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To: slacker711 who wrote (4350)11/6/2006 4:42:22 PM
From: Eric L  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 9255
 
M:Metrics 3G UMTS Market Share Estimates ...

... in 4 of the 5 key Western European markets.

Unfortunately Italy is not included in the consolidated market share estimate and Italy probably leads the other 4 in 3G sales.

Slacker,

I'm repeating this article you posted elsewhere. The share in the chart graphic is hard to read (especially Nokia's) even when the image is enlarged, so after enlarging I calculated Nokia share.

>> Competition, Consolidation and Consequences In The Global Handset Market

Analyst Angle
John Jackson of M:Metrics
RCR News
Nov 6, 2006

rcrnews.com

Nokia, Motorola, Sony Ericsson, Samsung, and LG commanded between 80-85 percent of global unit volume sell-in over the last three quarters—a figure that continues to increase. The gap between market share “haves” and “have-nots” is even greater in UMTS (see chart and table below).



OEM Share of Monthly 3G Purchases in (4) Key European Markets¹

                  June      July      August
==== ==== ======
Nokia 54% 46% 46%
Sony Ericsson 8% 19% 24%
Motorola 10% 9% 10%
Samsung 11% 15% 9%
LG 11% 4% 4%
Other 6% 7% 7%
·
¹ Spain, UK, Germany, France

Merriam Webster’s defines an oligopoly as “a market situation in which each of a few producers affects but does not control the market.” I’m no economist, but it’s tempting to characterize the global handset market thusly. However, all manufacturers remain under intense margin pressure. None has true control of the channel and retail pricing, or even product specifications in key markets. R&D investment runs on average less than 10 percent of revenues. The market/channel development burden is an estimated 6-7 percent of revenues. For all this, at a billion units per year, there remains plenty of room for new entrants.

Supplier consolidation is logical as markets mature. But what’s the ripple effect? There are winners, losers, and endgame implications for upstream technology markets, sub scale competitors and content and services channels. Let’s have a look at the tea leaves and draw conclusions about the next 24 months.

Tier-2 Shakeout a Fait Accompli:

The most conspicuous victims of global competition have been the tier-two manufacturers. BenQSiemens is the latest and perhaps most public vendor to exit Western European GSM/WCDMA markets. French aerospace and defense giant Groupe Safran is actively evaluating options to unload loss-making Sagem.

Most of the Japanese vendors including NEC, Fujitsu, Toshiba, Sharp, Mitsubishi, Sanyo, and Panasonic who developed a global GSM presence, have quietly retreated to home markets. Several are experimenting with various partnerships or alternative business structures. None has scaled, and all are loss-making. Many, such as NEC, make extensive use of ODMs and EMSs, who will also feel the pinch.

None of the incumbent tier-twos mentioned here are positioned to retrench or take share in major GSM/WCDMA markets in the next 12-18 months. Thereafter, the window of opportunity will be closed.

Emerging Markets, Local Brands, (more) Operator Brands, and Cheap 3G:

But hope is not lost for aspiring market participants. New, sub-scale, or non-traditional vendors are showing up almost weekly in both emerging and 3G markets. Examples include local brands such as Gradiente (Brazil), Usha (India), and Grundig (Western Europe). Beyond the modest volume of Taiwanese-manufactured Windows Mobile units, operator-centric examples range from captive supplier arrangements as in the case with Vitelcom/Telefonica, and a persistent stream of on-offs.

The latter include 3G models like the O2 Ice (Pantech), the H3G “Ministry of Sound” (Amoi), and the Onda 5000 (Amoi), and Virgin’s 2.5G “Lobster” series (Innostream/Emblaze, HTC). At best, these are beachhead strategies for manufacturers and point-solution experiments for operators. They are not a threat to incumbents.

An exception is the recently expanded sourcing relationship between Vodafone and Huawei for midrange 3G handsets. In this instance, Vodafone essentially specifies the handset around hero services such as Radio DJ. This is a direct threat to tier-one vendors—particularly those in favorable 3G IPR positions such as Nokia and Sony Ericsson who now dominate 3G volumes with a heavy bias toward higher-end, higher margin models. Nokia’s N-Series and Sony Ericsson’s Walkman and Cybershot initiatives will presumably serve as vehicles for content distribution initiatives (Loudeye and M-Buzz respectively).

