants' logic runs, then something else must be to blame for the second-rate status, economically, militarily, politically, of their lands. They blame the West - and the failure of most Muslims to practise their religion with sufficient discipline and devotion. The bombs are designed to restore the pride of Muslims worldwide and, by weakening the 'Crusaders' and their allies, hasten the eventual return to the golden age of a thousand years ago when the lands of Islam were the world's leading power.

The cosmic scale of the militants' aims make them very difficult to counter. But somehow we must halt the spread of their worldview, deny them political oxygen and strip away the legitimacy that allows them to operate. There is no silver bullet.

But there are things that can be done. Peace in Israel-Palestine, for example, might not end Islamic terrorism immediately but it would deny them a key piece of 'evidence'. So would forcing reform on the Saudi Arabian regime and other repressive governments.

The most powerful weapon in countering the radicals' violence is the goodwill and moderation of 95 per cent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. We must fight to keep it, and to use it, if we are, one day, to be free of fear and violence.

· Jason Burke is the author of Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (IB Tauris, £13.60)



To: Geoff Altman who wrote (205731)10/13/2006 1:18:13 PM
From: bentway  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
"t's called al-qaida."

When the chimp Nero took office, that organization consisted of about 2-3k individuals. Today, it's reportedly at 20k+ and growing! That's REAL PROGRESS!

I'm always forgetting it's INTENT and not RESULTS that count for you clowns. You must be terrible investors.