To: Jim S who wrote (13730 ) 10/28/2006 9:18:03 PM From: Peter Dierks Respond to of 71588 Maliki and the GI A kidnapped American is a test for Iraq's Prime Minister. Friday, October 27, 2006 12:01 a.m. EDT One of the toughest jobs confronting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is disarming the Shiite militias. The kidnapping Monday in Baghdad of an American soldier by vigilantes claiming to be from the so-called Mahdi Army underscores the urgency of the problem, and Mr. Maliki's response has been inadequate at best. Not only has he criticized American and Iraqi operations in Sadr City aimed at freeing the captive, he also appeared to accept at face value yesterday the Sadrists' denial that they are holding an American. "We asked the Sadr movement to look for him and they swear they know nothing about him," Mr. Maliki told Reuters in an interview, adding that Sunni insurgents sometimes pose as Mahdi fighters. But a well-placed source tells us it's becoming clearer that the American was in fact kidnapped by Shiite vigilantes and may have been moved from Sadr City in Baghdad to an area south of the capital. Mr. Maliki also got the details of the kidnapping wrong--the soldier (who is of Iraqi descent) was not with his brother, as the Prime Minister told Reuters--suggesting he has not been very engaged on the issue. Mr. Maliki obviously has concerns about confronting the Sadrists, who hold about 30 seats in parliament and backed his bid for the premiership (as did the Bush Administration). But he also needs to understand that this incident could prove a turning point in his relationship with the American forces who protect his government. Those troops need to see him exerting maximum effort behind the scenes to free their comrade. A public appeal for the American soldier's release is the least Mr. Maliki could do. On the broader issue of what to do about Mahdi Army violence in general, there's no easy answer. Moqtada al-Sadr could and should have been arrested several years ago when a warrant was issued in connection with the murder of moderate cleric Abdul Majid al-Khoei after the U.S. invasion in spring of 2003. But at this point it may be smarter to go after the worst of the Mahdi troublemakers in smaller operations, as U.S. and Iraqi forces are now doing, and hope that their nominal leader's political influence will wane. Mr. Maliki also says he is working with Mr. Sadr on a political solution to the problem, and he deserves a chance to try. But if Sadrist forces ask him to choose between them and his obligations to a unified Iraq worthy of U.S. support--as the Sadrists appear to have done with this kidnapping--he should know there will be consequences for picking the wrong side. Mr. Maliki's moves here will affect his relationship with Iraq's Sunni community as well. One key to striking a political compromise across religious communities is convincing Sunnis that Shiite death squads won't be tolerated by the government. If Sunnis see him unwilling to confront the Sadrists on behalf of the Americans to whom he indirectly owes his job, what reason do they have to believe he will act against militia violence on their behalf? opinionjournal.com