Operators are loath to subsidize what they perceive to be expensive R&D, branding, and marketing costs of OEMs that are not aligned with their long term interests.

In Huawei, Vodafone has found a flexible supplier with neither a brand nor content agenda or associated overhead. Vodafone and Qualcomm (at the chipset level) subsume much of the R&D burden associated with specification and technical integration. The extent to which Huawei will be cost-impaired by 3G IPR exposure remains unclear, but for now, they’re well positioned to be the People’s 3G ODM. To be sure, it’s a model not lost on Amoi, Pantech, ZTE, and others.

The ODM/EMS model or new sub-scale manufacturers are increasingly able to use mature, stable silicon/software reference designs to enter the market with niche offerings in a profitable manner. This appears to be true in 3G (Qualcomm, TI, Ericsson Mobile Platforms), as well as in low-cost markets where the 2.5G incumbents are intently focused.

Ultimately, however, advantage stays with OEMs with enough scale and money to compete globally. This means branding initiatives, channel development, IPR assets, and the ability to associate handsets with burgeoning content-centric revenue streams. Barriers to entry for competitors are low. But the barriers to developing effective, scalable distribution will remain a challenge for sub-scale vendors.

New manufacturing models and advanced board-level hardware/software integration should enable profitable sub-scale niche competition. But the global oligopolistic market structure will ossify. This will hasten consolidation among numerous application-framework and UI vendors as well as 2.5G chipset suppliers who don’t find expansion opportunities in low cost markets. ###

Best,

- Eric -



To: slacker711 who wrote (4350)11/7/2006 3:12:07 PM
From: Eric L  Respond to of 9255
 
Sony Ericsson Acquiring Symbian's UIQ



Sony Ericsson is to purchase UIQ Technology from Symbian. UIQ Technology is currently a wholly owned subsidiary of Symbian. UIQ Technology will continue to operate under its current management as a seperate business subsidiary of Sony Ericsson. This reverses the purchase on the Ericsson Mobile Application lab by Symbian in 1999. More on this throughout the day. For now, the full press release follows. - Rafe Blandford, AAS -

The UIQ website here ...

uiq.com

>> Sony Ericsson to acquire UIQ Technology AB

Press Release
London, UK
November 7, 2006

uiq.com

Sony Ericsson today announced it has reached agreement in principle for acquiring the Swedish software company UIQ Technology AB, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Symbian Ltd.

UIQ Technology, which uses Symbian OS™, licenses the UIQ user interface and application development platform to mobile phone vendors worldwide.

Sony Ericsson is already a licensee of UIQ Technology, and has been working closely with the company on UIQ version 3.0, which is included in Sony Ericsson's P990 smartphone, M600 messaging phone and W950 Walkman® phone.

"UIQ offers excellent technical flexibility enabling us to provide compelling features such as push email, internet browsing, end user personalization, and enhanced music applications" explains Mats Lindoff, Chief Technology Officer at Sony Ericsson. "By acquiring UIQ Technology we will further invest and exploit the full potential of UIQ on Symbian OS for phone vendors, mobile operators, developers and consumers."

Following completion of the acquisition, UIQ Technology will operate as a separate business subsidiary of Sony Ericsson under its current management team. UIQ on Symbian OS will continue to be openly available, licensed on equal terms to all its licensees.

"We welcome this decision by Sony Ericsson to purchase UIQ Technology as it will give us the additional investment needed to compete in the rapidly expanding software market for advanced phones," said Johan Sandberg, Chief Executive Officer, UIQ Technology.

"This announcement is a positive development as it will strengthen the capabilities and services available for phones based on UIQ and Symbian OS whilst allowing us to focus on the core product development of Symbian OS for the mass market. We look forward to continuing to work closely with Sony Ericsson and UIQ on future phone projects," said Nigel Clifford, Chief Executive Officer, Symbian.

Sony Ericsson expects the transaction to be completed over the next few months, pending regulatory approval and customary closing conditions. ###

>> The Story Behind Sony Ericsson and UIQ Technology

Rafe Blandford
All About Symbian
November 7th

tinyurl.com

Rafe looks at the implications on the acquisition of UIQ Technology by Sony Ericsson and tells the early story of Symbian and the Ronneby Lab.

Editorial Analysis

Clearly important to Sony Ericsson's decision to acquire UIQ Technology is that they have chosen UIQ on Symbian OS as the platform for many of their future phones. Rumours have suggested it was a fight between Symbian and Linux. However with the acquisition of UIQ Technology, Sony Ericsson has made a clear choice. Up until now UIQ has only been found in its high end P series phones. The announcement of the M600 and the W950 gave the first hint that this was changing and Sony Ericsson talked in a very positive way about UIQ at the recent Symbian Smartphone Show (and even more so at the AAS pub meet the night before). It seems likely that Sony Ericsson's future strategy will see it follow a path similar to that of Nokia and S60. In the coming years we can probably expect to see a portfolio of Sony Ericsson UIQ devices, including the non touchscreen, one handed devices made possible by UIQ 3.

From a business and strategic point of view bringing UIQ Technology back in house makes sense. Sony Ericsson will have a greater say in the direction of the UIQ platform. It should also save itself licensing costs. This is thought to be around $2-4 per unit, and although current UIQ phone volume is not significant by S60 standards this could change rapidly. It is easy to see that 2008 might see volumes of 10's of millions.

The acquisition does raise questions about licensing UIQ to other manufacturers. Sony Ericsson will continue to allow this, but given Nokia's relative lack of success (at least compared to its own volumes) in licensing S60 it is not clear how successful this will be. Other manufacturers are understandably wary of licensing software from a competitor. However, with both Samsung and LG are set to continue their portfolio of S60 devices and suggestions of Motorola's continuing interest in UIQ, the idea of UI licensing is still very much alive.

For the end consumer, nothing really changes, although fans of UIQ's user interface will be given reassurance that there are likely to be a wide variety of UIQ powered devices available in the future.

Developers too should be pleased on two levels. Firstly, the acquisition signals likely increasing volumes of UIQ phones, creating a bigger potential market to sell to. Developers will also see a more unified message from the Sony Ericsson and UIQ developer programs. UIQ is likely to focus on the core elements of the platform, encouraging applications that work on a wide variety of form factors and interfaces, while Sony Ericsson will concentrate on the value that it adds to the platform with individual devices and device families.

For Symbian, the divesting of UIQ Technology has a certain amount of inevitability about it. It may be that giving up control of UIQ was the carrot needed to keep Sony Ericsson within the Symbian family. However it also allows Symbian to focus on its core value. The politics of owning one of the Symbian OS UIs will be lessened, though politics are likely to continue to be a part of the Symbian Board decision making process. Symbian will have to work hard to prove they provide value for money for their licensees.

The Symbian ownership issue will need to be confronted in the near future. It does not make sense for non-active shareholders Panasonic and BenQ/Siemens to continue to own a portion of Symbian. Both Nokia and Sony Ericsson may wish to increase their holdings. This would put Nokia over the psychologically important 50% barrier (although it has little meaning, Symbian governance rules means 70% is required to approve proposals) so it may be that Nokia and Sony Ericsson look for an alternative shareholder. DoCoMo is an obvious candidate, but has not shown much inclination in this direction.

The story of UIQ, (Sony) Ericsson and Symbian



Above: The Ericsson R380 - the first Symbian smartphone.

UIQ Technology is currently a wholly owned subsidiary of Symbian. However, UIQ Technology was formerly Ericsson Mobile Application Lab, which was acquired by Symbian early in its life. Thus the acquisition of UIQ Technology by Sony Ericsson which was announced today completes a chapter in the Symbian story. Today it is mostly of academic interest, but it does explain a lot of things about Symbian and points the way to future for everyone in the Symbian ecosystem. Read on for the story of myths and legends that starts back in the previous century ...

When Symbian was founded it was envisioned that it would provide a full software suite from kernel and device drivers to the user interface. The founding members, after being approached by Psion, decided to work together to create the Symbian OS. The core of the OS was to come out of Psion's next generation OS project which was already well advanced. Psion, before the formal announcement of Symbian, had developed as many as 6 ideas for reference designs with different user interfaces (this was before the idea of a single user interface for multiple device configurations became prevalent). However it is likely that these ideas were less well advanced than the OS itself.

These early reference designs were later to emerge as Pearl (Smartphone, later S60), Quartz (Palm PDA, later UIQ) and Crystal (Clamshell PDA, later Series 80), but only after mingling with the ideas and resources of the other Symbian founders. The other founders also had skills and resources to contribute to the Symbian project because, like Psion, they had also been working on their next generation strategies.

Nokia had invested in the GEOS powered Communicator line of devices and effectively ported the Series 80 UI to Symbian from GEOS. Incidentally this left Psion's much loved Psion 5-era EIKON UI out in the cold. Nokia had also started a project to develop a software platform outside of the niche Communicator line market. This would later go to become Series 60 and later S60. It was around the time of the founding of Symbian that Nokia carefully looked at the options available to it, this included both Linux and Palm OS, before choosing to go the Symbian route. What Nokia wanted fitted in with the Pearl device reference design, but this was the least developed of all the original UIs, possibly because it was the furthest outside Psion's prior experience.

Meanwhile Ericsson had its Mobile Application Lab based in Ronneby, which it had set up in 1997 to look at next generation software for its phones. The lab was operating as a subsidiary of Ericsson Mobile Communications and so it was relatively easy to hive off and present to Symbian as Ericsson's contribution to research and development excellence. The agreement for Symbian to acquire the lab was announced in January 1999 when Symbian itself was only 6 months old.

The obvious difference here, of course, is that while Ericsson Ronneby lab was moved from Ericsson to Symbian the same as not true for Nokia's research and development efforts. However Symbian was still planning to make available a number of UIs on top of Symbian OS, of which the Ronneby lab would provide at least one.

We move forward a few years to 2001 and it is increasingly becoming apparent that developing a software platform is more resource and cost intensive than was first anticipated. While the R380 had made it on the market (marrying the Ronneby labs efforts to Psion5-era Epoc Release 5) other devices were conspicuous by their absence. Nokia meanwhile had taken Epoc Release 6 (Symbian OS 6) and ported its communicator UI to it; it was also well on the way to announcing its iconic Nokia 7650 which ran Series 60. Later Nokia was to announce its software strategy, whereby it would license Series 60 to other interested manufacturers.

At this point it was clear that Symbian's aim to produce the full software value chain was not going to be possible. Whether this was because it simply did not have sufficient resources or because Nokia was playing hard ball is more open to debate.

The UI problem was arguably Symbian's first major strategic setback. As a result Symbian aims became more focus on developing the core OS. It was clear that Nokia, at least, preferred to get the base from Symbian but build their own UI on top. Other Symbian licensees were also said to be in favour of this. It seemed that co-operating on a base level OS was collaboration enough for some.

Ericsson meanwhile had its own set of a problem. A fire in a Phillips chipset factory added to existing financial problems and as a consequence Ericsson decided to divest its mobile phone business. This led to a joint venture with Sony, who had their own technical problems, which resulted in the birth of Sony Ericsson. Ericsson and its former lab had not being standing still, a Quartz based device, code named Pamela, was under development, but had suffered from repeated delays.

Quartz largely came out of the Ronneby labs and was also to be used in a Sanyo pad-like device, Ericssom Pamela communicator and the infamous Psion/Motorola Odin project. Unfortunately for Quartz, none of these projects made it to the public market place. Subsequently Quartz underwent something of an evolution in its second version, becoming UIQ 2, which used a narrower screen size so as to be suitable for more phone-like devices such as the Sony Ericsson P800 - this was considered the ultimate smartphone at the time, and was well on the way. The first version was almost entirely an Ericsson effort; only in later P-series variants would the influence of Sony became more apparent.

2001 was a bumper year for Symbian happenings. It was also at this time that the joint venture between Palm and Nokia ran out of steam, possibly as a result of Nokia Series 60 licensing strategy. It was rumoured that this would have seen the Palm OS UI running on Symbian OS. In the long run that failure was probably the saddest failure of all as it doomed Palm to a messy software/hardware split and subsequently the software crisis it now faces. I wonder if Nokia realised that ending the joint venture would ultimately result in Microsoft-powered Palm devices.

In 2002 a clearer picture, which is still largely recognisable, emerged. Sony Ericsson formally announced the P800 and a clear commitment to UIQ and Motorola announced it too would be licensing UIQ. Nokia continued along the Series 60 path. Nokia scored early wins in licensing the Series 60 model with agreements with Samsung, Siemens and Matsushita. At this time DoCoMo was looking to build a software platform strategy for its phones. With Symbian powered FOMA phones already available Symbian and DoCoMo signed an agreement to work together in 2003 and this subsequently led to DoCoMo choosing MOAP-S (Symbian MOAP) as one of its two software platforms. The interesting thing was the majority of the investment for this came from DoCoMo and Fujitsu and amounted to several hundred million over the subsequent years.

In that light, the inclusion of UIQ within Symbian was somewhat different to the other UIs. It did allow Symbian to argue that it was doing more than just producing an OS. In the early 2000’s that was important as the value of the OS had yet to be fully realised. It is only now when the issues facing some of its competitors, such as Linux, Windows Mobile and Palm OS, have became apparent that the value of the Symbian OS is being partially recognised. The absolute value around this is still to be determined and it is an issue that will face Symbian in the coming years, especially as it has now divested itself of the last remnant of its complete software strategy.

If we move forward to 2006, we see a resurgent Sony Ericsson and a revitalised UIQ. In the four years since UIQ 2 phones started shipping, UIQ Technology has not been idle. UIQ 3, as used in the P990, W950 and M600, has been developed. It is unique in that it offers support for multiple input types and form factor regimes from a single code base. This is something that both Nokia with S60, and Microsoft with Windows Mobile, are planning to do, although both projects have taken longer than anticipated. UIQ 3 is therefore one of the most technically advanced UIs available. The design decisions such as a modular open framework and support for a high degree of customisation potentially makes it attractive to manufacturers and operators. It is much better placed to live in a single software platform based device portfolio world than its previous version.

Ever since Ericsson and the Ronneby lab parted company, there has been speculation that the decision would be reversed. But it is only recently with its successful use of Sony brands, especially in its Walkman phones, that the shine of success has returned to Sony Ericsson. Perhaps only now it has the resources and will to bring Ronneby, now UIQ technology, back in to the fold. ###

- Eric -



To: slacker711 who wrote (4350)11/7/2006 4:02:25 PM
From: Eric L  Respond to of 9255
 
Bubley Bubbles on Vodafone's OS and Platform Strategy

<< A nice win for Series 60, but no Series 40 at Vodafone? This would also limit Treo and RIMM.... >>

Bubley shares your thoughts. <ggg>

>> Vodfone's OS Strategy: Impact To Handset Makers

Dean Bubley
November 7th, 2006

wireless.seekingalpha.com

Vodafone (VOD) announced Monday morning that it's cut a deal with Microsoft (MSFT) on handset software. Leaving aside the fact that the company still uses the appallingly anachronistic word "terminal" in its PR headline, this is actually a pretty interesting strategy.

The Windows Mobile deal is part of a Voda's three-platform appoach to future devices, also embracing Symbian/S60 and - interestingly and up-till-now hardly mentioned - Linux. This makes Vodafone look similar to NTT DoCoMo's approach to handsets, which is based on its own flavour of Symbian OS, plus Linux and recently also Windows Mobile.

The press release has an interesting paragraph:

"Over the next five years, Vodafone expects to focus on supporting three standard terminal platforms across its portfolio of mobile phones: Microsoft Windows Mobile, Symbian/S60 and Linux. The first device to use the software produced under the agreement is planned to be with Samsung and is expected to launch in the first half of 2007."

The first thing to note is the realistic 5-year view, which clearly shows awareness of the need for Moore's Law to catch up and bring up low-end devices towards the level needed to host a proper OS. The second thing is the qualifiers "expect" and "focus"... ie a get-out clause which enables Voda to add additional platforms as well if things change. The third thing is which "Linux"? (or is it actually several variants?)

And the fourth thing is to try and map how any of this fits to the major device vendors, and how this could fit around their own software roadmaps.

Nokia (NOK) - OK, no surprises with S60 for high-end devices, but what happens to S40, its massmarket platform? Does it (a) disappear as S60 and Symbian moves downmarket? or (b) maybe it turns into a layer on top of a Linux OS like the 770 Internet tablet? or it it (c) Nokia ignores this & persuades Voda it needs special dispensation as it's market leader?

Motorola (MOT) - over a 5-year period, most of its high/mid devices should migrate to its inhouse Linux platform. May still have some low-end embedded ones, though, and if it continues to create "must have" phones like the RAZR, then again Voda might need to be flexible. Plus there's probably going to be a few MS-powered phones for enterprise, especially since the Symbol acquisition.

Samsung - seems to still be promiscuous, supporting Linux, Symbian and Microsoft. Still lots of inhouse embedded OS use, though....

SonyEricsson (ERICY) - Hmm, this is a tricky one given how popular some of its recent phones have been. It's going to be narked at having to change its embedded (and very good) featurephone platform, and also possibly ditch its UIQ smartphone platform. I wonder if S-E is also going to have a good reason to be on Voda's "exception" list.... although maybe it's got a Linux card up its sleeve ....

HTC - no problem, clearly.

LG - again, like Samsung, pretty promiscous with OS's so should be able to fit into Voda's vision

Research in Motion (RIMM) -- oh dear.

The other interesting question is what sits on the top of all these OS's. Will it be a proprietary Vodafone IMS+other stuff client? Will it be a third-party layer like Flash? Or will it vary between targeted customer segments?

And lastly.... I wonder if all this means Java's days are numbered?

Dean Bubley is the Founder of Disruptive Analysis, an independent technology industry analyst and consulting firm. An analyst with over 14 years’ experience, he primarily specialises in wireless, networking, and telecoms fields. His present focus is on wireless technology, especially the evolution of mobile device architecture & software, fixed-mobile convergence, shifts in service provider value chains, enterprise mobility, in-building technologies, wireless broadband, and the integration of cellular and WLAN. He was formerly an equity analyst, covering communications and software stocks with Granville Baird, the UK arm of US-based investment bank Robert W. Baird. Prior to that, he had spent eight years at UK research firm Datamonitor, where he co-founded the company's Technology business unit, directly managed the Internet & Networking competency area and custom consulting operations, and held the titles of Chief Analyst and Director of Consulting. Mr Bubley has extensive experience in both published analytical research and bespoke consultancy, and has regularly spoken at industry conferences and events. He holds a BA in Physics from Keble College, Oxford University. ###

>> Sony Ericsson and UIQ

Dean Bubley
November 07, 2006

disruptivewireless.blogspot.com

Interesting. S-E has today announced that it's acquiring the UIQ interface business from Symbian. I guess in hindsight this really isn't any big surprise - apart from S-E, nobody else really makes UIQ phones in any meaningful volume any more (I think there's still a Moto phone in production, and maybe an ODM one). I can't imagine Symbian's other shareholders can have been too chuffed at effectively subsidising S-E's software development.

More interesting is what S-E will do with UIQ in future. It is unclear to me whether this signals a push to drive Symbian further down its product range - perhaps as a better way to do operator customisation & multitasking, or as a platform for IMS services. Given S-E's recent good form with handsets like its K800i, it must be in two minds - not messing about with an existing high-end featurephone platform that works fine, vs. having to continue to evolve this for the uncertain applications of the future.

If S-E does use UIQ in a greater range of devices, and it also carries on creating must-have phones, I reckon that Vodafone may already be rethinking yesterday's software platform announcement and contemplating adding a fourth OS to its short-list .... ###

- Eric -